PERIODS    OF   EUROPEAN    HISTORY 

PERIOD   v.,    1598-1715 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW    YORK    •    BOSTON    •    CHICAGO    •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA    •    SAN    FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,   Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
OF  CANADA,   Limited 


EUROPE 

1598-1715 


BY 

HENRY   OFFLEY   WAKEMAN,    M.A< 

FELLOW   OF   ALL   SOULS'    COLLEGE 

TUTOR   OF    KEBLE   COLLEGE,    OXFORD 

AUTHOR   OF    "  THE   CHURCH    AND   THE   PURITANS,"    ETC. 


PERIOD    V 


NeJd  gorfe 
THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON  :  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1933 


Copyright,  1894, 
By  MACMILLAN  AND   CO. 


All  rights  reserved  —  no  part  of  this  book 
may  be  reproduced  in  any  form  without 
permission  in  writing  from  the  publisher, 
except  by  a  reviewer  who  wishes  to  quote 
brief  passages  in  connection  with  a  review 
written  for  inclusion  in  magazine  or 
newspaper. 


'  PRINTED  IN  THE   UNITED   STATES   OF   AMERICA  ' 


d^  CO 'TOO 


PREFACE 


oo       I  HAVE  not  attempted  in  the  following  pages  to  write 
S  the  history  of   Europe  in  the   seventeenth  century  in 
*"  detail.     The  chronicle  of  events  can  be  found  without 
CO  difficulty  in  many  other  works.     I    have  therefore  en- 
g]  deavoured  as  far  as  possible  to  fix  attention  upon  those 
^  events  only,  which  had  permanent  results,   and   upon 
those  persons  only  whose  life  and  character  profoundly 
influenced  those  results.      Other  events  and  other  per- 
sons I  have  merely  referred  to  in  passing,  or  left  out  of 
account  altogether,  such  as  for  instance  the  history  of 
Portugal  and  the  Papacy,  the  internal  affairs  of  Spain, 
Qc  Italy,  and  Russia.     Following  out  this  line  of  thought 
I  have  naturally  found  in  the  development  of  France 
J  the  central  fact  of  the  period  which  gives  unity  to  the 
•»  whole.     Round  that  development,  and  in  relation  to  it, 
uj  most   of   the   other  nations  of    Europe   fall  into  their 
f  appropriate  positions,  and  play  their  parts  in  the  drama 
of  the  world's  progress.     Such  a  method  of  reading  the 
history  of  a  complicated  period  may,  of  course,  be  open 
to  objection  from  the  point  of  view  of  absolute  histori- 
cal  truth.     The    effort   to    give    unity   to    a  period  of 
history  may  easily   fall   into   the  inaccuracy   of   exag- 
geration.    The  picture  may  become  a  caricature,  or  so 
strong  a  light  may  be  shed  on  one  part  as  to  throw  the 
rest  into  disproportionate  gloom.     It  would  be  presump- 
tuous in  me  to  claim  that  I  have  avoided  such  dangers. 


UJ 


300495 


VI 


Preface 


All  that  I  can  say  is,  that  they  have  been  present  to  my 
mind  continually  as  I  was  writing,  and  that  I  have  been 
emboldened  to  face  them  both  by  the  fact  that  the 
history  of  the  seventeenth  century  lends  itself  in  a  very 
marked  way  to  such  a  treatment,  and  by  the  conviction 
that  it  is  far  more  important  to  the  training  of  the  human 
mind,  and  the  true  interests  of  historical  truth  that  a 
beginner  should  learn  the  place  which  a  period  occupies 
in  the  story  of  the  world  than  have  an  accurate  knowl- 
edge of  the  smaller  details  of  its  history.  To  know  the 
meaning  and  results  of  the  Counter-Reformation  is  some 
education,  to  know  the  oiBcial  and  personal  names  of 
the  Popes  none  at  all. 

With  regard  to  the  spelling  of  names  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  follow  what  I  humbly  conceive  to  be  the  only 
reasonable  and  consistent  rule,  that  of  custom.  It 
seems  to  me  to  be  as  pedantic  to  write  Henri,  Karl,  or 
Friedrich,  as  it  is  admitted  to  be  to  write  Wien  or 
Napoli,  and  inconsistent  on  any  theory  except  that  of 
the  law  of  custom  to  write  anything  else.  But  with 
regard  to  some  names,  custom  permits  more  than  one 
form  of  spelling.  It  is  as  customary  to  write  Trier  as 
Treves,  or  Mainz  as  Mayence.  These  cases  mainly 
arise  with  reference  to  names  of  places  which  are  situ- 
ated on  border  lands,  and  are  spelt  sometimes  according 
to  one  language,  and  sometimes  according  to  another. 
In  these  cases  I  have  followed  the  language  of  the 
nation  which  was  dominant  in  the  period  of  which  I 
treat,  and  accordingly  write  Alsace,  Lorraine,  Basel, 
Koln,  Saluzzo,  etc.  The  use  of  an  historical  atlas  is 
presumed  throughout. 

H.  O.  W. 

All  Souls'  College,  Oxford. 
March,  1894. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PACE 

I.    Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century  i 

II.     France  under  Henry  iv J4 

III.  The  Counter-Reformation  and  religious  troubles  in 

Germany 39 

IV.  The  beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War    ...  53 
V.    The  Thirty  Years'  War  from  the  peace  of  Lubeck  to 

the  peace  of  Prague 78 

VI.    The  aggrandisement  of  France 105 

VII.     France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  ....  132 
VIII.     Northern  Europe  to  the  treaty  of  Oliva   .        .        .165 

IX.     Louis  xiv.  and  Colbert 184 

X.     Louis  xiv.  and  the  United  Provinces    ....  206 

XL     Louis  xiv.  and  William  iii 234 

XII.     South-eastern  Europe 265 

XIII.  The  northern  nations  from  the  treaty  of  Oliva  to 

the  peace  of  Utrecht 289 

XIV.  The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance       .  311 
XV.    The  War  of  the  Spanish   Succession  and  the  death 

of  Louis  xiv. 340 

vii 


viii  Contents 

MAPS 

NO. 

1.  Acquisitions  of  territory  by  France  during  the  period   . 

To  face  page       25 

2.  Germany  according  to  the  peace    of  Westphalia,  showing  the 

march  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  1 630-1 632  .         .       To  face  page     124 

3.  The   countries  of  the   Upper   Rhine   and   Danube,  showing  the    page 

march  of  Turenne,  1675,  .-^nd  of  jMarlborough,  1704  .         .     241 

4.  Northern    Italy,   illustrating    the    campaigns    of   Prince    Eugene, 

1 701-1706 341 

5.  The  Netherlands,  illustrating  the  campaigns  of  Conde,  Turenne, 

and  Marlborough 347 


GENEALOGICAL  TABLES 

1.  The  sovereigns  of  Europe  during  the  century        ....     374 

2.  The  House  of  Bourbon         ........     376 

3.  The  Cleves-Jiilich  succession         .......     378 

4.  The  Spanish  Succession .         -379 

INDEX .,,-..,   .38T 


CHAPTER  I 

EUROPE  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 

Importance  of  the  century  —  France  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  —  The 
States-General,  the  Parlement  de  Paris,  Religious  Toleration  —  Germany 
—  The  Emperor,  the  Imperial  Courts,  the  Diet  —  Disunion  of  Germany  — 
England  —  Spain  —  Italy. 

The  seventeenth  century  is  the  period  when  Europe,  shattered 
in  its  poHtical  and  reHgious  ideas  by  the  Reformation,  recon- 
structed itspoUtical  system  upon  the  principle  of  importance 
territorialism^nder  the  rule  of  absolute  monarchs.   oft^^eSeven- 

/    '  _  ■  teentn  Cen- 

It  opens  with  Henry  iv.,  it  closes  with  Peter  the  tury. 
Great.  It  reaches  its  climax  in  Louis  xiv.  and  the  Great 
Elector.  It  is  therefore  the  century  in  which  the  principal 
European  States  took  the  form,  and  acquired  the  position  in 
Europe,  which  they  have  held  more  or  less  up  to  the  present 
time.  A  century,  in  which  France  takes  the  lead  in  European 
affairs,  and  enters  on  a  course  of  embittered  rivalry  with  Ger- 
many, in  which  England  assumes  a  position  of  first  importance 
in  the  affairs  of  Europe,  in  which  the  Emperor,  ousted  from 
all  effective  control  over  German  politics,  finds  the  true  centre 
of  his  power  on  the  Danube,  in  which  Prussia  becomes  the 
dominant  state  in  north  Germany,  in  which  Russia  begins  to 
drive  in  the  Turkish  outposts  on  the  Pruth  and  the  Euxine  — 
a  century,  in  short,  which  saw  the  birth  of  the  Franco-German 
Question  and  of  the  Eastern  Question  —  cannot  be  said  to  be 
deficient  in  modern  interest.  The  map  of  Europe  at  the  close 
of  the  seventeenth  shows  the  same  great  divisions  as  it  does 

PERIOD    V.  I  A 


2  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  with  the  notable  excep- 
tion of  Italy.  Prussia  and  Russia  have  grown  bigger,  France 
and  Turkey  have  grown  smaller,  the  Empire  has  become  defi- 
nitely Austrian,  but  in  all  its  main  divisions  the  political  map 
of  Europe  is  practically  unchanged.  The  states  which  were 
formed  in  the  general  reconstruction  of  Europe  after  the  reli- 
gious wars  of  the  sixteenth  century  are  the  states  of  which 
modern  Europe  is  now  composed.  Great  nations  are  apt  to 
change  their  forms  of  internal  government  much  more  often 
than  they  do  their  political  boundaries  and  influence ;  but  it  is 
a  remarkable  thing  that,  with  the  great  exception  of  B'rance, 
the  principal  European  states  possess  at  the  present  time  not 
only  a  similar  political  position,  but  a  similar  form  of  govern- 
ment to  that  which  they  possessed  at  the  close  of  the  seven- 
teenth century.  In  spite  of  the  wave  of  revolutionary  principles, 
which  flowed  out  from  France  over  Europe  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  the  principal  states  of  Europe  at  the  present 
time  are  in  all  essentials  absolute  monarchies,  and  these  mon- 
archies are  as  absolute  now  as  they  were  then,  with  the  two 
exceptions  of  Italy,  which  did  not  then  exist,  and  France, 
which  is  now  a  Republic,  but  has  been  everything  in  turn  and 
nothing  long.  The  formation  of  the  modern  European  states 
system  is  therefore  the  main  element  of  continuous  interest 
and  importance  in  the  history  of  the  seventeenth  century,  that 
is  to  say,  the  acquisition  by  the  chief  European  states  of  the 
boundaries,  which  they  have  since  substantially  retained,  the 
adoption  by  them  of  the  form  of  government  to  which  they 
have  since  adhered,  and  the  assumption  by  them,  relatively  to 
the  other  states,  of  a  position  and  influence  in  the  affairs  of 
Europe  which  they  have  since  enjoyed.  The  sixteenth  century 
saw  the  final  dismemberment  of  medieval  Europe,  the  seven- 
teenth saw  its  reconstruction  in  the  modern  form  in  which  we 
know  it  now. 

Of  the  European  nations  which  were  profoundly  aflfected  by 
the  Reformation,  France  was  the  first  to  emerge  from  the 
conflict.     French  Calvinism  differed  from  the  south  German 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century      3 

type  by  being  more  distinctly  political  in  its  objects,  and  the 
leaders  of  the  French  Catholics,  especially  the  ambitious  chiefs 
of  the  house  of  Guise,  had  quite  as  keen  a  desire  for  their 
own  aggrandisement  as  they  had  for  the  supremacy  of  their 
religion.     The  religious  wars  in  France  soon  be-  ^, 

o  _  o  The  condition 

came  mainly  faction  fights  among  the  nobles  for  of  France, 
political  objects  in  which  personal  rivalry  was  em-  ^^'^' 
bittered  by  religious  division,  and  all  honest  and  law-abiding 
citizens  —  that  sturdy  middle-class  element  which  has  always 
formed  the  backbone  of  the  French  nation  —  soon  longed  for 
the  strong  hand  which  should  at  any  rate  keep  faction  quiet. 
The  authority  of  the  Crown  had  ever  been  in  France  the  sole 
guarantee  of  order  and  of  progress.  Under  the  weak  princes 
of  the  House  of  Valois  that  guarantee  ceased  to  exist.  Shifty, 
irresolute,  inconstant,  they  preferred  the  arts  of  the  intriguer 
to  the  policy  of  the  statesman,  the  poniard  of  the  assassin  to  the 
sword  of  the  soldier,  and  when  Henry  in.,  the  murderer  of 
the  Duke  of  Guise,  in  his  turn  fell  murdered  by  the  dagger  of 
the  monk  Clement,  France  drew  a  long  sigh  of  relief.  Like  Eng- 
land after  Bosworth  Field,  France  after  Ivry  was  ready  to  throw 
herself  at  the  feet  of  a  conqueror  who  was  strong  enough  to 
ensure  peace  and  suppress  faction.  The  House  of  Bourbon 
ascended  the  French  throne  upon  the  same  unwritten  condi- 
tions as  the  House  of  Tudor  ascended  the  English  throne. 
It  was  to  rule  because  it  knew  how  to  rule,  and  the  conditions  of 
its  rule  were  to  be  internal  peace,  and  national  consolidation. 

But  the  task  before  the  first  Bourbon  was  far  more  diffi- 
cult than  that  which  absorbed  all  the  energies  of  the  first 
Tudor.  He  had  no  machinery  to  his  hand  which  xhe  states- 
he  could  use  to  veil  the  arbitrariness  of  his  General, 
action,  or  to  guide  public  opinion.  Parliament  in  England 
had  often  been  the  terror  of  a  weak  king.  The  Tudors  soon 
made  it  the  tool  of  a  strong  king.  In  France  Henry  had  to 
rely  openly  upon  the  powers  of  the  Crown  and  upon  military 
force.  It  is  true  that  the  States-General  still  existed,  though 
they   were   seldom    summoned,   but    their    constitution    and 


4  Etiropean  History,   1 598-1715 

traditions  rendered  them  unfit  to  play  the  part  of  an  English 
Parliament.  They  met  in  three  houses  representing  the 
Clergy,  the  Nobility,  and  the  Commonalty,  the  latter  house, 
the  Tiers  Etat  as  it  was  called,  being  usually  about  as  large  as 
the  other  two  put  together ;  but  instead  of  there  being  a 
political  division  running  through  the  three  estates  of  those 
for  the  policy  of  the  Crown  and  those  against  it,  as  was 
usually  the  case  in  England,  the  tendency  in  France  always 
was  for  the  two  privileged  houses  to  coalesce  against  the  Tiers 
Etat.  The  Crown  had  therefore  only  to  balance  one  against 
the  other,  and  leave  them  to  entangle  themselves  in  mutual 
rivalries  in  order  to  gain  the  victory.  In  the  long  history  of 
the  English  Parliament  it  is  very  rare  to  find  serious  questions 
raised  between  the  two  houses.  Nobles  and  Commons  have 
as  a  rule  acted  together  for  weal  or  for  woe  in  attacking  or 
supporting  the  policy  of  the  Crown.  The  unity  of  Parliament 
has  been  its  most  significant  feature.  In  France  it  has  been 
quite  otherwise.  Mutual  jealousy  and  social  rivalry  played 
their  part  with  such  effect  that  they  destroyed  the  political 
usefulness  of  the  States-General.  Unable  to  act  together 
they  could  not  extort  from  the  Crown  either  the  power  over 
the  purse,  or  the  right  of  legislation,  which  were  the  two 
effective  checks  upon  the  king's  prerogative  exercised  by  the 
English  Parliament.  All  that  they  could  do  was  to  present  a 
list  of  grievances  and  ask  for  a  remedy.  They  had  no  power 
whatever  of  compelling  a  favourable  answer,  much  less  of 
giving  effect  to  it.  The"':  procedure  was  for  each  Estate  to 
draw  up  its  own  list  {cahier)  of  those  matters  which  it  wished 
to  press  upon  the  attention  of  the  Crown.  When  the  lists 
were  completed  they  were  formally  presented  to  the  king  and 
a  formal  answer  of  acceptance  or  rejection  was  expected 
from  him,  but  as  the  Estates  separated  directly  the  answer 
was  given,  the  Crown  was  apt  not  to  be  over  prompt  in  fulfill- 
ing its  promises. 

As  a  constitutional  check  upon  misgovernment  the  States- 
General  in  France  were  therefore  of  little  use.     That  function. 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century      5 

as  far  as  it  was  discharged  at  all,  had  by  accident  devolved 
upon  the  Parlement  de  Paris.  The  Parlement  was  in  its  origin 
nothing  more  than  a  court  of  law  which  sat  at  Paris  The  Parie- 
to  administer  justice  between  the  king  and  his  '"s"*  ^^  Paris. 
subjects,  and  between  subject  and  subject.  In  course  of  time 
it  grew  into  a  corporation  of  lawyers  and  judges,  not  altogether 
unlike  our  Inns  of  Court  in  England  amalgamated  into  one, 
having  just  that  kind  of  political  influence  which  a  close  and 
learned  corporation,  whose  business  it  was  to  make  by  judicial 
decision  a  great  deal  of  the  law  of  the  country,  could  not  fail 
to  have.  In  one  point  indeed  the  Parlement  had  almost 
established  a  definite  right.  As  the  highest  court  of  the  realm 
its  duty  was  to  register  the  edicts  of  the  king,  a  duty  which  was 
easily  turned  into  a  right  to  refuse  to  register  them  if  it  so 
willed.  Thus  the  Parlement  claimed  an  indirect  veto  upon  the 
royal  legislation.  It  is  true  that  the  king  could  always  over- 
ride the  refusal  of  the  Parlement  to  register  an  edict  by  coming 
in  person  to  its  session  and  holding  what  was  called  a  lit  de 
justice ;  but  this  was  a  proceeding  which  involved  a  good  deal 
of  inconvenience,  and  was  not  unlikely  to  excite  tumults ;  it 
would  not  therefore  be  resorted  to  except  on  Position  of 
critical  occasions.  So  completely  had  the  con-  the  Crown, 
stitution  of  France  become  in  its  structure  despotic,  that  there 
was  absolutely  no  constitutional  means  of  exercising  control 
over  the  king's  will  than  this  very  doubtful  right  of  the  Parle- 
ment de  Paris  to  refuse  to  register  the  king's  edict.  And  if 
there  was  no  constitutional  check  upon  the  king's  will,  there 
was  also  no  machinery  which  the  king  could  utilise  in  order  to 
associate  himself  with  his  people  in  the  task  of  government. 
He  stood  on  a  pedestal  by  himself  in  terrible  isolation  sur- 
rounded by  his  courtiers,  faced  by  the  nobility,  backed  by 
his  army,  unable  to  know  his  people's  wants,  and  unable  to  help 
them  to  know  their  own. 

But  this  was  not  all.  Henry  iv.  had  to  encounter  open 
enmity  abroad,  and  give  an  earnest  of  religious  peace  at  home, 
as  well  as  to  crush  civil  dissensions.     It  was  not  till  his  conver- 


6  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

sion  to  Catholicism  drew  the  teeth  of  Spain,  and  proved  to 
the  majority  of  his  subjects  that  he  desired  above  all  things 
Religious  ^o  be  a  national  and  not  a  party  king,  that  he  can 
toleration.  be  Said  really  to  have  reigned.  The  peace  of 
Vervins,  concluded  in  1598,  marked  the  issue  of  France  from 
the  throes  of  her  Reformation  wars.  Her  religious  struggle 
was  over.  Calvinism  had  made  its  great  effort  to  win  religious 
and  political  ascendency  in  France,  and  had  failed.  France 
was  to  remain  a  Catholic  country,  and  the  bull  of  absolution 
granted  to  Henry  rv.  by  Pope  Clement  viii.  in  1595  duly 
emphasised  the  return  of  the  Most  Christian  King  into  the 
pale  of  Catholic  obedience.  But  if  Calvinism  had  failed, 
neither  had  Papalism  wholly  won  the  day.  Catholic,  France 
had  determined  to  be,  but  she  was  far  from  assuming  as  yet 
the  mantle  of  the  champion  of  rigid  orthodoxy  just  laid  down 
by  Philip  11.  The  same  year  which  saw  the  death  of  Philip  11. 
and  the  real  beginning  of  the  reign  of  Henry  rv.  saw  also  the 
promulgation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  with  its  announcement 
The  Edict  of  of  the  ncw  policy  of  liberty  of  conscience.  "By  this 
Nantes.  famous  cdict  religious  toleration  and  political  recog- 

nition was  accorded  to  the  French  Calvinists.  They  were  to 
be  allowed  to  worship  as  they  pleased,  provided  they  paid 
tithes  to  the  Church,  and  observed  religious  festivals  like  other 
Frenchmen.  They  were  to  receive  a  grant  from  the  State  in 
return.  They  were  to  be  equally  eligible  with  Catholics  for 
all  pubHc  offices.  They  were  to  be  represented  in  the  Parle- 
ments,  and  were  to  have  exclusive  political  control  for  eight 
years  over  certain  towns  in  the  south  and  west  of  France, 
of  which  the  most  important  were  Nismes,  Montauban,  and 
La  Rochelle.  Thus  they  obtained  not  merely  toleration  as  a 
religious  body,  and  part  endowment  by  the  State,  but  also 
recognition  in  certain  places  as  a  political  organisation.  The 
political  settlement  was  evidently  but  a  palliative,  the  religious 
settlement  was  a  cure.  No  country  as  patriotic  as  France,  no 
government  as  strong  as  an  absolute  monarchy  could  tolerate 
longer  than  was  necessary  an  imperium  in  imperio  under  the 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century     7 

control  of  a  religious  sect.  But  the  toleration  of  Calvinism 
in  a  country  professedly  Catholic  was  a  solution  of  the  religious 
question  thoroughly  acceptable  to  the  genius  of  the  French 
nation.  It  enabled  France  at  once  to  fix  her  whole  attention 
upon  the  absorbing  business  of  political  aggrandisement.  It 
excused  her  somewhat  for  not  thinking  it  obligatory  to  play  a 
purely  Catholic  role  in  the  pursuit  of  that  aggrandisement. 
The  first  of  those  nations  of  Europe,  which  had  been  seriously 
affected  by  the  Reformation,  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  solution 
of  the  problem  of  religious  division,  she  was  able  to  set  an 
example  to  Europe  of  a  policy  entirely  outside  religious  con- 
siderations. Under  a  king  who  had  conformed,  but  had  not 
been  converted,  France,  pacified,  but  not  yet  united,  was 
ready  to  mix  herself  up  in  the  web  of  political  intrigue  and 
religious  rivalry  in  which  Germany  was  helplessly  struggling, 
with  the  simple  if  selfish  object  of  using  the  misfortunes  of  her 
neighbours  for  her  own  advantage. 

The  state  of  Germany  was  indeed  pitiable.  The  Empire 
had  become  but  the  shadow  of  a  great  name.  The  successor 
of  Augustus  had  nothing  in  common  with  his  pro-  Germany: 
totype  but  his  title.  Roman  Emperor  he  might  The  Emperor, 
be  in  the  language  of  ceremony,  punctiliously  might  the  im- 
perial hierarchy  of  dignity  be  ordered  according  to  the  solem- 
nities of  the  Golden  Bull,  but  all  the  world  knew  that  in 
spite  of  this  wealth  of  tradition  and  of  prescription,  the  Em- 
peror could  wield  little  more  power  in  German  politics  than 
that  which  he  derived  from  his  hereditary  dominions.  The 
archduke  of  Austria  must  indeed  be  a  figure  in  Germany 
under  any  circumstances,  still  more  so  if  he  happened  to  be 
also  king  of  Hungary  and  king  of  Bohemia  ;  but  if  the  electors 
set  the  Imperial  Crown  at  his  feet  and  hailed  him  as  Caesar, 
though  much  was  thereby  added  to  his  dignity  and  something 
to  his  legal  rights,  not  one  whit  accrued  to  him  of  effective 
force.  It  is  true  that  his  legal  position  as  head  and  judge 
over  the  princes  accrued  to  him,  not  so  much  because  he  was 
emperor  and  the  representative  of  Augustus  and  Charles  the 


8  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Great,  as  because  he  was  German  king  and  the  successor  of 
Henry  the  Fowler  and  Otto  the  Great.  Nevertheless,  the 
fact,  from  whatever  quarter  derived,  that  the  German  consti- 
tution gave  to  the  Emperor  the  lordship  over  the  other  princes 
and  the  right  of  deciding  disputes  which  arose  between  them, 
made  him  the  ojily_^ossiblejcentre^  o^_G£rman  unity. 

That  right  was  exercised  through  a  court  {iho^Reichskaffi- 
mergt'richt)  the  members  of  which  were  mainly  nominated  by 
The  Imperial  t^c  priuces  thcmsclves.  For  the  purpose  of  en- 
courts.  suring  the  enforcement  of  its  decrees,  Germany 

was  divided  into  circles,  in  which  the  princes  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  cities  who  were  members  of  the  diet  met, 
and  if  necessary,  raised  troops  to  give  effect  to  the  sentences 
pronounced.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  Reformation,  how- 
ever, there  had  been  a  difficulty  in  getting  this  machinery  to 
work,  owing  to  the  religious  dissensions  ;  and  the  Emperor  had 
begun  the  practice  of  referring  imperial  questions  which  had 
arisen  to  the  Imperial  or  Aulic  Council  {Reichshofrath),  which 
was  entirely  nominated  by  him  and  under  his  influence. 

In  all  important  matters  of  administrative  policy  the  Em- 
perors, since  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century,  had  been 
obhged  to  consult  theU3ietrbut  the  Diet  was  in 

The  Diet.  *  ■  ,  ,         r     ,  , 

no  sense  a  representative  assembly  of  the  classes 
of  which  the  nation  was  composed,  as  were  the  Parliament  of 
England  and  the  States-General  of  France,  but  was  merely  a 
feudal  assembly  of  the  chief  feudal  vassals  of  the  Empire.  It 
was,  in  fact,  a  congress  of  petty  sovereigns  gathered  under 
their  suzerain.  It  was  divided  into  three  houses.  The  first 
consisted  of  six  of  the  seven  electors,  three  ecclesiastical,  i.e. 
the  archbishops  of  Koln,  Mainz,  and  Trier,  and  three  lay,  the 
electors  of  Saxony  and  Brandenburg  and  the  elector  palatine, 
for  the  fourth  lay  elector  the  king  of  Bohemia  only  appeared 
for  an  imperial  election.  The  second  was  the  House  of 
Princes,  the  third  that  of  the  free  Imperial  Cities,  but  it  was 
considered  so  inferior  to  the  other  houses  that  it  was  only  per- 
mitted  to    discuss  matters  which  had   already  received  their 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century     9 

assent.     It  is  obvious  that  in  an  assembly  so  constituted  the 
only  interest  powerfully  represented  was  that  of  the  princes, 
and   the   only  influence    likely  to  be    exercised  by  it  was  in 
favour  of  that  desire  for  complete  independence,  which  was 
natural  to  a  body  of  rulers  who  already  enjoyed  most  of  the 
prerogatives  of  sovereignty.      For  there  had  ever  Qg^man 
been  two  divergent  streams  of  tendency  in  Ger-   desire  for 
man  politics.     Deep  in  the   German    heart   lay  a  ""'^y- 
vague  sense  of  nationality  and  patriotism,  a  dim  desire  that 
Germany  should  be    one.     This   sentiment   naturally  centred 
round  the  Emperor  as  the  visible  head  of  German  unity.     If 
Germans  ever  were  to  be  politically  one    it   could   only   be 
under  the  Emperor.     There  was  no  other  possible  head  among 
the  seething  mass  of  jarring  interests  known  geographically  as 
Germany.     The  other  tendency  had  sprung  from  the  strong 
love  of  local   independence  characteristic  of  the   Desire  for 
Teutonic   race.       Naturally   each    petty    duke    or   sovereignty 

■'  ^        -'  among  the 

prince  tried  to  become  as  independent  of  outside  Princes, 
authority  as  he  could  ;  and  in  the  pursuit  of  this  policy  he 
found  himself  greatly  aided  by  that  spirit  of  local  seclusion, 
which  ever  seeks  to  find  its  centre  of  patriotism  in  the  side 
eddies  of  provincial  life  rather  than  in  the  broad  stream  of  the 
national  existence.  The  Emperors  of  the  House  of  Habsburg 
had  fully  recognised  these  facts,  and,  since  the  days  of  Maxi- 
milian I.,  had  set  themselves  resolutely  to  the  task  of  rebuilding 
the  imperial  authority,  and  making  the  imperial  institutions  the 
true  and  only  centre  of  German  unity.  They  might  have  suc- 
ceeded, had  it  not  been  for  two  events,  the  concurrent  effect 
of  which  was  completely  to  shatter  the  half  begun  Effect  of  the 
work.  The  first  was  the  Reformation,  the  second  Reformation, 
was  the  long  rivalry  with  France.  The  Reformation  cut 
Germany  rudely  at  first  into  two  afterwards  into  three  pieces. 
"^Xutheranism,  which  absorbed  nearly  all  northern  Germany 
between  the  Main  and  the  Baltic,  drew  its  strength  especially 
from  the  support  of  the  north  German  princes.  Luther  him- 
self effected  a  closer  alliance  with  the  princes  and  the  nobles 


lO  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

than  he  did  with  the  people.  It  was  to  them  he  appealed  for 
protection  in  the  days  of  his  earlier  struggles,  on  them  that  he 
trustfully  leaned  in  the  later  days  of  his  power.  Naturally, 
therefore,  Lutheranism  gave  a  strong  impulse  and  sanction  to 
the  desire,  which  the  northern  princes  uniformly  felt,  to  assert 
their  independence  of  a  Catholic  emperor.  Calvinism,  spread- 
ing from  republican  Switzerland  down  the  upper  valley  of 
the  Rhine  into  the  heart  of  Germany,  had  a  no  less  fatal 
influence  upon  the  centralising  policy  of  the  Emperors. 
Subversive  in  its  tendencies  and  impatient  of  recognised 
authority,  it  intensified  the  spirit  of  dislike  to  autocratic  insti- 
Eff  fth  tutions.  Still,  in  spite  of  the  terrible  disruption 
rivalry  with  of  Germany  caused  by  the  Reformation,  a  sover- 
France.  ^jg^^  ^^  powerful  and  so  cautious  as  Charles  v.  might 

have  been  able  to  weather  the  storm,  without  suffering  any 
loss  of  prerogative  or  influence,  had  it  not  been  for  the  con- 
stant and  paramount  necessity  laid  upon  him  of  counteracting 
the  machinations  of  an  enemy  ever  wakeful  and  absolutely  un- 
scrupulous. As  long  as  Francis  i.  lived  Charles  v.  was  never 
able  seriously  to  apply  himself  to  German  affairs.  When  he 
was  dead  it  was  too  late.  The  religious  divisions  of  Germany 
had  taken  definite  political  shape,  and  were  inspired  with 
definite  poUtical  ambitions.  The  Emperor  had  ceased  to  be 
the  acknowledged  political  head  of  Germany.  He  had  sunk 
into  the  inferior  position  of  becoming  merely  the  chief  of  one 
political  and  religious  party. 

In  this  way  the  desire  for  political  independence  from  the 
authority  of  the  Emperor  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  achieve- 
Consequent  ™c"t  of  religious  independence  from  the'  author- 
disunion  of  ity  of  the  Church.  The  Emperors  who  followed 
Germany.  charlcs  V.  in  the  latter  years  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  Ferdinand  i.,  Maximilian  11.,  and  Rudolf  n.,  so  far 
from  being  able  in  the  least  to  extend  their  prerogative  in 
Germany,  were  barely  able  to  retain  what  shreds  of  it  yet  re- 
mained. But  towards  the  close  of  the  century  the  onward 
and   destructive    march   of    Lutheranism    and   of    Calvinism 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century     1 1 

stopped.  The  Reformation  spent  itself  as  a  living  force.  It 
had  reached  its  utmost  Hmits  and  slowly  the  tide  began  to 
turn.  The  Counter-Reformation,  with  the  spiritual  exercises 
of  S.  Ignatius  in  one  hand  and  the  sword  in  the  other,  went 
forth  to  win  back  half  Germany  to  the  faith.  When  the  peace 
of  Vervins  set  France  free,  Germany  was  at  her  weakest. 
Jarring  interests,  political  dissensions,  religious  hatreds  were 
rife  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  that  unhappy  land.  The 
Lutheran  princes  of  the  north  had  succeeded  in  throwing  off 
the  leadership  of  the  Emperor  without  themselves  producing 
either  a  leader  or  a  policy.  The  Calvinist  princes  of  the 
Rhine-land,  exasperated  by  the  advance  of  the  Counter-Refor- 
mation, were  ready  to  throw  all  Germany  into  the  crucible 
and  rashly  strike  for  a  supremacy  which  they  had  not  strength 
to  win.  In  Bohemia  men  remembered  with  fierce  glee  the 
stubborn  waggon  fortresses  of  the  unconquerable  Ziska,  and 
the  concessions  wrung  from  reluctant  Pope  and  Emperor  by 
the  success  of  a  rebellion.  Meanwhile  in  Bavaria  and  the 
hereditary  dominions  of  the  House  of  Austria,  by  steady 
governmental  pressure  backed  by  the  devotion  and  talent  of 
the  Society  of  Jesus,  Calvinism  was  being  gradually  rooted 
out  and  swept  away  by  the  advancing  tide  of  the  Counter- 
Reformation,  Yet  the  Emperor  himself  was  incapable  of 
directing  the  pohcy  of  his  own  party.  A  melancholy  recluse 
given  to  astrology  and  fond  of  morbid  religious  exercises, 
Rudolf  II.  was  the  last  man  fitted  to  lead  a  crusade.  He  could 
not  even  inspire  respect,  much  less  command  allegiance. 
Never  certainly  was  country  in  a  more  pitiable  phght.  Torn 
from  end  to  end  by  religious  dissension,  pierced  through  and 
through  by  personal  and  provincial  rivalries,  without  a  single 
public  man  on  either  side  sufficiently  respected  to  command 
obedience,  without  unity  of  poHtical  or  religious  ideal  even 
among  the  Protestants,  without  that  last  hope  of  expiring 
patriotism,  the  power  of  union  in  the  face  of  the  foreign 
aggressor,  Germany  at  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century  lay 
extended  at  the  feet  of  her  jealous  rival,  a  helpless  prey,  when- 
ever it  pleased  him  to  spring  and  put  an  end  to  her  miseries. 


12  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

England,  unlike  France  and  Germany,  had  as  yet  escaped 
the  necessity  of  making  the  sword  the  arbiter  of  religion,  but 
she  had  not  wholly  settled  her  religious  difficul- 
"^*"  '  ties.  Elizabeth,  masterful  in  all  things,  had 
imposed  upon  the  Church  and  the  nation  a  sohition  of  the 
religious  question  which  was  still  upon  its  trial.  The  experi- 
ment of  a  Church,  historically  organised  and  doctrinally  Catho- 
lic, but  in  hostility  to  the  Pope,  was  hitherto  unknown  in  the 
West,  though  common  enough  in  the  East ;  and  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  it  soon  found  itself  attacked  from  both  sides  by 
Roman  CathoHcs  and  Protestants  at  once.  During  the  reign 
of  Elizabeth  the  personality  of  the  Queen  and  the  success  of 
her  policy,  especially  as  the  champion  and  leader  of  the 
national  opposition  to  Spain  which  culminated  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Armada  in  1588,  kept  the  disturbing  elements  in 
check.  On  the  accession  in  1603  of  a  prince  who  with  some 
insight  into  statesmanship  was  wholly  deficient  in  the  faculty 
of  governing,  those  elements  rapidly  gathered  strength.  When 
serious  constitutional  questions  between  the  king  and  the  Par- 
liament were  added  to  the  religious  complications,  England 
soon  became  too  much  absorbed  in  her  own  internal  affairs  to 
be  able  to  speak  with  authority  in  European  politics.  For 
fifty  years  after  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Stuart,  England 
became  merely  a  diplomatic  voice  in  Europe  to  which  nations 
courteously  listened  but  paid  no  attention. 

While  England  was  failing  to  secure  her  newly  won  honours, 
Spain  was  trading  upon  a  past  reputation.  Never  was  the 
retribution  of  an  impossible  policy  so  quick  in 
coming.  The  transition  from  Philip  11.  to  PhiHp  iii. 
is  the  transition  from  a  first-rate  to  a  third-rate  power,  and 
that  without  the  shock  of  a  great  defeat.  Enervated  by  a 
proud  laziness,  drained  by  a  world-wide  ambition,  ruined  by 
a  false  economy,  depleted  by  a  fatal  fanaticism,  Spain  was 
already  falling  fast  into  the  slough  from  which  she  is  only  just 
beginning  now  to  emerge.  Yet  she  was  still  a  great  power, 
great  in  her  traditions,  great  in  her  well-trained  infantry,  great 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seventeenth  Century     1 3 

through  her  monopoly  of  the  American  trade.  Had  she  but 
produced  men  instead  of  puppets  for  kings,  and  statesmen 
instead  of  favourites  for  ministers,  she  would  quickly  have  re- 
covered something  of  her  ancient  glory.  Even  under  Philip 
III.  she  was  always  a  power  with  which  men  had  to  reckon,  and 
in  strict  family  alliance  with  the  House  of  Habsburg  formed 
the  kernel  of  the  Catholic  interest  in  Europe,  By  her  posses- 
sions in  the  Netherlands,  in  Franche  Comtd  and  in  the  Pyre- 
nees, she  presented  the  most  serious  obstacle  to  the  territorial 
aggrandisement  of  France. 

Patriotism  was  the  very  air  the  Spaniard  breathed.     In  Italy 
it  was  a  vice,  for  an  Italian  had  no  country  for  which  to  live 
or   to   die.     Italy,   since    France   and   Spain   had 
quarrelled   over  the   division   of  its   carcase,    had  ^' 

ceased  to  be  anything  but  a  name.  \  In  the  south,  the  Spanish 
House  had  made  good  its  hold  on  Naples,nn  central  Italy  the 
States  of  the  Church  were  thrust  in  like  a  great  wedge  to 
separate  north  and  south.  The  north  was  still  the  battle-field 
between  the  rival  powers.  Venice  lay  entrenched  along  the 
eastern  coast  and  commanded  the  mouth  of  the  Brenner  Pass, 
too  formidable  as  yet  to  be  attacked,  too  independent  to  be  won, 
by  either  sidei  S  In  the  middle  of  the  rich  plain  of  Lombardy, 
was  the  Milanese,  which  belonged  to  Spain,  and  was  held  by 
Austrian  or  Spanish  troops,  who  kept  up  a  precarious  com- 
munication with  Austria  through  the  Valtelline  and  Tirol,  or 
with  Spain  through  the  friendly  duchy  of  Genoa.  To  the  west 
of  the  Milanese  came  Piedmont  and  Savoy,  the  duke  of  which 
from  his  geographical  position  was  usually  obliged  to  be  on 
good  terms  with  France,  but  respected  the  obligation  no  longer 
than  necessary.  Italy  thus  torn  and  divided  was  always  ready 
to  produce,  whenever  it  was  wanted,  a  crop  of  international 
questions  of  the  greatest  nicety  for  her  neighbours  to  quarrel 
over,  and,  as  the  century  advanced,  she  seemed  more  and 
more  to  find  her  appropriate  function  to  lie  in  providing  the 
necessary  pawns  for  the  game  of  diplomatic  chess  characteris- 
tic of  the  new  European  states'  system. 


CHAPTER    II 

FRANCE   UNDER   HENRY  IV. 

Difficulties  of  Henry  IV.  —  Henry  iv.  and  Sully  —  Economical  policy  of  Sully 

—  His  financial  reforms — French  taxation  in  the  seventeenth  century  — 
Policy  of  Henry  IV.  towards  the  nobles —  His  foreign  policy  —  Acquisition 
of  Bresse  and  Bugey  —  The  Cleves-Jiilich  question  —  Death  of  Henry  IV. 

—  Regency  of  Marie  de  Medicis  —  Mismanagement  of  affairs  —  The  States- 
General  of  1614  —  The  Huguenot  rising  —  Entiy  of  Richelieu  into  the 
ministry. 

*  Now  I  am  king  ! '  cried  Henry  iv.  when  he  received  the 
submission  of  the  last  of  the  Leaguers.     He  was  right,  for  it 

Difficulties  of  ^^^  °"^y  ^^^"  ^^^*  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^°  ^^^^  ^^^  attention 
Henry  IV.  to  the  true  business  of  a  king,  the  good  govern- 
^^'^'  ment  of  his  people.     The  evils  under  which  France 

groaned  were  mainly  threefold :  the  selfishness  and  factiousness 
of  the  nobilit}',  the  religious  dissensions,  and  the  shameful 
financial  mismanagement.  As  long  as  civil  and  foreign  war 
was  desolating  the  country,  no  steps  could  be  taken  to  deal 
with  these  dangers,  but  directly  the  submission  of  the  League 
and  the  absolution  of  Henry  had  produced  internal  quiet, 
and  the  treaty  of  Vervins  restored  external  peace,  Henry 
found  his  hands  free  to  strike  at  the  root  of  the  evil.  Twenty 
days  before  the  treaty  was  signed  the  publication  of  the  Edict 
of  Nantes  found  the  true  solution  of  the  religious  difficulty. 
It  secured  to  the  Calvinists  the  freedom  of  conscience  for 
which  they  had  nominally  fought,  to  the  Catholics  the  religious 
ascendency  which  their  numbers  and  traditions  entitled  them 
to  demand.  Nor  could  the  most  zealous  of  Leaguers  refuse  to 
recognise  the  justice  of  a  compromise  which  the  Pope  himself 

14 


France  under  Henry  IV.  1 5 

had  sanctioned.  The  dangers  which  threatened  France  from 
the  factiousness  of  the  nobility  and  the  disorder  of  the  finances 
did  not  admit  of  so  simple  a  remedy.  They  required  long 
years  of  patient,  watchful  and  firm  government,  and  Henry  iv, 
was  not  able  in  the  time  allotted  him  to  do  more  than  make 
a  beginning  and  set  an  example.  For  this  purpose  he  called 
to  his  intimate  counsels  his  old  comrade  in  arms,  the  duke  of 
Sully,  whom  he  had  known  and  valued  since  childhood.  The 
whole  internal  administration  of  the  country  was  confided  to 
him  under  the  king,  and  the  title  of  Superintendent  of  the 
Finances,  which  was  conferred  on  him  in  1598,  gave  him 
special  authority  in  that  department. 

For  the  twelve  remaining  years  of  the  reign  of  Henry  these 
two  men  were  continuously  and  inseparably  engaged  upon  the 
great  work  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  affairs  of  France.  The 
very  contrast  between  them  in  temperament  and  Henry  iv. 
talents  served  to  bind  them  the  closer  together  and  and  Suiiy. 
fit  them  for  their  joint  work.  Henry  himself  was  a  true  Gas- 
con, frank,  open-hearted,  open-minded,  genial,  generous,  and 
perhaps  boastful.  Sully  was  severe,  harsh,  cold  and  reserved. 
With  Henry  pleasure,  even  dissipation,  had  ever  held  a  fore- 
most place.  Unhappy  in  his  marriage  he  had  solaced  himself 
with  many  mistresses  and  a  large  family  of  bastards,  and  even 
after  he  became  king  the  recklessness  of  his  expenditure,  and 
the  extravagance  of  his  orgies  occasioned  scandal  even  in  pleas- 
ure-loving Paris.  Sully,  on  the  other  hand,  was  morose  in  man- 
ner and  thrifty  even  to  meanness  in  private  life.  Avaricious, 
incorruptible,  indefatigable,  intensely  jealous  of  his  authority, 
and  proud  of  his  services,  he  found  his  pleasure  in  the  rooting 
out  of  abuse  and  his  triumph  in  the  overthrow  of  the  evil-doer. 
Henry  inspired  love  and  loyalty  in  his  people.  Sully  won  their 
respect  and  their  hatred.  Yet  neither  was  complete  without 
the  other.  To  Henry,  gay,  chivalrous,  and  manly,  human 
nature  was  a  book  more  easily  read,  a  tool  more  deftly  used. 
His  mind  was  more  inventive,  his  heart  more  expansive,  his 
conceptions  far  wider  and  deeper  in  their  scope.     In  a  word 


1 6  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

he  was  a  statesman,  while  Sully  was  an  administrator,  and 
France  required  the  services  of  both.  While  Henry's  clear 
genius  cut  the  knot  of  the  religious  question,  and  seized 
unerringly  the  moment  to  throw  France  boldly  on  to  the  track 
of  her  political  greatness,  Sully's  honest  watchfulness  was  lay- 
ing the  foundations  of  economical  resource,  and  purifying  the 
streams  of  administrative  policy,  which  alone  could  enable 
France  to  make  the  sacrifices  necessary  for  the  attainment  of 
her  political  future. 

The  characteristic  bent  of  Sully's  mind  is  most  evident  in 
his  economical  measures.  He  looked  upon  France  as  an 
essentially  agricultural  country,  and  he  believed  further  that  an 
Encoura  e-  agricultural  population  was  a  far  more  trustworthy 
ment  of  support  to  the  Crowu  than  one  engaged  in  indus- 

agncuiture.  ^.^.-^j  pursuits.  Consequently  he  devoted  all  his 
efforts  to  the  development  of  agriculture.  France  was  to  be 
the  great  producer  of  food  for  Europe.  By  the  draining  of  the 
marshes,  and  the  careful  management  of  the  forest-land,  large 
tracts  hitherto  unproductive  were  brought  under  cultivation, 
and  the  country  soon  began  to  supply  food  products  more  than 
sufficient  for  her  own  wants.  The  removal  of  all  export  duties 
on  corn  enabled  her  to  sell  this  surplus  to  less  favoured  nations 
at  considerable  profit,  without  rendering  herself  dependent  upon 
others  for  any  prime  necessity  of  national  existence.  In  this 
Sully  showed  himself  a  true  exponent  of  the  economical  ideas 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  At  a  period  when  Europe  was 
torn  with  religious  and  political  dissensions,  when  France 
especially  was  preparing  to  launch  herself  upon  a  career  of 
aggrandisement,  which  was  to  evoke  a  hundred  years  of  war,  it 
seemed  all  important  to  poHticians  that  a  country  should  not 
be  dependent  upon  any  other  for  the  chief  necessities  of  life. 
It  was  not  so  much  a  principle  of  economical  pohcy  as  a 
necessity  of  national  safety  which  drove  nations  to  make  them- 
selves as  self-supporting  as  possible  in  days  of  almost  universal 
war.  They  encouraged  only  such  manufactures  as  were  required 
by  their  own  people,  they  prohibited  the  importation  of  foreign 


France  under  Henry  IV.  1 7 

food  products  by  high  import  duties,  they  kept  gold  and  silvei 
as  much  as  possible  in  the  country,  chiefly  in  order  that  the 
government  might  have  ready  to  hand  the  means  of  waging 
war.  It  has  been  too  much  the  fashion  to  look  at  the  protec- 
tive system  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  from 
the  economical  side  alone.  Its  foundations  are  laid  far  more  in 
the  interests  of  prudent  national  policy  than  in  those  of  a  false 
economy,  though  it  is  true  that  hardly  any  statesman  of  the 
time  fully  realised  how  false  the  economy  was.  Sully  certainly 
was  no  exception  to  the  general  rule.  While  encouraging 
agriculture  as  much  as  possible  he  deliberately  depreciated 
manufactures,  imposed  duties  on  manufactured  articles,  pro- 
hibited the  exportation  of  gold  and  silver,  and  did  all  in  his 
power  to  hinder  the  establishment  of  new  industries.  Here 
the  greater  statesmanship  of  the  king  corrected  the  prejudices 
of  the  minister.  Henry  at  once  perceived  the  political  as  well 
as  the  economical  value  of  an  industrial  population 
and  of  national  industries,  encouraged  the  nascent  couragement 
silk  manufactures  of  Lyons  and  Nismes,  and  the  o^  manufac- 
glass  and  pottery  works  of  Paris  and  Nevers,  pro- 
moted the  construction  of  roads,  and  of  the  first  of  the  great 
canals  of  France,  that  between  the  Loire  and  the  Seine.  In 
the  department  of  foreign  affairs,  where  the  influence  of  Sully 
was  less  powerful,  his  efforts  were  even  more  observable.  He 
renewed  the  extremely  important  capitulations  with  Turkey, 
which  were  the  solid  fruit  of  the  alliance  of  Francis  i.  with  the 
Sultan,  and  thus  retained  for  France  a  predominant  voice  at 
the  court  of  Constantinople  and  the  larger  share  of  the  trade 
with  that  port.  He  made  favourable  treaties  of  commerce  with 
England  and  Holland,  which  helped  to  encourage  the  expor- 
tation of  French  wines,  and  promoted  the  colonisation  of 
Canada,  where  Champlain  founded  Quebec  in  1608. 

The   greatest    debt  which    France    owed   to  Sully   was   the 
reform    of   the    financial   administration.     It   is   a   Financial 
singular  thing  that  a  nation  which  has  shown  itself  reform, 
in  other  departments  of  administration  so  persistent  in  its  ad- 

i^RIOD   v.  B 


1 8  European  History,   1598-17 15 

herence  to  fixed  principles,  should  have  been  content  to  manage 
the  important  department  of  finance  at  hap-hazard.  From  the 
time  that  France  became  a  nation,  to  the  time  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, she  produced  but  four  great  finance  ministers,  Suger, 
Sully,  Colbert,  and  Turgot,  and  of  them  the  two  most  impor- 
tant, Sully  and  Colbert,  were  not  so  much  great  financiers  as 
honest  and  sensible  administrators.  The  business  of  Sully  was 
to  produce  order  out  of  chaos,  to  defeat  corruption,  to  govern 
justly.  He  made  no  attempt  to  reorganise  the  finances  of 
France,  to  introduce  a  new  and  better  system  of  taxation,  still 
less  did  he  venture  to  interfere  with  privileges  which  rendered 
anything  Uke  a  just  incidence  of  taxation  impossible.  Nor  in- 
deed would  he  have  wished  to  do  so  if  he  had  dared.  On  the 
contrary  he  accepted  the  system  as  he  found  it,and  contented 
himself  with  enforcing  its  proper  observance.  The  only  impor- 
tant novelty  which  he  introduced  was  the  tax  known  as  the 
paulette,  by  which  the  judicial  and  financial  officials  were  per- 
mitted to  hand  on  their  offices  to  their  heirs  on  payment  of 
the  tax.  This  was  in  fact  to  create  a  caste  of  hereditary  offi- 
cials, and  to  add  yet  one  more  to  the  many  privileged  classes 
of  France. 

The  revenue  of  the  country  was  chiefly  drawn  from  four 
sources  known  as  the  Taille,  the  Gabelle,  the  Aides,  and  the 
French  Douaues.      Of    these,    the    taille   was    the    most 

Revenue,  lucrative,  and  was  originally  a  direct  tax  upon 
the  Taille.  property.  But  in  course  of  time  its  mode  of 
assessment  became  varied  in  different  parts  of  France.  In 
the  pays  d'' election,  or  those  provinces  which  originally  apper- 
tained to  the  monarchy  of  France,  such  as  Normandy, 
Touraine,  the  Isle  de  France,  etc.,  the  taille  was  still  a 
property  tax,  and  was  levied  upon  each  man  personally 
according  to  a  computation  of  what  he  was  worth ;  but  in 
the  pays  d'etat,  or  those  provinces  which  had  been  annexed 
to  the  crown  of  France  in  more  recent  times,  many  of  which 
had  on  annexation  secured  fiscal  privileges  which  they  had 
been   accustomed    to    enjoy  —  such   as   Burgundy,   Guienne, 


France  under  Henry  IV.  1 9 

Provence,  etc.  —  it  was  levied  only  upon  land,  and  was  in  fact 
a  land  tax  and  not  a  property  tax.  In  the  pays  d^ election  the 
nobles,  in  the  pays  d'etat  the  terres  nobles,  i.e.,  the  lands 
which  were  or  once  had  been  in  the  possession  of  the  nobility, 
were  free  from  taille,  and  so  were  the  lands  of  the  Church, 
which  paid  their  tenths  {deci?nes)  instead.  In  itself  there  was 
nothing  unjust  about  the  taille,  excepting  the  fact  that  as, 
owing  to  the  exemptions,  it  fell  almost  entirely  on  the  classes 
which  had  no  political  power,  the  temptation  to  increase  it 
abnormally  was  a  very  strong  one  to  a  needy  finance  minister 
who  was  anxious  not  to  make  powerful  enemies.  But  the  real 
evil  of  the  tax  lay  in  the  method  of  its  assessment  and  collec- 
tion in  the  pays  d' election.  The  gross  sum  to  be  raised  from 
each  province  was  fixed  by  the  government,  and  a  contract 
made  with  a  capitalist  on  the  best  terms  available  for  the 
letting  to  him  of  the  sole  right  of  raising  that  sum  from  that 
particular  province.  The  Intendant,  the  financial  agent  for 
the  province,  then  proceeded  to  assess  the  total  sum  to  be 
raised  upon  the  different  parishes,  and  the  farmer  general  in 
his  turn  farmed  out  the  raising  of  these  smaller  sums  to 
subordinate  agents  of  his  own.  Finally  the  inhabitants  of 
each  parish  elected  a  committee  to  levy  the  parochial  quota 
upon  individuals.  Nothing  could  well  exceed  the  wastefulness 
and  injustice  of  such  a  system.  Every  parish  which  had 
made  or  could  make  interest  with  the  Intendant,  every  inhabi- 
tant who  had  interest  with  the  assessment  committee  got  the 
quota  reduced  at  the  expense  of  less  fortunate  neighbours. 
Each  farmer  and  sub-farmer  wrung  the  most  he  could  out  of 
an  unfortunate  peasantry,  and  was  protected  by  a  government 
which  had  already  received  all  that  was  due  to  it  of  the  tax. 
The  only  nominal  check  upon  the  farmers  was  the  supervision 
of  their  accounts  by  the  chambre  des  comptes,  but  that  was  a 
mere  farce,  as  no  attempt  was  made  to  ensure  the  accuracy  of 
the  registers  upon  which  they  worked.  A  system  by  which  it 
mattered  not  a  son  to  the  government  to  see  that  the  tax  was 
fairly  levied,  while  it  was  to  the  direct  interest  of  the  officials 


20  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

to  take  care  that  it  was  unfairly  levied,  stands  self-condemned ; 
but  it  was  a  system  which  was  universal  throughout  France. 
By  farming  out  the  different  branches  of  the  revenue  to  harpies 
who  fattened  on  the  misery  of  the  people,  the  government 
shirked  the  difficulty  of  having  to  deal  with  venal  servants  of 
its  own,  and  reaped  the  benefit  of  a  sure  though  diminished  in- 
come at  the  price  of  abdicating  one  of  the  chief  functions  of 
government,  and  subjecting  the  innocent  tax  payers  to  the 
worst  form  of  governmental  tyranny,  a  taxation  both  capricious 
and  corrupt.  When  Sully  turned  his  attention  to  the  abuses  of 
the  system,  it  is  said  that  the  people  were  paying  200  millions 
of  francs  in  taxes  while  the  government  received  only  50 
millions  ! 

If  the  taille  was  the  most  lucrative  tax,  the   Gabelle  or  salt 

tax  was  the  most  oppressive.     Salt  was  a  government  monopoly 

farmed   out   to   capitalists  in   the   usual  way,  but 

The  Gabelle.       ,  ...^  .,  ,  ,  j-j 

the  special  grievance  with  regard  to  the  tax  did 
not  lie  in  the  fact  that  it  was  a  monopoly,  or  that  the  quality 
of  the  government  salt  was  bad,  but  in  the  assessment  of  the 
tax.  The  government  laid  down  by  decree  the  amount  of  salt 
which  every  Frenchman  was  supposed  to  require,  or  at  any 
rate  had  to  buy,  and  each  household  was  assessed  therefore  at 
a  sum  representing  the  amount  of  salt  legally  consumable  by 
the  number  of  persons  of  whom  it  was  composed.  There  is 
something  ludicrous  in  the  idea  of  a  paternal  government  dic- 
tating to  its  children  the  amount  of  salt  which  is  good  for 
them,  but  there  was  little  of  a  joke  in  it  to  the  over-burdened 
French  peasant,  who  was  compelled  to  pay  an  extortionate  sum 
for  a  far  larger  amount  of  an  inferior  commodity  than  he  could 
possibly  use  or  dispose  of.  The  door  was  thus  thrown  open 
wide  to  corruption  and  to  smuggling — those  two  ogres  which 
ever  prey  upon  a  faulty  fiscal  system  —  but  the  abuse  not  only 
lasted  until  the  Revolution  but  grew  in  intensity  with  increas- 
ing civilisation.  In  1781,  eight  years  before  the  Revolution 
broke  out,  it  was  calculated  that  it  cost  18  million  livres  a 
year  to  bring  the  treasury  a  revenue  of  72  milhon  livres  from 


France  under  Henry  IV.  21 

the  gab e lie ;  in  other  words,  that  a  fourth  of  the  produce  of 
the  tax  was  spent  in  collecting  it,  while  the  yearly  convictions 
for  smuggling  amounted  to  between  three  and  four  thousand. 

The  Aides  and  the  Douanes,  which  answered  roughly  to 
the  modern  excise  and  customs  duties,  were  not  open  to  such 
obvious  objections,  but  they  too  played  their  part  in  helping  to 
.discourage  trade  and  impoverish  the  people.  Each  The  Aides 
province,  almost  each  district  of  France,  had  and  Douanes. 
its  own  internal  customs,  and  levied  a  toll  which  was  nearly  pro- 
hibitive on  the  circulation  of  wealth.  Each  branch  of  indirect 
taxation  was  farmed  out,  and  gave  rise  to  a  needy  host  of 
agents,  inspectors,  and  tax-gatherers,  who  looked  to  make  their 
fortune  out  of  the  necessities  of  the  tax  payers.  But  this  was 
not  all.  Besides  the  taxes  authorised  by  government  and 
paid  directly  or  through  farmers  to  the  national  exchequer, 
there  were,  when  Sully  took  charge  of  the  finances,  many  other 
payments  of  a  most  oppressive  nature  exacted  from  the  people, 
which  were  in  fact  part  of  the  terrible  legacy  of  the  long  civil 
wars.  Governors  of  provinces  and  commandants  Military 
of  garrisons  levied  what   they   considered  neces-   requisitions 

...  .      ,  .  ,  and  charges 

sary  for  the  mamtenance  of  the  troops,  without  upon 
any  authorisation  from  the  treasury,  and  without  revenue, 
rendering  any  account  of  the  sums  so  raised.  Many  of  the 
nobles  whose  assistance  or  whose  neutrality  Henry  had  found 
it  prudent  to  buy,  received  their  gratifications  in  the  form  of 
charges  upon  the  revenue  arising  from  certain  districts,  and,  as 
there  was  no  check  exercised  by  the  government  over  the 
amounts  raised,  they  frequently  levied  upon  the  wretched 
people  three  or  four  times  the  sum  originally  due. 

A  system  so  badly  conceived  and  so  iniquitously  adminis- 
tered as  this  was  calculated  both  to  impoverish  the  Administra- 
people  and  to  dry  up  the  sources  of  wealth.  Sully  tive  measures 
did  not  attempt  to  deal  with  the  larger  problem  "^  ^""^• 
except  by  encouraging  agriculture  and  permitting  the  free 
exportation  of  corn,  but  he  applied  himself  diligently  to  the 
humbler  task  of  reforming  the   financial   administration.     In 


22  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

this  he  kept  two  principles  steadily  in  view,  to  insist  rigorously 
that  the  levy  of  all  sums  on  the  people  should  be  definitely 
authorised  by  the  government,  and  to  enforce  a  proper  system 
of  audit  of  the  national  finances.  Thus  he  obliged  the  mili- 
tary governors  to  apply  to  the  treasury  for  the  pay  of  their 
troops,  he  abolished  a  crowd  of  useless  and  expensive  financial 
agents  and  forced  them  to  refund  their  ill-gotten  gains,  he 
caused  the  assessment  registers  to  be  verified  and  corrected, 
and  swept  away  at  a  blow  a  number  of  false  claims  for 
exemption  which  had  been  corruptly  admitted.  By  such 
measures  he  soon  succeeded  in  restoring  order  to  the  finances. 
In  twelve  years  of  rigorous  and  just  administration  he  relieved 
the  French  people  from  paying  unauthorised  and  illegal  taxa- 
tion, and  this  saved  them  more  than  120  millions  of  francs 
annually,  he  remitted  to  them  more  than  20  millions  of 
arrears,  paid  off  or  cancelled  330  millions  of  debt,  provided 
the  necessary  resources  for  the  maintenance  of  a  large  army, 
and  an  expensive  court,  and  stored  up  in  the  cellars  of  the 
Bastille  a  treasure  of  30  millions  against  unforeseen  contin- 
gencies. Well  may  France  look  upon  him  and  his  master 
as  the  joint  founders  of  her  national  greatness. 

The  restoration  of  order  after  thirty  years  of  civil  war  was  a 
task  far  more  difficult  and  no  less  necessary  than  the  purifica- 
Reiations  be-  tion  of  the  financial  system.  In  France  the 
tween  the        Crown  had  ever  been  the  champion  of  order  and 

Crown  and  ~ 

the  Nobles.  Centralisation,  the  nobles  the  representatives  of 
disorder  and  local  independence.  In  England  the  nobles 
were  a  class  singled  out  from  their  fellow-countrymen  by  greater 
responsibilities,  in  France  they  formed  a  caste  distinguished 
from  the  inferior  people  by  special  privileges.  Their  tendency 
therefore  naturally  was  to  magnify  those  privileges,  and  to 
intensify  the  distinctions  which  separated  them  both  from  the 
king  and  the  Commonalty,  to  assert  rights  of  their  own 
rather  than  assist  in  vindicating  the  rights  of  others.  Nothing 
is  more  significant  in  the  history  of  England  than  the  fact 
that   throughout    the    constitutional  struggles  of  the  medieval 


France  under  Henry  IV. 

period  the  nobles  as  a  whole  were  anxious  to  make  common 
cause  with  the  people  and  content  to  share  their  victory  with 
them.  Parliament,  the  representative  of  the  nation  in  its 
three  estates,  thus  became  by  their  common  action  the  deposi- 
tary and  the  safe-guard  of  the  national  liberty.  In  France  on 
the  other  hand  the  nobles  are  ever  found  fighting  for  their 
own  class  interests.  Fenced  round  by  their  own  privileges, 
'  regardless  of  the  common  weal,  they  aspired  to  an  indepen- 
dence which  could  not  but  be  destructive  of  national  life. 
The  people  learned  to  look  to  the  Crown  as  their  protector 
from  the  licence  of  the  nobles,  to  welcome  its  increasing 
power  as  representing  greater  security  of  life  and  property. 
A  centralised  and  absolute  Crown  might  possibly  be  a  curse 
in  the  future,  a  decentralised  and  independent  nobility  was 
beyond  question  a  curse  evident  and  imminent  in  the  present. 
And  so  the  States-General,  the  representative  of  France  in  her 
three  estates,  were  permitted  to  sink  into  oblivion  by  a  Crown 
which  would  have  no  rival,  and  a  nation  which  preferred  the 
maintenance  of  its  class  jealousies  to  that  union  of  classes 
which  could  alone  secure  liberty. 

The  religious  wars  had  afforded  a  great  opportunity  to  the 
nobles  of  asserting  their  independence.     Many  of  them  had 
embraced  Calvinism,  and  so   gained   for   their   disintegrating 
aspirations  a  religious  sanction  and  a  political  ideal. 
It  is  said  that  by  the  Edict  of  Nantes  Calvinistic    Henry  iv. 
worship  was  legalised  in  3500  castles.     Faction  is   towards  the 
ever  strong  when  the  Crown  is  weak,  and  Henry  iv. 
had  to  buy  the  doubtful   allegiance    of  many  of  the  smaller 
nobles  by   sheer   bribery,    before    he  could   establish    himself 
upon  the  throne.     But  no  sooner  had    he  made  his  position 
secure  than  the  nobles  found  that  they  had  a   master.     They 
might   be   courtiers,  but  not   politicians.     Henry  deliberately 
entrusted  the  affairs  of  government  to  men  of  business  of  in- 
ferior rank,  dependent  on  himself,  and  jealous  of  the  nobles. 
Rigid   inquiry  was   made   into  the  privileges  claimed   by  the 
nobles,  and  those  which  could  not  be  substantiated  were  re- 


24  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

scinded.  The  institution  of  the  paulette  was  intended  to  create 
a  noblesse  of  the  robe  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  noblesse  of  the 
sword.  Duelling,  that  much-loved  privilege  of  a  gentleman, 
was  absolutely  forbidden,  and  the  issue  of  letters  of  pardon  to 
those  who  killed  their  adversary  in  a  duel  stopped.  The 
nobles,  accustomed  to  the  licence  of  civil  war,  soon  grew  res- 
tive  under  the  strong  hand  of  Henry.  The  marechal 
spiracy  of  de  Biron,  on  the  part  of  the  Catholics,  and  the  due 
Biron,  1602.  ^^  Bouillon,  the  leader  of  the  Huguenots,  permitted 
themselves  to  enter  into  relations  with  Savoy  and  Spain,  and  to 
talk  somewhat  vaguely  of  a  partition  of  France,  in  a  way  which 
was  incompatible  with  loyalty  to  the  king.  When  Henry 
struck  he  struck  hard.  The  twenty-two  wounds  which  Biron 
had  received  in  the  service  of  France  failed  to  obtain  his 
pardon.  In  1602  he  was  executed,  and  his  death  gave  the 
signal  for  the  beginning  of  that  war  of  revenge  on  the  part 
of  the  Crown  against  the  nobles,  which  was  carried  on  with 
such  relentless  severity  by  Richelieu,  and  did  not  cease  until 
the  triumph  of  the  Crown  was  assured  under  Louis  xrv.  The 
due  de  Bouillon  escaped  to  Germany,  the  comte  d'Auvergne 
was  imprisoned,  the  due  d'Epernon,  frightened  into  sub- 
mission, was  pardoned.  Perhaps  Henry  himself  hardly  dared 
to  touch  the  former  companion  of  Henry  in.,  the  governor 
of  half  France,  and  the  proudest  of  all  her  proud  nobility. 
Four  years  afterwards  the  vengeance  of  Henry  was  still  awake 
though  all  the  excitement  and  danger  had  long  ago  quieted 
down.  In  1606  he  travelled  through  the  disaffected  districts 
of  the  south  and  south-west  accompanied  by  an  army,  de- 
stroyed several  castles  belonging  to  the  nobles,  and  put  to 
death,  after  sentences  by  special  tribunals,  those  who  had 
taken  a  prominent  part  in  the  late  troubles. 

But  it  was  in  the  sphere  of  foreign  affairs  that  the  genius  of 
Henry  rv.  fully  displayed  itself  For  many  years  France  had 
played  a  sorry  part  in  European  politics.  If  Francis  i. 
had  done  something  to  preserve  Europe  from  falling  under 
the  yoke  of  Charles  v.,  men  also  remembered  that  he  was  the 


Map  Showing  Territorial  Gains  of  France  in  the  Seventeenth  Century. 


France  under  Henry  IV.  25 

perjured  of  Madrid,  the  abettor  and  the  ally  of  the  Turk. 
Since  his  death  France  had  fallen  lower  and  lower  in  the 
scale  of  nations,  until  under  the  stress  of  the  re-   „     . 

Foreign 

ligious  wars  she  seemed  to  bid  fair  to  become  an-  policy  of 
other  Italy,  a  plaything  tossed  to  and  fro  among  the  ^^"""y  ^^• 
nations  of  Europe.  It  was  the  stubbornness  of  the  Dutch,  and 
the  craft  of  Elizabeth,  not  the  patriotism  of  Frenchmen,  which 
had  saved  France  from  the  yoke  of  Philip  11.  in  that  terrible 
time.  After  the  peace  of  Vervins  Henry  had  to  restore  the 
national  prestige,  and  regain  the  national  influence  which  had 
died  almost  to  nothing.  The  great  danger  to  France  lay  from 
the  pressure  exercised  upon  an  indefensible  frontier  _,.    .  ^ 

■'         '  .  ^^   — ~ indeien- 

on  all  sides  by  the  Austro-Spanish  power.  While  sibie  frontier 
Spain  held  Roussillon,  Franche-Comt6,  and  the  "^  f^^""- 
Netherlands,  and  could  reckon  on  the  vassalage  of  Savoy, 
while  the  passes  of  the  Vosges  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
Empire,  the  Austro-Spanish  House  held  the  gates  of  France. 
France  could  not  breathe  with  the  hand  of  her  enemy  on  her 
throat.  But  the  strength  of  a  chain  is  that  of  its  weakest  link, 
and  Henry's  eagle  eye  soon  detected  the  weak  place  in  the 
circle  of  iron  which  bound  him.  It  lay  in  north  Italy,  the  old 
battle-field  of  France  and  Spain.  '^^  Mijanp^p  -wag  a  rich 
open  country,  depending  for  its  protection  from  attack  upon 
its  fortresses  and  its  rivers.  It  was  a  fief  of  the  Empire, 
in  the  possession  of  Spain,  and  its  communications  with 
Spain  by  sea  through  the  friendly  port  of  Genoa  were  more_ 
easy  than  with  Germany,  through  the  tedious  and  often  dif- 
ficult mountain  paths  which  connected  the  Valtelline  with 
thjp^"Pf-pnnpr  paf^s;  and  the  valley  of  the  Inn. .  ItlayTh  ere  fore 
invitingly  open  to  attack  from  the  mountains  of  Savoy  on 
the  west,  and  those  of  the  Grisons  on  the  north,  and  if  once 
it  fell  into  the  hands  of  France,  not  only  would  the  chain 
which  bound  her  be  broken,  but  a  terrible  counterblow  would 
be  dealt  to  the  influence  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House  in 
Europe,  for  through  Milan  ran  the  road  by  which  Spain  could 
best  open  communications  in  safety  with  south  Germany  and 


26  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Franche-Comt^.  If  that  way  was  blocked,  the  only  route 
possible  for  the  troops  and  treasure  of  Spain  was  the  long  sea 
voyage  by  the  Bay  of  Biscay  and  the  English  Channel  to 
Antwerp  and  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  a  route  fraught  with 
peril  from  the  storms  which  rage  round  Cape  Finisterre,  and 
from  the  English  and  French  privateers  which  swarmed  in  the 
narrow  seas. 

In  Italy,  therefore,  lay  the  opportunity  of  France,  and 
Savoy  held  the  key  of  the  position.  The  duchy  of  Savoy, 
Importance  which  once  extended  as  far  as  the  Rhone,  and 
of  Savoy.  disputed  with  the  king  of  France  for  the  rule 
over  Provence  and  Dauphin^,  had  been  gradually  pushed  by 
its  more  powerful  neighbour  more  and  more  towards  Italy, 
until  at  last  its  duke  had  been  obliged  to  descend  from  his 
mountain  throne,  and  become  frankly  Italian  in  ambition,  as 
he  estabhshed  himself  in  his  capital  of  Turin  at  the  foot  of 
the  mountain.  But  though  Piedmont  and  not  Savoy  had  be- 
come the  centre  of  his  power,  the  border  land  of  Savoy  and 
not  the  Italian  land  of  Piedmont  became  necessarily  the  centre 
of  his  policy.  Situated  on  the  mountains  between  France 
and  the  Milanese,  Savoy  held  the  gates  both  of  France  and  of 
Imperial  Italy.  Through  her  mountain  passes  could  pour, 
when  she  gave  the  word,  the  troops  of  France  into  the  fertile 
plains  of  Lombardy,  or  those  of  the  Habsburgs  into  the 
valley  of  the  Rhone.  A  position  so  decisive  and  so  dangerous 
rendered  a  consistent  policy  impossible.  Courted  by  both 
parties,  her  opportunity  lay  in  playing  off  one  against  the 
other  as  long  as  possible,  but  her  safety  necessitated  the 
choice  of  the  stronger  for  her  ally  in  the  end.  A  misreading 
of  the  political  barometer  at  a  critical  moment  would  mean 
nothing  less  than  national  extinction.  From  the  time  that 
the  rivalry  between  France  and  the  Austro-Spanish  power 
began  to  develope  itself  in  Italy,  the  dukes  of  Savoy  had  been 
compelled  to  follow  this  tortuous  policy.  During  the  Italian 
expeditions  of  Charles  viii,  and  Louis  xii.  they  were  on  the 
side  of  victorious  France,  but  in  the  war  between  Francis  i. 


France  under  Henry  IV.  2/ 

and  Charles  v.  Savoy  veered  to  the  side  of  the  Emperor. 
Punished  for  this  by  the  occupation  of  his  country  by  French 
troops  for  twenty-five  years,  the  duke  was  reinstated  in  his 
dominions  at  the  peace  of  Cateau-Cambresis  (1559),  subject 
to  the  continued  occupation  by  France  of  six  fortresses,  in- 
cluding Susa,  Pinerolo,  and  Saluzzo,  which  commanded 
the  gates  of  important  passes  through  the  Alps.  In  the 
troubles  which  afflicted  France  under  the  later  Valois  kings, 
Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy  succeeded  in  obtaining  posses- 
sion of  Saluzzo  ;  and  although  it  was  provided  in  the  treaty  of 
Vervins  that  he  should  restore  it,  the  provision  remained  a 
dead  letter.  This  gave  Henry  iv.  the  opportunity  he  desired 
of  recalling  Savoy  to  the  French  alliance.  In  1600,  after  the 
death  of  Gabrielle  d'Estr^es,  he  had  procured  a  divorce  from 
his  first  wife  Marguerite  de  Valois,  and  had  strengthened  his 
influence  in  Italy  by  his  marriage  with  Marie  de  M^dicis,  the 
daughter  of  the  grand-duke  of  Tuscany.  In  the  Cession  of 
same  year  he  marched  upon  Savoy  and  quickly  ^'■^s"^^"'* 
overran  it,  but  in  January  1601  agreed  to  a  treaty  France, 
with  the  young  duke  Emmanuel  who  had  succeeded  Charles 
Emmanuel  in  1588,  by  which  Saluzzo  was  left  in  the  hands  of 
Savoy,  but  France  obtained  instead  the  two  small  duchies  of 
Bresse  and  Bugey,  the  sole  remaining  possessions  of  Savoy 
on  the  Rhone.  By  this  treaty  Henry  became  master  of  both 
banks  of  the  Rhone  from  Geneva  to  its  mouth,  Savoy  was 
made  definitely  into  a  border  and  Italian  power,  and  was 
brought  back  into  alliance  with  France  at  the  price  of  the 
surrender  of  a  distant  possession,  which,  in  the  hands  of 
France,  could  not  but  be  considered  a  standing  menace  and  a 
cause  of  hostihty  by  the  court  of  Turin. 

Thus  Henry  iv.    laid   the    foundations   of  the  policy  after- 
wards so  successfully  pursued  in  Italy  by  Richelieu.   Attack  upon 
In  fact,  to  both  of  these  great  statesmen  the  end  to   s'^^a^i^h*'^"' 
be  attained  was  the  same.     The  abasement  of  the   House. 
Austro-Spanish  House  in  the  interests  of  France  was  the_be^ 
ginning  and  end  of  their  foreign  poHcy.     But  Henry  had  not 


28  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  same  opportunities  of  putting  his  designs  into  execution 
which  were  enjoyed  by  his  successor.  It  is  difficult  to  say 
how  far  the  Great  Design  attributed  to  Henry  in  the  Memoirs 
The  Great  '■''f  Siilfy  was  cvcr  more  than  a  dream.  Statesmen 
Design.  havc  oftcn  sought  relief  from   the   ennui  engen- 

dered by  the  pettiness  of  diplomatic  routine  in  the  delightful 
task  of  building  political  castles  in  the  air,  and  it  is  likely 
enough  that  Henry,  in  his  more  imaginative  moments,  con- 
ceived of  a  Europe  in  which  religious  jars  should  cease 
and  national  dissensions  rest,  at  the  bidding  of  an  arbitration 
court  which  represented  a  confederacy  of  free  states,  and 
was  the  mouth-piece  of  a  law  of  religious  toleration.  It  is 
not  less  likely  that  his  shrewd  genius  also  foresaw  that  in  a 
Europe  whose  unity  depended  on  political  confederacy,  whose 
peace  was  secured  by  religious  toleration,  there  would  be 
no  room  for  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  or  for  the  monarchy 
of  Spain.  The  destruction  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House  was 
a  condition  precedent  to  the  success  of  the  Great  Design.  If 
Henry  ever  intended  seriously  to  try  to  combine  those  who 
represented  the  political  forces  of  Protestantism  in  a  con- 
federacy against  Spain  and  the  Empire,  based  on  a  recognition 
of  the  three  religions,  he  must  have  abandoned  the  attempt 
as  hopeless  on  the  death  of  Elizabeth  in  1603. 

A  few  years  later,  however,  the  opportunity  presented  itself 
of  dealing  a  blow  at  the  Austro-Spanish  House  in  a  less 
original  but  equally  effective  way.  In  1609  John  William,^ 
Thecieves-  ^^^^  of  Cleves  Jiilich,  and  Berg,  died  without 
juiich  ques-  children,  and  the  right  of  succession  was  claimed 
by  two  princes.  The  count  palatine  of  Neuburg 
had  married  a  younger  daughter  of  William  the  Rich,  the 
brother  and  predecessor  of  the  last  duke,  and  claimed  the 
inheritance  for  their  son  as  the  nearest  of  kin.  John  Sigis- 
mond,  the  elector  of  Brandenburg,  was  the  grandson  of  the 
eldest  daughter  erf"  William  the  Rich,  and  rested  his  claim 
partly  on  his  descent  from  the  elder  branch,  and  partly  on  a 

^  See  Appendix  in. 


France  tinder  Henry  IV.  29 

will  made  by  William  the  Rich  in  which  he  gave  the  descen- 
dants of  the  elder  daughter  preference  over  those  of  the 
younger.  The  question  was  therefore  mainly  the  old  one  of 
the  eldest  by  descent  against  the  nearest  of  kin,  and  was 
eminently  one  for  the  imperial  courts  to  decide.  But  the 
matter  was  complicated  by  religious  considerations.  The 
three  duchies  lay  along  the  course  of  the  lower  Rhine  from 
the  frontiers  of  the  United  Provinces  nearly  to  Andernach, 
enclosing  within  their  embraces  the  whole  of  the  archbishopric 
of  Koln.  The  population  was  Catholic,  but  both  the  claimants 
were  Lutherans ;  and  on  the  principle  of  ciijus  regio  ejus 
religio,  laid  down  by  the  religious  peace  of  Augsburg,  if  the 
duchies  passed  into  Lutheran  hands,  there  was  a  strong 
probability  that  they  would  before  long  not  only  become 
Lutheran  themselves,  but  drag  the  vacillating  archbishopric 
of  Koln  with  them.  The  Emperor  Rudolf,  in  order  to  guard 
against  this  danger,  at  once  claimed  the  right  of  administering 
the  duchies  until  the  question  of  the  succession  was  settled, 
and  sent  an  army  to  occupy  Julich.  But  if  the  Catholics 
could  not  permit  the  duchies  to  fall  into  Lutheran  hands,  still 
less  could  Protestant  or  French  interests  see  unmoved  the 
imperial  armies  encamped  on  the  borders  of  the  United  Prov- 
inces, in  close  proximity  to  the  frontiers  of  France  and  the 
Spanish  Netherlands.  An  imperial  army  on  the  lower  Rhine 
was  a  menace  alike  to  north  German  Protestantism,  to  the 
hardly  won  Dutch  independence,  and  to  English  and  French 
jealousy. 

Henry  iv.  seized  the  opportunity.  He  at  once  declared 
himself  the  protector  of  the  rights  of  the  elector  of  Branden- 
burg and  the  count  of  Neuburg,  and  put  himself  League  under 
at  the  head  of  an  alliance  of  the  enemies  of  the    "^"'•y  ^^^ 

against  the 

Austro-Spanish  House.     England,  the  United  Pro-    Emperor, 
vinces,  the  German  Protestant  Union,  Venice,  and   '^'°- 
Savoy  responded  to  his  call.     Three  French  armies  were  set 
on  foot ;  one  was  directed  to  the  Pyrenees,  the  second  under 
Lesdiguieres  was  to  co-operate  with  Savoy  and  Venice  in  the 


30  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

conquest  of  the  Milanese,  while  the  third,  under  the  command 
of  the  king  himself,  attacked  Jiilich  and  occupied  the  duchies 
in  conjunction  with  the  Dutch  and  English  contingents  and  the 
German  Protestants.  It  seemed  as  if  the  death-knell  of  the 
Austro-Spanish  power  had  sounded.  Rudolf  11.,  ignorant  of 
poHtics  and  half-crazed  in  intellect,  was  implicated  in  serious 
quarrels  with  his  unwiUing  subjects  of  Bohemia  and  Hungary. 
In  Styria,  Carinthia,  and  Carniola,  Ferdinand,  the  nephew  of 
the  Emperor,  was,  with  the  help  of  the  Jesuits,  waging  an 
ardent  and  determined  war  against  the  Calvinism  which 
threatened  to  take  a  strong  root  even  in  the  hereditary  domin- 
ions of  the  Habsburgs.  Wanting  in  money,  wanting  in  leader- 
ship, wanting  in  unity,  the  power  of  Austria  had  no  troops  on 
which  it  could  depend,  no  subjects  which  it  could  trust.  Nor 
was  Spain  in  much  better  plight.  Exhausted  by  the  ambition 
of  Philip  II.,  misgoverned  by  a  weak  king  and  an  incapable 
minister,  she  had  chosen  this  very  time  gratuitously  to  deal  a 
serious  blow  to  her  own  prosperity  by  expelling  from  her  bor- 
ders the  Moriscoes,  the  most  laborious  and  intelligent  of  her 
working  population.  It  was  clear  that  she  could  do  little  more 
to  help  the  cause  than  to  defend  her  own  frontiers,  and  hold 
the  Milanese  against  the  attacks  of  the  allies.  The  forces  of 
the  Catholic  League,  the  resources  of  Maximilian  of  Bavaria, 
and  the  genius  of  his  general  Tilly  were  in  fact  all  that  Catho- 
licism and  the  Austro-Spanish  power  had  to  rely  upon  in  the 
death  duel  in  which  she  had  almost  by  inadvertence  engaged 
herself.  What  could  they  do  against  the  combined  power  of 
France,  the  north  Germans,  and  the  Dutch?  Help  came  from 
a  quarter  the  least  expected.  A  terrible  crime  struck  France 
Assassination  with  tragic  suddcnness  to  her  knees  and  saved  the 
of  Henry  IV.  House  of  Austria.  As  Henry  iv.  passed  through 
the  streets  of  Paris  to  visit  his  minister  Sully,  but  two  days  before 
the  date  fixed  for  his  departure  for  the  campaign,  a  fanatic  named 
Ravaillac  plunged  a  dagger  into  his  heart.  With  Henry  iv. 
died  the  combination  of  which  he  was  the  head  and  soul,  and 
the  capture   of  JtiUch    from    the   imperialists   by  Maurice   of 


France  under  Henry  IV.  31 

Nassau,  aided  by  a  small  English  contingent,  was  the  only 
step  taken  in  the  direction  of  realising  the  Great  Design  of  the 
first  of  the  Bourbons. 

The  dagger  of  Ravaillac  not  only  saved  the  Austro-Spanish 
House  but  plunged  France  into  fifteen  years  of  misery  and 
dishonour.  The  young  king  Louis  xiii,  was  but  nine  years  old, 
and  a  regency  was  inevitable.  The  due  d'Epernon 
was  the  only  man  who  showed  the  necessary  energy  M^^icis^ 
and  presence  of  mind  to  deal  with  the  crisis  which  declared 
had  so  suddenly  arisen.  Surrounding  the  palace  ■'*^^"*' 
and  the  Hotel  de  Ville  with  his  own  troops  and  those  of  the 
other  nobles  on  whom  he  could  rely,  he  entered  the  chamber 
where  the  Parlement  was  assembled,  and  demanded  that  they 
should  at  once  recognise  the  queen-mother  as  regent.  Point- 
ing significantly  to  his  sword  he  said  :  '  This  sword  is  as  yet  in 
its  scabbard,  but  if  the  queen  is  not  declared  regent  before  this 
assembly  separates,  I  foresee  that  it  will  have  to  be  drawn. 
That  which  can  be  done  to-day  without  danger  cannot  be  done 
to-morrow  without  difficulty  and  bloodshed.'  There  were 
many  in  the  Parlement  who  were  not  sorry  to  see  that  body 
thus  suddenly  raised  into  the  unaccustomed  position  of  the 
arbiter  of  the  government  of  France.  There  were  many  more 
who  found  the  arguments  of  Epernon  too  powerful  to  be  re- 
sisted, and  Marie  was  without  further  question  recognised  by  a 
decree  of  the  Parlement  as  regent  of  the  kingdom  during  the 
minority  of  the  king,  and  invested  with  the  full  powers  of  the 
Crown.  A  Council  of  Regency  was  at  once  formed  from  among 
the  leaders  of  the  nobility,  and  thus  fell  in  a  moment  the 
whole  structure  of  government  which  Henry  iv.  and  Sully  had 
laboured  so  hard  to  erect.  The  nobles  resumed  their  place 
at  the  head  of  affairs.  Sully,  who  alone  might  have  had  in- 
fluence enough  to  stop  this  disastrous  counter-revolution,  lost 
his  courage,  thought  only  of  securing  his  own  safety,  and  after 
a  few  ineffectual  protests  retired  into  private  life.  The  trea- 
sure which  he  had  so  painfully  amassed  was  squandered  among 
the  nobles  to  buy  their   adherence    to   the    new  government. 


32  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

The  regent,  devoted  in  her  inmost  heart  to  Spain,  and  dreading 

the  risk  of  foreign  war,  hastened  to  disband  the  larger  part  of 

,    ,     the  troops  which  Henry  rv.  had  collected,  and  to 

Reversal  of  *^  -'  ' 

the  policy  of  set  on  foot  secrct  negotiations  with  the  court  of 
Henry  IV.  Spain.  After  the  capture  of  Jiihch,  on  September 
ist,  16 10,  by  which  all  danger  of  imperial  aggression  in  the 
lower  Rhineland  was  taken  away,  she  openly  announced  her 
intention  to  withdraw  altogether  from  the  war,  and  to  ally 
herself  with  Spain  through  the  double  marriage  of  her  daughter 
Elizabeth  to  the  heir  to  the  Spanish  crown,  and  of  Anne  of 
Austria,  the  eldest  daughter  of  Philip  in.,  to  the  young  king  of 
France.  Six  months  after  the  murder  of  Henry  iv.  his  whole 
policy  at  home  and  abroad  had  been  reversed.  The  great 
combination  against  the  House  of  Austria  fell  to  pieces  when 
France  retired.  The  German  Protestants  and  the  Dutch  made 
their  peace  with  the  Emperor  by  the  truce  of  Willsted^,  signed 
in  October  16 10.  The  duke  of  Savoy,  betrayed'by  France, 
had  to  make  his  peace  as  best  he  could  with  Spain,  and  the 
key  of  Italy  was  once  more  thrown  away.  At  home,  disorder 
corruption  and  anarchy  raised  their  heads  again,  and  the  selfish 
and  factious  nobility  tore  France  in  pieces  in  a  struggle  in 
which  their  desire  for  places  and  money  was  hardly  disguised 
by  a  thin  veneer  of  political  ambition. 

For  seven  years  Marie  held  the  reins  of  government.  She 
was  a  vain,  irritable,  and  intriguing  woman,  with  little  of  the 
talent  for  rule  hereditary  in  her  family,  and  much  of  the 
Influence  of  dependence  upon  stronger  natures  characteristic 
the  marechai   of  her  sex.     They  were  years  of  discord  and  dis- 

""^"  grace.     The  real  rulers  of  France  were  the   Italian 

adventurers  Leonora  Galigai  and  her  husband,  whom  the 
weakness  of  Marie  actually  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  marshal 
of  France,  although  he  had  never  seen  a  shot  fired  in  earnest. 
The  nobles  were  justly  enraged  at  the  prostitution  of  an  office, 
which  they  considered  one  of  the  chief  prizes  of  their  order, 
and  bitterly  jealous  of  the  influence  of  a  parvenu  like  the  mare- 
chai d'Ancre.     Twice  they  rose  in  rebelHon  under  the  leader- 


France  under  Henry  IV.  33 

ship  of  the  worthless  prince  de  Cond^/  but  d'Ancre  and  Marie 
knew  well  the  sop  to  throw  to  that  Cerberus.  A  quarter  of  a 
million  of  livres  purchased  the  treaty  of  Ste.  Menehould  on 
May  15th,  1614,  and  six  million  that  of  Loudun  in  May  1616, 
and  the  regent  and  her  minister  quietly  pursued  their  policy 
unmoved  by  demands  for  reform  which  died  in  the  presence  of 
gold.  The  feeble  ray  of  dying  constitutionalism  alone  sheds 
a  pale  gleam  of  interest  over  the  dreary  years.  Partly  in  the 
hopes  of  strengthening  her  own  position,  partly  to  take  a  cry, 
always  dangerous,  out  of  the  mouth  of  Cond^,  Marie  de  M^di- 
cis  consented  to  summon  once  more  the  States-General  of 
France  and  ask  their  advice  upon  the  grievances  of  the 
kingdom. 

The  melancholy  interest  which  surrounds  a  deathbed  attaches 
to  this  the  last  meeting  of  the  States-General  of  monarchical 
France.     The  Estates  assembled  at  Paris  on  the   ^gg^j^     r 
14th  of  October    16 14,  according  to  their  three   the  states- 
orders.     There  appeared   forty  representatives  of  General,  1614. 
the  clergy,  thirty-two  of  the  noblesse,  ninety-two  of  the  Tiers 
Etat ;  but  these  last  were  not  in  any  real  sense  representatives 
of  the  commonalty  of  France.     The  name  of  a  merchant  or 
a  farmer  or  a  small  landowner  does  not  appear  among  them. 
They  were  for  the  most  part  of  the  official  and  professional 
classes,  officers  of  the  petty  districts   into  which  France  was 
divided,  financial  and  municipal  officers,  with  a  sprinkling  of 
lawyers  and  citizens,  and  they  at  once  assumed  the  role  which 
their  composition  marked  out  for  them,  and  organised  them- 
selves as  the  official  order  in  opposition  to  the  other  orders  of 
the  clergy  and  the  noblesse.     From  the  beginning  Qua„eis 
the  jealousy  of  the  three  orders  among  themselves,   between  the 
and  the  fatal  determination  of  the  Tiers  Etat  to  °'''^'"- 
defend  the   privileges    of  their  own  official  class  against  the 
nobles  instead  of  urging  the  grievances  of  the  country  upon  the 
Crown,  rendered   the  possibility  of  obtaining  any  real  check 
upon  the  Crown  absolutely  hopeless.     The  nobles  not  unnat- 

1  See  Appendix  ii. 
PERIOD   V.  C 


34  European  History,   1598-17 15 

urally  looked  with  jealous  eyes  on  the  gradual  formation  of  an 
hereditary  privileged  class  of  officials,  by  means  of  the  pur- 
chase of  offices  and  the  right  of  transmission  secured  by  the 
patilette,  which  could  not  fail  to  grow  in  a  little  time  into  a 
second  noblesse,  and  they  directed  their  efforts  mainly  to  pro- 
curing the  abolition  of  purchase  in  the  civil  services.  The 
Tiers  Etat  on  their  side,  numbering  as  they  did  but  compara- 
tively few  of  the  privileged  '  exempt '  among  their  ranks,  fixed 
their  eyes  on  the  inordinate  pensions  enjoyed  by  the  great 
nobles,  and  demanded  the  abolition  of  the  pension  list  and  the 
reduction  of  the  taille.  This  was  to  hit  the  nobles  in  their 
weakest  place,  and  the  conteijtion  between  the  two  orders 
became  so  keen  that  the  court  had  to  interfere  and  bring  about 
a  reconciliation.  Hardly,  however,  had  the  Tiers  Etat  finished 
their  controversy  with  the  nobles  than  they  became  involved 
in  a  quarrel  with  the  clergy.  The  magistracy,  especially  the 
lawyers,  were  strongly  Galilean  in  their  views  of  ecclesiastical 
government,  that  is,  they  maintained  the  right  of  the  national 
authorities  to  govern  the  Church  in  France  in  all  matters 
which  were  not  directly  spiritual  in  their  nature,  and  repudi- 
ated interference  from  the  Pope.  Especially  they  disliked  the 
Jesuits,  and  wished  to  avoid  the  recognition  of  the  decrees  of 
the  Council  of  Trent,  which  had  not  as  yet  been  formally  ac- 
cepted by  France.  The  Tiers  Etat  accordingly  drew  up  an 
article  in  their  cahier,  or  Hst  of  grievances,  which,  under  the 
form  of  asserting  the  right  divine  of  the  French  kings,  and 
denouncing  the  crime  of  regicide,  impliedly  denied  the  right 
of  the  popes  to  depose  kings  and  absolve  subjects  from  their 
allegiance.  At  once  the  whole  question  between  the  Galhcans 
and  the  Ultramontanes  was  raised,  and  for  more  than  a  month 
no  other  matter  was  discussed  among  the  Estates.  The  nobles 
sided  with  the  clergy,  and  agreed  with  them  on  twenty-four 
articles  representing  their  common  views,  among  which  the 
recognition  of  the  decrees  of  Trent  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
authority  of  the  Holy  See  assumed  an  equal  place  of  import- 
ance with  the  union  of  Navarre  and  B^arn  to  France,  and  the 


France  under  Henry  IV.  35 

abolition  of  iht  pau kite  and  the  purchase  system.  The  Parle- 
ment  supported  the  Tiers  Etat,  and  by  its  interference  intro- 
duced one  more  cause  of  dissension.  Finally,  the  court  had 
again  to  interfere  and  order  the  Tiers  Etat,  to  omit  the  objec- 
tionable article  from  their  cahier.  Yet  in  spite  of  these  sui- 
cidal quarrels,  which  proved  the  unfitness  of  the  Reforms 
States-General  to  undertake  constitutional  respon-   ^'■°"^^*  °^°"* 

i^  by  the  States- 

sibilities,  their  meeting  was  not  wholly  useless.  General. 
Differing  on  almost  all  other  questions,  the  three  orders  were 
agreed  upon  an  attack  upon  the  financial  administration. 
Jeannin,  the  finance  minister,  was,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
the  court,  forced  to  produce  accounts,  which,  when  produced, 
showed  clearly  enough  that  none  had  been  kept  which  were  fit 
for  production.  The  consent  of  the  Crown  was  obtained  to  a 
considerable  reduction  of  the  pension  list,  the  suppression  of 
the  paulette,  and  the  erection  of  a  special  court  to  control  the 
finances.  Endowed  with  no  legislative  power,  all  that  the  Es- 
tates could  do  in  the  way  of  amehorating  the  government  was 
to  make  representations  and  extort  promises,  and  this  they  did 
as  effectively  as  circumstances  permitted  in  the  most  important 
department  of  administration.  If  it  must  be  allowed  that  they 
did  much  to  destroy  their  own  influence  and  render  them- 
selves ridiculous  by  their  jealousy  and  quarrelsomeness,  it  must 
also  be  remembered  that  no  king  ever  dared  to  summon  them 
again  until  monarchy  was  tottering  to  its  fall. 

Louis  was  declared  of  age  just  before  the  meeting  of  the 
States-General  in  1 614,  when  he  had  reached  his   Fail  of  the 
fourteenth  year.     In  1616  the  hated  double  mar-    marechai 
riage    with    Spain    was    celebrated,   and    Marie's   Ministry  of 
triumph  was  complete.     It  was  short-lived  —  Louis   Luynes,  1617. 
himself    shared   the    universal   hatred    felt    for   the    marechai 
d'Ancre.     Urged  on  by  his  friend   and  fellow-sportsman    the 
count  de  Luynes,  he  determined  to  take  the  government  into 
his  own  hands.     A  third  rising  of  the  nobles  at  the  beginning 
of  161 7  professed  as  its  object  the  saving  of  the  king  from  the 
hands  of  a  foreigner.     Only  the  queen-mother  supported  her 


36  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

favourite ;  she  was  powerless  against  her  son.  As  the  mar^chal 
entered  the  Louvre  on  the  25th  of  April  161 7,  he  was  ordered 
in  the  king's  name  to  surrender  his  sword.  On  his  refusal  the 
guard  fired,  and  he  fell  dead.  His  wife  was  not  long  in  follow- 
ing him.  Condemned  on  an  absurd  charge  of  sorcery,  she  was 
executed  shortly  after.  The  queen- mother  was  obhged  to  retire 
to  Blois,  and  Louis,  seeing  his  oppressors  so  successfully  dis- 
posed of,  felt  that  at  last  he  was  king.  He  was  mistaken.  He 
had  only  exchanged  one  master  for  another.  Luynes,  who  suc- 
ceeded to  the  power  formerly  exercised  by  the  mar^chal  d'Ancre, 
soon  proved  neither  more  capable  or  honest  in  administration, 
nor  more  agreeable  to  the  nobles.  The  queen-mother  never 
ceased  her  intrigues  to  regain  her  power,  intrigues  which  became 
daily  more  dangerous  as  they  were  directed  by  the  unseen 
hand  of  Richelieu.  In  1619  the  old  duke  of  Epernon,  in  1620 
the  dukes  of  Mayenne  and  Vendome,  in  alliance  with  the 
Huguenots  under  Rohan  and  La  Tremouille,  rose  in  her 
favour,  and  Louis  and  his  favourite  found  themselves  obliged 
to  come  to  an  arrangement  with  her. 

But  no  sooner  had  the  treaty  of  Angouleme,  made  in 
February  1619,  and  confirmed  in  1620,  restored  harmony  be- 
tween Louis  and  his  mother  and  the  nobles,  than  the  Hugue- 
Risin  of  the  ^^^^j  ^^^  wished  to  take  advantage  of  the  troubles 
Huguenots,  of  the  court  in  order  to  increase  their  political  in- 
'^^°'  dependence,  threw  all  the  south  of  France  into  a 

blaze.  Frightened  by  the  forced  restoration  of  Catholicism  in 
B^arn  in  1620,  they  struck  boldly  for  independence,  dreamed  of 
a  Huguenot  republic  in  the  south  cf  France,  and  were  content 
to  see  the  dismemberment  of  the  nation,  if  by  it  they  could 
satisfy  their  personal  ambition.  Wherever  the  eye  turned 
among  the  various  interests  of  which  France  was  composed, 
whether  upon  Luynes  and  the  courtiers,  upon  the  queen-mother 
and  her  rival  court,  upon  Cond^  and  the  nobles,  upon  Rohan  and 
the  Huguenots,  the  same  picture  of  self-seeking  ambition  and 
personal  aims  was  everywhere  presented.  Each~one  for  hun- 
«elf  and  no  one  for  the  country  was  the  motto  of  all  among  the 


I 


France  under  Henry  IV.  37 

leaders  of  France  with  two  exceptions.  The  king  himself  and 
Richelieu  the  young  bishop  of  Lugon,  at  that  time  in  disgrace 
with  his  patroness  Marie  de  Mddicis,  were  the  only  ones  in 
whose  breasts  the  love  of  France  burned  with  a  pure  and  un- 
sullied flame,  and  the  hour  had  not  yet  struck  which  was  to 
bind  them  together  in  a  common  work  for  the  common  weal. 
Meanwhile  the  crisis  was  a  serious  one,  and  Louis  set  himself 
manfully  to  meet  it.  The  clash  of  arms  and  the  threat  of 
danger  always  brought  out  the  stronger  parts  of  his  nature. 
He  confirmed  the  Edict  of  Nantes  ;  then  at  the  head  of  a  large 
army,  after  quieting  the  north,  he  marched  towards  the  great 
Huguenot  stronghold  of  La  Rochelle,  and  captured  S.  Jean 
d'Angely  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Soubise.  Leaving  the  due 
d'Epernon  to  form  the  siege  of  La  Rochelle,  he  directed  all  his 
energies  to  the  capture  of  Montauban,  the  great  Huguenot 
stronghold  of  the  south,  while  Montmorency  subdued  the 
Cevennes.  For  three  months  the  stout  city  resisted  all  the  ill- 
directed  efforts  of  the  royal  army,  and  in  November  1621  the 
king  sullenly  withdrew  the  remnants  of  his  perishing  troops. 
The  death  of  Luynes  from  a  fever  caught  in  camp  did  much  to 
make  peace  possible,  and  the  victory  of  Louis  and  Cond^  over 
Soubise  in  the  marches  of  Rie  in  April  1622  brought  it  near. 
The  Huguenots  had  come  to  see  that  without  foreign  assistance 
their  cause  was  hopeless.  The  due  de  Bouillon  remained  im- 
movable in  the  north.  Lesdiguieres,  the  old  Huguenot  leader, 
became  a  Catholic  and  received  the  baton  of  Constable.  La 
Force,  the  heroic  defender  of  Montauban,  accepted  the  rank 
of  marshal  of  France  and  a  gift  of  200,000  crowns.  Rohan 
alone  remained  steadfast,  but  he  too  was  forced  to  accept  the 
inevitable,  when  it  became  clear  that  MontpelUer,  the  last 
Huguenot  fortress  of  the  south,  must  surrender,  ^he  peace  of 
The  peace  of  Montpellier,  signed  on  the  19th  Oc-  Montpeiiier, 
tober  1622,  marks  the  first  great  step  taken  by  the  of^Rjcj^^i'Ju 
Crown  towards  the  destruction  of  the  Huguenots  into  the  Min- 
as  a  political  organisation.  By  it  religious  tolera-  '^^''^^ 
tion  was  secured  to   them,  but  they  were  forbidden  to  hold 


38  Europeatt  History,   1598-1715 

political  assemblies  of  any  kind  whatever.  All  fortifications 
recently  raised  by  them  were  to  be  demolished,  and  La  Rochelle 
and  Montauban  were  to  be  for  the  future  the  only  guaranteed 
towns.  The  victory  of  France  over  the  Huguenots  had  results 
far  more  extended  than  appeared  upon  the  surface.  The  res- 
toration of  civil  order  in  the  country  naturally  led  to  an  attempt 
to  restore  personal  harmony  at  court,  and  under  the  auspices 
of  La  Vieuville,  who  now  exercised  the  chief  influence  in  the 
ministry,  a  settlement  of  the  questions  still  at  issue  between  the 
king  and  his  mother  was  effected.  One  of  the  conditions  of 
this  settlement  was  the  entry  of  Richelieu  into  the  royal  council. 
From  that  day  a  new  era  dawned  for  France. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  COUNTER-REFORMATION  AND   RELIGIOUS 
TROUBLES   IN   GERMANY 

Causes  of  the  Counter-Reformation  —  The  weakness  of  Protestantism — The 
revival  in  the  Church  —  The  influence  of  the  Jesuits — Beginning  of  the 
Counter-Reformation  in  Poland,  in  Germany,  in  the  Austrian  dominions  — 
Questions  still  unsettled  in  Germany,  the  position  of  the  Calvinists,  the 
secularised  lands,  the  ecclesiastical  reservation  —  Dangerous  position  of 
the  Calvinists  of  the  Rhineland  —  The  troubles  of  Donauworth — For- 
mation of  the  Calvinist  Union  and  the  Catholic  League  —  Constitutional 
difficulties  between  the  Emperor  and  the  BohemianS-'—  Revolt  of  the 
Bohemian  Protestants  —  The  throwing  from  the  windows.^  - 

The  reaction  against  Protestantism  in  Europe  began  to  make 
itself  felt  in  the  concluding  years  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Like  all  great  movements  in  the  religious,  as  in  causes  of  the 
the  political,  sphere,  it  owed  its  existence  to  many  Counter- 
complex  causes.  To  some  extent  racial  distinc-  ^^fo""*"^''""- 
tions  asserted  themselves.  The  Romance-speaking  nations 
and  the  Sclavonic  peoples,  roughly  speaking,  after  a  moment 
of  hesitation  declared  plainly  against  Protestantism.  To  a 
larger  extent  poHtical  reasons  dictated  the  attitude  of  govern- 
ments, and  governments  were  able  to  do  much  towards  de- 
fining the  religion  of  their  subjects.  The  determined  stand 
made  by  Spain  in  defence  of  Catholicism  was  greatly  affected 
by  the  ambition  of  Philip  ii.  to  make  himself  master  of 
Europe.  The  effective  opposition  to  the  domination  of  Spain 
offered  by  Elizabeth  was  far  more  due  to  zeal  for  the  in- 
dependence and  commercial  prosperity  of  England  than  to 
differences  of  faith.     The  final  resolve  of  France   to  remain 

39 


40  Buropean  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

distinctly  Catholic  was,  as  we  have  seen,  due  to  the  tact  that 
she  prized  her  unity  before  everything,  and  the  Huguenots 
were  the  party  of  disruption. 

But  after  making  all  allowance  for  the  influence  of  other 
consideration,  the  reasons  which  determined  the  course  of 
Inherent  events  remained  always  religious.      Protestantism 

Protest"nt°^  was  at  the  first  the  expression  of  a  great  moral 
ism.  revolution.      The   religious   and    moral   nature    of 

man  rose  in  rebellion  against  a  distorted  faith,  and  an  im- 
moral system  which  seemed  incapable  of  reform.  Based 
mainly  on  a  negative  theology,  it  was  at  its  strongest  as  long 
as  its  work  was  almost  wholly  destructive.  The  overthrow  of 
moral  abuse,  the  attack  on  wrongly  defined  faith  was  easy  to 
men  inspired  with  the  zeal  of  a  crusade  on  behalf  of  truth. 
But  when  it,  in  its  turn,  was  called  upon  by  the  necessities  of 
controversy  to  attempt  to  construct  a  system  of  its  own,  to  lay 
down  principles,  to  explain  truth,  its  weakness  became  evi- 
dent. Quickly  divided  into  the  two  great  schools  named 
after  Luther  and  Calvin,  in  hopeless  and  virulent  antagonism, 
it  was  soon  seen  that  in  each  division  the  tendency  was  still 
further  to  define  and  still  further  to  divide.  Confession  fol- 
lowed confession  in  the  hopeless  attempt  to  arrive  at  unity 
through  the  expression  of  self-evident,  perfect  truth  in  human 
language.  The  only  result  was  greater  division.  Luther- 
anism,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  disruption,  took  refuge  under 
the  wing  of  the  State,  and  as  it  became  more  and  more 
merely  the  moral  department  of  governments,  it  lost  more  and 
more  its  powers  over  mankind.  From  the  middle  of  the  six- 
teenth century  its  progress  began  to  cease,  and  when  progress 
stops  in  a  religious  movement,  reaction  begins.  Calvinism 
showed  more  vitality.  It  was  more  aggressive  and  lent  itself 
as  readily  to  the  aid  of  those  opposed  to  governmental  cen- 
tralisation, as  Lutheranism  did  to  the  assistance  of  the  govern- 
ments themselves.  Its  stern  creed,  with  its  strong  tendency 
to  fanaticism  and  bigotry,  produced  a  type  of  character 
always  concentrated  and  effective,  and  often  lofty  and  severe. 


Religious   Troubles  in  Germany  41 

It  was  seen  at  its  best  when  combined  with  the  spirit  of 
patriotism  and  liberty  in  the  Dutch  and  the  Swiss,  at  its 
worst  when  degraded  into  a  pretext  for  selfishness  and  faction 
in  France  and  in  Germany.  At  one  time  it  looked  as  if  it 
was  going  to  carry  everything  before  it.  Firmly  rooted  in 
Scotland,  Switzerland,  the  upper  Rhineland,  and  among  the 
Dutch,  it  was  rapidly  winning  over  to  its  flag  England,  France, 
and  Hungary,  was  making  rapid  strides  in  the  hereditary 
dominions  of  the  House  of  Austria,  and  had  even  made 
good  its  footing  in  north  Italy  and  Spain.  But  like  Luther- 
anism  it  was  more  fitted  to  attack  than  to  defend,  to  win 
than  to  consolidate,  and  gradually  the  tide  began  to  ebb. 
The  long  and  bitter  struggle  in  the  Netherlands  ended  in  a 
division  of  territory.  The  seven  northern  provinces  became 
independent  and  remained  Calvinist,  in  spite  of  the  utmost 
efforts  of  Philip  11.,  but  south  and  west  of  the  Scheldt  the 
country  adhered  to  Spain  and  Catholicism.  England  in  her 
national  expression  of  religion,  under  the  guidance  of  Eliza- 
beth, definitely  refused  to  become  Calvinistic,  though  many 
EngUshmen  became  Calvinists.  France,  as  we  have  seen, 
having  to  choose  between  Calvinism  and  unity,  not  only 
chose  to  remain  Catholic  and  united,  but  set  herself  dehber- 
ately  to  root  out  the  political  influence  of  the  Huguenot 
organisation. 

But  after  all  it  was  not  the    inherent  weakness  of  Protes- 
tantism,   either    in    its    philosophical,    religious,    or    political 
aspects,  which  finally  put  an  end  to  its  progress,   Religious 
and   turned    back   the    tide.     It   was    the   greatly  revival  in 
increased  strength  of  Catholicism.     The  power  of 
Protestantism  lay,  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century,  in 
its  protest  against  wicked   lives  and  a  degraded  system.     By 
the  end  of  the    century  that    protest  was  no  longer  needed, 
and  no  longer  effective.     The  Church,  which  had  refused  to 
reform  itself  after  the  horrors  of  the  great  schism  under  the 
pressure  of  the   councils  of  Constance   and    Basel,  and   had 
answered   the    trumpet   call   of    Savonarola   with    an    excom- 


42  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

munication  at  the  hands  of  Alexander  vi.,  had  at  length  been 
forced  into  reform  by  the  success  of  Protestantism.  The 
Council  of  Trent  left  its  mark  upon  the  Roman  Church  in 
two  special  ways.  By  the  establishment  of  the  seminaries, 
and  the  enforcement  of  residence,  it  reformed  the  clergy 
and  taught  them  to  be  the  teachers  of  the  people.  By 
the  acknowledgment  of  Papal  supremacy  it  centralised  the 
organisation  of  the  Roman  Church,  as  an  army  is  centralised 
under  the  absolute  command  of  its  leader,  to  whom  unques- 
tioning obedience  is  due.  From  that  time  the  Pope  has 
exercised  influence  over  a  smaller  area  of  Europe  than  before 
the  Reformation,  but  with  far  greater  power  of  compelling 
obedience  among  his  own  adherents.  The  institution  of  new 
religious  orders,  and  the  remarkable  revival  of  the  religious 
life  in  the  Roman  Church  in  the  century  following  the 
Reformation,  is  perhaps  the  proof  rather  than  the  cause  of 
the  renewal  of  personal  piety  and  the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice, 
but  the  foundation  of  the  Society  of  Jesus  marks  a  turning- 
influence  of  point  in  the  religious  history  of  the  world.  Igna- 
the  Jesuits,  ^iyg  Loyola  was  a  soldier  before  he  was  a  priest, 
and  his  Society  was  a  military  organisation  for  religious 
purposes.  The  conquest  of  heresy  and  infidelity  was  its 
object,  obedience  and  renunciation  of  personality  were  to  it 
the  first  of  virtues.  A  Jesuit,  who  was  thoroughly  imbued  with 
the  principles  of  his  order,  lost  his  individuality  and  became  but 
a  part  of  a  great  machine.  He  lived,  moved,  felt,  thought, 
but  in  his  Society  and  for  it  alone.  Trained  on  one  system, 
directed  by  the  will  of  one  man,  bound  by  its  constitution  to 
implicit  obedience  to  the  Pope,  the  Society  of  Jesus,  as  it 
spread  over  the  whole  world  in  the  ardour  and  pure 
enthusiasm  of  its  earlier  years,  formed  a  power  in  the  hands 
of  the  Papacy,  which,  from  the  intense  concentration  of  its 
government,  and  the  immense  diffusion  of  its  activity,  has  never 
been  equalled  in  the  world's  history.  In  Europe,  where 
Protestantism  was  the  great  enemy  to  be  overthrown,  it  seized 
with  charact-^ristic  dexterity  upon  education  as  its  chief  work. 


Religious  Troubles  in  Germany  43 

Protestantism,  though  born  of  the  Renaissance,  had  done 
little  to  satisfy  the  demands  for  increased  knowledge  which 
the  growing  spirit  of  free  inquiry  was  making  so  Their  educa- 
loudly.  It  had  trained  some  scholars,  it  had  t»onai  work, 
done  little  for  general  education.  The  Jesuits  seized  the 
opportunity.  They  offered  to  the  world  the  best  education 
attainable  free  of  cost,  and  before  long  they  had  far  distanced 
all  competitors.  The  value  of  this  to  the  Church  in  countries 
where  Protestantism  was  powerful  but  not  dominant  can 
hardly  be  exaggerated.  It  was  a  guarantee  that  the  rising 
intelligence  of  the  country  should  be  trained  in  the  most 
uncompromising  school  of  churchmanship.  No  Catholic 
power  found  itself  able  to  dispense  with  their  support.  Even 
in  France  where  Calvinism  was  strong,  under  a  king  whose 
religion  was  always  tempered  by  policy,  the  Jesuits  managed 
to  make  good  their  footing  in  spite  of  the  most  virulent  and 
active  opposition  of  the  Sorbonne.  To  the  rulers  of  Bavaria 
and  Austria,  who  were  sincerely  anxious  for  the  rooting  out  of 
Protestantism,  they  were  simply  invaluable.  Thus  by  the  end 
of  the  century  the  tables  had  become  completely  turned. 
Zeal,  devotion,  learning,  self-sacrifice,  religious  enthusiasm, 
were  now  on  the  side  of  the  Church.  Superior  in  organisation, 
superior  in  religious  effort,  superior  in  concentration,  the 
Church  presented  a  united  and  effective  front  to  her  enemies, 
and  was  prepared,  when  the  opportunity  should  come,  to 
initiate  a  crusade  by  the  help  of  the  Jesuits  against  Protestant- 
ism in  Europe,  while  a  new  world  was  being  won  for  her  across 
the  ocean  by  their  missionary  efforts. 

The  opportunity  was  not  long  in  coming.  In  the  conclud- 
ing years  of  the  sixteenth  century,  men  attained  to  power  in 
central  Europe  whose  youth  had  been  trained  under  the 
influences  of  the  Catholic  revival.  Already  by  the  efforts  of 
Philip  II.  and  S.  Carlo  Borromeo,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Inquisition,  the  movement  in  favour  of  Protestantism  in 
Spain  and  Italy  had  been  crushed,  and  heresy  driven  back 
behind   the   Alps   and    the    Pyrenees.      In    1587    Sigismund, 


44  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  son  of  John  of  Sweden  and  Catherine  Jagellon,  was 
elected  to  the  throne  of  Poland.  Sigismund  was  a  staunch 
„^   ^      ,       Catholic,  and  owed  his  election  to  the  efforts  of 

The  Counter-  '  i  •  ir 

Reformation  the  Catholics.  He  at  once  set  himself  to  re- 
in Poland.  g^Qj.g  Poland  to  Catholicism.  He  used  the  royal 
patronage,  which  was  extremely  extensive  in  Poland,  in  favour 
of  Catholics  only.  He  called  the  Jesuits  to  his  assistance, 
supported  them  with  money,  and  encouraged  the  sons  of  the 
nobility  to  attend  their  schools.  In  disputed  questions  as  to 
the  right  to  the  ecclesiastical  buildings,  he  used  the  influence 
of  the  Crown  in  favour  of  the  Catholics,  and  was  so  success- 
ful in  this,  that  it  is  said  that  Dantzig  was  the  only  town  of 
importance  in  Poland,  where  the  Protestants  retained  the  use 
of  the  parish  church.  Thus  in  a  few  years  the  whole  of  the 
official  classes  became  Catholic  ;  while  large  country  districts, 
especially  in  Livonia  and  Lithuania,  were  won  back  to  the  old 
faith  by  the  efforts  of  the  Jesuit  missionaries.  In 
Germany  recourse  was  had  to  still  stronger  meas- 
ures, for  in  virtue  of  the  principle  of  the  religious  peace  of 
Augsburg  of  1555  it  was  held  that  every  ruler  had  the  right  of 
dictating  the  religion  of  his  subjects.  Accordingly  at  Christ- 
mas 1595,  the  bishop  of  Bamberg  issued  an  edict  banishing 
from  the  diocese  all  who  refused  to  receive  the  Eucharist 
according  to  the  Catholic  rite.  Emboldened  by  his  success, 
the  bishop  of  Paderborn  followed  his  example  a  few  years 
afterwards,  and  established  and  endowed  a  Jesuit  college  in 
his  cathedral  city.  In  the  first  years  of  the  new  century  the 
electors  von  Bicken  and  Schweikard  of  Mainz,  Ernest  and 
Ferdinand  of  Koln  and  Lothaire  of  Trier,  partly  by  govern- 
mental pressure,  partly  by  personal  influence,  restored  Catho- 
Hcism  permanently  in  the  three  archbishoprics  of  the  Rhine. 
But   it   was  in  south  Germany  that   the  "greatest 

'        results  were  obtained.      In    1596    Ferdinand,  the 

cousin  of  the  emperor  Rudolf  11.,  came  of  age,  and  succeeded 
to  the  duchies  of  Styria7~Carinthia,  and  Carniola,  formerly 
held  by  his  father  the  archduke   Charles.     Ferdinand  was  a 


Religions   Troubles  in  Gej-many  45 

man  of  resolute  will  and  deep  religious  convictions,  which  had 
been  developed  by  his  Jesuit  teachers  into  something  little 
short  of  fanaticism.  He  looked  upon  the  restoration  of 
Catholicism  as  the  special  work  of  his  Hfe,  and  kneeling  before 
the  shrine  of  Loretto  the  year  after  his  accession,  he  solemnly 
swore  to  eradicate  Protestantism  from  his  hereditary  domin- 
ions. He  did  not  sleep  upon  his  promise.  In  1598  edicts 
were  issued  ordering  all  Protestant  ministers  to  leave  the 
country  within  fourteen  days.  In  the  following  year  commis- 
sions were  sent  through  the  country  to  enforce  the  edicts.  The 
Protestant  churches  were  thrown  down,  the  pastors  ejected, 
and  the  inhabitants  compelled  to  conform  to  ,in  Austria 
Catholicism.  The  Emperor,  seeing  his  nephew's  and  Moravia. 
success,  followed  in  his  footsteps,  and  from  1599  to  1603  similar 
commissions  were  issued  for  Upper  and  Lower  Austria,  and 
the  Protestant  ministers  were  driven  out.  Not  content  with 
this,  Rudolf  proceeded  to  follow  a  similar  policy  in  his  other 
deminiens.  In  1602  he  suppressed  the  meetings  of  the 
Moravian  brethren  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  and  gave  armed 
assistance  to  the  efforts  of  the  Hungarian  bishops  to  convert 
their  Protestant  flocks.     Meanwhile  by  the  exer- 

II-  In  Bavaria. 

tions   of  William,   duke  of  Bavaria,  and   his  son 
Maximilian,  who  came  to  the  throne  on  the  abdication  of  his 
father  in   1696,  powerfully  assisted  by  the  great  Jesuit  college 
at  Ingolstadt,  Catholicism  had  completely  won  the  upper  hand 
in  Bavaria. 

The  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century  therefore  saw  the 
reaction  in  favour  of  the  Church  in  full  flood  tide  of  prosperity. 
At  its  head  stood  a  pope,  Paul  v.  (Borghese),  who,  if  some- 
what deficient  in  the  grandeur  of  mind  of  Sixtus  v.,  and  the 
fervour  of  piety  which  distinguished  Pius  v.,  yielded  to  none  of 
his  predecessors,  not  even  to  Hildebrand  himself,  in  the  lofty 
conception  he  had  formed  of  the  nature  and  prerogatives  of 
his  office,  and  in  the  determination  to  make  them  respected. 
_Jn .  Philip  m.  of  Spain,  Maximilian  of  Bavark,  Ferdinand  of 
Styria,  and  Sigismund  of  Poland,  he  had  lieutenants  who  had 


46  Etiropean  History,   1598-17 15 

made  the  restoration  and  increase  of  Catholicism  the  first 
object  of  their  poUcy.  Already  their  efforts  had  been  crowned 
with  success  in  Poland  and  in  south  Germany,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  the  movement  had  made  itself  felt  all  over  the  debat- 
able land  subject  to  the  Empire,  which  was  not  as  yet  definitely 
attached  to  one  side  or  the  other.  Even  the  imperial  institu- 
tions themselves  were  affected  by  its  progress,  and  men  noticed 
that  the  decisions  of  the  imperial  courts  of  appeal  were  biassed 
by  the  rehgious  opinions  o^  the  judges  and  of  the  Emperor. 
This  was  all  the  more  important  as  it  happened  that  these 
particular  courts  were  at  that  time  being  called  upon  to  decide 
Questions  re-  a  most  interesting  political  question.  The  peace 
^eace'of*^^  of  Augsburg,  Concluded  in  1555,  which  attempted 
Augsburg.  to  establish  peace  between  the  Church  and  the 
Lutherans  in  Germany,  had  left  three  problems  unsolved, 
which  were  certain  sooner  or  later  to  be  decided  by  the  sword, 
if  no  peaceful  compromise  could  be  arrived  at  in  the  mean- 
I  Position  time.  In  the  first  place  it  only  applied  to  the 
of  the  Gal-  Lutherans,  for  at  the  time  of  its  conclusion  the 
vimsts.  Protestant  princes  of  the    Empire    were    all    Lu- 

therans, and  they  merely  thought  of  securing  their  own  inter- 
ests. Calvinism,  therefore  had  no  rights  whatever  in  the 
Empire,~and  ha*d  still  to  win  its  recognition  from  the  law. 
%.  The  secu-  Secondly,  it  had  been  laid  down  by  the  peace  that 
lansed  lands,  ^j^g  Church  should  no  longer  have  any  rights  over 
Church  property  lying  within  the  territories  of  Lutheran  princes, 
which  had  been  secularised  by  them  or  applied  by  them  to 
Lutheran  purposes,  before  1552  ;  but  differences  had  since  arisen 
between  the  two  parties  as  to  the  bearing  of  this  provision 
upon  lands  secularised  subsequently  to  1552.  It  was  argued 
by  the  Catholics,  that  the  very  fact  that  lands  secularised 
before  1552  were  expressly  exempted  from  all  the  claims 
of  the  Church,  clearly  implied  that  lands  secularised  after 
1552  were  not  subject  to  that  exemption,  and  had  therefore 
been  taken  from  the  Church  illegally  and  ought  to  be  at  once 
restored.     The  Lutherans  on  the  other  hand  maintained  that 


Religions   Troubles  in  Germany  47 

the  treaty  intended  to  lay  down  a  general  rule,  which  was  to 
apply  to  all  lands  secularised  under  similar  circumstances,  and 
the  date  only  referred  to  the  convention  of  Passau,  which  led 
to  the  religious  peace,  and  was  not  meant  to  create  two  differ- 
ent classes  of  secularised  lands.  Following  out  this  somewhat 
broad  construction  of  the  peace,  large  quantities  of  Church 
land  had  been  secularised  since  1552  by  Lutheran  and  even 
by  Calvinist  princes,  and  used  by  them  as  a  very  convenient 
endowment  for  younger  sons  and  other  rela-  ^j^ 
tions.  A  further  difficulty  arose  with  regard  to  siasticai  rc- 
what  was  called  the  Ecclesiastical  Reservation.  ^*''^**'°"- 
It  frequently  happened,  during  the  earlier  years  of  the  Re- 
formation, that  a  bishop  or  abbot,  who  was  a  territorial  prince 
in  right  of  his  bishopric  or  abbacy,  —  of  which  there  were  a 
great  number  in  Germany,  —  became  a  Lutheran.  In  order 
to  preserve  the  rights  of  the  Church  in  such  a  case,  it  was 
provided  by  the  peace  of  Augsburg,  that  a  bishop  or  abbot 
who  became  a  Lutheran  should  at  once  vacate  his  dignity. 
But  the  Protestants  maintained  that  this  Ecclesiastical  Reser- 
vation, as  it  was  called,  was  only  intended  to  apply  to  cases 
where  a  bishop  or  abbot,  who  had  been  elected  by  a  Catholic 
Chapter  as  a  Catholic,  became  a  Protestant,  and  did  not 
affect  those  cases  where  a  Chapter  which  had  itself  become 
Protestant  elected  a  Protestant  to  be  their  bishop  or  abbot. 
In  virtue  of  this  contention,  eight  of  the  great  bishoprics  of 
north  Germany  and  many  abbacies  throughout  the  country 
became  practically  secularised.  The  Protestant  bishop  or 
abbot  made  no  pretence  to  ecclesiastical  position  or  func- 
tions. He  was  merely  a  territorial  prince  who  enjoyed  the 
title  of  bishop,  or  sometimes  administrator,  instead  of  that 
of  duke  or  landgrave,  but  his  right  to  his  title  and  his 
lands  had  never  been  admitted  by  the  imperial  courts  or  the 
Diet. 

As  long  as  the  tide  was  flowing  in  the  direction  of  Protes- 
tantism the  Protestant  view  of  these  matters  naturally  pre- 
vailed, as  being  that  of  the  stronger  party,  and  the  Catholics 


48  European  History,   15  98-1715 

had  to  content  themselves  with  protests.  But  with  the  advent 
of  the  Counter-Reformation  things  became  very  different.  The 
D  of  the  division  in  the  Protestant  party  was  so  enven- 
Rhineiand  omed,  that  no  Lutheran  would  stir  a  finger  to 
Caivinists.  daim  the  privileges  of  the  religious  peace  for  Cal- 
vinists.  The  Catholics  had  now  powerful  friends  to  back 
them  in  demanding  back  the  secularised  lands.  It  was 
almost  certain  if  the  question  could  be  brought  before  the 
imperial  courts  that  the  decision  would  be  in  their  favour. 
The  Caivinists  of  the  upper  Rhineland  therefore  found  them- 
selves in  a  dangerous  position.  Situated  between  the  Spanish 
power  on  the  one  side  and  Bavaria  on  the  other,  without  a 
shadow  of  legal  claim  to  the  protection  of  the  religious  peace 
of  Augsburg,  without  the  chance  of  deriving  any  assistance 
from  the  Lutheran  princes  of  the  north,  they  were  in  danger 
of  being  the  next  victims  of  the  Emperor  and  Maximilian,  just 
The  troubles  ^^shed  with  their  triumph  over  heresy  at  home, 
of  Donau-  A  little  incident  showed  how  real  the  danger 
wort  ,1607.  ^^g  jj^  1607,  at  Donauworth,  a  free  city  on  the 
Danube,  which  had  become  Protestant  after  the  peace  of 
Augsburg,  a  Catholic  procession  was  insulted  and  a  religious 
quarrel  excited.  The  matter  was  at  once  brought  to  the 
notice  of  the  Imperial  (Aulic)  Council,  a  body  entirely  com- 
posed of  nominees  of  the  Emperor.  The  ban  of  the  Empire 
was  pronounced  against  Donauworth,  and  Maximilian  of 
Bavaria  appointed  to  carry  it  out.  He  at  once  occupied  the 
town  with  his  troops,  but  not  content  with  establishing  order 
and  taking  security  for  the  payment  of  his  army,  he  proceeded 
to  eject  the  Protestants  from  the  churches  and  restore  the 
Catholic  worship,  on  the  plea  that  the  estabhshment  of  Pro- 
testantism there  had  been  illegal,  and  was  not  protected  by 
the  peace  of  Augsburg.  The  immediate  result  of  this  action 
on  the  part  of  Maximilian,  which  was  looked  upon  by  the 
Protestants  as  a  distinct  and  indefensible  act  of  aggression, 
was  to  bring  about  the  organisation  of  the  two  parties  in  two 
rival  camps.     Christian  of  Anhalt,  one  of  those  sanguine  and 


Religions  Troubles  in  Germany  49 

turbulent  spirits,  whose  advent  to  the  leadership  of  affairs  is 
a  sure  presage  of  war  and  dissension,  seized  the  opportunity 
to  bind  together  the  Protestant  states  of  the  Rhineland  in  1608 
into  a   Union  for  self-defence,  which,  when  once   -        ^.       . 

'  '  Formation  of 

formed,  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  lead  to  the  at-  the  Caivinist 
tack  against  the  House  of  Austria.  In  the  next  ""'°"'  '^°'- 
year  the  Union  was  joined  by  the  important  free  cities  of 
Strasburg,  Nuremberg,  and  Ulm.  The  Elector  Palatine  was 
acknowledged  as  its  head,  and  Christian  of  Anhalt  and  the 
Margrave  of  Baden- Durjach  appointed  its  generals,  and  Ger- 
man Calvinism  thus  stood  ready  to  defend  its  interests  to 
the  death  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Counter-Reforma- 
tion. Nor  were  the  Catholics  far  behind  in  their  preparations 
for  war.  In  1609  the  Catholic  League  was  formed  Formation  of 
among  the  Catholic  bishops  of  south  Germany,  the  Catholic 
under  the  leadership  of  Maximilian  of  Bavaria,  ^=*e"e.  J^og. 
to  defend  Catholic  interests.  The  Pope  gave  it  his  approval 
and  Spain  promised  assistance.  With  the  long  head  of  Max- 
imilian to  direct  its  policy,  with  his  long  purse  to  provide 
the  sinews  of  war,  with  his  trained  army  under  Tilly  to 
fight  its  battles,  and  with  Spain  and  the  Pope  to  fall  back 
upon,  the  Catholic  League  bid  fair  to  distance  its  rival  in  the 
game  for  leadership  in  south  Germany,  which  was  being 
played. 

But  just  at  this  moment  occurred  two  events  which  rapidly 
swung  the  balance  to  the  opposite  side.  The  disputed  suc- 
cession to  Cleves  and  Jiilich  —  followed  as  it  was  weakness  of 
by  the  intervention  of  the  Emperor  and  the  occu-  ^'^^  Emperor, 
pation  of  Jiilich  on  his  behalf,  while  the  elector  of  Branden- 
burg and  the  count  palatine  of  Neuburg  made  themselves 
joint  masters  of  Cleves  —  brought  about,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
most  formidable  combination  of  Protestant  powers  under  the 
leadership  of  France,  to  overthrow  the  House  of  Austria  and 
put  a  stop  to  the  progress  of  Catholicism  in  Germany.  At  the 
very  moment  when  he  was  thus  threatened  by  foreign  attack, 
the  unfortunate  Rudolf  found  himself  at  the  mercy  of  his  own 

PERIOD   V.  D 


50  European  History,   1598-17 15 

revolted  subjects.  Already  in  1606  his  brother  Matthias  had 
taken  advantage  of  the  unpopularity  caused  by  the  forcible 
restoration  of  Catholicism  in  Austria  and  Hungary,  especially 
among  the  nobility,  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a  combination 
of  the  estates  of  those  countries,  in  order  to  win  for  himself 
the  sovereignty  over  them  at  the  price  of  granting  religious 
toleration.  The  revolt  was  completely  .successful.  In  1608 
Rudolf  made  over  to  his  brother  the  government 
Religious         ^^  Austria  and  Hungary,  and  Matthias,  in  his  turn, 

toleration  in  0^7  j  7 

Austria  and  appointed  a  Protestant  to  be  palatine  in  Hungary, 
^°g^™'^'  and  guaranteed  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion, 
public  and  private,  to  all  his  subjects.  The  Em- 
peror was  thus  left  with  Bohemia  and  Moravia  alone  faithful 
to  him,  but  the  Bohemians  were  no  less  quick  than  the  Aus- 
trians  had  been  to  see  the  profit  that  might  be  made  out  of  the 
weakness  of  their  king.  In  1609  the  Bohemian  estates  ex- 
torted from  him  the  Royal  Chaxttr {Majestdtsbrief)  as  the  price 
'of  their  loyalty,  by  which  freedom  of  conscience  was  secured 
»to  all  who  belonged  to  certain  specified  creeds,  and  freedom  of 
worship  granted  on  all  Crown  lands ;  but  on  private  estates, 
and  in  towns,  the  consent  of  the  landowner  and  the  town 
authorities  was  made  necessary  to  the  erection  of  any  church 
or  the  establishment  of  any  religious  worship.  An  arrange- 
ment so  one-sided  as  this,  by  which  the  king  was  obliged  to 
grant  freedom  of  worship,  while  his  subjects  were  not,  was 
thoroughly  unpractical.  Difficulties  at  once  broke  out  about 
its  interpretation,  which  ended  in  161 1  in  the  deposition  of 
Death  of  Rudolf,  and  the  recognition  of  Matthias  as  king 
Rudolf.  of  Bohemia.     In  161 2   Rudolf  died  and  Matthias 

Matthias,        '^^as  elected  Emperor.     The  change  was  in  favour 
1612.  of  peace.     The  death  of  Henry  iv.  in   16 10,  and 

1 1  the  consequent  withdrawal  of  France  and  England  from  the 
combination  against  the  House  of  Austria,  made  the  Union  less 
ready  to  follow  the  fiery  counsels  of  Christian  of  Anhalt.  The 
Cleves-Jiilich  question  remained  in  abeyance  after  the  imperial 
troops  had  been  expelled  from  Jiilich,  but  was  somewhat  further 


Religious   Troubles  in  Germany  5 1 

complicated  by  the  conversion  of  the  count  palatine  of  Neu- 
burg  to  Catholicism,  and  of  the  elector  of  Brandenburg  to 
Calvinism.  Eventually  by  the  treaty  of  Xanten  in 
1 614,  subsequently  modified  in  1630,  a  division  of  ofthecieves- 
the  duchies  between  the  two  claimants  was  agreed  J"'ich  ques- 
upon,  by  which  the  elector  of  Brandenburg  acquired  '  ''''*' 
Cleves,  the  Mark  and  Ravensberg,  while  Jiilich,  Berg  and 
Ravenstein  fell  to  the  house  of  Neuburg.  For  eight  years 
Germany,  freed  from  the  impending  horror  of  a  desolating 
war,  enjoyed  a  truce  ;  but  still  in  Bohemia  were  to  be  heard 
murmurs  that  the  Royal  Charter  was  not  observed  by  Matthias, 
still  flowed  steadily  and  surely  the  stream  of  the  Counter- 
Reformation,  and  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  reinforced  his  army 
and  amassed  treasure,  awaiting  the  day  when  the  sword,  and 
the  sword  alone,  should  decide  the  religious  question  in 
Germany. 

The  truce  was  broken  by  the  Emperor  himself.     Matthias 
was  an  old  man  without  children.     His  brothers,  who  were 
but   little    younger   than   himself,   were   like    him   The  succes- 
childless,  and  all  the  hopes  of  the  Austrian  House   ^*.°"  °^  f^""' 

'  ^  dinand  to 

were  centred  upon  Ferdinand  of  Styria  as  the  Austria, 
only  Habsburg  who  had  an  heir  to  succeed  him.  ^^^\^^ 
It  became  therefore  the  cardinal  point  of  the  recognised, 
policy  of  the  Emperor,  during  his  later  years,  to  secure  the 
succession  of  Ferdinand  to  the  various  dominions  of  the 
Austrian  House  in  Germany,  and,  if  possible,  his  eventual 
election  to  the  Empire.  The  succession  to  the  hereditary 
dominions  of  the  Habsburgs  only  required  the  consent  of 
the  senior  members  of  the  family  and  the  approval  of  Spain, 
and  presented  but  Httle  difficulty  ;  but  that  to  the  Crowns  of 
Hungary  and  Bohemia  was  a  different  matter  altogether,  as 
the  Crown  in  both  kingdoms  was  elective.  By  mingled 
address  and  assurance  the  policy  of  Matthias  triumphed  for 
the  time.  The  estates  of  Hungary  duly  elected  Ferdinand 
to  be  the  successor  of  Matthias,  and  he  was  crowned  at 
Pressburg  without  a  murmur  of  opposition  being  heard.     In 


52  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Bohemia  courage  won  the  day.  The  estates  were  suddenly 
called  together  in  161 7,  and  required  to  acknowledge 
Ferdinand  as  the  lawful  successor  to  Matthias  by  hereditary 
right,  and  evidence  was  brought  to  show  that  they  had  in 
former  times  acknowledged  that  the  Crown  of  Bohemia  was 
rightfully  hereditary.  Taken  by  surprise  and  subjected  to 
pressure  from  the  court  the  estates  acquiesced  in  this  new 
assumption.  No  leader  appeared  to  question  or  refute  the 
imperial  case.  Ferdinand  was  recognised  and  crowned  as 
hereditary  king  of  Bohemia,  and  at  his  coronation  swore  to 
observe  the  Royal  Charter.  But  no  sooner  was  Ferdinand 
seated  on  the  throne  than  the  Bohemian  Protestant  nobility 
began  to  realise  what  had  been  done.  They  had  not  only 
assisted  in  placing  the  most  determined  enemy  of  their 
religion  over  them,  but,  by  setting  aside  the  elective  character 
of  their  monarchy,  they  had  dealt  the  greatest  possible  blow 
to  their  own  importance.  The  discontent  found  an  able 
leader  in  count  Henry  of  Thurn,  who,  like  another  Christian 
of  Anhalt,  was  not  a  man  to  let  scruples  stand  in  the  way  of 
his  determination  to  effect  the  dethronement  of  Ferdinand, 
and  the  overthrow  of  the  House  of  Austria.  A  meeting  of 
„      ,     ,  ._      the  Protestant  members  of  the  estates  was  sum- 

Revolt  of  the 

Protestants  in  moned,  and  a  petition  to  the  Emperor  agreed 
Bohemia.  The  ^pQj^  Qi^  j-j^g  reply  proving  unfavourable,  Thurn, 
from  the  win-  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  nobles,  forced  his  way 
dow,"i6i8.  jj^j.Q  ^^  palace  at  Prague  on  May  23d,  1618,  and 
seizing  the  two  regents  of  the  kingdom,  ^artinitz  and  Slavata, 
who  were  accused  of  being  the  real  authors  of  the  obnoxious 
reply,  threw  them  with  their  secretary  Fj,bricius  out  of  the 
window  in  old  Bohemian  fashion.  They  fell  sheer  seventy 
feet  into  the  ditch  below,  but  strange  to  say  not  one  of  them 
lost  his  life.  Thurn  hoped  by  this  deed  of  violence  to  render 
peace  between  Austria  and  Bohemia  impossible.  He  httle 
thought  that  he  had  given  the  signal  for  a  war  which  was  to 
desolate  his  country  and  all  Germany  for  thirty  years,  and 
throw  them  back  in  the  race  of  civilisation  for  a  century. 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE   BEGINNING   OF  THE  THIRTY  YEARS'   WAR 

Character  of  the  Bohemian  Revolution  —  Help  sent  by  Savoy  and  the  Silesians 

—  Accession  of  Ferdinand  of  Styria  —  Revolt  in  Austria  —  Ferdinand  elected 
Emperor,  deposed  as  King  of  Bohemia  —  Acceptance  by  Frederick,  Elector 
Palatine,  of  the  Crown  of  Bohemia  —  Alienation  of  England  and  the  Luthe- 
ran Princes  from  Frederick  —  Bavaria,  Spain,  and  Saxony  support  Ferdi- 
nand—  Battle  of  the  White  Mountain  —  Settlement  of  Bohemia  and  Silesia 

—  Conquest  of  the  Palatinate  —  The  Electorate  transferred  to  Bavaria  —  The 
war  spreads  to  the  north — Interference  of  England  and  Denmark  —  Wal- 
lenstein  raises  an  army  for  the  Emperor  —  His  character  and  views  —  Cam- 
paigns of  1626-1627  —  Defeat  of  Denmark — Peace  of  Liibeck  —  Edict  of 
Restitution  —  New  questions  raised  by  the  success  of  Wallenstein  and  the 
issue  of  the  Edict. 

It  is  probable  that  when  count  Thurn  and  his  companions 
threw  the  regents  out  of  the  window  at  Prague,  they  only 
intended  to  snap  the  cord  which  bound  Bohemia  character  f 
and  the  House  of  Austria  together,  and  pictured  to  the  Bohemian 
themselves  as  the  result  of  their  rash  act  an  inde-  ^^^oiution. 
pendent  Protestant  Bohemia,  ruled  by  themselves  and  their 
brother  nobles  under  the  nominal  sovereignty  of  a  puppet  king 
of  their  own  choosing.  At  first  it  seemed  as  if  they  were  right. 
Germany  was  inclined  to  let  king  and  rebellious  subjects  fight 
out  the  battle  by  themselves.  John  George  of  Saxony  and 
Maximilian  of  Bavaria  refused  to  interfere.  Spain  promised 
aid  but  did  not  send  it.  Matthias  and  Ferdinand  had  but 
fourteen  thousand  men  under  Bucquoi,  a  Spanish  general  who 
had  served  with  distinction  in  the  Netherlands,  upon  whom  to 
rely.  Behind  that  army  lay  an  empty  treasury  and  a  discon- 
tented  people.     If  the   Bohemian   revolution  had   had   in  it 

S3 


54  European  History^   1 598-1 71 5 

anything  of  the  spirit  of  calm  and  disinterested  patriotism, 
capable  of  making  all  sacrifices,  and  determined  to  face  all 
consequences,  which  was  characteristic  of  the  Swiss  and  the 
Dutch  revolutions,  the  knell  of  the  House  of  Austria  must  have 
sounded.  But  it  was  not  so.  The  unconquerable  spirit  was 
with  Ferdinand.  A  mean  desire  to  make  other  people  bear 
the  burdens,  while  they  enjoyed  the  fruits,  of  successful  rebel- 
lion marked  the  conduct  of  the  Bohemian  leaders.  A  body  of 
directors,  thirty  in  number,  was  formed  under  the  guidance  of 
Ruppa,  the  ablest  and  most  honourable  of  the  insurgents.  A 
diet  was  held  to  carry  on  the  affairs  of  the  country  while 
Thurn  took  command  of  the  army.  Orders  were  given  to 
raise  troops,  but  the  question  at  once  arose  who  was  to  pay  for 
them?  The  first  suggestion  was  that  the  towns  should  have 
that  honour,  but  the  towns  not  unnaturally  refused  the  heroic 
role  of  self-sacrifice  so  thoughtfully  proposed  to  them  by  the 
nobles.  Fresh  taxes  were  then  voted  but  no  one  even  at- 
tempted to  raise  them.  On  the  news  of  the  advance  of  Bucquoi 
towards  Budweis,  a  Catholic  town  which  still  remained  true  to 
the  Emperor,  a-  panic  seized  the  directors  and  the  diet.  A 
general  levy  of  the  male  population  was  ordered,  the  raising  of 
the  taxes  already  voted  was  proposed,  but  rather  than  face  so 
disagreeable  a  question  the  members  of  the  diet  slunk  quietly 
home.  It  was  like  schoolboys  playing  at  rebellion.  Some  of 
the  levies  made  their  appearance  in  the  camp  of  Thurn,  but 
there  were  no  arms  to  put  into  their  hands,  no  officers  to  train 
them,  no  money  to  pay  them.  It  is  not  thus  that  successful 
revolutions  are  made.  The  Bohemian  nobles  were  but  a  fac- 
tion, fighting  for  licence  and  for  power  under  the  sacred  names 
of  liberty,  of  patriotism,  and  of  religion.  They  must  have 
met  the  fitting  reward  of  their  selfishness  and  their  arrogance 
at  the  hands  of  Bucquoi  and  his  fourteen  thousand  half-starved 
and  badly  paid  troops,  had  it  not  been  for  the  timely  interfer- 
ence of  other  powers. 

Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy  had  not  abandoned  his  enmity 
to  the  Austro-Spanish  House  because  he  had  been  obliged  to 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War  5  5 

make  his  peace  with  Spain  after  the  death  of  Henry  iv.  Of  a 
restless  and  ambitious  nature,  but  by  no  means  devoid  of  natu- 
ral prudence,  no  sooner  did  he  hear  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  Bohemia  than  he  determined  to  do  all  in  his  of  Charles 
power  to  assist  it,  provided  he  could  do  so  secretly.  Emmanuel 
With  this  object  he  opened  negotiations  with  Fred-  °  ^^  ^' 
erick  v.  Elector  Palatine.  Frederick  had  succeeded  to  the  elec- 
torate on  the  death  of  his  father  in  16 10.  Young,  handsome, 
enthusiastic,  he  was  readily  attracted  by  the  difficulties  of  an 
undertaking,  without  having  sufficient  mental  power  to  surmount 
them.  In  politics  he  was  a  pupil  of  Christian  of  Anhalt,  in 
religion  a  zealous  Calvinist,  and  he  looked  upon  himself,  and 
was  looked  upon  by  others,  as  the  natural  leader  of  the  German 
Calvinists,  and  the  determined  foe  of  the  House  of  Austria  and 
the  Counter-Reformation.  His  pohtical  opinions  had  lately 
become  of  more  importance  to  the  world,  through  his  marriage 
with  the  beautiful  Elizabeth,  the  daughter  of  James  i.  of  Eng- 
land. It  was  known  that  James  was  bent  upon  an  alliance 
with  Spain,  and  desired  nothing  less  than  to  be  mixed  up  in 
an  European  war.  Still  it  was  equally  certain  that  he  had  by 
no  means  resigned  the  position  of  ally  and  defender  of  Protes- 
tantism, which  he  had  inherited  from  his  predecessor  ;  and  that 
there  was  a  large  and  influential  party  in  England,  who  looked 
upon  the  marriage  with  the  Elector  as  a  guarantee  of  a  more 
decided  Protestant  policy. 

Frederick  had  been  the  first  German  prince  to  congratulate 
the  Bohemians  on  their  rebellion,  and  offer  them  assistance. 
In  July  1 61 8  he  sent  a  confidential  agent  to  Prague  to  report 
upon  the  state  of  affairs,  and  to  assure  the  directors  of  the  sup- 
port of  the  Protestant  Union,  should  Spain  or  Bavaria  send 
help  to  the  Emperor.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Charles 
Emmanuel  appeared  upon  the  scene,  and  offered  through  the 
Elector  Palatine  to  send  Mansfeld  with  two  thousand  men  at 
once  to  the  assistance  of  the  Bohemians,  if  it  could  be  made 
to  appear  that  the  troops  were  sent  by  the  Elector  himself. 
Frederick  at  once  agreed.     The  real  truth  was  known  only  to 


56  European  History^   1 598-1 71 5 

the  Elector  Palatine,  Christian  of  Anhalt,  and  the  margrave  of 
Anspach,  and  when  Mansfeld  arrived  at  the  scene  of  war  in 
September  161 8,  and  formed  the  siege  of  Pilsen, 
sent  to^assist  ^11  the  world  believed  that  he  was  acting  on  behalf 
the  Bohe-  of  Frederick,  and  many  concluded  that  the  Elector 
would  not  have  dared  to  take  so  serious  a  step, 
unless  he  had  reason  to  reckon  on  the  support  of  England. 
The  relief  was  well  timed,  but  the  arrangement  was  not  very 
creditable  to  any  of  the  parties  concerned,  for  Mansfeld,  though 
an  able  soldier,  was  one  of  that  class  of  military  adventurers 
ever  bred  in  times  of  war  to  be  the  bane  and  scourge  of  the 
helpless  and  inoffensive  people.  To  put  such  a  man  in  com- 
mand, at  the  beginning  of  a  national  struggle,  was  to  stamp  it 
at  once  as  a  war  of  brutality  and  plunder.  His  arrival,  how- 
ever, at  Pilsen  changed  the  face  of  affairs.  The  Silesians  hear- 
ing the  action,  as  they  thought,  of  the  Elector 
assistance  Palatine  resolved  to  interfere,  and  sent  three  thou- 
sent  from  sand  men  to  the  assistance  of  the  Bohemians. 
Bucquoi,  in  the  face  of  these  reinforcements,  not 
only  checked  his  advance  on  Prague,  but  was  soon  obliged  to 
fall  back  to  Budweis,  where  he  was  besieged  by  Thurn.  On 
the  2 1  St  of  November  Pilsen  surrendered  to  Mansfeld,  and  by 
the  end  of  the  year  Budweis  with  its  beleaguered  garrison  was 
all  that  was  left  to  the  Emperor  of  his  Bohemian  kingdom  and 
army. 

The  year  1619  opened  still  more  darkly  for  the  House  of 
Austria.  The  worn-out  Emperor  sank  at  last  into  his  grave 
on  the  20th  of  March,  and  men  felt  that  with  the 
Mauhias  accession  of  Ferdinand  the  time  for  compromise 
Accession  of  had  passed.  If  they  wanted  to  win  the  day,  they 
le"'^'"*"'^'  ™ust  strike  quickly  before  he  could  rally  to  his  aid 
the  unwieldy  forces  of  the  Empire  and  of  Spain. 
Negotiations  which  had  been  begun  at  Eger  were  at  once 
stopped.  The  diets  of  Silesia  Moravia  and  Lusatia  openly 
joined  the  Bohemian  cause,  and  arranged  with  Bohemia  the 
contingent  which  they  should  each  provide  for  the  common 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War  57 

army,  and  the  proportion  of  votes  which  they  were  to  have  in 
the  election  of  a  new  Bohemian  king.  The  estates  of  Upper 
and  Lower  Austria,  who  were  mainly  Protestant,  Revolt  in 
adopted  the  cause  of  the  Bohemians  as  their  own,  Austria, 
voted  men  for  the  war,  seized  and  administered  the  archducal 
estates,  and  summoned  Thurn  and  the  Bohemian  army  to 
their  aid.  Nothing  loth  Thurn,  leaving  Hohenlohe  to  watch 
Bucquoi,  swooped  down  upon  Vienna  hoping  to  end  the  war 
and  secure  the  success  of  the  revolution  by  a  brilliant  coup  de 
main.  On  June  2d,  Ferdinand,  defenceless,  harassed,  hope- 
less, had  consented  to  give  audience  to  a  deputation  of  the 
estates,  who  were  to  urge  upon  him,  as  the  only  chance  of 
deliverance,  the  recognition  of  the  Bohemian  revolution,  and 
the  establishment  in  Austria  of  a  separately  organised  Protes- 
tant government.  None  knew  better  than  Ferdinand  himself 
that  if  he  refused  those  terms  the  gates  of  Vienna  would  be 
opened  to  Thurn  and  his  army.  That  very  night  might  find 
him  a  prisoner  in  the  hands  of  his  greatest  foe.  Yet  at  this 
crisis  of  his  life,  and  of  the  fate  of  Europe,  he  never  faltered. 
'If  it  be  God's  will,'  he  said,  'let  me  perish  in  the  struggle.' 
He  was  ready  to  perish,  not  an  inch  would  he  yield.  The 
deputation  became  excited.  They  pressed  round  him  clamor- 
ously. Eagerly  they  urged,  imperiously  they  demanded  the 
acceptance  of  their  terms.  One  deputy  had  actually,  it  is  said, 
his  hand  upon  the  archduke's  person,  when  suddenly  there 
rang  through  the  hall  a  trumpet  blast,  and  the  streets  were 
alive  with  the  confused  noise  which  heralds  the  arrival  of  sol- 
diers. It  was  a  regiment  of  loyal  cavalry,  the  vanguard  of 
reinforcements  ordered  up  from  the  country  by  Ferdinand. 

The  crisis  was  over.  The  deputation  dispersed  abashed 
and  afraid  for  their  own  safety.  The  very  next  day  Thurn 
arrived  before  the  gates  of  the  city,  and  found  them  shut, 
and  the  walls  manned.  He  had  not  resources  for  a  siege, 
and  retired  back  again  across  the  frontier  as  quick  as  he 
had  come.  He  was  only  just  in  time,  Bucquoi  had  at  last 
received  reinforcements  from   the    Spanish   Netherlands,  and 


58  European  History,   1 598-1 715 

leaving  part  of  his  army  to  watch  Hohenlohe  at  Budweis 
suddenly  fell  upon  Mansfeld,  who  was  marching  to  join 
Hohenlohe  at  Zablat,  and  completely  destroyed  his  army. 
The  siege  of  Budweis  was  at  once  raised,  and  Bucquoi 
advanced  into  South  Bohemia  driving  Hohenlohe  before  him, 
until  he  was  suddenly  recalled  to  defend  Pressburg  and  Vienna 
from  the  advance  of  Be^hlen  Gabor,  Prince  of  Transylvania, 
who  had  just  declared  for  the  Bohemians.  Among  those  who 
distinguished  themselves  at  the  battle  of  Zablat  was  a  Bohe- 
mian noble,  who  commanded  one  of  the  Walloon  regiments  of 
cavalry,  count  Albert  von  Waldstein. 

Hardly  had  Ferdinand  escaped  from  the  attack  of  his 
enemies  at  Vienna,  than  he  had  to  betake  himself  to  Frank- 
Ferdinand  ^"^^^  ^°  support  his  interests  at  the  approaching 
elected  Em-  imperial  election.  At  first  sight  there  seemed 
peror,  1619.  lit^ig  doubt  of  his  succcss,  as  he  was  certain  of  the 
three  ecclesiastical  votes,  which,  with  his  own  vote  as  king  of 
Bohemia,  would,  give  him  the  majority.  But  the  elector  of 
Saxony  took  a  formal  objection  to  the  exercise  by  Ferdinand 
of  the  Bohemian  vote,  until  the  settlement  of  the  Bohemian 
question  had  made  it  clear  that  the  Crown  was  rightfully  his, 
and  all  felt  that  it  would  not  be  safe  to  proceed  to  an  election 
until  so  formidable  a  legal  point  had  been  decided.  The  way 
therefore  was  still  open  to  the  Calvinist  representatives,  the 
Elector  Palatine  and  the  margrave  of  Brandenburg,  by  clever 
management  to  avoid  the  election  of  Ferdinand,  if  they  could 
not  actually  secure  that  of  their  own  nominee.  If  they  had  at 
once  supported  with  their  whole  strength  the  policy  of  John 
George,  they  would  have  at  least  postponed  the  election  of 
Ferdinand  indefinitely,  and  united  the  Protestant  interest. 
But  the  Elector  Palatine,  led  by  Christian  of  Anhalt,  could 
not  bring  himself  to  play  second  fiddle  to  the  elector  of 
Saxony.  They  wished  themselves  to  be  emperor-makers. 
Christian  of  Anhalt  had  gone  a  weary  journey  to  Turin  to 
try  and  make  terms  with  Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy.  Max- 
imilian of  Bavaria  was  sounded,  but   gave  a  definite  refusal, 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War  59 

and  so  it  happened  that  when  the  electoral  diet  met  on  the 
20th  of  July,  the  Calvinists  were  without  a  candidate  and 
without  a  policy.  John  George,  nettled  at  seeing  his  own 
policy  contemptuously  set  aside  and  nothing  put  in  its  place, 
shrank  from  entrusting  the  institutions  of  the  Empire  to  such 
rash  and  incapable  hands.  He  instructed  his  representative 
to  withdraw  his  objection  to  the  vote  of  Ferdinand  for  Bohemia, 
and  to  record  his  own  vote  in  his  favour.  Frederick  and 
the  elector  of  Brandenburg,  seeing  that  a  majority  was  now 
obtained  irrespective  of  Ferdinand's  own  vote,  made  a  virtue 
of  necessity.  On  the  28th  of  August  Ferdinand  was  unanimously 
elected,  and  all  that  Christian  and  Frederick  had  achieved 
by  their  notable  policy  was  to  attach  John  George  firmly  to 
the  Emperor's  side. 

The  evil   consequences  of  this   suicidal    step  were  quickly 
seen.     Ten  days  before  Ferdinand  was   elected  at  Frankfort 
he   had   been  solemnly  deposed   at   Prague.     On 
the    27th   of    August    the    Elector  Palatine    was   of  Ferdinand 
elected  king  of  Bohemia  in  his   place,  and   was   ^^  '''"if  °f 

,,     ,  T       •  1  T       1  1  11     Bohemia  by 

called  upon  to  decide  whether  or  not  he  would   the  revoiu- 
accept  the  Crown.     The  decision  was  a  momen-   tionary  party. 

-  T        ,  111  -1  Election  of 

tous   one.     No   longer    could    the    question    be    Frederick 
treated  merely   as    one    between    the    House    of  Elector 
Austria  and  one  of  its  dependencies,  if  the  strug- 
gle  against   Ferdinand   was    to    be  headed   by  the  leader  of 
the  Calvinists  and  an  elector  of  the  Empire.     German  interests 
of  the  greatest  magnitude  were  involved.     In  such  a  quarrel 
the   welfare  of  Germany  was   no   less   at   stake  than  that  of 
Austria  or  of  Bohemia.     If  Frederick  and  the  Calvinists  suc- 
cessfully established  themselves   in    Bohemia,  the   importance  of 
balance  of  power  at   present  existing  among  the   ^^e  crisis, 
princes   of  the    Empire   and    the   two  divisions  of  the  Prot- 
estant  world   would    be   rudely   shaken,   and   the   traditional 
leadership  of  the  German  Protestants  would  pass  from  Dres- 
den to  Heidelberg.     Men  were  not  prepared  to  see  Christian 
of  Anhalt   the   dictator   of   Germany,   or   Geneva   victorious 


6o  European  History,  1 598-171 5 

over  Rome  and  Wittenberg  alike.  On  the  other  hand  was 
it  likely  that  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  and  the  ecclesiastical 
princes  would  stand  tamely  by  while  the  champion  of  their 
rehgion  was  dispossessed  of  his  territories  and  his  power 
scattered  to  the  winds?  Nor  did  the  danger  end  there. 
Spain  had  already  sent  money  and  troops  to  the  aid  of 
Ferdinand,  would  she  be  deterred  by  the  prospect  of  the 
English  marriage  alliance,  so  strenuously  urged  upon  her  by 
James  i.,  from  throwing  her  whole  weight  into  the  struggle, 
when  it  once  became  clear  that  the  war  was  a  war  of  religion 
as  much  as  a  war  of  politics?  Would  the  Pope  hesitate  to 
preach  a  crusade  against  the  aggression  of  Frederick,  and  pre- 
pare a  second  St.  Bartholomew  for  the  Calvinists  of  Germany? 
And  if  the  Catholic  powers  banded  themselves  together 
against  the  Elector,  and  determined  to  risk  all  rather  than 
suffer  the  tide  of  the  Counter-Reformation  to  be  forced  back, 
could  James  i.  himself  be  so  deaf  to  natural  affection,  so 
unmindful  of  the  traditions  of  England,  so  careless  of  English 
opinion,  as  to  refuse  to  draw  the  sword  to  save  his  son-in-law 
and  Protestantism  from  ruin  at  the  hands  of  Spain  and  the 
Pope  ?  Sober  men  asked  themselves  these  questions.  Before 
their  frightened  eyes  rose  the  spectre  of  a  religious  war  which 
should  desolate  not  merely  Germany  but  Europe.  They 
applied  themselves  earnestly  but  unavailingly  to  make  Fred- 
erick understand  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  His  own  mother 
and  councillors,  the  ambassador  of  France,  even  the  land- 
grave of  Hesse-Cassel,  urged  him  to  decline  the  tempting 
offer.  Only  Christian  of  Anhalt  and  his  followers  shut  their 
eyes  to  the  inevitable  and  forced  him  on.  Frederick  himself 
wished  to  delay  his  answer  until  he  could  find  out 

Acceptance  of  -i-,       i        i     t    i  •       r     i  ■      i 

the  Crown  of  from  England  if  his  father-in-law  would  support 
Bohemia  by     \<;\\-^^  but  delay  vvould  not  suit  the  Bohemians  or 

Frederick.  „,     .     .  r    .     i     i  tt  i  i       i  • 

Christian  of  Anhalt.  Urged  on  by  his  own  vanity 
and  his  leader's  ambition,  he  plunged  blindly  into  the  abyss 
which  opened  out  before  him.  On  the  25th  of  September 
1619,  he  formally  notified  his  acceptance    to    the    Bohemian 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War  6i 

diet,  and  on  the  4th  of  November  was  crowned   with  great 
state  in  the  cathedral  of  Prague. 

The  evil  consequences  which  had  been  threatened  at  once 
made  their  appearance.  James  i.  had  never  approved  of  the 
Bohemian  revolution,  but  he  had  endeavoured  to  make  use  of 
it  in  order  to  mediate  between  Catholics  and  Prot- 

J  IT   1  TT-  Alienation  of 

estants  in  Germany  and  establish  peace.  His  son-  England  and 
in-law's  rash  act  destroyed  at  once  what  little  chance  ^'^^  Lutheran 
of  success  James  might  have  had.  But  there  was 
worse  still  behind.  It  was  bad  enough  that  Frederick  should 
have  dared  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility,  before  James  had 
had  sufficient  time  to  decide  from  a  study  of  the  Bohemian  con- 
stitution whether  the  Bohemian  revolution  was  legally  justifiable 
or  not.  It  was  worse  still  that  he  should  have  taken  a  step  which 
might  alarm  the  susceptibilities  of  Spain,  and  endanger  the  suc- 
cess of  the  negotiations  for  a  marriage  between  the  prince  of 
Wales  and  the  infanta  Maria  of  Spain,  upon  which  James  had  set 
his  whole  heart.  James  at  once  repudiated  all  complicity  with 
his  son-in-law's  conduct,  and  was  fretfully  indignant  with  him  for 
having  by  it  injured  his  own  pet  scheme  for  Europe.  Kail  hope 
of  assistance  from  England  was  gone,  still  less  chance  was  there 
of  aid  from  Savoy,  or  from  the  Lutheran  princes  of  Germany. 
The  Protestant  Union  only  agreed  to  defend  the  Elector's 
hereditary  dominions,  in  case  they  were  attacked  while  he  was 
occupied  in  Bohemia.  Frederick  had  to  face  the  coming 
struggle  with  his  own  resources.  Even  Bethlen  Gabor,  the 
drunken  but  able  prince  of  Transylvania,  who  had  taken  ad- 
vantage of  Ferdinand's  weakness  to  advance  to  the  gates  of 
Vienna,  pillaging  as  he  went,  deserted  the  cause  of  the  Bo- 
hemians when  he  found  he  could  obtain  no  money  from  them. 
On  the  17th  of  January  1620  he  made  a  treaty  with  the  Em- 
peror, by  which  he  was  secured  in  the  sovereignty  over  the 
larger  part  of  Christian  Hungary.  Ferdinand  on  the  other 
hand  had  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  allies,  when  once  it  had 
been  recognised  how  great  a  menace  to  German  institutions 
was  implied  in  the  action  of  the  Elector  Palatine.     Maximilian 


62  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

of  Bavaria  took  the  lead.  Stipulating  as  his  reward  the  elec- 
toral hat  which  was  to  be  torn  from  the  head  of  Frederick, 
and  the  right  of  occupying  upper  Austria  as  se- 
between  Fer-  curity  for  his  expeuscs,  he  placed  his  army  and 
dinand,  the     ^^  rcsourccs  of  the  Lcaguc  at  Ferdinand's  dis- 

League,  i  i  • 

Spain  and  posal.  In  March  1620,  under  his  auspices,  a 
the  Pope.  meeting  of  the  League  was  arranged  with  the 
elector  of  Saxony  at  Mtilhausen,  and  an  agreement  arrived  at 
by  which  the  League  undertook  not  to  attempt  to  recover  the 
lands  of  the  Protestant  bishops  and  administrators  in  north 
Germany,  as  long  as  they  continued  loyal  to  the  Emperor. 
This  arrangement,  though  no  solution  of  the  question  of  the 
ecclesiastical  lands,  secured  at  any  rate  for  the  time  the 
neutrality  of  Saxony  and  the  Lutheran  princes.  The  Pope 
sent  money  to  swell  the  resources  of  the  League,  and  PhiHp  of 
Spain  agreed  to  march  troops  from  the  Netherlands  to  attack 
the  Palatinate. 

The  campaign  of  1620  opened,  therefore,  under  very  differ- 
ent circumstances  from  those  of  16 19.  The  war  had  already 
become  a  German  war.  With  the  certainty  of  the  interven- 
The  war  ^^°^  ^^  Spain  and  the  Pope,  with  the  possibility  of 
national  and  that  of  England,  it  threatened  to  assume  an  Euro- 
rehgious.  pean  character.  With  the  League  on  the  one  side 
and  the  Union  on  the  other,  it  was  a  war  of  creeds.  From  a 
military  as  well  as  a  political  point  of  view,  the  accession  of 
Maximilian  of  Bavaria  to  the  cause  of  the  Emperor  made  all 
the  difference.     Weak  in  health,  and  unpleasing  in 

Importance  .       .         - 

of  Bavaria,  appearance,  he  concealed  under  an  insignificant 
Policy  of         exterior  an  iron  will  and  a  faultless  judgment.     He 

Maximilian.  .         . 

alone  among  his  contemporaries  in  Germany  had 
the  statesman's  faculty  of  knowing  exactly  what  was  possible. 
He  never  struck  except  to  succeed.  He  never  ventured 
without  being  sure  of  his  ground.  Succeeding  to  an  impov- 
erished exchequer,  and  a  territory  disjointed  in  extent  and 
divided  in  religion,  he  had  set  before  himself  as  the  objects 
of  his  poUcy,  the  supremacy  of  Cathohcism,  the  consolidation 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  63 

of  his  dominions,  and  the  acquisition  of  the  electoral  dignity. 
By  thrift  and  good  management  he  had  amassed  considerable 
treasure,  and  had  carefully  trained  a  powerful  army,  which  he 
had  entrusted  to  the  command  of  the  Walloon  Tilly,  who  had 
the  reputation  of  being  the  greatest  general  of  the  day.  His 
opportunity  was  now  come,  and  he  threw  himself  zealously  into 
the  war  of  ambition  and  religion  with  the  proud  consciousness 
that  he  was  the  real  leader  of  the  Catholic  cause  and  the 
saviour  of  the  House  of  Austria.  In  June  the  toils  began  to 
close  round  the  ill-fated  Frederick.  Philip  iii.,  convinced  through 
Gondomar's  diplomacy  that  James  i.  would  not  break  his  neu- 
trality even  though  the  Palatinate  was  invaded,  sent  the  necessary 
orders  to  Spinola,  and  by  August  the  Spanish  army  was  at  Mainz. 
At  the  end  of  June,  Tilly  crossed  the  frontier  into  Austria, 
effected  a  junction  with  Bucquoi,  and  advanced  slowly  into 
Bohemia,  capturing  the  towns  as  he  went,  and  driving  the 
enemy  back  upon  Prague.  On  November  8th,  he  came  in 
sight  of  the  city,  and  found  Christian  of  Anhalt  and  g^ttig  ^j  ^he 
the  Bohemian  army  drawn  up  on  the  White  Moun-  White  Moun- 
tain just  outside  the  walls.  Regardless  of  Bucquoi's  ***"'  '^*°" 
desire  for  delay,  Tilly  insisted  on  an  immediate  attack.  Fred- 
erick was  inside  the  city  when  the  attack  began.  Hurrying  out 
to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  he  found  he  was 
already  too  late.  The  army  was  flying  in  panic  from  the  face 
of  Tilly's  veterans.  Frederick  himself  was  hurried  away  in  the 
crowd.  His  own  dominions  were  already  in  the  possession  of 
the  Spaniards.  An  outcast  and  a  fugitive,  he  fled  for  his  life 
through  Germany,  and  rested  not  till  he  found  an  asylum 
with  Maurice  of  Nassau  at  the  Hague.  He  will  only  be  a 
winter-king,  the  Jesuits  had  sneeringly  said,  when  the  summer 
comes  he  will  melt  away.  The  prophecy  was  fulfilled  almost 
to  the  letter,  save  that  it  was  not  the  heat  of  summer  but  the 
floods  of  autumn  which  swept  him  to  his  destruction. 

The  victory  of  the  White  Mountain  marks  the  end  of 
the  attempt  of  Protestantism  to  establish  its  supremacy  in 
Bohemia,     Ferdinand  at  once  sent  for  the  Royal  Charter  and 


64  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

tore  it  up  with  his  own  hands.  The  leaders  of  the  revolution 
were  executed,  and  their  lands  confiscated.  Frederick  was 
placed  under  the  ban  of  the  Empire,  and  his  lands 
of*Prcftes'-  aiid  titles  declared  to  be  forfeited.  The  Protestant 
tantism  in  clergy  wcre  for  the  most  part  banished,  and  a  heavy 
war  indemnity  exacted  from  the  rebels  whose  lives 
and  possessions  were  spared.  A  new  race  of  landowners, 
Catholic  and  German,  became  the  possessors  of  the  confis- 
cated lands,  and  by  thei**.  means  Catholic  worship  was 
gradually  restored  throughout  the  country  districts.  Jesuit 
colleges  were  planted  in  the  chief  towns  to  complete  by 
persuasion  what  force  had  begun,  and  before  another  genera- 
tion had  passed  away  Bohemia  was  definitely  ranged  among 
^.  \  the  CathoUc  countries  of  Europe.  Only  Silesia  and  Lusatia 
"succeeded  in  retaining  something  of  their  old  rights  and  much 
of  their  old  religion.  The  war  against  these  alhes  of  Bohemia 
had  fallen  to  the  lot  of  John  George  of  Saxony,  and  when  the 
battle  of  the  White  Mountain  had  made  it  plain  that  they 
must  treat  for  peace,  they  did  not  find  the  Lutheran  leader  a 
hard  taskmaster.  On  his  own  responsibility,  he  concluded 
Toleration  pcacc  with  the  Silcsian  estates  by  an  instrument 
granted  to  kuown  as  the  Accord  on  January  21st,  1621,  by 
Silesia,  1621.  ^yi^|(,}^  (.j^gy  recognised  Ferdinand  as  their  duly 
elected  and  crowned  king  and  supreme  duke,  and  agreed  to 
pay  a  fine  of  300,000  florins  on  condition  that  their  political 
and  religious  hberties  were  respected.  Ferdinand  when  he 
heard  of  this  was  naturally  very  angry  at  the  mention  of  the 
words  '  elected  king,'  but  found  it  prudent  to  accept  the  treaty 
rather  than  aft'ront  the  elector  of  Saxony. 

By  the  beginning  of  162 1,  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian 
Continued  found  their  policy  completely  crowned  with  success, 
success  of       -yi^g  Bohemian  revolution  was  crushed,  the  lower 

Ferdinand  .  •  i         i  i  r       i 

and  Maximii-  Palatinate  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards, 
ian,  1621-1622.  Frederick  had  been  declared  to  have  forfeited 
his  electoral  dignity,  the  Counter-Reformation  was  victorious 
in    Austria,    Moravia,    and    Bohemia.      In    April    1 621,    the 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War         65 

Protestant  Union  itself  was  dissolved.  Yet  there  were  rocks 
ahead  which  would  require  very  careful  seamanship  to  avoid. 
The  Spanish  court  was  indignant  at  the  idea  of  the  trans- 
ference of  the  Palatine  Electorate  to  Bavaria.  James  of 
England  was  so  moved  by  the  seizure  of  his  son-in-law's 
hereditary  dominions,  that  he  authorised  the  enlistment  of 
Englishmen  under  Vere  to  defend  the  lower  Palatinate  against 
Spinola,  and  made  its  restoration  to  Frederick  the  central 
point  of  the  long  negotiations  he  was  carrying  on  with  Spain 
for  a  family  alliance.  The  truce  of  Antwerp  between  the 
Spaniards  and  the  Dutch  had  just  come  to  an  end  by  lapse 
of  time,  and  Maurice  of  Nassau  was  minded  to  place  his 
unrivalled  military  talents  in  the  scale  against  the  House  of 
Austria.  The  German  princes  of  the  Rhineland  were  frightened 
at  the  success  of  the  League,  and  were  looking  out  for  allies 
even  beyond  the  limits  of  Germany.  But  at  present  no  one 
stirred  except  the  margrave  of  B^den-Durlach  and  Christian 
of  Brunswick,  both  of  whom  held  large  estates  which  had  been 
secularised  since  the  peace  of  Augsburg,  and  were  consequently 
in  danger  from  the  success  of  the  Counter-Reformation. 
Christian  besides  being  Protestant  bishop  of  Halberstadt  was  a 
military  adventurer  of  the  knight-errant  pattern.  He  liked 
fighting  for  its  own  sake  and  loved  still  better  to  surround  it 
with  a  halo  of  romance.  Fired  by  a  glance  from  the  beautiful 
eyes  of  the  queen  of  Bohemia,  and  wearing  her  glove  on  his 
helmet,  he  posed  before  the  world  as  the  chivalrous  pro- 
tector and  avenger  of  beauty  in  misfortune.  The  new  allies 
of  Frederick  did  not  avail  him  much.  In  October  1621, 
Mansfeld  had  to  abandon  the  upper  Palatinate  and  take 
refuge  across  the  Rhine  in  Alsace.  In  the  summer  of  1622, 
in  conjunction  with  the  margrave  of  Baden  and  Christian  of 
Brunswick,  he  advanced  to  the  recovery  of  the  lower  Palati- 
nate, but  Tilly  crushed  the  margrave  at  Wimpfen  on  the 
Neckar  on  May  6th,  and  Christian  at  Hocht  on  the  Main 
on  the  20th  of  June.  Christian  and  Mansfeld  with  the 
remnants   of  their   armies   had   to   retire    across    the    Rhine 

PERIOD   v.  i. 


66  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

into  Lorraine,  where  they  Hved  at  free  quarters  upon  the 
wretched  inhabitants.  On  September  i6th  Heidelberg  sur- 
rendered to  Tilly,  and  on  November  8th  Mannheim  followed 
the  example  of  the  capital,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year 
Frankenthal  was  the  only  city  in  his  hereditary  dominions 
which  still  belonged  to  the  unfortunate  Elector.  Deprived  of 
his  land  and  his  resources,  he  was  now  obliged  to  deprive  him- 
self of  his  own  remaining  army,  and  formally  dismissed  from 
his  service  Christian  of  Brinswick  and  Mansfeld  on  finding 
himself  without  authority  over  them  and  yet  looked  upon  by 
Europe  as  responsible  for  their  crimes.  Fortune  had  still  one 
Transference  '^^^^  ^1°^^  i"  rescrve.  On  February  13th,  1623, 
oftheEiecto-  Ferdinand,  having  succeeded  in  pacifying  the 
FreVeHckto  opposition  of  the  elector  of  Saxony  and  the 
Maximilian,  Spaniards,  solemnly  transferred  the  electorate  to 
*^*^'  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  for  his  life  at  the  meeting  of 

the  diet  at  Regensburg,  and  gave  him  the  administration  of 
the  upper  Palatinate  as  additional  security  for  the  expenses 
of  the  war. 

The  transference  of  the  electorate  to  Maximilian  of  Bavaria 
fitly  marks  the  close  of  the  first  act  of  the  great  drama  of 
Extension  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  namely,  that  signalised 
the  war  to       \^j   j-}^g    Bohemian    Revolution,   for    he    was   the 

Northern  "'  ,  ,  ,  .  , 

Germany,  person  to  whom  the  success  achieved  was  due. 
v;>^i^23-i624.  j^ig  army  had  won  the  victories,  his  head  had 
lirected  the  policy,  his  purse  had  paid  the  soldiers  —  could 
he  only  now  have  enforced  a  peace  upon  a  reasonable  basis, 
he  would  have  stood  forth  before  the  world  as  the  greatest 
statesman  in  Germany,  and  the  saviour  of  the  House  of 
Austria.  The  difficulties  in  the  way  were  serious.  The 
Dutch  since  the  expiration  of  the  truce  of  Antwerp  had 
been  at  open  war  with  the  Spaniards,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
1623,  being  hard  pressed  by  Spinola,  summoned  the  brigand 
bands  of  Mansfeld  and  Christian  of  Brunswick  to  their  aid. 
Insensibly  the  war  was  beginning  to  affect  the  north  German 
princes.     Many  of  them  felt  that  if  the  Emperor  succeeded  in 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years   War  67 

crushing  the  bishop  of  Halberstadt,  other  Protestant  bishoprics 
might  prove  too  tempting  a  prey  to  be  resisted,  and  ralHed  to 
the  standard  of  Christian.  The  lower  Saxon  circle,  animated 
by  similar  fears,  actually  began  to  arm.  With  these  dangers 
looming  in  the  distance,  it  was  impossible  for  the  League  to 
lay  down  its  arms.  Even  the  crushing  defeat  inflicted  by 
Tilly  upon  Christian  of  Brunswick  at  Stadtlohn  in  the  bishop- 
ric of  Miinster  in  August  1623  was  not  a  sufficient  guarantee 
of  peace,  whilst  Mansfeld  was  still  at  large ;  and  so  the  war 
simmered  on  through  1623  and  1624,  and  the  opportunity  for 
a  satisfactory  peace  in  which  German  interests  alone  should  be 
consulted  passed  away  never  to  return. 

Ere  the  first  day  of  1625  had  dawned  it  was  too  late.  Ger- 
many was  already  the  prey  of  foreign  intervention,  but  it  was 
as  yet  the  intervention  of  foreigners  who  had  dis-    ,  ,    , 

•'  °  Interference 

tinct  interests  in  Germany.  James  of  England  had  of  England, 
at  last  been  forced  to  acknowledge  the  hopeless-  '^^*' 
ness  of  trying  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Europe  after  his  own 
wishes,  by  means  of  an  alliance  with  Spain.  The  rash  visit 
of  prince  Charles  and  Buckingham  to  Madrid  in  1623  had  at 
length  opened  their  eyes  to  the  fact,  which  all  the  rest  of  the 
world  had  understood  long  ago,  that  Spain  only  valued  the 
negotiations  for  the  proposed  alliance  as  a  means  of  prevent- 
ing James  from  drawing  his  sword  in  the  German  quarrel,  and 
the  alliance  itself  as  a  stepping-stone  to  the  eventual  recovery 
of  England  to  the  obedience  of  the  Pope.  Angry  at  the  dis- 
covery, the  prince  and  the  favourite  pushed  the  old  and  timid 
king  unwillingly  into  war.  In  1624  English  envoys  hurried 
between  the  courts  of  Sweden  and  Denmark  and  the  princes 
of  the  lower  Saxon  circle,  eager  to  negotiate  a  general  alliance 
_to  win  back  the  Palatinate.  James  himself  received  Mansfeld 
graciously  in  London,  permitted  hrni  to  enlist  20,000  men  for 
the  war  in  the  Palatinate,  and  obtained  permission  from  Louis 
of  France  for  the  army  to  march  through  France  to  its  des- 
tination. The  EngUsh  dockyards  resounded  with  prepa- 
rations for  a  great   maritime  expedition  against  the  ports  of 


68  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Spain  and  the  treasure  ships  from  the  Indies.  In  March  1625, 
James  died,  and  Charles  and  Buckingham,  no  longer  hampered 
by  an  old  man's  caution,  threw  themselves  into  the  German 
war  with  a  lightness  of  heart  and  want  of  foresight  worthy 
of  Frederick  himself.  Christian  iv.  of  Denmark  was  the 
victim  who  fell  into  the  trap  which  was  so  innocently  but  un- 
interference  ^rriugly  laid.  He,  like  other  Lutheran  princes, 
of  Denmark,  had  watchcd  with  nervous  anxiety  the  spread  of 
'^^^'  the  war  into  northern  Germany,  and  had  winced 

under  the  blow  dealt  to  the  Lutheran  cause  by  the  establish- 
ment of  Catholicism  by  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian  in  Bohe- 
mia and  the  upper  Palatinate.  He  was  nearly  concerned  too 
in  the  question  of  the  ecclesiastical  lands,  for  he  had  secured 
for  one  of  his  sons  the  Protestant  bishopric  of  Verden  and 
the  succession  to  that  of  Bremen.  So  when  the  offer  came 
from  England  to  pay  him  ;,^3  0,000  a  month,  in  addition  to 
Alliance  of  ^^  Sending  of  the  naval  expedition  against  the 
England,  coasts  of  Spain,  Christian  felt  that  religion  and 
°^"™^'^^'        interest   combined   to   urge   him   to   action.      In 

and  part  of  ° 

north  Ger-  May  1625,  a  treaty  was  made  on  those  terms 
rnany  against  bet^yggn  Charlcs  I.  of  England,  Christian  of  Den- 

the  Emperor  °  ' 

and  Spain,  mark,  and  the  lower  Saxon  circle,  and  the  first 
'^*5'  instalment  of  the  English  subsidy  was  duly  paid. 

Ill-success  dogged  their  well-meant  efforts  from  the  first. 
In  the  previous  year,  Louis  had  at  the  last  moment  found 
reasons  to  recall  his  verbal  permission  to  Mansfeld  to  cross 
the  soil  of  France,  and  the  troops  had  been  sent  instead 
into  the  Low  Countries,  where,  unpaid  and  unprovided  with 
necessaries,  they  fell  victims  to  disease.  The  naval  expedition, 
which,  under  Wimbledon's  leadership,  arrived  at  Cadiz  in  the 
October  of  1625,  achieved  nothing  but  disaster  and  contempt. 
In  England  quarrels  broke  out  between  Charles  and  his 
Parliaments,  which  effectually  prevented  the  payment  of  the 
promised  subsidies  to  Christian  iv.  Nevertheless  the  united 
forces  of  Mansfeld,  Christian  of  Brunswick,  and  Christian  of 
Denmark,  ill   provided   as   they  were,   far  outnumbered   the 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  69 

army  of  Tilly  and  the  League,  and  it  was  clear  to  Ferdinand 
and  Maximilian  that  with  discontent  seething  in  Silesia,  Bo- 
hemia, and  Austria,  with  Bethlen  Gabor  again  Difficulties  of 
threatening  the  frontiers  of  Hungary,  and  the  Danish  Ferdinand, 
forces  invading  upper  Germany,  it  was  absolutely  essential  to 
place  another  army  in  the  field.  Yet  where  was  it  to  come 
from?  The  Emperor  could  not  stoop  to  employ  a  brigand 
army  paid  by  plunder  like  that  of  Mansfeld,  but  the  resources 
of  Maximilian  and  the  League  were  strained  to  the  utmost. 
Spain,  threatened  alike  by  England  and  France,  could  spare 
nothing,  and  Ferdinand's  treasury  was  as  usual  empty. 

It  was  in  this  crisis  that  a  man  stepped  forward  to  the  help 
of  Ferdinand,  who  is  in  some  ways  the  most  interesting  figure 
of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Albert  von  Waldstein,  or 
Wallenstein,  was  the  younger  son  of  an  illustrious 
Bohemian  family  of  Sclavonic  blood.  Educated  partly  by  the 
Moravian  Brethren  and  partly  by  the  Jesuits,  he  never  sur- 
rendered himself  dogmatically  to  either  creed,  but  out  of 
the  mysticism  of  both  constructed  for  himself  a  religion,  which, 
not  unlike  that  of  Napoleon  afterwards,  chiefly  expressed 
itself  in  an  unfailing  belief  in  his  own  star.  Thus  removed 
samewhat  apart  from  the  controversies  of  the  day,  he  was  able 
to  see  more  clearly  through  the  mists  which  darkened  the 
eyes  of  ordinary  politicians.  Statesmanship  as  well  as  interest 
and  tradition  led  him  to  devote  himself  to  the  cause  of  the 
Emperor,  as  the  one  stable  element  in  Germany  among  the 
disintegrating  influences  of  rival  religions  and  personal  jeal- 
ousies. True  patriotism  made  common  cause  with  ambition 
to  urge  him  to  risk  much  to  keep  the  foreigner  out  of  Ger- 
many. Common  sense  alUed  with  dogmatic  indifference  made 
him  see  more  clearly  than  others,  that  in  toleration  for  all 
creeds  lay  the  only  possibility  of  civil  unity.  But  statesman 
and  patriot  though  he  was  in  his  conception  of  the  real  needs 
of  Germany  and  the  necessity  of  resisting  foreign  interference, 
his  statesmanship  and  his  patriotism  were  never  allowed  to 
free  themselves  from  the  trammels  of  an  overmastering  ambi- 


70  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

tion.  In  the  settlement  of  Germany,  it  was  he  who  was  to 
dictate  the  terms.  In  the  ousting  of  the  foreigner  and  the 
crushing  of  the  factions,  it  was  he  who  was  to  receive  the  Uon's 
share  of  the  spoil.  He  was  an  imperialist,  but  only  on  con- 
dition of  military  independence.  He  was  a  patriot,  but  only 
on  condition  of  being  also  a  dictator.  As  long  as  the  stream 
of  his  own  policy  and  personal  aggrandisement  flowed  in  the 
same  channel  with  that  of  the  Emperor  and  his  allies,  all  would 
be  well.  But  should  they  diverge,  Germany  could  no  more 
contain  a  Ferdinand  and  a  Wallenstein,  than  France  could 
afterwards  contain  a  Directory  and  a  Napoleon.  . 

Such  difficulties  were,  however,  in  the  womb  of  the  future. 
For  the  present  Ferdinand  required  a  disciplined  army  and 
a  capable  general,  and  had  not  the  means  to  provide  himself 
Character  of  ^^^^  either.  Wallcnstcin  offered  to  raise  20,000 
Waiienstein's  men  without  putting  any  additional  strain  on  the 
army.  treasury   of  the    Empire,    provided   he    might   be 

allowed  to  support  them  by  requisitions  on  the  country  in  which 
they  were  quartered.  As  with  Napoleon,  war  was  to  support 
war,  not  by  the  unlicenced  waste  and  brutal  plunder  of  a  Mans- 
feld,  but  by  orderly  and  methodical  requisitions  couched  in 
the  form  of  law.  The  Emperor  accepted  the  conditions, 
though  he  well  knew  that  the  constitution  of  the  Empire  gave 
him  no  authority  to  levy  requisitions.  Directly  the  standard 
of  Wallenstein  was  raised  men  flocked  to  it  from  all  sides. 
Soldiers  of  fortune,  peasants  ruined  by  the  war,  younger  sons 
who  had  to  make  their  own  way  in  the  world,  adventurers  of 
all  religions,  and  all  nationalities,  hastened  to  serve  under 
a  leader  who  had  already  carved  for  himself  by  his  sword  and 
his  wits  a  colossal  fortune  out  of  the  spoils  of  the  Bohemian 
Revolution.  In  the  autumn  of  1625,  he  found  himself  at  the 
head  of  an  army  of  50,000  men,  whose  only  bond  of  union  was 
their  allegiance  to  himself,  and  he  advanced  into  the  dioceses 
of  Magdeburg  and  Halberstadt  and  spent  the  winter  there 
in  training  his  forces  for  the  coming  struggle. 

The  plan  of  campaign  arranged  by  the  king  of  Denmark  and 


The  Beginning  of  tJie  Thirty  Years    War  71 

his  allies  was  a  simple  one.  Christian  himself,  with  his  own 
troops  and  those  paid  by  the  English  subsidies,  was  to  advance 
up  the  Weser  against  Tilly  and  the  army'  of  the  The  cam- 
League,  thus  securing  the  bishoprics  of  Bremen  pa'e"  of  '626. 
and  Verden,  and  driving  the  enemy,  as  it  was  hoped,  out  of 
Halberstadt  back  to  the  line  of  the  Main.,  Meanwhile  Mans- 
feld  was  to  operate  against  Wallenstein  on  the  Elbe,  push  him 
back  into  Bohemia,  and  force  him  either  to  let  go  his  hold 
upon  the  upper  Palatinate,  or  lay  Vienna  open  to  a  combined 
attack  from  the  army  of  Mansfeld  and  that  of  Bethlen  Gabor, 
who  was  again  stirring  on  the  side  of  Hungary.  The  plan, 
however,  was  better  conceived  than  executed.  No  subsidies 
arrived  from  England,  and  Mansfeld  had  to  begin  his  attack 
without  the  co-operation  of  Christian.  Wallenstein  awaited 
him  withdrawn  behind  the  line  of  the  Elbe,  having  carefully 
fortified  the  bridge  of  Dessau,  which  was  the  key  of  his  posi- 
tion. On  April  25th,  Mansfeld  dashed  himself  in  vain  against 
the  fortifications  of  the  bridge,  and  Wallenstein,  seizing  the 
moment  when  the  enemy,  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  repulse, 
was  retiring  in  some  disorder,  took  the  offensive,  and  by  a 
brilliant  counter-attack  turned  the  repuise  into  a  complete 
rout. 

Foiled  in  his  attempt  to  force  Wallenstein's  position  on  the 
Elbe  by  a  front  attack,  Mansfeld  now  determined  to  turn  it, 
and  by  making  a  long  flank  march  through  discontented  Silesia, 
to  effect  a  junction  with  Bethlen  Gabor  in  Hungary,  and  ad- 
vance upon  Vienna  from  the  east.  The  plan  was  not  credit- 
able to  Mansfeld's  military  genius.  A  long  flank  march,  in  the 
presence  of  a  victorious  force  acting  on  interior  lines,  is  one  of 
the  most  hazardous  operations  in  war  ;  and  with  an  army  of 
soldiers  of  fortune  dependent  on  plunder  for  their  support,  and 
ignorant  of  discipline,  was  doomed  to  certain  failure.  Wallen- 
stein, leaving  8000  men  to  co-operate  with  Tilly  against  Chris- 
tian, contented  himself  with  moving  slowly  after  Mansfeld  on 
an  interior  circle  covering  Vienna,  and  finally  entrenched  him- 
self at  Gran  on  the  Danube,  about  half-way  between  Pesth  and 


72  European  History,   1598-1^  15 

Pressburg,  where  he  awaited  the  combined  attack.  Mansfeld 
did  not  dare  to  risk  another  bridge  of  Dessau  with  his  attenu- 
ated and  dispirited  force,  recruited  though  it  was  by  the  half 
barbarous  levies  of  the  Transylvanian  prince,  while  Bethlen 
himself  saw  that  he  could  gain  more  by  negotiation  than  by 
war.  A  truce  was  quickly  made  by  which  Mansfeld  was  obliged 
to  leave  Hungary.  Ill  in  mind  and  body,  the  indefatigable 
adventurer  attempted  to  make  his  way  across  the  mountains 
to  Italy  in  the  depth  of  winter,  in  the  hope  of  stirring  up  the 
Death  of  RcpubHc  of  Venice  to  greater  exertions,  but  as  he 
Mansfeld,  Struggled  ou  through  Bosnia,  death  overtook  him 
*^*^-  on  the  30th  of  November.     Thus  suddenly  disap- 

peared from  the  scene  one  who  by  his  military  talents  had  been 
the  chief  obstacle  to  the  success  of  the  imperiaUsts,  and  by  his 
total  want  of  morality  and  patriotism  had  been  the  greatest  foe 
to  the  peace  of  Germany.  His  removal  unfortunately  came  too 
late.  The  dragon's  teeth  which  he  had  sown  produced  a  crop 
of  mihtary  adventurers  all  over  the  soil  of  Germany  as  reckless 
and  as  able  as  himself,  and  already  round  the  carcase  of  pros- 
trate Germany  were  gathering  the  foreign  powers,  who  did  not 
scruple  to  use  such  auxiliaries  for  their  own  selfish  purposes. 
For  the  moment  the  death  of  Mansfeld  made  the  restoration 
of  peace  between  the  Emperor  and  Bethlen  Gabor  more  easy, 
and  on  the  28th  of  December  the  treaty  of  Pressburg  was 
signed  by  which  Bethlen  was  to  retain  the  sovereignty  over  the 
thirteen  counties  of  Hungary,  and  the  army  of  Mansfeld  was 
disbanded. 

Meanwhile  the  forces  of  the  League  had  achieved  a  still 
greater  success  on  the  Weser.  Christian  iv.  could  not  com- 
plete his  armament  without  the  English  subsidies,  but  no  money 
came,  or  could  come,  from  England,  where  Charles  i.  was  quar- 
Battieof  relling  with  one  Parliament  after  another.  Tilly 
Lutter.  accordingly  advanced  slowly  down  the  Weser  and 

captured  Minden  and  Gottingen.  After  the  defeat  of  Mans- 
feld at  Dessau,  he  was  further  reinforced  by  8000  men  from 
Wallenstein's  army,  and  Christian  felt  that  if  he  was  to  assume 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years    War  73 

the  offensive  at  all,  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Accordingly 
in  August  he  hastily  advanced  into  Thuringia,  hoping  to  throw 
himself  upon  Tilly  and  crush  him  before  the  imperialist  forces 
arrived,  but  he  was  too  late.  The  junction  was  effected  on 
the  2 2d  of  August,  and  Christian  finding  himself  in  the  presence 
of  superior  numbers  retreated.  Tilly  at  once  followed,  over- 
took the  Danish  army  on  the  26th  of  August  at  Lutter,  just  as 
it  was  about  to  plunge  into  a  narrow  defile,  and  inflicted  upon 
them  a  severe  defeat.  Christian,  leaving  8000  men  and  all  his 
artillery  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  2000  prisoners  in  the  ene- 
mies' hands,  retired  into  Holstein  and  Mecklenburg,  while  Tilly 
overran  the  duchy  of  Brunswick  and  quartered  his  men  for 
the  winter  along  the  lower  Elbe,  and  an  imperialist  detachment 
occupied  the  mark  of  Brandenburg. 

In  the  next  year  the  tide  of  victory  rolled  on.  Wallenstein, 
now  made  duke  of  Friedland,  marched  into  Silesia  with 
irresistible    forces,    and    sent    fifty    standards    to 

-  ,  .  rrii  •    •  Further  suc- 

Vienna  as  evidence  of  his  conquest.      1  hen,  join-   cesses  of 
ing  hands  with  Tilly  on  the  lower  Elbe,  the  united   ^iiiy  and 

^  .  .   .         \^    .        .  ,  „  ,      Wallenstein. 

armies  poured  into  Holstein,  and  overran  Denmark 
until  stopped  by  the  sea,  and  forced  the  unfortunate  Christian 
to  take  refuge  in  the  islands.     In  February  1628,  Ferdinand, 
following  the  precedent  of  the  Elector  Palatine,  put  the  dukes 
of  Mecklenburg  to  the  ban  for  the  assistance  they  had  given 
to   Christian,  declared   their   lands    forfeited,  and   authorised 
Wallenstein  to  occupy  and  administer  them  in  pledge  for  the 
expenses   incurred.     Sweeping  over  the  country  the  imperial 
general  seized  upon  the  ports  of  Wismar  and  Rostock,  obliged 
the  duke  of  Pomerania  to  put  the  long  coast  line  of  his  duchy 
under  the  care  of  the  imperial  troops,  and  was  only  checked 
in  his  career   of   conquest  in    March    1628    by  the   marshes 
and  the  fortifications  of  Stralsund.      For  five  long   gj^^^  ^^ 
months   the    imperialist  army  lay  before  the  city,   straisund, 
attempting  the  almost  impossible  feat  of  the  cap- 
ture of  a  defended  city  open  to  the  sea  by  an  attack  from  the 
land  side  only,  for  none  knew  better  than  Wallenstein  himself 


74  Etwopean  History,    1598-1715 

the  importance  of  the  issue.  All  the  southern  coast  of  the  Bal- 
tic from  Dantzig  to  Liibeck,  except  Stralsund,  owned  his  author- 
ity. Across  the  water  lay  the  only  foe  he  had  now  to  fear. 
Sovereignty  over  the  Baltic  as  well  as  over  the  Baltic  provinces 
was  necessary  to  him  if  he  was  to  be  safe  from  the  attacks  of 
Sweden.  To  further  this  policy,  he  had  already  obtained 
from  the  Emperor  the  title  of  admiral  of  the  Baltic,  and  he 
was  negotiating  with  the  Hanse  towns  to  provide  him  with  a 
fleet,  which  should  make  the  title  something  of  a  reality.  As 
long  as  Stralsund  afforded  to  the  enemy  an  open  door  into 
the  heart  of  Germany,  the  first  steps  necessary  to  gain  that 
sovereignty  were  not  complete.  Nor  was  that  all.  Hitherto 
the  opposition  to  the  Emperor  in  Germany  had  been  led  by 
furious  partisans  like  Christian  of  Anhalt,  military  adventurers 
like  Mansfeld  and  Christian  of  Brunswick,  or  self-seeking 
politicians  like  Christian  of  Denmark  and  the  other  holders  of 
the  ecclesiastical  lands.  The  German  people  and  the  cities 
of  Germany  had,  as  a  rule,  kept  themselves  aloof  from  the 
struggle,  or  extended  their  sympathies  to  the  Emperor  as  the 
representative  of  order.  But  the  siege  of  Stralsund  showed 
that  new  forces  were  coming  into  play.  It  was  the  citizens, 
not  their  leaders,  who  insisted  on  fighting  to  the  last  gasp. 
The  independent  spirit  of  civic  liberty  was  determined  not  to 
submit  to  a  military  dictatorship.  The  religious  spirit  of  staunch 
Protestantism  was  determined  not  to  make  terms  with  the  vic- 
torious Counter-Reformation.  When  Wallenstein,  foiled  and 
exasperated,  drew  off  his  army  on  August  3d  from  before  the 
walls  of  Stralsund,  he  at  least  understood  that  among  the 
cities  of  Germany  there  were  those  who  would  throw  them- 
selves into  the  arms  of  the  foreigner,  and  risk  all  they  had, 
rather  than  submit  to  military  government  and  religious  perse- 
cution. Nor  was  Stralsund  alone  in  its  victory.  Gliickstadt 
proved  to  Tilly  as  difficult  a  morsel  to  digest  as  Stralsund  had 
been  to  Wallenstein,  and  in  January  1629  he  was  forced  to 
raise  the  siege.  Matters  had  now  reached  a  deadlock.  Chris- 
tian could  not  venture  on  the  mainland  and  his  enemies  could 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  75 

not  reach  him  at  sea.  Wallenstein  saw  the  importance  of 
bringing  the  Danish  war  to  an  end  before  Sweden  appeared  on 
the  scene,  and  opened  negotiations  for  peace.  In  xhe  peace  of 
May  the  treaty  of  Liibeck  was  signed.  Christian  Liibeck,  1629. 
surrendered  all  his  claims  upon  the  ecclesiastical  lands  in  Ger- 
many and  received  back  his  hereditary  dominions. 

Ten  years  had  elapsed  since  the  fatal  day  when  the  revolted 
Bohemian  diet  elected  Frederick,  Elector  Palatine,  to  the 
throne  of  Bohemia,  and  the  margrave  of  Anspach   _  ,». 

'  or  Causes  of  the 

had  exultingly  cried,  *  Now  we  have  the  means  of  imperialist 
upsetting  the  world.'  In  those  ten  years  the  Ger-  ^""«s*- 
man  world  had  indeed  been  upset  but  not  in  the  sense  of  the 
margrave's  prophecy.  It  was  the  very  fact  that  in  their  attack 
upon  the  House  of  Austria  the  Calvinists  were  attempting  to 
upset  the  world  of  Germany,  were  attempting  to  revolutionise 
German  institutions,  and  were  not  in  any  way  representing  the 
rights  of  Protestantism,  or  the  independence  of  the  German 
princes,  that  deprived  them  of  support  in  Germany  outside 
their  own  body.  Cautious  and  shrewd  rulers  like  John  George 
of  Saxony  looked  upon  them  as  the  party  of  anarchy,  and  upon 
the  Emperor  as  the  representative  of  order.  The  recklessness 
with  which  Frederick  and  his  advisers  let  Mansfeld  and  Chris- 
tian of  Brunswick  loose  upon  the  unoffending  people,  and  out- 
raged the  sacred  name  of  religion  with  burning  homesteads 
and  tortured  peasants,  lost  them  the  respect  of  every  right- 
thinking  man.  Men  felt  that  to  revolutionise  Germany  and 
to  plunder  Germans  was  not  the  way  to  defend  the  cause  of 
Protestantism,  and  welcomed  the  successes  of  Maximilian  and 
the  League  in  Bohemia,  and  even  in  the  Palatinate,  as  securi- 
ties for  the  restoration  of  order  upon  the  traditional  lines. 

But  since  then  a  great  change  had  taken  place.     The  advent 
of  Wallenstein  upon  the  scene,  with  his  personal    change 
army  and  transcendent  military  talents,    brought    brought 
new  forces  into  play.     Germany  found  itself  threat-     waiienstein 
ened  by  the  rule  of  the  sword.     Ferdinand  found    and  his  army, 
at  his  back  a  power  capable  of  enforcing  his  will  upon  Germany, 


76  European  History,   1598-17 15 

and,  if  need  be,  of  superintending  the  reconciliation  of  German 
Protestantism  to  the  Church.  After  the  peace  of  Liibeck  who 
was  to  say  him  nay  if  he  boldly  entered  upon  a  policy  of  Cath- 
olic aggression?  The  Protestant  sympathies  of  his  Austrian 
subjects  had  been  drowned  in  blood.  In  Bohemia  and  Mora- 
via, under  their  new  Catholic  landowners,  Protestantism  was 
suppressed,  and  all  Protestants  had  been  banished  by  the  Re- 
forming Commissions  issued  under  the  new  constitution  in 
1627.  Silesia  had  lately  felt  the  heavy  hand  of  Wallenstein 
and  was  in  no  condition  to  rebel.  The  upper  Palatinate  and 
part  of  the  lower,  lately  made  over  to  Maximilian,  were  already 
being  rapidly  converted  to  Catholicism.  Secure  then  in  his 
own  dominions  and  sure  of  Maximilian's  support,  what  opposi- 
tion was  he  likely  to  receive  in  Germany?  The  smaller  princes 
of  north  Germany  had  been  for  the  most  part  implicated  in 
the  Danish  war,  and  their  lands  were  in  the  occupation  of  the 
armies  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the  League.  John  George  of 
Saxony,  the  elector  of  Brandenburg,  and  the  duke  of  Pomer- 
ania,  were  not  likely  at  such  a  time  to  forfeit  the  protection 
of  the  agreement  of  Mulhausen,  which  had  been  faithfully 
observed  on  both  sides  hitherto.  Possibly  a  few  free  cities, 
such  as  Magdeburg  and  Hamburg,  might  object,  and  the  king 
of  Sweden  across  the  water  might  interfere,  but  no  great  end 
was  ever  achieved  without  running  some  risk.  In  1627  the 
Catholic  electors  and  the  duke  of  Bavaria  had  urged  upon 
Ferdinand  that  the  time  was  now  come  to  assert  the  rights  of 
the  Church  under  the  peace  of  Augsburg,  and  Ferdinand  was 
too  strongly  himself  in  favour  of  the  policy  to  say  that  they 
were  wrong.  On  March  29th,  1629,  he  issued  the  Edict  of 
The  Edict  of  Restitution,  restoring  to  the  Church  all  the  land 
Restitution,  secularised  since  the  peace  of  Augsburg  was  signed. 
^^*^"  At   one   stroke  the  archbishoprics  of  Magdeburg 

and  Bremen,  the  bishoprics  of  Minden,  Verden,  Halberstadt, 
Liibeck,  Ratzeburg,  Misnia,  Merseburg,  Naumburg,  Branden- 
burg, Havelberg,  Lebus  and  Camin,  and  about  one  hundred 
and  twenty  smaller  foundations  were  taken  away  from  their 


The  Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  yj 

Protestant  bishops  and  administrators,  and  restored  to  the 
Church.  Never  was  greater  mistake  made.  To  resume  lands 
in  the  name  of  the  law,  which  had  been  from  fifty  to  eighty- 
years  in  the  undisputed  possession  of  Protestant  holders,  was 
in  itself  a  straining  of  the  letter  of  the  law  in  violation  of  its 
spirit,  which  only  intensified  the  sense  of  wrong  brought  about 
by  the  confiscation.  In  itself  it  armed  the  public  opinion  of 
all  Germany  against  the  Emperor.  It  roused  the  ardent  Prot- 
estants to  frenzy.  But  to  do  it  in  dependence  on  mere  brute 
force  was  political  suicide.  Without  the  armies  of  Tilly  and 
Wallenstein  the  Edict  of  Restitution  was  a  dead  letter,  with 
them  it  was  a  military  revolution.  By  it  the  Emperor  stood 
out  to  the  world  as  the  author  of  a  religious  and  political  revo- 
lution, the  success  of  which  depended  entirely  upon  military 
despotism,  and  was  without  any  moral  basis  whatever.  Ger- 
many would  not  be  revolutionised  by  such  measures  as  these. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  LUBECK 
TO  THE  PEACE  OF  PRAGUE 

Difference  between  Wallenstein  and  the  Emperor  —  Opposition  of  the  League 
to  Wallenstein  —  Dismissal  of  Wallenstein  —  Critical  state  of  Protestantism 
in  Germany  —  Condition  of  Sweden — Policy  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  — His 
wars  with  Denmark,  Russia,  and  Poland — His  interference  in  Germany 
and  Alliance  with  France  —  The  Campaign  of  1631  and  sack  of  Magde- 
burg—  Alliance  between  Saxony  and  Sweden — Battle  of  Breitenfeld  — 
Military  successes  and  political  difficulties  of  Gusiavus — Wallenstein 
appointed  dictator — Gustavus  baffled  by  Wallenstein  at  Nuremburg  — 
Battle  of  Liitzen  —  The  League  of  Heilbronn  —  The  murder  of  Wallen- 
stein—  The  battle  of  Nordlingen  —  The  Peace  of  Prague — Policy  of  John 
George  of  Saxony. 

The  recklessness  with  which  Ferdinand  had  undertaken  to 
revolutionise  Germany  soon  made  itself  apparent.  To  crush 
Difference  of  the  political  opposition  of  Denmark  and  the 
policy  be-  lower  Saxou  circle,  he  had  had  to  call  to  his  aid 
lenstein  and  Wallenstein  and  his  personal  army.  To  carry  out 
Ferdinand.  thg  far  more  difficult  task  of  transferring  from 
Protestants  to  Catholics  large  districts  of  north  Germany, 
which  had  been  for  eighty  or  ninety  years  in  the  hands  of 
Protestants,  and  of  forcibly  converting  to  his  own  religion 
thousands  of  Protestant  Germans,  he  had  but  the  same  force 
upon  which  to  rely.  It  was  idle  to  think  that  the  Edict  of 
Restitution  could  be  carried  out  without  the  help  of  soldiers. 
It  was  certain  that  Tilly  and  the  troops  of  the  League  would 
not  suffice  to  enforce  the  Edict  and  resist  the  threatened  ad- 
vance of  Sweden.  To  whom  could  the  Emperor  turn  except  to 
Wallenstein  and  his  60,000  men?     Yet  it  was  just  here  that  he 

78 


The  Thirty  Years    War  79 

was  least  sure  of  his  ground.  Wallenstein  himself  strongly 
disapproved  of  the  policy  of  the  Edict.  It  ran  counter  to  the 
principle  of  religious  equality  upon  which  he  had  organised 
his  own  power.  His  army  was  the  only  place  in  Europe 
where  Catholics,  Lutherans,  and  Calvinists,  met  on  equal 
terms  and  served  loyally  one  with  another  as  comrades.  To 
put  an  army  organised  on  such  a  basis  to  the  work  of  oust- 
ing Protestant  clergy  and  superintending  conversions  would 
split  it  to  its  very  foundations.  More  than  that.  It  was  no 
mere    caprice   which   had   led  Wallenstein   to  make  religious 

^quahty  the  basis  of  the  organisation  of  his  army.  He  be- 
lieved strongly  that  it  was  the  only  possible  basis  for  the  reor- 
ganisation of  Germany,  and  he  looked  forward  to  the  time 
when,  as  dictator  of  Germany,  he  might  at  the  head  of  an  irre- 
sistible force  impose  upon  the  fanatics  of  both  sides  the  boons 
of  peace  and  religious  toleration.  For  the  first  time  in  his 
career  his  own  convictions  and  his  own  ambition  led  away  from 
the  policy  and  interests  of  his  suzerain. 

Just  at  this  time  the  leaders  of  the  League  were  becoming 
on  their  side  very  much  dissatisfied  with  Wallenstein.  They 
disliked  his  opinions.  They  feared  his  ambition,  opposition  of 
They  distrusted  his  loyalty.  His  system  of  sup-  the  League  to 
porting  his  army  by  requisitions,  though  venial  ^  enstem. 
enough  when  exercised  at  the  expense  of  the  Protestant 
enemy,  became  sheer  plunder  when  Catholics  were  the  victims. 
During  the  winters  1626-27  and  1628-29,  his  drums  had  been 
beating  continuously  in  all  the  chief  towns  of  Germany,  and 
not  unnaturally  it  appeared  intolerable  that  the  Emperor's  own 
general  should  be  even  more  oppressive  to  his  friends  than  to 
his  enemies. 

The  opposition  came  to  a  head  at  the  diet  held  at  Regens- 

J)urg   in   July  1630.     The   lead  was   taken  by  Maximilian  of 
Bavaria.     Father  Joseph,  Richelieu's  accomplished   ^^^  j^.^^  ^^ 
diplomatist,    laboured    indefatigably   and   success-    Regensburg, 
fully  in  fomenting  the  discontent,  and  Ferdinand   '^3°" 
soon  found  that  he  had  to  choose  between  Wallenstein  and 


So  European  History,   1598-17 15 

the  League.  There  was  no  middle  course  possible.  He 
must  part  with  one  or  the  other.  To  a  man  of  lofty  soul, 
high  ambition,  and  bold  courage,  there  was  much  to  attract 
in  the  prospect  held  out  by  Wallenstein.  If  Ferdinand  could 
only  make  up  his  mind  to  risk  all  in  order  to  gain  all,  throw 
himself  without  reserve  into  Wallenstein's  arms,  and  at  the 
head  of  100,000  men  impose  upon  Germany  a  new  constitu- 
tion, in  which  the  imperial  power  should  be  established  upon 
the  ruin  of  that  of  the  princes,  a  new  era  would  dawn  for  the 
Emperor,  the  supremacy  of  the  House  of  Austria  in  Euiope 
would  be  assured.  But  a  policy  such  as  this  was  too  revolu- 
tionary and  too  venturesome  for  a  conscientious  and  common- 
place nature  like  that  of  Ferdinand.  It  certainly  involved 
the  overthrow  of  the  traditional  relations  between  the  Emperor 
and  the  princes.  It  certainly  necessitated  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Edict  of  Restitution.  It  might  not  improbably  make  the 
Emperor  the  slave  of  his  too  successful  general  instead  of  the 
lord  of  the  world.  It  was  not  given  to  Ferdinand  to  drive  the 
horses  of  the  Sun.  For  him  there  was  no  alternative.  He 
was  nothing  if  not  traditionally  legal.  Wallenstein  was  the 
Dismissal  of  ^isturbcr  of  precedent  and  law,  and  Wallenstefn 
Wallenstein,  must  be  Sacrificed.  A  few  weeks  after  Gustavus 
^^^°'  Adolphus  had  landed  on  the  coast  of  Pomerania, 

Ferdinand,  at  the  bidding  of  the  Catholic  powers  of  Germany, 
dismissed  the  only  general  capable  of  withstanding  the  Prot- 
estant champion. 

With  the  coming  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  the  war  was  lifted 

for  a  while  into  a  higher  region  of  politics.     It  became  ennobled 

by  higher  motives  and  a  greater  policy.     Hitherto 

Critical  state        ,        °      ,  ...  .  •  ,      ,     ,  ,. 

of  Protes-  what  nobility  of  motive  had  been  discoverable 
tantismin       ^^s  all  on  the  CathoHc  side.     The  maintenance 

Germany.  .  .     ,        _  i      i         • 

of  the  authority  of  the  Emperor  and  the  mstitu- 
tions  of  the  Empire,  the  establishment  of  the  authority  of  the 
Church,  in  the  teeth  of  a  factious  and  reckless  nobility,  were  at 
least  nobler  objects  to  fight  for  than  the  winning  of  a  crown,  or 
the  command  of  an  army,  or  the  right  to  provide  for  younger 


IL 


The  Thirty  Years    War  8 1 

sons  out  of  secularised  Church  lands.  But  the  victories  of 
Tilly  and  Wallenstein  and  the  issue  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution 
had  brought  a  great  change.  With  Christian  of  Denmark 
beaten  to  his  knees,  with  the  troops  of  the  League  and  the 
Emperor  in  occupation  of  north  Germany,  with  Wallenstein, 
admiral  of  the  Baltic  and  duke  of  Mecklenburg,  in  possession 
of  the  Baltic  coast  and  harbours,  the  questions  at  stake  were  \ 

Cno  longer  the   maintenance  of  the  authority  of  the  Emperor,      \ 
but  the  independence  of  the  north  German  princes,  and  the ^ 
sovereignty  of  the  Baltic.     By  the  pubHcation  of  the  Edict  of 
Restitution,  not  merely  were  the  secularised  lands  endangered, 
but  Protestantism  itself  in  north  Germany  was  threatened. 

The  Thirty  Years'  War  is  the  last  of  the  great  wars  of  religion, 
and  the  first  of  the  great  wars  of  politics.  In  obectsof 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  the  hero  of  the  war,  both  Gustavus 
aspects  are  united.  When  he  landed  in  Pomer-  ■^^°'p''"s. 
ania  in  July  1630,  he  came  distinctly  as  the  champion  of 
Protestantism,  to  save  German  Protestantism  from  being  over- 
whelmed by  brute  force  ;  but  he  came  no  less  distinctly  as 
the  national  king  of  Sweden,  to  defend  and  establish  that 
supremacy  over  the  Baltic  sea  and  the  Baltic  coast,  which 
was  essential  to  the  prosperity  and  existence  of  his  country. 
It  was  a  defensive  war  that  he  came  to  wage,  a  war  in 
defence  of  his  religion  and  in  defence  of  his  kingdom,  though 
it  necessarily  took  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case  an 
aggressive  form.  Between  the  policy  of  Gustavus  in  1630  and 
that  of  Richelieu  in  1635  there  is  the  whole  difference  between 
patriotism  and  aggrandisement. 

No  one  who  looked  attentively  at  Sweden  at  the  beginning 
of  the  seventeenth  century  would  for  a  moment  have  antici- 
pated the  fortune  which  in  fact  was  about  to  condition  of 
attend  her.  Poor  in  material  resources,  sadly  Sweden, 
deficient  in  roads  and  means  of  communication,  sparsely 
populated,  frost-bound  for  half  the  year,  cut  off  almost  wholly 
by  her  old  conqueror  Denmark  from  the  ocean,  she  seemed 
to  be  doomed  to  be  pressed  out  of  existence  by  her  more 

PERIOD  v.  F 


82  European  History y   1 598-1 71 5 

fortunately  placed  neighbours.  From  this  fate  she  was  saved 
by  one  of  the  most  remarkable  races  of  kings  of  whom  history 
makes  mention.  From  Gustavus  Vasa,  the  emancipator  of 
Sweden  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Danes,  who 
ascended  the  throne  in  1523,  to  Charles  xii.,  the 
terror  and  pride  of  Europe,  who  lost  his  life  in  171 8,  there 
was  not  one  sovereign  of  the  House  of  Vasa  who  did  not  in 
some  ways  show  the  marks  of  fine  and  original  genius.  Well 
may  the  historian  of  Sweden  exclaim,  '  The  history  of  Sweden 
is  the  history  of  her  kings,'  for  in  few  countries  have  national 
characteristics  and  national  development  been  so  intimately 
The  Lutheran  bound  up  with  the  monarchy.  Gustavus  Vasa 
Church.  achieved  the  independence  of  Sweden,  and  estab- 

lished his  new  monarchy  on  the  ruins  of  the  Church.  Seizing 
with  the  eye  of  a  statesman  the  close  affinity  between  Luther- 
anism  and  state  power,  he  introduced  the  Reformation  into 
Sweden  as  a  political  measure,  enriching  the  Crown  and  pur- 
chasing the  support  of  the  nobles  by  the  confiscation  of  the 
Church  lands.  From  that  time  Sweden  had  two  enemies  to 
contend  against,  the  hostility  of  Denmark,  and  the  power  of 
the  nobility;  to  which,  under  John  in.,  the  husband  of 
Catherine  Jagellon,  the  heiress  of  the  Jagellon  kings  of  Po- 
land, a  third  was  added,  namely  the  Counter-Reformation. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century  this  last  was  the 
most  pressing  danger,  for  Sigismund,  the  son  of  John  iii.  and 
Catherine  Jagellon,  was  an  ardent  Catholic.  He  had  be- 
Attemptof  come  king  of  Poland  by  election  in  1587,  and 
Sigismund       j^^^fj   donc    much    to   rc-establish    Catholicism    in 

to  restore  ,      /-  ,  i     i     i         •    i        • 

Catholicism,  that  Country  before  he  succeeded  by  mhentance 
X592-1604.  to  the  crown  of  Sweden  in  1592.  On  his  attempt- 
ing a  similar  policy  in  Sweden  he  lound  himself  at  once 
opposed  by  the  self-interest  of  the  nobihty,  who  held  so  large 
a  share  of  the  Church  lands,  and  by  a  spirit  of  nationality 
among  the  people,  who  resented  the  interference  of  Poles  and 
Italians  with  a  sturdy  independence,  which  reminds  us  of  the 
hatred  of  the  medieval  English  for  all  *  outlandish '  people. 


The  Thirty  Years'  War  83 

These  feelings  found  a  representative  in  Charles,  the  youngest 
son  of  Gustavus  Vasa,  and  uncle  of  Sigismund,  who  after  a 
brief  contest  expelled  his  nephew  from  Sweden  and  seated 
himself  on  the  throne  in  his  stead  in  1604. 

This  dynastic  revolution  strengthened  Sweden  by  making 
her  religion  the  symbol  and  the  test  of  her  liberty.  Lutheran- 
ism  became  the  political  as  well  as  the  religious  ^  .  . 
faith  of  the  country.  It  weakened  her  by  adding  charies  ix., 
another  to  the  number  of  her  hereditary  foes.  If  '^°4-i6"- 
Denmark  could  not  forget  that  she  had  once  been  the  ruler 
of  Sweden,  neither  could  Poland  forget,  at  any  rate  during  the 
life  of  Sigismund,  that  her  king  had  by  law  no  less  right  to 
rule  at  Stockholm  than  at  Warsaw.  If,  however,  Charles  ix. 
increased  the  external  he  diminished  the  internal  difficulties 
of  his  country.  Nobles  and  king  had  united  together  against 
foreign  influence,  and  when  raised  to  the  throne,  Charles 
succeeded  by  his  wise  administration  in  making  the  bond  still 
closer  and  was  able  to  hand  on  to  his  son,  the  young  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  the  jjovernment  of  a  united  and  prosperous  nation. 
Nevertheless,  patriotic  and  religious  as  Sweden  was  on  the 
accession  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  in  161 1,  she  had  not  yet 
passed  through  that  crisis  common  to  the  infancy  of  nations, 
when  extension  of  territory  and  influence  becomes  essential  to 
the  preservation  of  national  life.  Since  she  had  become  an 
independent  nation  her  mineral  wealth  had  been  much  de- 
veloped by  her  kings.  Education  and  civilisation  had  made 
great  strides.  Since  she  had  become  Protestant,  she  had 
naturally  been  drawn  into  political  and  commercial  relations 
with  the  English  and  the  Dutch,  who  were  rapidly  establishing 
their  commercial  supremacy  in  the  northern  seas,  and  espe- 
cially in  the  Baltic,  on  the  ruins  of  the  Hansa.  But  weakness  of 
as  yet  Denmark  held  the  southern  provinces  of  Sweden, 
the  Swedish  peninsula.  Only  in  one  place,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  river  Gota,  where  the  fortress  of  Elfsborg  stood  and  the 
houses  and  wharves  of  Gottenburg  were  beginning  to  rise, 
did  Sweden  touch  the  outer  sea.     For  all  practical  purposes 


84  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

her  trade  was  a  purely  Baltic  trade,  and  could  only  reach  the 
outside  world  by  the  permission,  and  subject  to  the  regulations, 
of  Denmark,  who  held  the  Sound  and  imposed  tolls  on  all 
ships  which  passed  through. 

Within  the  confines  of  the  Baltic  itself  the  position  of  Sweden 
was  by  no  means  assured.  The  coast  line  which  she  held 
was  large,  but  only  because  it  included  the  inhospitable  and 
semi-barbarous  Finland.  She  had  not  a  city,  not  even  Stock- 
holm, which  could  vie  in  riches  or  in  trade  with  Liibeck  or 
with  Dantzig.  Since  the  days  of  Ivan  the  Terrible,  Russia 
had  made  her  appearance  in  the  north  as  a  power  which  must 
be  reckoned  with,  and  threatened  to  claim  her  share  of  the 
Baltic.  In  the  '  troublous  times '  which  preceded  the  rise  of 
the  Romanoff  dynasty  Sweden  saw  her  opportunity,  and  under 
Eric  and  Charles  ix.  had  stretched  across  the  sea,  and  made 
good  her  hold  over  the  first  of  her  Baltic  provinces  in  Esthonia 
and  Livonia ;  but  situated  as  they  were  between  hostile 
Poland  and  semi-hostile  Russia,  they  could  not  be  looked  upon 
in  any  other  light  than  that  of  an  outpost  to  be  withdrawn 
or  reinforced  as  occasion  might  serve.  Exceedingly  precarious 
therefore  was  the  position  of  the  young  monarchy.  A  com- 
bined attack  by  its  three  enemies  must  at  any  moment  destroy 
it.  Steady  hostile  pressure  under  the  forms  of  peace  might 
Folic  of  gradually  stifle  it.  Sweden  could  not_be__safe 
Gustavus  until  she  had  obtained  supremacy  in  the  Baltic, 
Adoiphus.  gj^g  could  not  bc  prosperous  until  she  had  gained 
free  access  to  the  ocean,  she  could  not  be  dominant  in  the 
north  until  she  had  secured  her  supremacy  over  the  Baltic  by 
the  acquisition  of  a  substantial  foothold  on  its  eastern  coast. 
These  were  the  three  main  objects  of  Swedish  national  policy 
steadily  pursued  by  Gustavus  Adoiphus,  and  after  his  death 
by  his  friend  and  chancellor  Oxenstjerna.  They  necessitated 
an  aggressive  policy.  To  sit  still  was  to  die.  The  martial 
instincts  and  the  youth  of  the  king  combined  with  motives 
of  pohcy  to  urge  him  to  a  bold  course,  and  the  nation  well 
understanding  the  nature  of  the  crisis  seconded  him  nobly. 


The  TJiirty  Years    War  85 

Denmark  was  the  foe  upon  whom  Gustavus  was  called  to 
whet  his  virgin  steel.    Taking  advantage  of  the  confusion  caused 
by  the  minority  of  the  new  king,  Christian  iv.  had    ^^  ^.  . 
seized  upon  Elfsborg  and  Calmar  early  in   161 1.    Denmark, 
Directly  Gustavus    had    been   pronounced  of  age   '^"-'^'3- 
he   marched  to  recover  the   fortresses,  and    learned    his    first 
Jesson  in  the  art  of  war  in  a  year  of  frontier  hostilities,  which 
were  ended  through  the  mediation  of  James  i.  by  the  peace  of 
Knarod  in  January  16 13.     By  this  treaty  Calmar  was  at  once 
restored  to  the  Swedes,  and  Elfsborg  covenanted  to  be  restored 
on  the  payment  of  a  million  dollars,  which  were  duly  raised 
and  paid  in  two  years.     Relieved  from  all  present  anxiety  from 
the  side  of  Denmark,  Gustavus  at  once  turned  his  attention  to 
the  growing  power  of  Russia,  now  gathering  itself  ^^^  ^.^j^ 
together  under  Michael    Romanoff.     In    1614   he    Russia,  1614- 
invaded  Ingria,  and  spent  three  years  in  desultory   '^'^' 
fighting,  in  which  he  was  uniformly  victorious  in  battle,  and 
slowly  occupied  the  country.     Again  England,  who  had  trade 
relations  with  Russia,  offered  her  mediation,  and  by  the  treaty 
of  Stolbova,  signed  in  February  161 7,  Sweden  obtained  from 
Russia  the  cession  of  Ingria  and  Carelia,  thus  gaining  a  con- 
tinuous coast  line  on  the    Baltic  from  Colmar   to    Riga,  and 
shutting  Russia  from  the  sea  altogether.     '  The  enemy,'  said 
Gustavus  triumphantly,  '  cannot  launch  a  boat  upon  the  Baltic 
without  our  permission.' 

Hardly  was  the  peace  of  Stolbova  signed,  than  an  invasion 
of  Swedish  Livonia  by  Sigismund  of  Poland  forced  Gustavus 
to  enter  upon  his  third  war.  Poland  was  a  much  ^^j,  ^.^j^ 
more  difficult  nut  to  crack  than  Russia  had  been,  Poland,  1617- 
for  behind  Sigismund  lay  the  forces  of  the  Coun-  '^*'' 
ter-Reformation,  but  from  various  circumstances  neither  side 
could  press  the  war  with  vigour.  Two  armistices  (from  16 18- 
162 1  and  from  162 2- 1625)  interrupted  its  lethargic  course,  and 
enabled  Sweden  to  recruit  her  failing  energies,  and  her  king  to 
perfect  the  improvements  in  military  tactics  for  which  he  is 
iamous.     In  1625  he  resumed  the  war  in  earnest,  and  crossing 


86  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

the  Dwina  overran  and  occupied  Courland,  pushing  the  Polish 
generals  back  into  Lithuania.  But  neither  Riga  nor  any  of  the 
Courland  towns  gave  him  what  he  most  wanted,  a  place  of  first- 
rate  importance,  which  he  might  make  the  centre  of  his  opera- 
tions ;  so  in  the  next  year  he  directed  his  attack  on  Dantzig, 
although  it  involved  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  his  brother- 
in-law,  George  William  of  Brandenburg.  Dantzig  was  a  town 
strongly  fortified  on  the  land  side.  The  Swedish  fleet  was  too 
weak  to  enforce  the  attempted  blockade  by  sea.  Hence,  like 
Stralsund  and  La  Rochelle,  until  cut  off  from  the  sea  it  was 
impregnable.  For  four  weary  years  Gustavus  attempted  un- 
successfully to  reduce  it.  Eventually  in  1629,  when  the  affairs 
in  Germany  rendered  it  essential  for  him  to  have  his  hands  free, 
he  consented  to  make  peace  without  gaining  the  desired  end. 
Yet  the  Polish  war  was  not  thrown  away.  By  the  treaty  of 
Stuhmsdorf,  Sweden  gained  the  whole  of  Livonia,  and  some 
places  in  Prussia,  and  by  the  training  both  of  himself  and  of  his 
army  in  the  four  Polish  campaigns,  he  had  unconsciously  made 
Sweden  one  of  the  most  formidable  military  powers  of  the  day. 
While  the  Thirty  Years'  War  was  in  progress,  the  eyes  both 
of  Catholics  and  Protestants  in  Germany  had  often  been  turned 
Negotiations  towards  Gustavus  in  fear  and  in  hope.  He  himself 
between  looked  forward  with  eagerness  to  the  day  when  his 

England  and  .  ■    i        i  r        i        i  i 

Gustavus  in  assistaucc  might  be  necessary,  for  he  longed  to 
'^^4-  cross  swords  with  Tilly  and  the  imperial  generals, 

but  it  was  eagerness  tempered  with  prudence.  He  would 
ejiter  into  the  war  at  his  own  time,  and  on  his  own  terms,  or 
not  at  all.  In  1624  he  was  asked  by  England  to  formulate 
those  terms,  and  he  laid  down  three  conditions  as  indispensa- 
ble :  that  he  should  have  the  sole  military  management  of  the 
war ;  that  England  should  provide  the  money  for  1 7,000  men, 
and  pay  the  subsidies  for  five  months  in  advance  ;  that  he  should 
be  protected  from  attack  from  Denmark,  while  at  war  in  Ger- 
many, and  have  two  ports  made  over  to  him  to  secure  his 
communications.  Unlike  Christian  of  Denmark,  he  would  not 
be  content  with  fair  promises,  but   insisted   on   performance 


The  Thirty  Years    War  8/ 

before  he  would  move.     The  terms  were  too  onerous  for  ac- 
ceptance at  that  time,  but  the  fate  of  Christian  proved  their 
wisdom  and   necessity.     The  defeat   of  the   Danes,  and   the 
estabhshment  of  Wallenstein  on  the  Baltic  coast,  brought  the 
danger  nearer  home.     What  chance  was  there  for  Sweden  to 
obtain  supremacy  over  the  Baltic  with  Mecklenburg  and  Pom- 
erania  in  the   hands   of  the   imperial   admiral?     Clearly  she 
would  have  to  fight  for  her  independence,  let  alone  her  religion, 
if  Wallenstein  was  suffered  to  make  himself  duke  of  Mecklen- 
burg.    Gustavus  recognised  the  necessity  at  once.   Alliance 
In  April  1628  he  made  an   alliance  with  his  old  between 
enemy  Christian  iv.  of  Denmark,  by  which  all  for-   Denmark, 
eign  ships  except  those  of  the  Dutch  were  excluded   '^^s. 
from  the  Baltic.     In  the  summer  of  the  same  year,  he  sent 
2000  men  under  Alexander  Leslie  to  defend  Stralsund  against 
Wallenstein.     In  September  1629  he  put  an  end  to 

Landing^  of 

the  Polish  war  by  the  treaty  of  Stuhmsdorf,  and  on   Gustavus  in 
the  24th  of  June  1630  he  landed  on  the  island  of  Germany, 
Usedom,  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  13,000  men, 
which  was  raised  to  40,000  before  the  end  of  the  year. 
'     Gustavus  timed  his  invasion  with  great  judgment.     The  diet 
of  Regensburg  was  still  sitting,  and  the  army  of  Wallenstein 
was  demoraUsed  by  the  approaching  sacrifice  of  its   Measures  of 
chief.     Hardly  a  month  after  the  landing  of  the   Gustavus. 
Swedish  king  that  sacrifice  was  consummated,  a  large  part  of 
Wallenstein's  army  was  disbanded,  and  the  rest  put  under  the 
command  of  Tilly,  who  was  becoming  in  his  old  age  extremely 
dilatory  in  his  movements.     Gustavus  accordingly  found  him- 
self for   six   months   practically  unopposed,  and   he  at  once 
employed  the  time  in  establishing  for  himself  a  strong  basis  of 
operations  on  the  Baltic  and  in  the  enlistment  of  fresh  troops. 
In  January  of  the  next  year  came  a  most  welcome  assistance. 
Richelieu  had  long  fixed  his  eyes  upon  Gustavus,  as  one  of 
the  most  formidable  weapons  capable  of  being  used  against 
the  House  of  Austria,  and  he  desired  to  put  it  into  the  armoury 
of  France.     Negotiations  had  been  opened  with  this  object  in 


88  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  spring  of  the  year  but  had  failed.  He  had  found  Gus- 
tavus  more  stubborn  than  he  had  expected,  and  quickly  real- 
Aiiiance  be-  iscd  that  if  he  wanted  the  king  of  Sweden's  help 
tween  Gus-  hg  could  have  it  only  on  the  king  of  Sweden's 
RilcheHeu,  terms.  Gracefully  submitting  to  the  inevitable,  on 
1631.  January   23d,    1631    he    concluded  with  Gustavus 

the  treaty  of  Barwalde,  by  which  he  undertook  to  supply  the 
king  with  200,000  dollars  for  six  years,  on  condition  that  Gus- 
tavus maintained  an  army  of  36,000  men,  promised  to  respect 
the  imperial  constitution,  observed  neutrality  towards  Bavaria 
and  the  League  as  far  as  they  observed  it  towards  him,  and 
left  the  Cathohc  rehgion  untouched  in  those  districts  where  he 
found  it  established.  The  alliance  of  the  foreigner  was  the 
only  voluntary  aid  which  the  liberator  of  Germany  could  obtain. 
,    ,  ,      The  old  duke  Boguslav  of  Pomerania  was  as  sub- 

Jealousy  of  ° 

Gustavus  in  missive  in  the  hands  of  Gustavus  as  he  had  been  in 
Germany.  ^j^^  hands  of  Wallcnstein,  but  it  was  helplessness 
not  friendship  which  put  his  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the 
invader.  John  George  of  Saxony  and  George  William  of 
Brandenburg  steadily  refused  to  break  their  neutrality,  or  take 
one  step  in  the  direction  of  the  dismemberment  of  the  Empire. 
In  March  a  great  gathering  of  Protestants  was  held  at  Leipzig 
to  consider  the  situation.  They  agreed  to  raise  troops  for 
their  own  defence  in  case  they  were  attacked.  They  assured 
the  Emperor  of  their  continued  loyalty,  if  only  he  would  with- 
draw the  Edict  of  Restitution.  They  said  not  one  word  about 
assistance  to  the  foreigner. 

German  patriotic  feeling  was  against  Gustavus.  It  was  clear 
that  be  would  have  to  make  his  way  by  the  sword,  and  the 
The  cam-  sword  alonc.  At  the  end  of  March  the  campaign 
paign  of  1631.  began.  Tilly  suddenly  dashed  at  Neu  Branden- 
burg, captured  it  on  March  29th,  and  destroyed  its  garrison  of 
2000  Swedes,  thus  thrusting  himself  in  between  Gustavus  in 
Pomerania  and  Horn  in  Mecklenburg.  Gustavus  saw  the 
danger.  By  forced  marches  he  succeeded  in  circumventing 
Tilly  and  effecting  his  junction  with  Horn,  and  the  old  marshal 


The  Thirty  Years'   War  89 

sullenly  retreated  to  the  Elbe,  where  he  formed  the  siege  of 
Magdeburg,  which  had  of  its  own  accord  declared  against  the 
Emperor,  and  asked  for  a  Swedish  garrison.  Meanwhile  Gus- 
tavus  had  marched  to  the  Oder,  and  captured  the  important 
fortress  of  Frankfort,  which  was  garrisoned  by  the  imperialists. 
From  there  he  designed  to  move  to  the  relief  of  Magdeburg, 
now  hard  pressed  by  Tilly  and  Pappenheim.  Every  motive 
of  honour  and  policy  impelled  him  to  ensure  its  safety.  But 
unforeseen  obstacles  presented  themselves.  In  order  to  march 
to  Magdeburg,  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the  territories  of 
Brandenburg  and  Saxony,  and  neither  of  the  electors  would 
for  a  moment  think  of  permitting  an  act  which  might  seem  to 
the  Emperor  a  violation  of  their  neutrality.  While  Magdeburg 
was  in  its  death  throes  fruitless  negotiations  continued.  Both 
the  electors  remained  stubbornly  immovable.  At  last  in  des- 
peration Gustavus  appeared  at  Berlin  with  a  more  potent  argu- 
ment at  his  back  in  the  shape  of  an  army,  and  forced  the 
unwilling  George  WiUiam  to  throw  open  to  him  the  fortress  of 
Spandau.  But  it  was  too  late.  Saxony  had  still  to  be  dealt 
with,  and  while  Saxony  was  deliberating  Magde-  paii  of 
burg  fell.  On  May  20th,  Pappenheim  stormed  the  Magdeburg, 
town.  Amid  the  confusion  of  the  assault  the  houses  caught 
fire.  The  imperialist  soldiers,  maddened  by  victory  and  plun- 
der, lost  all  self-control,  and  amid  the  roar  of  the  flames  and 
the  crash  of  falling  houses  ensued  a  scene  of  carnage,  of  out- 
rage, and  of  horror,  at  which  Europe  stood  aghast.  By  the 
next  morning  the  cathedral  alone  showed  gaunt  against  the 
sky,  amid  a  mass  of  blackened  ruins,  to  say  where  Magdeburg 
once  had  been. 

The  sack  of  Magdeburg  is  one  of  the  darkest  spots  on  the 
page  of  history.     For  many  years  it  has  been  allowed  to  stain 
the  reputation  of  the  veteran  Tilly,  unjustly,  for   Rggponsi- 
he  was  far  away  at  the  time,  but  upon  Gustavus   biuty  of 
must  rightly  rest  some  part  of  the  fearful  responsi-   Gustavus. 
bility.     Magdeburg  had  risen  against  the  Emperor  trusting  in 
him.     He  had  sent  one  of  his  own  officers  to  lead  the  defence. 


90  Eiiropeaji  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

He  knew  to  what  desperate  straits  the  town  was  reduced,  and 
though  he  could  not  have  anticipated  the  actual  horrors  of  the 
sack,  he  knew  well  enough  what  the  storming  of  a  town  by 
soldiers  of  fortune  meant  in  those  brutal  days.  Yet  for  two 
critical  months  he  allowed  his  march  to  be  checked,  and  his 
honour  compromised,  by  the  mulish  stubbornness  of  the  two 
electors,  who  had  no  force  at  their  command  sufficient  to  resist 
his  advance,  had  he  nobly  acted  upon  the  necessity  which 
knows  no  law.  It  is  just  possible  that  by  such  an  action 
he  might  have  driven  the  electors  to  throw  themselves  into 
the  arms  of  the  Emperor,  but  it  is  not  likely.  Gustavus  had 
not  hesitated  in  1626  to  seize  Pillau  by  force  from  the  Elector 
of  Brandenburg,  when  he  wanted  a  basis  of  operations  against 
Dantzig.  In  this  very  campaign,  when  too  late,  he  had  to 
use  force  to  gain  possession  of  Spandau,  yet  the  Elector  was 
not  moved  from  his  neutrality  by  either  of  these  high-handed 
acts.  Surely  the  least  which  Magdeburg  might  fairly  ask  of 
him  in  her  distress  was  not  to  be  more  scrupulous  about 
violating  neutrality  for  her  safety  than  he  had  been  for  his 
own  advantage. 

From  a  military  point  of  view  the  loss  of  Magdeburg  was 
a  crushing  blow.  The  incipient  movements  in  favour  of 
Gustavus,  which  had  begun  to  show  themselves  among  the 
Protestant  towns,  at  once  ceased.  No  German  princes  except 
WiUiam  of  Hesse-Cassel  and  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar  joined 
Retreat  of  him.  As  Gustavus  slowly  fell  back  down  the  Elbe, 
Gustavus.  and  entrenched  himself  at  Werben,  he  must  have 
felt  that  all  the  imperialist  leaders  had  to  do  was  to  leave  him 
alone,  and  his  power  would  melt  away  of  itself.  But  to  leave 
things  alone  was  just  what  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian  in  the 
flush  of  their  anticipated  victory  could  not  do.  In  April  peace 
had  been  signed  at  Cherasco  between  Ferdinand  and  France, 
and  the  Italian  army  of  the  Emperor  had  now  crossed  the 
Alps  and  reinforced  Tilly.  Forty  thousand  men  followed  his 
standard,  and  in  the  hope  of  quelling  all  opposition  and  end- 
ing the  war  at  a  blow,  orders  were  sent  to  the  marshal  to  pro- 


The  Thirty  Years'  War  91 

cure  the  dismissal  of  the  Saxon  troops,  and  then  to  march 
against  the  Swedes.  But  John  George  unexpectedly  resented 
this  interference  with  his  independence.      He  re-    ,        .       . 

^  Invasion  of 

fused   to  dismiss   his   troops.      Tilly  immediately   saxony  by 
occupied  Merseburg  and  Leipzig  and  began  har-   '^'"^" 
rying  the  country.     The  sight  of  his  burning  villages,  and  the 
invasion  of  his  cherished  independence,  roused  the  sluggish 
Elector  at  last.     He  sent  messengers  post  haste  to  Gustavus 
offering  his  alliance  and  demanding  his  help.     By  one  fatal  blun- 
der Ferdinand  had  done  more  to  destroy  his  own  cause,  than 
all  his  foes  together  had  hitherto  succeeded  in  doing.     He  had 
driven  Saxony  over  to  the  enemy.     It  was  not  so 
much   the   material    resources  which    the    Elector  between 
possessed,  which  made  his  friendship  so  important   Saxony  and 
to   Gustavus,   as   the    position   which   he   held   in 
Germany.     Drunken,  sluggish,  obstinate,  irresolute  as  he  was, 
men  recognised  in  him  a  strenuous  loyalty  to  the  constitution 
of  the  Empire  as  it  then  existed,  a  hearty  dread  of  revolution- 
ary proposals,  and  a  certain  pohtical  shrewdness.     It  was  these 
qualities,  quite  as  much  as  his  hereditary  position  as  the  leader 
of  the  Lutheran  party,  which  had  hitherto  determined  the  atti- 
tude of  the  north  German  princes  both  towards  Frederick  and 
Christian  of  Denmark.     That  he  should  now  join  his  forces  to. 
the  Swedes  meant  that  to  him  the  foreigner  and  the  invader  1 
appeared  less  of  a  revolutionary  than  the  legal  head  of  the 
Empire  himself. 

Gustavus  did  not  let  the  grass  grow  under  his  feet.  He  set 
out  at  on9e  for  Saxony  with  the  elector  of  Brandenburg,  effected 
a  junction  with  the  Saxon  army,  and  marching  The  battle  of 
towards  Leipzig  met  the  army  of  Tilly  drawn  up  in  Breitenfeid. 
battle  array  on  the  field  of  Breitenfeid  on  September  17th,  1631. 
Tilly  marshalled  his  men  to  the  number  of  32,000  in  one  long 
line  of  battle  along  rising  ground  overlooking  the  Uttle  stream 
of  the  Loderbach.  In  the  centre  were  posted  as  usual  the 
soUd  squares  of  pikemen  flanked  by  musketeers,  which  formed 
the  main  battle  according  to  the  tactics  of  the  Spanish  schooL 


g2  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

On  the  right  wing  was  Furstenberg  with  the  horse  of  the  Italian 
army,  while  the  left  was  guarded  by  the  fiery  Pappenheim  and 
his  famous  cavalry.  Between  the  wings  and  the  centre  were 
placed  the  heavy  guns,  probably  between  thirty  and  forty  in 
number.  Tilly  himself  on  his  well-known  white  horse  put  him- 
self among  his  Walloon  fellow-countrymen  in  the  centre.  The 
arrangement  adopted  by  Gustavus  was  somewhat  different. 
The  army  was  drawn  up  in  two  Hnes,  with  a  reserve  of  cavalry 
behind  each  line,  and  a  final  reserve  also  of  cavalry  behind  the 
centre  of  the  whole  army.  The  extreme  left  opposed  to  Fur- 
stenberg was  occupied  by  the  Saxon  troops  under  the  Elector 
in  person.  On  the  right  of  the  Saxons,  and  in  touch  with  the 
Swedish  centre,  was  Horn  with  the  Swedish  cavalry.  Gustavus 
himself  took  command  of  the  right  wing,  opposed  to  Pappen- 
heim, with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry ;  but  between  each  division 
of  cavalry  on  both  wings  in  the  first  line  was  a  detachment  of 
two  hundred  musketeers.  The  infantry  occupied  the  centre, 
marshalled  in  very  much  smaller  squares  than  those  of  Tilly, 
and  having  a  much  greater  proportion  of  musketeers  to  pike- 
men,  while  in  front  of  each  regiment  was  the  light  or  field 
artillery.  The  heavier  guns,  in  all  about  one  hundred,  under 
the  command  of  Torstenson,  were  placed  in  the  left  centre. 
In  numbers  Gustavus  was  decidedly  superior.  His  own  army 
amounted  to  some  26,000  men,  while  the  Saxons  could  not  be 
less  than  15,000.  His  guns,  too,  though  not  so  heavy  as  those 
of  Tilly,  were  far  more  numerous,  and  could  fire  three  shots  to 
one  of  the  imperialists.  The  wind  and  the  ground  favoured 
Tilly.  The  battle  began  with  an  artillery  duel,  in  which  the 
quick  firing  Swedish  pieces  wrought  fearful  havoc  among  the 
dense  masses  of  the  imperialist  army.  Yet  the  stubborn  old 
marshal  remained  immovable  amid  the  hail  of  the  balls.  Pap- 
penheim, younger  and  less  disciplined,  lost  patience.  Without 
orders  he  suddenly  launched  his  cavalry  on  the  Swedish  right, 
but  Gustavus  was  ready  for  him.  The  musketeers  received 
him  with  a  volley  which  made  him  reel,  and  Baner  at  the  head 
of  the  reserve  cavalry,  and  Gustavus  himself  with  the  right 


The  Thirty  Years'  War  93 

wing,  dashed  upon  him  at  the  moment  and  drove  him  fairly 
off  the  field.  Meanwhile  on  the  extreme  imperialist  right 
Furstenberg  in  his  turn  threw  himself  upon  the  Saxons,  drove 
back  their  cavalry  first  on  to  their  guns  and  then  on  to  their 
infantry,  until  the  whole  mass  in  wild  confusion  broke  and  ran, 
carrying  the  Elector  with  them  to  Duben,  and  even  to  Eilen- 
burg,  pursued  by  the  victorious  imperialists.  Tilly  saw  his 
opportunity,  and  ordered  his  centre  to  advance  to  take  Horn 
in  the  flank  left  exposed  by  the  flying  Saxons  ;  but  the  well-dis- 
cipHned  and  mobile  Swedes  falling  back  a  little  formed  a  new 
front  on  their  old  flank  and  defended  themselves  vigorously. 
In  making  this  flank  movement  Tilly  had  necessarily  left  his 
artillery  undefended,  and  Gustavus,  checking  his  pursuit  of 
Pappenheim,  wheeled  back  his  cavalry,  and  sweeping  the  posi- 
tion originally  occupied  by  Tilly  from  left  to  right,  captured 
the  guns  and  turned  them  against  their  own  masters,  while  he 
himself  with  his  horsemen  swooped  down  upon  Tilly's  rear. 
Caught  between  Horn's  foot  in  front  and  Gustavus's  cavalry  in 
the  rear,  with  their  own  guns  directing  a  plunging  fire  into 
their  flanks,  the  imperialist  infantry  proved  themselves  worthy 
of  their  reputation.  They  fought  like  heroes ;  but  the  longer 
they  fought  the  more  hopeless  became  the  struggle,  the  more 
decisive  the  defeat.  When  the  autumn  sun  went  down  on  the 
field  of  blood,  but  six  hundred  men  remained  in  disciplined 
array  to  make  a  ring  round  their  veteran  leader  and  carry  him 
in  safety  from  the  field.  The  imperiahst  army  was  entirely  de- 
stroyed as  a  fighting  force.  About  10,000  men  were  left  on 
the  field  of  battle,  as  many  more  were  taken  prisoners,  and  ac- 
cording to  the  custom  of  the  time  took  service  with  the  victors. 
One  hundred  and  six  standards  and  all  the  guns  remained  to 
grace  the  conqueror's  triumph.  Tilly  retreated  on  the  Weser, 
gathering  up  the  fragments  of  his  defeated  army  as  he  went, 
but  he  found  no  rest  there.  Pressed  back  by  the  advance  of 
the  victorious  Swedes  to  the  Danube  and  even  across  the 
Danube,  he  did  not  dare  to  make  head  against  Gustavus  again 
until  the  following  spring. 


94  European  History ,   1 598-1 71 5 

The  victory  of  Breitenfeld  placed  all  north  Germany  at  the 
feet  of  the  Swedish  king.  Perceiving  at  a  glance  that  even  a 
successful  attack  upon  Vienna  would  not  end  the  war,  and 
recognising  that  his  first  duty  was  to  the  troubled  Protestants 
March  of  ^^  ^^  Centre  and  of  the  south,  Gustavus  marched 
Gustavus  to  Straight  into  the  heart  of  Germany  on  the  Main 
the  Mam.  ^^^  ^^  Rhine,  disregarding  the  characteristic 
suggestions  of  Wallenstein  that  they  should  divide  Germany 
between  them  at  the  expense  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Catholic 
party.  On  October  loth  he  occupied  Wlirtzburg.  The  i8th 
of  November  saw  him  at  Frankfort  on  the  Main,  the  old 
capital  of  Germany.  He  spent  Christmas  Day  at  Mainz,  and 
there  in  the  fair  and  rich  Rhineland  he  rested  his  tired  troops, 
while  in  the  north  Tott  was  completing  the  reduction  of  the 
Mecklenburg  coast  line,  and  the  Protestant  administrators 
who  had  been  ousted  under  the  Edict  of  Restitution  were  being 
replaced.  No  one,  however,  knew  better  than  Gustavus  on 
what  slender  foundations  his  power  rested.  Richelieu  was 
already  beginning  to  think  that  his  ally  was  becoming  too 
powerful.  Louis  xiii.,  it  was  said,  had  been  heard  to  mutter 
'  It  is  time  to  put  a  limit  to  the  progress  of  this  Goth.'  Force, 
far  more  than  inclination  or  policy,  had  brought  him  the  Saxon 
alliance,  and  force  might  easily  break  the  bond  which  it  had 
forged.  Tilly  was  mustering  new  forces  beyond  the  Danube, 
and  at  any  moment  a  general  of  reputation  might  stamp  his 
feet  and  produce  an  army  of  soldiers  of  fortune  on  his  flank 
or  in  his  rear.  Even  the  Protestants  could  not  be  trusted 
should  misfortune  come.  Except  at  Nuremberg  and  a  few 
other  places,  which  had  felt  the  hand  of  the  oppressor,  there 
was  no  enthusiasm  in  Germany  for  the  Protestant  Liberator. 
His  schemes  Two  things  were  necessary  to  secure  the  fruits  of 
for  a  general    j^g  victory  which  he  had  won.     He  must  crush  the 

Protestant  i     r  i         i      i      •  r  i 

alliance  un-  enemy  before  he  had  time  to  recover  from  the 
der  Sweden.  i^Jqw  of  Breitenfeld,  and  he  must  gain  a  basis  of 
military  operations  and  political  influence  by  uniting  the  Prot- 
estant states  in  a  firm  league  under  his  leadership.     With  Tilly 


The  Thirty  Years    War  95 

destroyed,  and  the  Corpus  Evangelicorum  formed,  and  trusty 
Swedish  captains  placed  in  occupation  of  the  ecclesiastical 
lands  of  central  Germany,  then  and  not  till  then  might  Gus- 
tavus  consider  his  work  secure. 

The  first  thing  was  to  crush  military  opposition.  At  the  end 
of  March  the  Swedes  were  again  in  the  field.  On  the  31st 
Gustavus  entered  Nuremberg  in  triumph  and  re-  Advance  u 
ceived  an  enthusiastic  welcome.  On  April  5  th  the  Danube  to 
he  captured  Donauworth,  on  the  14th  he  found  '^""''='^'  '^32. 
Tilly  entrenched  behind  the  Lech,  forced  the  passage  of  the 
river,  stormed  the  enemies'  position,  and  drove  back  the  old 
marshal  to  Ingolstadt  wounded  to  death.  Bavaria  was  at  his 
feet.  Side  by  side  with  the  Elector  Palatine  he  rode  into 
Munich  on  the  7th  of  May.  There  was  now  no  enemy  left  to 
be  dealt  with  except  the  Emperor,  and  the  dominions  of  the 
Habsburgs  were  still  in  far  too  disorganised  a  state  to  be  able 
to  offer  much  opposition.  Even  the  Saxons  had  marched  un- 
opposed into  Bohemia ;  and  when  Gustavus  was  celebrating  his 
triumph  with  the  winter-king  at  Munich,  John  George,  who 
had  done  more  than  any  one  else  to  oust  Frederick  from 
Bohemia,  was  keeping  high  festival  himself  at  Prague. 

It  was  not  for  long.  There  was  but  one  man  in  all  wide 
Europe  who  could  save  Ferdinand  from  the  storm  just  break- 
ing upon  his  head,  for  there  was  but  one  capable  waiienstein 
of  drawing  to  himself  and  binding  together  into  appealed  to  by 
an  organised  army  the  soldiers  of  fortune  who  were  ^^^  Emperor, 
scattered  all  over  the  civilised  world.  In  December,  Eggen- 
berg,  Ferdinand's  most  trusted  counsellor,  had  been  sent  to 
Waiienstein  to  ask  him  to  forgive  the  past  and  strike  one  more 
blow  for  the  defence  of  the  House  of  Austria.  Waiienstein 
eagerly  seized  the  opportunity,  for  circumstances  had  played 
singularly  into  his  hand.  The  victories  of  Gustavus  had  drawn 
the  teeth  of  Maximilian  and  the  League.  The  necessities  of 
the  Emperor  must  force  him  to  agree  to  whatever  terms  were 
demanded.  The  long  wished  for  moment  had  arrived  when 
he  at  the  head  of  an  army,  wholly  his  own,  owing  no  allegiance 


96  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

to  the  Emperor,  might  become  the  dictator  of  Germany,  and, 
ousting  from  her  soil  all  foreigners  except  himself,  might  im- 
pose peace  upon  Germany  on  the  basis  of  religious  toleration. 
The  terms  which  he  exacted  from  the  Emperor 
forbid  any  doubt  as  to  his  intentions.  No  army 
was  to  be  allowed  in  the  Empire  except  under  his  command, 
he  alone  was  to  have  the  right  of  pardoning  offenders  and  con- 
fiscating lands.  The  Edict  of  Restitution  was  to  be  with- 
Appointed  drawn.  In  other  words  he  was  to  be  the  military 
dictator.  and   political  dictator    of  Germany.      The    terms 

were  accepted,  his  standard  raised.  From  Italy,  Scotland, 
Ireland,  as  well  as  from  every  part  of  Germany,  flocked  to 
him  men  eager  for  distinction  and  more  eager  for  plunder, 
without  distinction  of  nationality  and  without  distinction  of 
religion.  In  May  1632,  his  organisation  was  completed. 
Falling  suddenly  upon  the  Saxons  at  Prague  he  drove  them 
headlong  out  of  Bohemia,  then  turning  swiftly  to  the  left 
His  plan  of  directed  his  main  army  upon  the  rich  and  Protes- 
campaign.  t^nt  Nuremberg,  while  Pappenheim  scoured  the 
Rhine  country  at  the  head  of  his  horse.  Gustavus  saw  the 
crisis,  threw  himself  into  Nuremberg  and  fortified  it ;  then, 
•summoning  to  his  assistance  his  outlying  detachments,  offered 
Wallenstein  battle  in  the  hope  of  crushing  this  new  enemy  by 
another  Breitenfeld.  But  Wallenstein  had  made  up  his  mind 
to  show  Gustavus  quite  another  sort  of  warfare.  He  knew  the 
great  difificulties  which  the  Swedes  experienced  in  conducting 
their  operations  in  a  country  largely  hostile,  at  such  a  dis- 
tance from  their  base.  He  knew  also  the  value  of  his  own 
superiority  in  light  cavalry  in  provisioning  his  own  army,  and 
in  hampering  the  commissariat  of  the  Swedes.  He  did  not 
trust  the  discipline  of  his  own  recent  levies  on  the  battlefield, 
and  so,  forming  a  huge  entrenched  camp  on  an  eminence  over- 
looking the  plain  on  which  Nuremberg  stands,  he  prepared  to 
force  Gustavus  away  by  sheer  starvation. 

At  the  end  of  June  the  camp  was  finished,  and  the  duel  be- 
tween the  two  greatest  soldiers  of  the  day  began.     But  it  was 


The  Thirty  Years    War  97 

not  only  a  duel  between  soldiers,  it  was  also  a  duel  between 
rival  policies.  The  crisis  of  the  fate  of  the  Empire  was  being 
then  decided.  On  the  one  side  was  military  dicta-  The  camp  at 
torship  and  religious  toleration  in  connection  with  Nuremberg, 
the  traditional  institutions  of  the  Empire,  on  the  other  Protestant 
supremacy  and  political  federation  under  the  leadership  of  the 
foreigner.  Stubbornly  the  ques'-.ion  was  fought  out,  not  by  arms 
\ySX  by  endurance ;  but  day  by  day  it  became  clearer  that 
Wallenstein  had  calculated  rightly,  and  that  Gustavus  must  starve 
the  first.  By  the  beginning  of  September  the  strain  was  grow- 
ing intolerable,  discipline  was  becoming  relaxed,  and  the  king 
felt  that  he  must  stake  all  on  one  last  attack.  On  September 
3d  he  led  his  army  against  Wallenstein's  entrenchments,  but  in 
vain.  After  heroic  efforts  he  had  to  retire  baffled.  A  few  days 
afterwards  he  marched  out  of  Nuremberg,  leaving  Retreat  of 
the  best  part  of  his  army  dead  before  the  ramparts  Gustavus. 
of  the  Alte  Veste,  or  dying  in  the  hospitals  of  the  town. 
Wallenstein,  following  out  determinedly  the  plan  he  had  laid 
down  for  himself,  never  attempted  to  pursue,  but  turning  north 
into  Saxony  prepared  somewhat  leisurely  to  choose  a  position 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Saale,  where  he  might  invasion  ^f 
entrench   himself  for   the   winter,    and    apply  the   saxony  by 

,,  ^^■  J-  1  ■   •.-•    „• Wallenstein. 

gentle  pressure  of  his  marauding  and  requisitioning 
bands  to  the  ever-vacillating  will  of  John  George,  and  detach 
him  from  the  Swedish  alliance.  Gustavus  had  in  the  previous 
year  lost  Magdeburg  by  a  want  of  decision.  He  was  not  going 
to  lose  Saxony  in  the  same  way.  Summoning  Oxenstjerna  and 
Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar  to  his  aid,  he  flew  through  Thuringia 
as  quick  as  he  could  go,  and  seized  Erfurt  and  Naumberg 
before  Wallenstein  quite  realised  what  had  happened.  It  was 
now  the  beginning  of  November,  the  weather  had  suddenly 
turned  piercingly  cold ;  and  Wallenstein,  making  up  his  mind 
that  Gustavus  would  not  pursue  his  operations  further  that 
winter,  prepared  to  entrench  himself  between  Merseburg  and 
Torgau,  and  gave  permission  to  Pappenheim  to  return  to  the 
Rhineland,  capturing  Halle  as  he  went.     It  was  a  great  blunder. 

PERIOD    V,  G 


98  European  History,   1598- 171 5 

Gustavus  dashed  forwards  on  Wallenstein's  main  army  to  crush 
it  before  the  mistake  could  be  repaired.  Wallenstein  finding 
a  battle  inevitable  sent  messenger  after  messenger  to  bring 
Pappenheim  back,  and  hastily  throwing  up  some  field  entrench- 
ments and  deepening  the  ditches  which  intersected  the  plain, 
awaited  the  onslaught  of  the  Swedish  king  at  Liitzen  on  the 
1 6th  of  November. 

As  at  Breitenfeld  the  Swedes  were  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  and 
the  imperialists  only  in  one,  but  Wallenstein,  unlike  Tilly, 
Battle  of  seems  to  have  interspersed  bodies  of  musketeers 
Liitzen,  1632.  among  the  troops  of  the  cavalry,  and  posted  a 
strong  reserve  behind  his  centre.  The  battle  began  as 
usual  with  the  artillery  in  the  early  morning,  then,  as  the 
autumn  mist  cleared  away,  the  Swedes  advanced  to  the  attack 
about  ten  o'clock.  There  was  no  room  for  generalship.  It 
was  hard  hand-to-hand  fighting.  For  two  hours  the  battle 
swayed  backwards  and  forwards,  the  hardest  of  the  fighting 
being  on  the  Swedish  right,  where  the  king  himself  was  engaged 
with  Piccolomini's  black  cuirassiers.  Bit  by  bit  the  Swedes 
were  gaining  ground,  when  Wallenstein  bringing  up  his  reserves 
directed  a  terrible  charge  upon  the  Swedish  centre,  and  forced 
it  back  with  fearful  loss,  especially  among  the  officers.  Gustavus, 
at  the  head  of  such  horsemen  as  he  could  muster,  flew  to  the 
rescue,  and  as  he  made  his  way  through  the  mist  which  had 
gathered  again  for  a  few  moments  in  the  hollow,  found  himself 
Death  of  Unexpectedly  in  the  middle  of  a  troop  of  the 
Gustavus.  enemy's  cavalry.  A  shot  broke  his  left  arm, 
another  pierced  his  back,  and  he  fell  heavily  to  the  ground, 
where  he  was  soon  despatched  by  a  bullet  through  the  head. 

His  white  horse,  riderless  and  blood-stained,  tore  on  through 
the  enemy  into  the  Swedish  ranks  and  announced  the  loss  of  their 
leader.  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar  took  the  command,  and 
rallying  the  army  with  the  cry  of  vengeance,  renewed  the 
charge  with  an  enthusiasm  which  carried  all  before  it.  Just 
then  Pappenheim  and  his  cavalry  appeared  on  the  right  flank 
of  the  Swedes,  and  the  battle  again  settled  down  to  hard  hand- 


The  Thirty  Years'  War  99 

to-hand  fighting  for  three  hours  more.  Pappenheim  himself 
fell  dead  in  the  first  charge,  but  his  men,  like  their  enemies, 
fought  on  the  more  fiercely  to  avenge  the  fall  of  their  captain. 
At  last  as  the  darkness  fell,  the  Swedes  nerved  themselves  for.  a 
supreme  effort,  and  drove  the  imperialists  from  their  entrench- 
ments just  as  the  leading  columns  of  Pappenheim's  infantry 
appeared  upon  the  field. 

The  honours  of  the  battle  were  with  the  Swedes,  its  fruits 
were  with  Wallenstein.  As  regards  mere  numbers,  the 
Swedish  loss  was  probably  heavier  than  that  of  Results  of 
the  imperialists,  and  their  army  more  weakened  ^'^  death, 
as  a  fighting  force.  But  if  Gustavus  had  been  the  only  man 
killed  on  that  side,  his  death  would  have  more  than  counter- 
balanced the  whole  of  the  imperialist  losses,  for  not  only  was 
he  the  general  and  the  king,  not  only  was  he  the  one  man  capa- 
ble of  uniting  the  forces  of  Protestantism,  the  one  who  could 
successfully  cope  both  with  the  ambition  of  Richelieu  and  the 
fanaticism  of  Ferdinand,  but  he  was  also  the  only  man  still  in 
power  in  Germany  who  ennobled  the  struggle  with  a  distinct 
moral  ideal.  Whether  Protestants  in  Germany  had  sufficient 
powers  of  cohesion  and  strength  of  conviction  to  follow  a  com- 
mon policy,  whether  Sweden,  even  under  Gustavus,  could  have 
become  sufificiently  German  in  interests  and  sympathies  to 
command  the  allegiance  of  Germans,  may  be  doubtful ;  but  at 
any  rate  it  was  a  policy  worth  trying,  it  was  a  policy  based  on 
the  moral  and  pohtical  needs  of  the  people,  and  not  upon  the 
personal  ambition  of  the  successful  general.  If  it  failed  it 
would  fail  only  because  Protestantism  in  Germany  had  not  the 
quaUties  necessary  to  make  it  succeed.  But  when  Gustavus 
Adolphus  died  on  the  field  of  Liitzen  all  moral  and  religious 
ideal  died  too  out  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  On  the  one  side 
was  the  personal  ambition  of  a  military  dictator,  on  the  other 
the  national  ambition  of  a  foreign  aggressor,  and  the  very  fol- 
lowers and  companions  of  the  noble  Gustavus  himself  soon 
sank  to  be  little  more  than  '  condottiere,'  bent  only  upon 
gorging  themselves  and  their  country  out  of  the  spoils  of  help- 
less Germany. 


lOo  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

On  the  death  of  Gustavus,  the  supreme  direction  of  Swedish 
affairs  passed  into  the  hands  of  Oxenstjerna,  whose  one  object 
was  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  his  dead  friend  and 
taken  by  king ;  but  Oxenstjema  was  no  general,  and  being 
Oxenstjerna.  ^ji-^Qut  the  Supreme  authority  which  Gustavus 
wielded,  had  often  to  persuade  where  he  would  have  com- 
manded. His  first  step  showed  th&  change  which  had  taken 
place.  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar,  Uke  other  military  adven- 
turers, required  his  reward  before  he  would  venture  his  life 
further  in  the  cause,  and  a  duchy  had  to  be  carved  for  him  out 
of  the  bishoprics  of  Bamberg  and  Wtirtzburg.  It  was  the  first 
confiscation  of  Catholic  lands  by  the  Protestant  forces,  the 
first  forcible  subjection  of  a  Catholic  population  to  a  Protestant 
ruler.  However  justifiable  it  might  be  as  an  act  of  retaliation 
for  the  Edict  of  Restitution,  it  was  but  too  evident  a  proof  of 
the  increasing  tendency  to  consider  the  interests  of  the  German 
people  as  of  no  value  in  comparison  with  the  political  and  mili- 
tary necessities  of  their  so-called  saviours.  Sure  of  the  assis- 
„.    ,  tance  of  Bernhard  of  Saxe-VVeimar,  Oxenstjerna 

The  League  '  ■* 

of  Heiibronn,  was  enabled  to  unite  the  circles  of  Swabia  Fran- 
^^^'  conia  and  the  upper  and  lower  Rhine  to  Sweden 

by  an  offensive  and  defensive  league,  which  was  signed  at 
Heiibronn  in  April  1633.  Bernhard  took  command  of  the 
forces  raised  by  the  circles,  and  prepared  in  conjunction  with 
the  Swedish  army  to  resume  the  attack  on  Vienna. 

The  supreme  word  on  military  affairs  for  the  moment  lay 
not  with  Bernhard  or  with  Oxenstjerna  but  with  Wallenstein. 
Schemes  of  The  death  of  Gustavus  left  him,  as  he  well  knew, 
Wallenstein.  vvithout  a  rival  in  Germany,  and  retiring  slowly 
from  Liitzen  behind  the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  he  surrendered 
himself  to  the  illusion  that  he  could  now  dictate  peace  to  Ger- 
many on  his  own  terms.  Secure,  as  he  thought,  of  the  support 
of  his  army,  contemptuous  of  the  poUtics  both  of  Ferdinand 
and  of  Oxenstjerna,  he  prepared  to  enforce  his  own  conditions 
of  peace  upon  the  Emperor  and  upon  the  Swedes  alike.  The 
Edict  of  Restitution  was  to  be  withdrawn,  the  Swedes  to  be 


The  Thirty  Years    War  lOi 

compensated  by  some  places  on  the  Baltic  coast,  while  he 
himself,  the  peacemaker,  would  exchange  the  duchy  of  Meck- 
lenburg for  the  Rhenish  Palatinate,  or  possibly  the  crown  of 
Bohemia.  During  the  summer  of  1633  he  was  pressing  these 
terms  upon  Oxenstjerna  and  upon  John  George.  In  June  he 
had  almost  obtained  the  consent  of  the  latter,  but  Oxenstjerna, 
cautious  and  hostile,  would  not  trust  him.  Couriers  went 
quick  and  often  between  the  two,  and  rumours  of  treachery 
were  beginning  to  be  heard  behind  Wallenstein's  back,  not 
merely  at  Vienna,  but,  a  far  more  serious  thing,  in  the  camp. 
The  more  they  were  canvassed  the  more  did  Wallenstein's  pro- 
posals seem  hateful  to  important  interests  in  Europe.  The 
Jesuits  and  the  Catholics  were  not  willing  to  give  opposition  of 
up  so  soon  the  policy  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution,  t^^^  Jesuits, 
The  Spaniards  and  the  French  would  risk  anything  jards^'an'd 
rather  than  see  Wallenstein  lord  of  the  Palatinate,  t^e  army. 
Conservative  statesmen  and  the  loyal  soldiers  resented  the 
attempt  to  impose  terms  on  the  unwilling  Emperor  by  the 
brute  force  of  an  army  nominally  his  own.  The  soldiers  of 
fortune,  especially  the  officers,  did  not  want  an  end  put  to  a 
war  which  had  been  so  lucrative  and  promised  to  be  more 
lucrative  still.  In  January  1634,  the  Spaniards  were  plying  the 
Emperor  with  accusations,  and  demanding  the  dismissal  of 
Wallenstein,  just  as  Maximilian  and  the  League  had  done  four 
years  ago.  Wallenstein  contented  himself  with  binding  his 
officers  closer  to  him  by  an  oath.  Sure  of  their  support  he 
could  face  the  world.  But  in  the  beginning  of  February  his 
support  began  to  give  way  underneath  him.  Piccolomini  Gallas 
and  Aldringer  deserted  him,  and  Ferdinand  boldly 

^r  ■  /-     1       o  •       1  Tr        Dismissal 

threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  Spaniards.     He   and  murder 
dismissed  Wallenstein  from  his  command,  branded   °f  waiien- 
him  as  a  traitor,  released  his  army  from  its  obedi- 
ence to  him,  and  put  a  price  upon  his  head.     The  breach  was 
complete,  but  still  Wallenstein  did  not  quail.     Summoning  the 
colonels  to   meet  him  at   Pilsen  he  obtained  from  them   on 
February  20th   an  undertaking  to   stand   by  him   against  his 


I02  Eiu'opean  History,   1598-1715 

enemies,  and  moved  to  Eger  to  meet  Bernhard  of  Saxe- 
Weimar,  in  the  hope  of  inducing  the  Swedes  to  make  common 
cause  with  him,  and  obHge  the  Emperor  to  accept  the  peace. 
There  also  came  four  soldiers  of  fortune,  two  Irishmen  and  two 
Scots,  who,  finding  in  the  declaration  issued  by  the  Emperor  a 
warrant  for  their  own  dark  plots,  like  Fitzurse  and  his  compan- 
ions five  centuries  before,  determined  to  take  upon  themselves 
the  responsibility  of  ridding  their  master  of  too  powerful  a  ser- 
vant. At  nightfall  on  the  25th  of  February,  Wallenstein's 
chief  supporters  were  invited  to  a  banquet  and  there  murdered. 
Devereux,  an  Irish  captain,  reeking  from  the  butchery,  made 
his  way  to  the  general's  quarters,  and  struck  him  down  to  the 
ground  as  he  arose  from  his  bed  alarmed  at  the  noise.  So 
perished  Wallenstein  in  the  height  of  his  fame  and  power,  and 
with  him  perished  the  last  chance  of  keeping  the  foreigner  out 
of  Germany. 

At  first  the  star  of  Ferdinand  seemed  to  shine  the  brighter 
in  spite  of  the  dark  shade  cast  by  the  murder  of  Wallenstein. 
Battle  of  ^^^  army  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  young 
Nbrdiingen,  Ferdinand,  king  of  Hungary,  captured  Regensburg 
^^•^^^  in   July,  stormed    Donauworth  and   laid   siege  to 

Nordlingen.  There  the  king  was  joined  by  the  cardinal- 
infant,  Ferdinand  of  Spain,  who  was  on  his  way  to  assume  the 
government  of  the  Netherlands,  at  the  head  of  15,000  men. 
In  spite  of  inferior  numbers  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar,  ever 
sanguine  and  ever  impetuous,  prevailed  on  the  wary  Horn, 
who  commanded  the  Swedes,  to  risk  a  battle ;  but  the  evening 
of  the  6th  of  September  1634  saw  him  a  fugitive,  and  Horn 
a  prisoner  with  16,000  men  hors  de  combat.  The  battle  of 
Nordlingen  was  one  of  the  decisive  battles  of  the  war.  Just  as 
Breitenfeld  had  made  the  conquest  of  north  Germany  by  the 
Emperor  and  the  success  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution  impossible, 
so  did  NordHngen  render  the  conquest  of  south  Germany  by 
Protestantism  impossible.  The  Catholic  bishoprics  were  recov- 
ered, Bernhard's  duchy  of  Franconia  vanished,  and  the  line  of 
the  Main  became  once  more  the  boundary  between  the 
religions. 


The  Thirty  Years'  War  103 

In  May  1635,  the  negotiations  for  peace  which  had  been 
going  on  so  long  with  Saxony  were  brought  to  a  happy  con- 
clusion, and  a  treaty  embodying  the  terms  agreed  upon  was 
duly  signed  at  Prague  between  John  George  and  Peace  of 
the  Emperor.  The  question  of  the  ecclesiastical  Prague,  1635. 
lands  was  setded  by  taking  the  year  1627  as  the  test  year. 
Whatever  belonged  to  Protestants  at  that  time  was  to  remain 
Protestant,  whatever  was  then  Catholic  was  to  be  Catholic  still. 
This  arrangement  secured  nearly  all  the  northern  bishoprics 
to  Protestantism.  Lusatia  was  to  be  made  over  to  Saxony, 
and  Lutheranism  in  Silesia  guaranteed  by  the  Emperor. 
Lutheranism  was  still  to  remain  the  only  privileged  form  of 
Protestantism.  These  conditions  were  intended  to  form  a 
basis  for  a  general  peace.  It  was  hoped  that  other  states  would 
accept  them,  and  so  gradually  put  an  end  to  the  war.  To 
some  extent  the  anticipation  was  reahsed.  A  considerable 
number  of  the  cities  and  smaller  states  of  north  Germany 
accepted  the  treaty  of  Prague,  but  that  it  would  ever  form 
a  satisfactory  basis  for  a  general  peace  was  impossible,  as  long 
as  it  provided  no  security  whatever  for  the  Calvinists,  and  did 
not  attempt  to  deal  with  the  dangers  of  foreign  intervention. 

By  the  treaty  of  Prague   Saxony  ranged  itself  once   more 
upon  the  side  of  the  Emperor.     It  is  easy  to  sneer  at  the  want 
of  public  spirit  and  the  narrowness  of  aim  which  marked  the 
policy  of  John  George  throughout  this  difficult  time.     Yet  it 
will  be  found  by  an  attentive  observer  that  from  first  to  last 
there  was  a  singular  consistency  in  his  action,  which  sprang 
not  from  weakness  of  will  or  sluggishness  of  tem-   pqu^   ^^ 
perament,  but   from   settled    principles    of  policy  John  George 
from  which  he  never  budged.     In  imperial  politics   °^  Saxony. 
John   George  was   a   conservative,  in  ecclesiastical    matters  a 
Lutheran,    and    he   remained   steadily,  even   stubbornly,  con- 
sistent   to   those    two   conceptions.     As   a   conservative    and 
a  Lutheran  he  hated  the    destructive    policy  of  Christian   of 
Anhalt   and    Frederick    Elector    Palatine,   and    consequently 
secured  to  Ferdinand  his  election  to  the  Empire,  and  actually 


I04  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

supported  him  in  arms  against  his  revolted  subjects.  When 
Frederick  threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  Mansfeld,  when  his 
co-religionists  in  the  north  began  to  feel  alarmed,  when  Chris- 
tian of  Denmark  determined  to  fight  for  his  religion  and  his 
son's  bishoprics,  John  George  remained  sturdily,  obstinately, 
neutral ;  for  he  believed  that  it  was  better  to  run  some  risk  of 
aggression  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor  than  to  throw  all  the 
institutions  of  the  Empire  into  the  crucible.  The  Edict  of 
Restitution  was  the  first  thing  that  shook  him,  but  even  that 
would  not  have  weighed  against  the  danger  of  allowing  the 
foreigner  a.  footing  in  Germany,  had  not  the  Emperor  actually 
had  recourse  to  violence.  If  John  George  had  to  break  his 
neutraUty,  if  he  was  obliged  to  have  a  hand  in  the  work  of 
destruction  of  Germany,  if  conservatism  was  no  longer  possible, 
then  he  would  rather  join  a  Gustavus  than  a  Wallenstein  or 
a  Tilly.  But  he  never  felt  happy  in  that  alliance.  His  sense 
of  the  desolation  of  the  country,  of  the  destruction  of  war,  was 
too  great  for  him  ever  willingly  to  remain  long  under  arms. 
When  the  Emperor  had  been  beaten  back,  when  the  Edict 
of  Restitution  had  become  an  impossibility,  when  Wallenstein 
was  dead,  and  France  beginning  to  interfere  actively  in  the 
affairs  of  Germany,  it  was  time  for  John  George  once  more 
to  range  himself  side  by  side  with  the  Emperor,  for  once  more 
the  Emperor  had  become  the  champion  of  German  institu- 
tions against  revolution.  The  treaty  of  Prague  represents  no 
high  ideals  of  policy.  It  shows  that  the  great  religious  ideals 
with  which  the  war  began  are  over.  No  longer  do  men 
believe  that  they  are  fighting  for  the  Church  or  for  Protestant- 
ism, for  the  highest  interests  of  nations  and  of  souls.  Seven- 
teen years  of  war  have  disabused  them  of  that  illusion.  But 
next  to  religion  among  the  ennobling  influences  of  life  comes 
that  of  patriotism,  and  John  George  retiring  from  alliance 
with  the  foreigner,  as  the  Swede  and  the  Frenchman  prepare 
to  put  Germany  on  the  rack  for  thirteen  more  weary  years 
for  their  own  aggrandisement,  is  a  figure  which  shows  at  any 
rate  something  of  patriotism  and  of  policy,  among  the  heart- 
less dissensions  of  ambitious  brigand  chiefs. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE  AGGRANDISEMENT  OF  FRANCE 

Foreign  policy  of  Richelieu  —  Territorial  aggrandisement  —  Questions  of  the 
Valtelline  and  the  Mantuan  Succession — Intrigues  of  Richelieu  in  Ger- 
many—  Interference  of  France  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War  —  Alteration  of  the 
character  of  the  war — Unsuccessful  operations  of  France  —  Conquest  of 
Alsace  —  Revolt  of  Portugal  and  Catalonia — Position  of  France  at  the 
death  of  Richelieu — Policy  of  Mazarin  —  Battle  of  Rocroy  —  Conquest  of 
the  Upper  Rhineland  —  Campaign  of  Turenne  —  Negotiations  for  peace  — 
The  peace  of  Westphalia  —  The  solution  of  the  religious  difficulty  —  The 
beginning  of  modem  Europe —  Permanent  advance  of  France  —  Desperate 
condition  of  Spain  —  Outbreak  of  the  Fronde  —  Alliance  of  Mazarin  and 
Cromwell — The  peace  of  the  Pyrenees. 

When  Richelieu  in  1624  took  the  reins  of  government  into 
his  hands  in  France,  the  Thirty  Years'  War  was  just  about  to 
envelope  the  whole  of  Germany  in  its  fell  embraces,  p^^.^^ 
The  princes  of  the  lower  Saxon  circle  had  begun  policy  of 
to  arm,  the  king  of  Denmark  was  about  to  take  ^>«=''^''="- 
the  lead  of  the  Protestant  forces,  England  had  already  taken 
active  steps  for  the  recovery  of  the  Palatinate,  and  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  power  of  Spain.  There  was  every  probability  that 
the  whole  energies  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House  would  be  ab- 
sorbed in  the  affairs  of  Germany  for  many  years.  The  neces- 
sity of  Spain  and  the  Empire  was  ever  in  the  seventeenth 
century  the  opportunity  of  France,  and  Richelieu  realised  by  a 
flash  of  genius  that  the  hour  had  arrived,  which  was  to  make 
or  mar  the  influence  of  France  in  the  world.  Three  things 
were  necessary  to  the  establishment  of  French  supremacy  in 
Europe,  —  national  unity,  monarchical  centralisation,  and  the 
extension  and  security  of  the  frontiers.     To  attain  these  three 

lot; 


Io6  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

objects,  Richelieu  devoted  his  life,  and  he  was  sensible  enough 
to  see  that  complete  success  in  foreign  affliirs  must  do  much 
to  render  success  in  the  other  two  inevitable.  If  the  crown  of 
France  by  military  and  diplomatic  conquest  could  push  back 
the  French  frontier  towards  the  Rhine,  the  Scheldt,  and  the 
Pyrenees,  it  need  have  little  to  fear  from  its  internal  foes.  So 
Richelieu  took  up  again  the  threads  of  policy,  which  had 
dropped  from  the  lifeless  hands  of  Henry  iv.,  and  directed  all 
his  energies  to  the  resumption  of  the  attack  upon  the  Empire 
and  upon  Spain.  But  there  was  this  difference  between  the 
two  men.  Henry  iv.  had  dreamed  of  estabUshing  the  peace 
and  good  order  of  the  world  upon  the  ruin  of  the  Habsburgs. 
Richelieu  cherished  no  such  illusions.  Nakedly  and  avowedly 
he  sought  but  the  supremacy  of  France. 

Richelieu  stands  out  upon  the  canvas  of  history  as  the  first 
of  that  long  line  of  statesmen  who  were  actuated  by  purely 
selfish  national  interests.  Unaffected  by  moral 
ideals,  such  as  did  so  much  to  disguise  the  per- 
sonal ambitions  of  the  wars  of  the  Middle  Ages,  uninfluenced 
by  the  religious  motives,  which  often  ennobled,  even  though 
they  intensified,  the  ruthlessness  of  the  wars  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  rulers  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  latter  half  of  the 
seventeenth  centuries  made  war  upon  each  other  purely  in  the 
interests  of  their  crowns  and  of  themselves.  Personal  glory, 
territorial  aggrandisement,  commercial  advantage  were  the 
motives  which  led  to  the  great  wars  of  Europe  from  the  peace 
of  Westphalia  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  Before  the  fierce- 
ness of  those  appetites  the  rights  of  nations,  of  races,  even  of 
humanity  itself  weighed  not  a  feather  in  the  balance.  Ger- 
mans must  lose  their  speech  and  their  fatherland,  that  France 
may  push  her  boundaries  to  the  Rhine.  Poland  must  be 
wiped  out  of  the  map  of  Europe,  that  Prussia  and  Russia  may 
be  bigger  and  greater.  Even  African  negroes  must  be  torn 
from  their  homes,  and  sold  as  chattels  in  the  market  places  of 
the  West;,  that  the  pockets  of  Enghshmen  and  of  English 
colonists  might  swell  with  gold.     And  if  amid  the  dark  scene 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  107 

of  selfishness  and  rapacity  there  shines  at  times  the  nobler 
light  which  hallows  the  wars  of  liberty  against  the  oppression 
of  Louis  XIV.  and  Napoleon,  yet  the  shadows  deepen  as  they 
gather  round  the  career  of  Frederick  the  Great,  and  the  closing 
acts  of  the  Napoleonic  drama  at  Vienna,  and  the  historian  has 
sadly  to  acknowledge  that  in  them  are  to  be  found  the  charac- 
teristic scenes  of  eighteenth  century  diplomacy  and  war.  It  is 
the  triumph  of  Macchiavellianism  on  the  large  scale  in  inter- 
national politics.  It  is  the  adaptation  to  the  affairs  of  nations 
of  Hobbes's  description  of  the  natural  man.  Homo  homini 
lupus.  Everything  is  permissible  to  a  sovereign  which  tends 
to  the  security  and  greatness  of  his  power,  and  nations  are  to 
one  another  as  wild  beasts.  Man  in  his  personal  relations  is 
civilised  Christian  and  refined.  Nations  in  their  ordinary 
intercourse  with  one  another  are  punctilious,  courtly,  and  even 
deferential,  but  when  once  selfish  aggrandisement  is  possible,  it 
becomes  allowable.  The  thin  veneer  of  civilisation  and  of  con- 
sideration is  rudely  broken  through,  and  nation  stands  out 
against  nation  in  open  and  barbarous  hostility  on  the  principle 
of  the  old  moss  trooper's  rule  that  they  shall  win  who  have  the 
power  and  they  shall  keep  who  can. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  needs  of  the  French  monar- 
chy, there  was  no  doubt  that   Richelieu  was  right  in  urging 
France   to   a  policy  of  territorial  aggrandisement.      She   was 
better  able  to  pursue  it  than  were  her  neighbours,   Territorial 
for   she  was  sufficiently  free  from  religious  dififi-   ag&randise- 

1   •  111  1  1  1      •  1         ment  neces- 

culties  to  be  able  to  throw  her  sword  into  the  sary  to 
Protestant  or  the  Catholic  scale  as  her  interests  France, 
might  suggest.  She  had  more  to  gain  from  such  a  policy  than 
any  other  nation  in  Europe,  for  almost  on  all  sides  her  land 
frontiers  were  a  source  of  weakness.  In  the  south  the  Spanish 
provinces  of  Cerdagne  and  Roussillon  lay  on  the  French  side 
of  the  central  ridge  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  gave  easy  access  to 
the  Spanish  armies  into  rich  and  disaffected  Languedoc.  The 
Italian  frontier  was  in  the  keeping  of  the  duke  of  Savoy,  who, 
as  long  as  he  preserved   his  independence,  was  as  likely  to 


io8  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

admit  Spanish  and  imperialist  troops  into  the  valley  of  the 
Rhone,  as  French  troops  into  the  plain  of  Lombardy.  To  the 
east  and  to  the  north-east  the  frontier  was  still  more  insecure. 
Following  roughly  the  streams  of  the  Saone,  the  Meuse,  and  the 
Somme,  it  brought  the  Empire  and  Spain  dangerously  near  to 
Paris,  especially  as  the  intervening  country  was  not  easily 
defensible.  It  is  true  that  on  the  eastern  side  a  considerable 
access  of  strength  had  been  gained  by  the  occupation  of  the 
three  bishoprics  of  Metz  Toul  and  Verdun  in  1552,  which 
secured  to  France  the  important  fortress  of  Metz,  but  they 
were  not  yet  formally  annexed  to  the  crown  of  France,  but 
only  administered  by  French  officials.  A  glance  at  the  map 
will  therefore  show  that  the  danger  from  Spain  was  consider- 
able, and  that,  until  she  had  succeeded  in  breaking  the  chain 
which  bound  her  almost  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Straits  of 
Dover,  France  could  not  make  full  use  of  her  unrivalled  geo- 
graphical position. 

Such  were  the  influences  which  impelled  Richelieu  to  make 
the  rectification  of  the  frontier  of  France  on  the  side  of  the 
Netherlands,  the  Rhine,  and  the  Pyrenees,  the  first  object  of 
his  foreign  policy  ;  and  to  launch  France  on  that  career  of  con- 
quest and  aggrandisement  at  the  expense  of  the  House  of 
Habsburg,  which  has  been  from  his  time  almost  to  the  present 
day  the  central  feature  of  European  politics.  From  the  battle 
of  Nordlingen  to  the  battle  of  Solferino,  there  has  hardly  been 
a  great  war  in  Europe  in  which  the  armies  of  France  and  of 
the  House  of  Austria  have  not  been  arrayed  against  each 
Question  of  Other  as  enemies.  Spain  was  the  first  foe  to  be 
theVaiteiiine,  dealt  with,  for  Spain  was  the  most  dangerous  to 
neglect,  and  the  easiest  to  attack.  The  Spaniards 
who  garrisoned  the  Milanese  had,  in  1622,  seized  upon  the 
valley  of  the  ValtelHne,  and  occupied  it  by  force,  in  order 
to  secure  their  communications  with  the  Empire  ;  and  had 
even  obliged  Chur,  the  chief  town  of  the  League  of  the 
Grisons,  to  receive  an  imperial  garrison.  This  was  undoubt- 
edly an  act  of  aggression  on  their  part,  and  gave  RicheHeu 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  109 

the  opportunity  of  striking  a  deadly  blow  at  his  enemy.  The 
Valtelline  is  a  broad  and  rich  valley  which  runs  in  a  north- 
easterly direction  into  the  heart  of  the  Rhaetian  Alps  from 
the  top  of  the  Lake  of  Como.  About  half-way  up  the  val- 
ley a  mountain  pass,  practicable  for  the  passage  of  troops, 
leads  to  the  east  into  the  valley  of  the  Adige  a  little  north 
of  Trent,  from  which  by  the  well-frequented  Brenner  Pass 
communication  with  Innsbruck  and  south  Germany  was  easy 
and  safe.  This  was  the  only  route  which  was  certain  to 
be  available  for  the  passage  of  troops  and  stores  from  the 
Empire  to  Milan,  as  the  other  mountain  passes,  which  led 
direct  from  Tirol  and  Carinthia  into  Italy,  opened  into  the 
territory  of  the  repubhc  of  Venice,  and  Venice  was  usually 
not  incHned  to  welcome  the  arrival  of  imperial  troops.  Pro- 
vided, however,  that  the  passage  of  the  ValteUine  was  secured, 
the  rest  of  the  way  was  safe,  as  it  lay  through  imperial  ter- 
ritory. Hence  the  command  of  the  Valtelline  was  absolutely 
essential  to  the  maintenance  of  the  power  of  the  Habsburgs 
in  Italy,  but  the  valley  itself  was  politically  subject  to  the 
League  of  the  Grisons,  which  as  long  ago  as  1509  had  come 
under  the  protection  of  France.  So  then,  when  Spain  moved 
troops  into  the  Valtelline,  built  a  fortress  in  the  valley,  and 
obliged  the  Grisons  to  admit  an  imperial  garrison  at  Chur, 
Louis  XIII.  as  the  protector  of  the  Grisons  had  the  right  to 
interfere. 

Richelieu  took  his  measures  promptly.  In  1624  he  helped 
to  bring  about  a  marriage  alliance  between  Charles  prince 
of  Wales    and    Henrietta    Maria,    the    sister    of  ,^ 

'  Its  recovery 

Louis  XIII.,  by  which  he  hoped  to  gain  the  assist-  for  the 
ance  of  England  against  Spain  on  the  sea  and  G"s°"s,i626. 
in  the  Netherlands,  while  he  struck  at  the  Valtelline.  An 
army  of  the  mountaineers  of  the  Grisons  under  French  leader- 
ship drove  the  imperial  troops  from  Chur,  and  the  papal 
troops  from  the  Valtelline,  where  they  had  replaced  the 
Spaniards.  Lesdiguieres,  at  the  head  of  a  French  force, 
marched  to  the  assistance  of  Savoy  against  Genoa.     But  just 


no  Eitropean  History,    1 598-1715 

at  that  time  the  Huguenots  of  La  Rochelle  flew  to  arms,  and 
Richelieu,  afraid  of  finding  himself  involved  at  once  in  war  at 
home  and  abroad,  came  to  terms  with  Spain  at  the  treaty  of 
Monzon,  concluded  in  March  1626,  by  which  the  Valtelline 
was  to  remain  under  the  control  of  the  Orisons. 

For  the  next  three  years  the  whole  energies  of  Richelieu 
and  of  France  were  engaged  in  the  reduction  of  La  Rochelle, 
and  in  the  war  with  England,  which  followed  hard  upon,  and 
indeed  sprung  out  of,  the  marriage  treaty  of  1624.  In  1629 
a.v  ««    ^        he  was  once  more  at  liberty  to  turn  his  attention 

TheMantuan  -' 

succession,  to  Italian  affairs.  In  1627  the  duke  of  Mantua 
'^*^"  and  Montferrat  had  died.     His  nearest  heir  was 

a  Frenchman,  the  duke  of  Nevers.  But  the  Emperor,  at  the 
instigation  of  Spain,  not  wishing  to  have  a  French  prince  so 
near  the  Milanese,  determined  to  sequester  the  territory  on 
the  pretext  of  a  disputed  succession.  Spanish  troops  at  once 
overran  both  Mantua  and  Montferrat,  and  driving  the  duke 
of  Nevers  into  Casale  besieged  him  there.  The  Italian  princes, 
however,  were  not  inclined  to  submit  without  protest  to  this 
exercise  by  the  Emperor  of  obsolete  and  doubtful  rights.  The 
Pope  (Urban  viii.),  who  was  strongly  French  in  sympathy, 
combined  with  Venice  to  ask  the  assistance  of  France,  and  in 
January  1629  Louis  and  Richeheu  crossed  the  Mont  Genevre 
at  the  head  of  a  large  army,  captured  Susa,  relieved  Casale, 
and  forced  the  duke  of  Savoy  to  make  peace.  Again,  however, 
a  rebellion  of  the  Huguenots  obliged  Louis  to  draw  back  in  the 
hour  of  victory  (March  1629),  and  in  the  summer  of  that  year 
fresh  troops,  set  free  by  the  imperialist  successes  in  Germany, 
invaded  Italy  under  Spinola  and  formed  the  sieges  of  Man- 
tua and  Casale.  In  spite  of  the  most  strenuous  efforts  of 
Louis  himself,  who  crossed  the  Alps  at  the  head  of  the  French 
armies  in  the  winter  of  1629-30,  the  combined  forces  of  Spain 
and  the  Empire  were  too  strong  to  be  dislodged  from  Mantua 
or  Montferrat.  But  the  invasion  of  Germany  by  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  promoted  by  France  and  even  by  the  Pope,  made 
the  Emperor  anxious  for  peace,  and  through  the  diplomatic 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  in 

skill  of  the  papal  agent,  Giulio  Mazzarini  —  afterwards  to  be- 
come so  celebrated  in  French  history  —  a  truce  was  arranged, 
which  afterwards  ripened  into  the  definitive  peace   p 
of  Cherasco  (April  26th  1631).     By  this  treaty  the   cherasco, 
duke  of  Nevers  was  invested  with  the  duchy,  and   '^^'' 
the  fortresses  were  restored  on  both  sides,  except  Pinerolo, 
which  was  still  held  by  the  French. 

So  ended  the  first  great  effort  made  by  Richelieu  against 
the  House  of  Habsburg.  Like  most  of  his  plans  it  was  better 
conceived  than  executed,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
carrying  it  out,  he  was  sorely  hampered  by  opposition  to  his 
authority  at  home  both  from  the  Huguenots  and  from  the 
nobles.  His  Italian  policy  must  not  be  considered  by  itself. 
It  is  part  of  a  great  whole.  While  he  was  openly  attacking  the 
imperial  forces  in  Italy,  his  diplomacy  was  undermining  the 
imperialist  power  in  Germany,  and  if  in  1631  he  thought  it 
best  to  rest  content  with  the  reduction  of  Savoy,  and  the  ac- 
quisition of  a  passage  through  the  Alps,  it  was  because  at  that 
particular  moment  he  could  best  effect  his  purpose  by  shifting 
his  method  from  direct  to  indirect  hostility,  and  the  scene  from 
Italy  to  Germany. 

Already  he  had  endeavoured  to  keep  the  flame  of  opposition 
to  Spain  alive  by  granting  subsidies  to  the  Dutch,  and  directing 
Mansfeld's  army  in  1624  to  the  Netherlands.      In 

,  ,  .  1       r  Intrigues  of 

July  1630,  he-sent  his  most  trusted  agent  the  famous   Richelieu  in 
Capuchin,   Father  Joseph,  to  the  meeting  of  the   Germany, 
diet  of  Regensburg,  where  he  laboured  with  nota- 
ble skill  and  success  to  bring  about  the  dismissal  of  Wallenstein, 
and  to  pave  the  way  for  detaching  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  and 
the  League  from  their  close  alliance  with  the  Emperor  and 
Spain.     In  the  autumn  of  the  year  before  another  well-trained 
diplomatist,  Charnac^,  had  travelled  as  far  as  Dantzig  to  offer 
the  mediation  of  France  in  the  quarrel  between  Sweden  and 
Poland,  and  so  removed  one  of  the  obstacles  which  made  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  hesitate  to  take  part  in  the  German  War.     At 
that  time  Richelieu  seems  to  have  thought  that  he  could  use 


112  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Gustavus  merely  as  a  fighting  tool,  and  by  offering  him  French 
money  and  a  French  alliance  could  make  him  fight  the  battles 
of  France  against  the  Emperor.  But  he  was  quickly  unde- 
ceived. Gustavus  definitely  refused  to  allow  his  political  or 
military  independence  to  be  impaired.  He  was  quite  willing 
that  France  should  interfere  openly  in  the  war,  if  she  chose  to 
do  so,  provided  she  would  limit  her  operations  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine  ;  but  he  would  not  tolerate  for  a  moment  any 
interference  with  his  own  command.  The  utmost  that  Riche- 
lieu could  obtain  from  him  by  the  treaty  of  Barwalde  in  1631, 
in  return  for  French  gold,  was  the  promise  to  observe  friend- 
ship or  neutrality  towards  Bavaria  and  the  League,  so  far  as 
they  would  observe  them  towards  him.  Nor  was  this  promise 
of  much  avail,  for  when,  after  the  battle  of  Breitenfeld,  Gusta- 
vus determined  to  march  upon  central  and  southern  Germany 
instead  of  on  Vienna,  all  hope  of  detaching  Bavaria  from  the 
Emperor  had  to  be  laid  aside. 

As  long   as   Gustavus  Adolphus  lived  there  was  but  little 

room  for  Richelieu  in  German  politics.     Had  he  survived  a 

few  years  longer,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  world 

Open  inter-  ,,.  r      i         •««•     i 

ference  in  would  havc  secu  an  alliance  of  the  Moderates  m 
Germany,  Germany,  under  the  leadership  of  Richelieu,  sup- 
ported possibly  by  both  Maximilian  and  Wallen- 
stein,  against  the  Emperor  and  the  king  of  Sweden.  But  the 
death  of  Gustavus  quickly  put  the  decisive  voice  in  German 
affairs  into  the  possession  of  France.  Already  in  1632  French 
troops  had  appeared  upon  the  Rhine,  and  garrisoned  the  new 
fortress  of  Ehrenbreitstein  at  the  invitation  of  the  elector  of 
Trier.  In  the  same  year  Richelieu  became  a  party  to  the 
League  of  Heilbronn,  and  so  secured  the  right  to  interfere  in 
German  affairs.  In  1633  a  French  army  entered  the  old 
German  territory  of  Lorraine  and  captured  its  capital  Nancy, 
owing  to  the  incessant  intrigues  against  the  all-powerful  cardinal 
of  which  the  duke  had  been  guilty.  The  battle  of  Nordlingen 
in  1634  put  Protestant  Germany  at  the  feet  of  Richelieu.  The 
soil  of  Germany,  harried  and  plundered,  could  with  difificulty 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  113 

sustain  the  armies  which  devastated  it.  Sweden,  poor  and 
exhausted,  could  make  no  sacrifices.  England  was  too  much 
occupied  with  pecuniary  difficulties  at  home  to  be  able  to  send 
assistance  to  Germany.  France  was  the  only  power  both  able 
and  willing   to  provide    the  sinews   of  war.      She 

1  IT  r     1        T  Declaration 

became  the  protector  and  director  of  the  League   of  war 
of  Heilbronn,  took  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar  and   against 
his  army  into  her  pay,  claimed  from  the  Swedes 
the  custody  of  the  fortresses  held  by  them  in  Alsace,  and  on 
May  19th,  1635,  formally  declared  war  against  Spain. 

From  that  moment  the  character  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War 
profoundly  alters.     It   is  no   longer  a  war  of  religion,  to  set 
limits  to  the  progress  of  the  Counter- Reformation   The  charac- 
or  to  save  Catholicism  or  Protestantism  from   ex-   *^''  °f  ^'^^ 

...  war  altered 

tinction.  It  is  no  longer  a  war  of  institutions,  to  by  French 
maintain  the  authority  of  the  Emperor  or  to  pre-  interference, 
serve  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  princes.  It  is  no  longer  a  war 
of  property,  to  resist  the  undoing  of  the  territorial  settlement  of 
1555.  It  is  no  longer  a  war  for  the  re-settlement  of  Germany 
upon  a  new  basis  by  military  force.  German  interests  no 
longer  have  a  place  in  this  terrible  war  waged  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  Germany  on  German  soil.  Primarily,  it  is  a  war^i^ 
between  the  House  of  Bourbon  and  the  House  of  Habsburg,f*^ 
to  break  the  power  of  Spain  and  increase  that  of  France, 
through  the  acquisition  by  the  latter  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 
Secondarily,  it  is  a  war  between  the  Swedes  and  the  Empire, 
to  gain  for  the  former  out  of  German  soil  an  adequate  compen- 
sation for  the  money  which  they  had  spent  and  the  blood 
which  they  had  shed.  Two  points  of  interest  alone  remain  in 
tracing  the  melancholy  story  of  the  weary  years,  the  gradual 
development  of  the  power  of  France,  and  the  brilliant  achieve- 
ments of  skilful  generalship. 

The  entrance  of  France  into  the  war  did  not  at  first  check 
the  tide  of  imperialist  success.  Richelieu  overestimated  the 
resources  and  the  military  strength  of  France.  He  put  into 
the  field  no  less  than  four  armies,  amounting  in    the    aggre- 

PERIOD    v.  H 


T 14  European  History,   1 598-1 7 1 5 

gate  to  1 20,000  men  ;  but  unaccustomed  to  war,  ill  disciplined, 

ill  fed,  ill  paid,  and  badly  commanded,  they  were  no  match  for 

.  ,   the  veterans  of  Spain  and  the  Emperor.     It  was 

Unsuccessful  ^  ^ 

campaigns  the  first  time  that  the  new  monarchy  in  France 
°"  ^^^      ,      had   made  war  upon  a  grand   scale,  and  it  had 

frontiers  of  r  o  j 

France,  to  buy  its  experience.     The  campaigns  of  the  years 

1635-1637-  \(i2)S  1636  and  1637  told  a  story  of  almost  unre- 

lieved failure.  In  Italy  the  French  armies  just  managed  to 
hold  their  own.  In  Alsace  and  the  Netherlands  they  were 
everywhere  outgeneralled  and  beaten  back.  In  1636,  a  Spanish 
army  actually  invaded  France  and  threatened  Paris.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  skilful  generalship  of  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar 
in  the  Rhineland,  and  the  signal  success  which  attended  the 
efforts  of  the  Swedish  army,  it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  the 
Emperor  would  have  been  able  to  impose  upon  all  Germany 
the  conditions  of  the  peace  of  Prague,  and  by  procuring  the 
retirement  of  the  Swedes  have  narrowed  the  issues  involved  to 
the  simple  one  of  a  national  war  between  France  and  Austro- 
Spain.  Already  Bavaria  and  Catholic  Germany,  as  well  as 
Saxony,  Brandenburg  and  nearly  all  the  Lutheran  powers,  had 
accepted  the  treaty.  Oxenstjerna  and  the  Swedes  had  refused 
after  protracted  negotiations,  only  because  the  Emperor  and 
John  George  would  not  hear  of  making  over  to  them  an  inch 
of  German  soil.  On  their  side  they  would  not  be  content 
merely  with  a  money  indemnity.  Saxony  and  Brandenburg 
accordingly  joined  their  forces  to  those  of  the  Emperor  and 
determined  to  drive  the  Swedes  back  across  the  sea  to  their 
Success  f  ^^^^  country.  It  was  a  critical  moment.  Had  the 
Baner  in  Saxons  pressed  on  vigorously  after  the  final  rupture 
Batueor  °^  ^^  negotiations  in  the  autumn  of  1635,  they 
Wittstock,  could  hardly  have  failed  to  have  crushed  Baner  the 
^^^^'  Swedish  general  at  Magdeburg  with  their  superior 

forces,  but  the  opportunity  was  allowed  to  slip.  Baner  with- 
drew in  safety  to  the  north,  and  was  there  strongly  reinforced. 
He  now  had  under  his  orders  an  army  sufficient  to  cope  with 
his  enemies,  and  after  some  marching  and  countermarching 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  1 1 5 

succeeded  in  throwing  himself  upon  the  Saxons  and  imperialists 
at  VVittstock  on  the  Mecklenburg  frontier  of  Brandenburg  on 
October  4th,  1636,  before  the  Brandenburgers  could  come  to 
their  assistance.  The  victory  was  one  of  the  most  complete 
won  by  the  Swedes  during  the  whole  war.  The  elector's  army 
was  almost  annihilated,  and  Baner  became  as  paramount  in 
northern  Germany  as  the  imperialists  were  upon  the  Rhine 
until  the  following  autumn  when  he  was  again  driven  back  into 
Pomerania. 

It  is  noticeable  that  both  in  diplomacy  and  war  Richelieu 
improved  his   position  year  by   year.      Gradually  he  learned 
how  to  win  campaigns,  as  he  had  learned  gradually  how  to 
rule  France.     In  the  last  four  years  of  his  life,  he  gathered  the 
fruits  for  which  he  had  so  patiently  laboured  in  the  previous 
years.     In   1638  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar   sue-  capture  of 
ceeded  in  making  himself  master  of  the  upper  Breisach  by 
Rhineland,  and   having  defeated  the  imperialists  saxeWeimar, 
at   Rheinfelden    occupied   Freiburg   in    Breisgau,  1638- 
and  on  December   19th    captured  the   important   fortress   of 
Breisach.     Richelieu  when  he  heard  the  news  hurried  to  the 
bedside  of  his  dying  friend    the  Capuchin  Joseph,  '  Courage, 
pere  Joseph,^  he   cried,  *  Breisach  est  a   tious,'  and  with  this 
characteristic  viaticum  to  console  and  strengthen  him  in  his 
last  agony,   the  wily  diplomatist   passed   from    this   world   of 
intrigue,  of  which  for  the  last  ten  years  his  subtle  brain  had 
been  the  master  and  the  mainspring.     In  July  of  the  next  year 
Bernhard  himself  died,  and  his  army,  together  with  Death  of 
the  conquests  which  it  had  made,  passed  directly  Bernhard. 
under    the    command  of   the    French.      French  under  French 
governors  ruled  in  the  Alsatian  towns,  and  from  command, 
that  time  the  annexation  of  Alsace  to  the  French  monarchy 
became  one  of  the  recognised   objects  of  the   policy  of  the 
Bourbons.      The  success  of  Richelieu  did   not  stop  with  the 
land.     Ever  since  the  fatal  day,  when  the  capture  of  a  few 
French  ships  by  the  Huguenot  Soubise  in  the  port  of  Blavet 
had  sent  the  proud  cardinal  on  his  knees  to  England  and  the 


1 1 6  European  History,    1 598- 1 7 1 5 

Dutch  to  borrow  ships  to  use  against  the  revolted  Rochellois, 
Richeheu  had  devoted  special  care  to  the  formation  of  a  navy. 
In  1639  for  the  first  time  a  French  fleet  appeared  in  the 
Channel,  ready  to  cope  with  the  huge  galleons  of  Spain,  and 
to  cut  the  bond  which  united  her  to  the  Netherlands.  France 
was  now  to  play  the  same  game  at  the  expense  of  Spain  which 
had  been  played  by  Ehzabeth  of  England  in  the  century 
before.     But  the  time  had  not  yet  come  when  France  was  to 

wrest  from  Spain  the  command  of  the  sea.  The 
Spanish  Fleet  Spaniards  succeeded  in  escaping  the  French  fleet, 
in  the  Downs,  ^ut  only  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  their  allies  the 
'  ^^'  Dutch.     Sorely  bested  by  their  quick -sailing  an- 

tagonists, they  took  refuge  in  the  Downs  under  the  neutral  flag 
of  England,  but  even  there  the  Dutch  admiral  pursued  them, 
burned  some  of  their  ships,  captured  others,  and  forced  the 
remnant  to  seek  the  frien  lly  shelter  of  Dunkirk.  From  that 
time  the  passage  of  the  Channel  was  closed  to  a  Spanish  fleet 
as  long  as  Spain  was  at  war  with  the  Dutch  or  the  French.  In 
the  next  year  still  more  serious  misfortunes  awaited  the  crown 
of  Spain.     Portugal  assisted  by  French  subsidies  successfully 

reasserted  its  independence,  and  re-established  its 
Portugal  and  monarchy  under  the  House  of  Braganza  in  Decem- 
Cataionia,        jjej-  1640,  while  earlier  in  the  year  the  revolt  of  the 

high-spirited  Catalans  effectually  saved  France  from 
all  danger  of  invasion  from  the  south  and  opened  her  path  to 
Roussillon,  while  in  Italy  the  French  flag  was  successfully 
planted  on  the  walls  of  Turin.  The  two  following  years  served 
to  make  good  the  ground  thus  won,  and  when  Richelieu  died 
in  December  1642,  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  feeling  that  he 
had  got  his  hand  upon  the  throat  of  his  huge  antagonist  and 
was  choking  her.  With  French  armies  strongly  encamped  on 
the  Rhine  and  the  plain  of  Piedmont,  with  French  governors 
established  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  with  Roussillon  and  Cer- 
dagne  and  the  passes  of  Savoy  in  the  possession  of  France,  she 
had  indeed  acquired  a  frontier  which  not  only  preserved  her 
from  all  danger  of  sudden  invasion,  but  enabled  her  to  strike  a 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  117 

swift  and  deadly  blow  at  her  enemies,  before  they  could  have 
time  to  concentrate  their  forces  against  her.     Richelieu  in  his 
eighteen  years  of  power  had  given  France  concen- 
tration,  unity,   and   a  scientific  frontier.      Seated    improved 

,  1  1  1     1     1  1         -r^  position  of 

between  the  two  seas,  bounded  by  the  Pyrenees   France  at  the 
the  Alps  and  the  Vosges,  with  her  hand  upon  the   '^^^t^  °f 

T-.  1  •  1       1         r>.    1     1  1        T-<  1  Richelieu, 

Rhme  and  the  Scheldt,  J:*  ranee  was  prepared  to   1642. 
strike  for  the  supremacy  of  Europe. 

The  direction  of  the  policy  of  France  passed  on  the  death  of 
the  stern  and  uncompromising  Richelieu  into  the  hands  of  the 
supple   and   intriguing   Mazarin,   but   the    change 

1  t-rr  1  ~i r    'r        •  Richelieu's 

made  no   difference    to   the   conduct    of    foreign   poucy  con 
affairs.      Louis   xiii.    followed    his   great   minister  tinued  by 

.    ,  ,  ,  11-1  •  •  r    Mazarin. 

quickly  to  the  grave,  and  during  the  minority  of 
his,  young  son,  Louis  xiv.,  Anne  of  Austria,  the  queen  mother, 
who  was  entirely  devoted  to  Mazarin,  became  regent,  and  the 
policy  of  aggrandisement  at  the  expense  of  the  Austro-Spanish 
House  was  vigorously  carried  on.  Within  a  few  months  of 
the  accession  of  the  young  king,  his  reign  was  graced  by  the 
most  splendid  success  which  had  attended  the  arms  of  France 
since  the  capture  of  Calais  by  the  duke  of  Guise.  Don 
Francisco  Mello,  who  had  succeeded  the  cardinal-infant  in  the 
government  of  the  Netherlands  in  December  1641,  thought 
to  take  advantage  of  the  weakness  caused  by  the  change  of 
rulers  in  France ;  and  sent  the  count  of  Fuentes  at  the  head 
of  all  the  available  troops  which  he  could  muster,  across  the 
frontier.  Mazarin,  following  his  habitual  policy  of  trying  to 
attract  the  princes  of  the  blood  to  his  side,  entrusted  the  com- 
mand of  the  French  army  to  the  young  due  d'Enghien,  the 
eldest  son  of  the  prince  of  Cond^,  who  found  the  Spaniards  on 
the  19th  of  May  1643  strongly  posted  among  the  marshes 
which  surround  the  Httle  fortress  of  Rocroy.  Cond^,  to  give 
him  the  name  by  which  he  is  best  known,  though  he  never  in 
the  course  of  a  long  training  in  war  developed  any  of  the 
higher  qualities  of  a  general,  had  that  magnetic  personal 
power  over  his  men  which  is  all  important  on  the  battle-field. 


Il8  Europemi  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

They  would  follow  him  anywhere.  The  furia  francese^ 
which  had  been  often  remarked  upon  in  the  Itahan  wars  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  had  been  but  the  mad  rush  of  an  undis- 
Destruction  ciplincd  mob,  like  the  rush  of  African  dervishes, 
of  the  miii-  Cond^  was  the  first  great  leader  to  utilise  this 
of  Spain  at  powcr  among  disciplined  troops,  and  to  make  the 
Rocroy,  1643.  peculiar  elan  of  the  French  charge  into  one  .of 
the  most  decisive  tactics  of  the  battle-field.  Ever  since  the 
days  of  the  great  captain,  Gonsalvo  da  Cordova,  the  Spanish 
infantry  had  been  the  finest  in  the  world.  The  solid  mass  of 
pikemen,  wedged  close  together  in  a  fortress-like  formation, 
by  their  stubborn  endurance  could  resist  all  cavalry  attack, 
and  by  sheer  weight  bear  down  all  opposition.  But  if  once 
the  mass  became  disorganised,  it  could  never  reform.  Once 
break  the  '  hedgehog  '  of  pikes,  and  the  day  was  won.  Gusta- 
vus  Adolphus  had  shown  at  Breitenfeld  how  the  superiority  of 
artillery  and  musketry  fire  might  open  lanes  in  these  mighty 
masses,  into  which  the  heavy  cavalry  might  throw  themselves, 
and  overcome  weight  by  weight  in  the  shock  of  hand-to-hand 
conflict.  Cond^  at  Rocroy  illustrated  a  similar  principle  by 
his  mobile  and  disciplined  infantry.  Plunging  a  deadly  fire 
into  the  dense  immovable  masses  of  the  Spaniards,  he  waited 
for  the  moment  when  the  falling  men  began  to  create  con- 
fusion in  the  ranks,  then  against  their  front,  and  into  their 
flanks  he  poured  the  lithe  and  well  trained  infantry  with  irre- 
sistible effect.  It  was  the  story  of  the  Armada  and  the  English 
ships  retold  on  land.  The  huge  masses  could  do  nothing 
against  their  swarming  antagonists.  Taken  flank,  front,  and 
rear,  they  could  not  alter  their  formation,  they  could  not 
adapt  themselves  to  this  new  kind  of  warfare,  they  would  not 
break  and  run,  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  die.  There  is 
something  inexpressibly  pathetic  in  the  figure  of  the  old 
count  of  Fuentes,  seated  on  his  chair  in  the  middle  of  the  fast 
diminishing  square  of  his  choicest  troops,  for  the  gout  would 
not  permit  him  even  to  stand,  calmly  and  patiently  awaiting 
inevitable  death,  as  the  defending  ranks  became  thinner  and 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  119 

thinner,  without  the  thought  of  surrender,  without  the  power 
even  of  striking  a  blow  in  self-defence,  the  type  of  his  country, 
and  his  country's  greatness,  which  was  passing  away  with 
the  shouts  of  victory  which  hailed  the  young  conqueror  of 
Rocroy. 

The  victory  of  Rocroy  made  France  the  first  military  power 
of  Europe,  but  it  was  on  the  Rhine  and  not  in  the  Netherlands 
that  she  put  forth  all  her  energies.     During  the  re-    conquest  of 
maining  years  of  the  war,  the  chief  struggle  was  for    ^'^^  Upper 

1  •  r     y  T^i  ■       1        1         T-.  Rhineland  by 

the  possession  of  the  upper  Rhmeland.  France  the  French, 
wished  to  secure  her  hold  over  Alsace  by  occupy-  1644-1645. 
ing  both  banks  of  the  great  river,  and  making  herself  perma- 
nently mistress  of  the  fortresses  of  Breisach  and  Philipsburg. 
The  Emperor  and  Maximilian  fought  stubbornly,  the  one  to 
save  the  Breisgau,  one  of  the  oldest  possessions  of  the  House 
of  Habsburg,  from  falling  into  the  hand  of  the  enemy,  the 
other  to  defend  the  frontiers  of  Bavaria  from  insult  and 
plunder.  In  the  cautious  Mercy,  and  the  dashing  Werth,  they 
obtained  the  services  of  generals  not  unfit  to  be  matched  with 
Cond^  and  Turenne.  At  Freiburg  in  Breisgau  for  three  days 
the  impetuous  Cond6  dashed  himself  in  vain  against  the  in- 
trenchments  of  Mercy  in  August  1644,  neglecting  the  wiser 
counsel  of  Turenne,  who  showed  how  easily  a  flank  march 
through  the  mountains  in  the  rear  must  compel  the  Bavarian 
general  to  retire.  Just  a  year  afterwards,  on  August  3d,  1645, 
Cond^  won  a  Pyrrhic  victory  at  Nordlingen  by  his  reckless  and 
irresistible  attack,  but  at  too  great  an  expenditure  of  life  to 
permit  him  to  make  use  of  it,  although  the  Imperialists  were 
sore  beset  at  the  time,  and  Vienna  itself  threatened  by  the 
Swedes  under  Torstenson. 

The  honour  of  giving  the  final  determination  to  the  war 
belongs  to  Turenne.  In  1646  he  found  himself  for  the  first 
time  at  the  head  of  an  adequate  force,  and  his  own  master,  and 
he  at  once  determined  to  put  a  stop  to  the  ruinous  system  of 
frittering  away  advantages  by  acting  on  two  different  centres. 
By  combining  his  army  with  that  of  the  Swedes,  he  saw  that  he 


t20  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

could  oppose  an  overwhelming  force  to  the  enemy,  and  end 
the  war  at  a  blow.  Having  procured  the  assent  of  Wrangel 
to  his  plan,  who  had  replaced  Torstenson  in  com- 
Turenne  and  mand  of  the  Swcdes,  Turenne  crossed  the  Rhine  at 
Wrangel,  Wesel,  below  Koln,  and  effected  his  junction  with 
Wrangel  on  the  Main.  Slipping  cleverly  between 
the  archduke  Leopold  William  and  the  Bavarians,  who  sought  to 
bar  their  passage,  the  united  armies  marched  straight  upon  the 
Danube,  seized  Donauworth,  and  spread  themselves  over  the 
rich  plain  of  Bavaria,  plundering  and  burning  up  to  the  gates 
of  Munich,  and  even  penetrating  as  far  as  Bregenz  in  the 
Vorarlberg.  Maximilian  in  despair  deserted  the  Emperor,  and 
signed  a  separate  truce  with  the  allies  in  May  1647.  ^^  did 
not  keep  it  long.  Stung  in  conscience,  and  afraid  of  after  all 
losing  the  electoral  hat,  which  he  had  risked  so  much  to  win, 
he  again  joined  the  Emperor  in  September  of  the  same  year. 
Terrible  was  the  retribution  which  awaited  him,  Turenne  and 
Wrangel  returned  into  Bavaria  with  an  army  swollen  with  camp- 
followers  to  the  number  of  127,000.  Beating  the  elector's 
troops  at  Zusmarshausen  on  May  17th,  1648,  they  fastened  like 
locusts  on  the  land,  and  soon  reduced  it  to  the  state  of  desola- 
tion in  which  the  rest  of  Germany  lay.  Maximilian  summoned 
Wallenstein's  old  general  Piccolomini  to  his  aid,  and  prepared 
to  strike  one  more  blow  for  house  and  home,  but  before  the 
armies  met,  the  welcome  news  came  that  peace  had  been 
signed  on  the  24th  of  October  at  Miinster,  and  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  was  at  an  end. 

For  some  years  the  desire  for  peace  had  been  getting 
stronger  and  stronger.  In  Germany  it  was  felt  that  the  main 
Negotiations  Obstacles  to  peace  had  passed  away  with  the  chief 
for  peace,  actors  in  the  struggle.  Ferdinand  11.  had  died  in 
'  ''^'  the  year  1637,  and  his  son  Ferdinand  in.  was  not 

bound  in  conscience  or  in  pohcy  to  the  Edict  of  Restitution. 
The  Elector  Palatine,  Frederick  v.,  had  preceded  him  in  1632. 
Christian  of  Anhalt,  Christian  of  Brunswick,  Wallenstein,  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  and  Bethlen  Gabor  had  long  passed  away,  and 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  I2i 

the  policies  which  they  had  represented  had  taken  other  forms. 
There  was  no  German  question  left  seriously  difficult  of  solu- 
tion. The  real  obstacles  of  peace  were  the  ambition  of 
France,  and  the  determination  of  Oxenstjerna  to  carve  a  terri- 
tory  for  the  Swedes  out  of  the  Baltic  provinces  of  Germany. 
But  they  could  not  prevent  the  beginning  of  negotiations, 
though  they  could  do  much  to  hinder  their  progress,  and  in 
1642  it  was  agreed  that  representatives  should  meet  in  West- 
phalia, at  the  towns  of  Miinster  and  Osnabriick,  to  discuss  the 
preliminaries  of  a  treaty.  So  many  were  the  ob-  „ 
structions  thrown  in  the  way  that  it  was  not  till  Munsterand 
1644  that  the  congress  actually  met.  At  Miinster,  Osnab«'"c>'- 
which  was  the  meeting-place  of  the  Catholic  powers,  there  ap- 
peared under  the  presidency  of  the  papal  nuncio  (Chigi)  and 
the  ambassador  of  Venice  —  the  two  mediating  powers  —  the 
representatives  of  the  Empire,  of  France,  of  Spain,  of  the 
CathoHc  electors,  and  the  Catholic  princes  of  the  Empire.  At 
Osnabriick  were  gathered  the  representatives  of  Sweden,  of  the 
Protestant  electors,  and  the  Protestant  princes  and  cities  of 
the  Empire,  together  with  envoys  of  France,  which  was  thus 
represented  at  both  places.  It  was  one  thing  to  get  the  repre- 
sentatives to  meet,  it  was  quite  another  to  get  them  to  set  to 
work.  The  proposal  of  an  armistice  during  the  negotiations 
had  been  definitely  refused,  and  consequently  it  became  to  the 
interest  of  each  of  the  chief  combatants  in  turn  to  delay  or  pro- 
mote the  conclusion  of  peace  as  the  fortune  of  war  shifted  from 
one  side  to  the  other.  Questions  of  precedence  and  etiquette, 
always  dear  to  the  diplomatic  mind,  raised  themselves  in  plenty 
from  the  side  of  France  or  Spain  or  Sweden,  whenever  things 
seemed  to  be  going  too  quick.  Months  accordingly  passed 
away  and  no  progress  was  made. 

The  German  princes,  who  saw  their  lands  devastated,  their 
villages  burned,  their  towns  depopulated,  their  subjects  obliged 
to  turn  soldiers  or  brigands,  or,  where  that  was  impossible, 
driven  to  stave  off  the  pangs  of  hunger  by  eating  grass  and 
roots,   and   even   human   flesh,  in   order   that   France   might 


122  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

annex  Alsace,  or  Sweden  seize  Pomerania,  soon  lost  all  faith  in 
the  tortuous  dealings  of  the  diplomatists  in  Westphalia,  and  began 
Separate  to  shift  for  themselves.   On  the  24th  of  July  1642,  the 

treaties  made  young  elcctor  of  Brandenburg,  Frederick  \Villiam, 

byBranden-      ^        ,  -  °  ,.  .,      ,       ^         i 

burg,  Saxony,  made  a  Separate  treaty  of  neutrality  with  the  Swedes, 
and  Bavaria,  which  practically  withdrew  Brandenburg  from  the 
area  of  the  war.  On  the  31st  of  August  1645,  John  George 
of  Saxony  followed  the  example  of  Brandenburg  but  on  far  worse 
terms.  In  1647,  ^^  we  have  seen,  even  Maximilian  of  Bavaria 
was  induced  under  stress  of  the  invasion  of  Turenne  to  conclude 
for  a  short  time  a  separate  truce.  These  acts  showed  how  pas- 
sionately Germany  longed  for  peace,  but  its  actual  conclusion 
was  due  to  the  pressure  exercised  upon  the  Emperor  and 
Maximilian  by  the  successes  of  Turenne,  and  upon  Oxenstjerna 
Interference  and  the  Swedes  by  their  young  queen.  Christina, 
of  Christina    t^g  daughter  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  had  come  of 

of  Sweden  .        °  ^  j    ,       , 

in  favour  of  age  m  the  year  1644,  and  had  at  once  begun  to 
peace.  show  that  mastcrful  spirit  and  commanding  ability 

which  were  to  make  her  one  of  the  most  interesting  characters 
of  the  century.  Partly  from  a  real  desire  to  end  the  barbarities 
of  the  war,  partly  from  the  necessities  of  her  crown,  she  at  once 
applied  herself  to  bring  the  Westphalian  negotiations  to  a  suc- 
cessful issue,  sent  a  special  embassy  to  the  court  of  Paris,  and 
insisted,  sorely  against  the  old  chancellor's  will,  upon  accepting 
in  behalf  of  Sweden  far  less  than  had  hitherto  been  demanded. 
By  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  signed  at  last  on  the  24th 
The  peace  of  °^  October  1648,  exactly  thirty  years  and  five 
Westphalia,  mouths  sincc  the  regents  were  thrown  out  of  the 
*  ^  ■  window  at  Prague,  the  religious  difficulty  in  Ger- 

many was  met  by  the  extension  to  the  Calvinists  of  all  the 
rights  enjoyed  by  the  Lutherans  under  the  religious  peace. 
The  first  day  of  the  year  1624  was  taken  as  the  test  day  by 
1.  Solution  of  which  the  question  of  the  ecclesiastical  lands  was 
the  religious  to  be  Settled.  All  that  was  in  Cathohc  hands  on 
ques  ions.  ^j^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  remain  Catholic,  all  that  was  in 
Protestant  hands  was  to  remain  Protestant.     Roughly  speak- 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  123 

ing  the  line  thus  laid  down  was  the  line  which  answered  to 
the  facts.  It  preserved  the  bishoprics  of  the  south,  which 
were  avowedly  Catholic,  to  the  Catholics ;  and  the  secularised 
lands  of  the  north,  such  as  Bremen  and  Verden,  Halberstadt 
and  Magdeburg,  where  the  Protestants  were  in  a  large  major- 
ity, to  Protestantism  ;  and  it  secured  to  Catholicism  the  vic- 
tories of  the  Counter-Reformation  in  the  hereditary  dominions 
of  Austria,  in  Bohemia,  in  Bavaria,  and  in  the  upper  Pala- 
tinate. Finally,  the  treaty  provided  for  the  equal  division 
of  the  two  interests  in  the  imperial  court  of  justice.  There 
was  little  difficulty  in  thus  finding  a  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  questions  connected  with  religion,  which  had  been  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  so  grave  and  alarming.  Both  sides  had 
by  the  process  of  time  become  aware  that  they  could  not 
destroy  the  other,  and  had  learned,  if  they  did  ^  xernt  ai 
not  admit,  the  necessity  of  toleration.  The  seri-  compensa- 
ous  problems  for  solution  were  those  connected  ''°"' 
with  compensation.  Eventually,  however,  the  following  arrange- 
ments were  agreed  to. 

1.  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  retained  the  electorate,  which  was 
made  hereditary  in  his  family,  and  was  permitted  to  add  the 
upper  Palatinate  to  his  duchy  of  Bavaria. 

2.  A  new  electorate  was  created  for  Charles  Lewis,  the  eldest 
son  of  Frederick,  Elector  Palatine,  and  the  lower  Palatinate 
was  restored  to  him. 

3.  Sweden  received  western  Pomerania,  including  the  mouth 
of  the  Oder,  and  the  bishoprics  of  Bremen  and  Verden,  which 
gave  her.  a  commanding  strategical  and  commercial  position 
on  the  German  rivers,  and  the  right  of  being  represented  in 
the  German  Diet. 

4.  Brandenburg  was  compensated  for  her  loss  of  western 
Pomerania  by  the  addition  of  the  bishoprics  of  Halberstadt, 
Camin,  Minden,  and  the  greater  part  of  Magdeburg,  to  her 
dominions;  and  by  the  confirmation  of  her  inheritance  in 
eastern  Pomerania.  In  addition  to  this,  she  now  obtained 
control  over  the   duchies  of  Cleves,  Mark,  and   Ravensberg, 


124  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

which  had  been  apportioned  to  her  by  the  treaty  of  Xanten 
in  1 6 14,  but  during  the  war  had  been  occupied  by  the  rival 
armies  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  Dutch. 

5.  France  obtained  possession  of  Austrian  Alsace,  including 
Breisach,  and  the  right  to  garrison  Philipsburg ;  but  the  free 
city  of  Strasburg  was  expressly  reserved  to  the  Empire.  The 
three  bishoprics  of  Metz  Toul  and  Verdun  were  formally 
annexed  to  the  crown  of  France,  while  in  Italy  she  received 
the  fortress  of  Pinerolo. 

6.  Saxony  retained  Lusatia,  and  acquired  part  of  the  diocese 
of  Magdeburg,  and  the  independence  of  the  Dutch  and  the 
Swiss  was  finally  acknowledged. 

The  peace  of  Westphalia,  like  the  war  to  which  it  put  an 
end,  marks  the  close  of  one  epoch  and  the  beginning  of 
The  Peace,  another.  It  closes  the  long  chapter  of  the  re- 
a  solution  Hgious  troublcs  in  Germany,  which  grew  out  of 
religious  the  Reformation  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  it 
difficulty.  difi  so  in  the  most  satisfactory  manner  possible, 
not  by  laying  down  any  great  principle  of  religious  toleration 
or  religious  domination,  but  simply  by  recognising  accom- 
plished   facts.     Calvinism   had   worked    its  way  to   an   equal 

1  position  with  Lutheranism  among  the  religious  forces  of 
Germany,  and  that  fact  was  accordingly  recognised.  The 
supremacy  of  each  prince  in  his  own  dominions  over  the 
religious  as  well  as  the  political  conduct  of  his  people  had 
been  recognised  by  the  peace  of  Augsburg  in  1555,  and  been 

V  uniformly  acted  upon  by  Catholic  and  Protestant  alike  ever 
since.  It  was  now  definitely,  if  tacitly  admitted,  and  possible 
evils  guarded  against  by  drawing  the  territorial  line  between 
Catholicism  and  Protestantism  as  nearly  as  possible  to  co- 
incide with  the  actual  difference  of  belief.  It  was  still  pos- 
sible for  a  Protestant  prince  in  the  north  to  oppress  his  Catholic 
subjects,  it  was  still  possible  for  a  CathoHc  prince  of  the  south 
to  banish  all  Protestants  from  his  dominions,  but  the  question 
henceforth  was  but  a  local  one,  a  matter  solely  between  the 
prince  and  his  subjects,  which  imposed  upon  Protestants  and 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  125 

Catholics  elsewhere  in  Germany  no  greater  duty,  and  gave 
them  no  more  right  to  interfere,  than  did  the  revocation  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes  by  Louis  xiv.  in  France.  Such  a  solution  may 
not  have  been  from  the  point  of  view  of  morals  the  best  con- 
ceivable. It  was  under  the  circumstances  of  the  time  the  best 
possible.  To  modern  ideas  it  may  seem  that  the  negotiators 
of  Westphalia  lost  a  great  opportunity  of  forcing  into  the 
unwilling  hands  of  Germany  the  priceless  boon  of  religious 
toleration.  Had  they  attempted  to  do  so,  they  would  only 
have  kept  alive  the  spirit  of  religious  animosity,  and  given  to 
political  ambition  the  right  again  to  shelter  itself  under  the 
claims  of  religion  and  renew  the  flame  of  war.  By  making 
the  question  wholly  one  between  prince  and  people,  they 
ensured  that  all  the  conservative  forces  of  human  nature,  the 
forces  that  make  against  novelty,  disturbance,  and  revolution, 
the  forces  which  impel  men  and  governments  so  powerfully  to 
take  the  line  of  the  least  resistance,  should  be  enlisted  on  the 
side  of  religious  peace.  If  the  door  was  still  left  open  to  an 
archbishop  of  Salzburg  to  banish  all  Protestants  from  his 
dominions,  the  paucity  of  such  instances  of  oppression  after 
the  peace  of  Westphalia,  is  alone  sufficient  proof  of  the  truce 
in  religious  affairs  which  it  practically  brought  about ;  while 
the  danger  of  a  hundred  such  acts  of  tyranny  cannot  weigh  as 
a  feather  in  the  balance  against  the  unspeakable  horror  of  a 
renewal  of  the  war. 

The  peace  of  Westphalia  is  also  the  beginning  of  a  new  era. 
It  marks  the  formation  of  the  modern  European 

The  Peace 

States  system.  In  Germany  itself  the  central  fact  the  begin- 
registered  by  the  peace  is  the  final  disintegration  "'ig  of  mod- 
of  the  Empire.  The  machinery  it  is  true  was  still 
left  intact.  There  was  an  emperor  and  a  diet,  electors  and  an 
imperial  court  of  justice,  but  all  reality  had  passed  away  from 
them  as  a  governing  power  in  Germany.  The  German  people 
were  governed  by  the  German  princes,  who  had  all  the  rights 
of  sovereignty.  They  could  coin  money,  make  war,  organise 
armies,  and  send  representatives  to  other  courts.     The  central 


126  European  History,    1598-17 15 

authority  was  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  if  the  Emperor  was 
still  a  power  in  Germany,  it  was  not  because  he  was  Emperor, 

1  The  Em-  ^"^  bccausc  hc  was  archduke  of  Austria  and  many 
pire  becomes  Other  German  duchies,  king  of  Bohemia,  and  king 
Austrian.  ^^  Hungary.  The  effect  is  at  once  visible  in  the 
poHcy  of  the  House  of  Austria.  The  Emperor  still  main- 
tained his  interests  in  Germany  and  on  the  Rhine,  still  he 
stood  forward  as  the  champion  of  Germany  to  prevent  France 
from  dominating  over  Europe,  still  from  time  to  time  he  waged 
war  to  check  the  growing  power  of  Prussia,  to  develop  schemes 
of  commercial  enterprise  in  the  Netherlands,  but  nevertheless, 
irresistibly,  in  spite  of  tradition,  and  of  association,  his  real 
attention  became  fixed  more  and  more  irrevocably  on  the  east 
and  on  the  south.  His  policy  in  fact  in  its  heart  of  hearts 
ceased  to  be  imperial  or  even  German  and  became  purely 
Austrian.  He  sought  compensation  on  the  Danube  for  his 
losses  on  the  Rhine.  He  sacrificed  much  for  a  hold  over 
Italy,  which  should  give  to  his  impoverished  and  land-locked 
country  the  riches  of  the  plain  of  Lombardy  and  ports  on  the 
Adriatic.  Insensibly  and  steadily  he  pushed  his  territorial 
frontier  more  and  more  to  the  east  and  south,  while  Branden- 
burg actuated  by  similar  forces  was  pushing  hers  to  the  west 
and  to  the  north. 

Set  free  from   even  the  shadow  of  imperial    centralisation, 
Germany  was  enabled  to  follow  unimpeded  her  own  laws  of 

2  Sovereien-  development.  In  central  Germany  the  spirit  of 
ty  of  the  Ger-  disintegration,  and  the  fearful  desolation  caused  by 
man  princes.  ^^  ^^^  conquered  all  desire  for  unity.  Almost 
to  the  present  day  it  has  remained  a  heap  of  undistinguished 
and  undistinguishable  atoms.  But  in  north  Germany,  the  nat- 
ural tendency  of  small  states  to  coalesce  with  larger  states  began 
3.  Growth  of  ^'^  show  itself,  and  Brandenburg  at  once  started  on 
Brandenburg   that  Career  of  conqucst  and  aggrandisement  which 

has  brought  her  in  our  own  day  to  the  headship  of 
Europe,  while  Bavaria,  in  alliance  with  France,  bid  with  some 
success  against  the   House  of  Austria   for  the   leadership   of 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  127 

south  Germany,  which  since  1866  she  has  practically  attained. 
Thus,  with  regard  to  the  internal  politics  of  Germany,  the  peace 
of  Westphalia  set  in  motion  the  forces,  which,  by  ousting  the 
Emperor  from  predominance  in  Germany,  throwing  the  ener- 
gies of  the  House  of  Austria  towards  Italy  and  the  lower  Dan- 
ube, and  enabling  the  House  of  HohenzoUern  to  strike  for  the 
leadership  of  north  Germany  and  the  command  of  the  Rhine, 
have  during  the  last  two  hundred  years  permanently  affected 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  the  condition  of  the  Ger- 
man people. 

Outside  the  boundaries  of  Germany,  the  treaties  of  West- 
phalia mark  no  less  a  change  in  the  relations   of  the  great 
powers   of  Europe.     It  is  the  last  time  that  the 
Pope   appears  as   the  mediator  of  the   peace   of  ished  influ. 
nations.     His  refusal    to  sanction  the  treaties  was   ^""^^  °f  '^'^^ 
simply  set  on  one  side  by  Catholic  and  Protestant 
powers  alike,  and  from  that  time  his  influence  in  the  inter- 
national politics  of  Europe  ceased.     France  and  Sweden  are 
the  two  nations  who  have  most  right  to  claim  the  peace  of 
Westphalia  as  marking  an  epoch  in  their  national 

.  .  5.  Transitory 

history.     With  Sweden  it  is  the  high  water  mark  of  character  of 
her  European  influence.     The  treaties  recognised   Swedish 

r   T-.  1  greatness. 

her  as  one  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  and  se- 
cured to  her  ^he  supremacy  of  the  Baltic,  and  the  right  to 
claim  the  allegiance  of  north  Germany,  if  she  could  win  it. 
But  the  task  proved  beyond  her  capacity,  and  she  slowly 
shrank  before  the  advancing  power  of  Brandenburg  and  of 
Russia,  until  before  a  hundred  years  had  passed  it  had  become 
abundantly  clear  that  with  regard  to  Sweden  the  peace  did  not 
mark  the  permanent  inclusion  of  a  new  power  among  the  great 
nations  of  Europe. 

With  France  the  case  was  quite  different.     The  peace  is  but 
one  step  on  the  long  road  of  territorial  aggrandise-   g  perma- 
ment  on  which  she  had  definitely  entered,  at  the   nent  advance 
bidding  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin.      Sh^  became   °^  France, 
by  the  war  the  first  jnilitary  power  In  Europe.     By  the  peace 

'     i    ;     . 


128  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

she  was  planted  securely  upon  the  Rhine  and  acquired  not 
merely  a  scientific  frontier  for  offence  and  defence  in  the  virgin 
fortress  of  Metz,  the  mountains  of  the  Vosges,  and  the  strong- 
holds of  Breisach  and  Philipsburg,  but  an  incentive  to  future 
exertion,  and  a  spur  to  criminal  ambition,  in  the  desire  to 
make  her  hold  upon  the  Rhine  but  the  beginning  of  a  vaster 
scheme  of  conquest.  The  damnosa  hereditas  of  the  Rhine 
frontier  for  France,  sanctioned  in  part  by  the  peace  of  West- 
phalia, has  been  the  chief  disturbing  element  in  European 
politics  for  nearly  two  centuries  and  a  half,  and  the  malig- 
nancy of  its  poison  shows  even  now  no  signs  of  abatement. 
The  great  questions,  which  have  agitated  Europe  during  the 
years  which  have  elapsed  since  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  have 
mainly  centred  round  the  rivalry  of  Russia  and  of  Austria  for 
the  command  of  the  Danube  and  the  inheritance  of  the  Turk, 
and  the  rivalry  of  France  and  Germany  for  the  possession  of 
the  Rhine.  The  great  settlements  of  European  affairs,  which 
have  taken  place  since  that  time  at  Utrecht,  at  Vienna,  at 
Paris,  and  at  BerHn,  have  been  but  the  hatching  of  the  fully 
developed  chicks  from  the  eggs  laid  in  Westphalia  in  1648. 

Spain  was  not  included  in  the  peace  of  Westphalia.  The 
war  between  her  and  France  still  continued  for  twelve  years 
Des  erate  niore,  though  at  the  time  the  peace  was  signed  at 
condition  of  Miinster  it  seemed  as  if  the  unwieldy  monarchy 
Spain,  1648.  ^^g  ^^  ^^  brink  of  dissolution.  Portugal  had 
asserted  its  independence,  Catalonia  assisted  by  a  French  army 
was  in  full  revolt.  Roussillon  and  Cerdagne  were  in  French 
hands.  Flanders  and  the  port  of  Dunkirk  had  fallen  under 
the  spell  of  the  conqueror  of  Rocroy.  In  1646  a  naval  battle 
off  the  coast  of  Tuscany  made  the  French  for  the  first  time 
masters  of  the  Mediterranean.  Finally  in  1648  Naples  revolted 
at  the  bidding  of  a  fisherman  named  Masaniello,  and,  had 
Mazarin  shown  a  little  more  vigour  and  decision,  might  have 
been  entirely  lost  to  the  Spanish  monarchy.  Freed  from  the 
necessity  of  exertion  on  the  side  of  the  Rhine,  Mazarin  had 
but  to  press  his  victories  home  in  the  Netherlands  and  Cata- 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  1 29 

Ionia  to  force  Spain  to  a  dishonourable  peace.     But  suddenly 
all   these   advantages   were    lost,    and    the   tables   completely 
turned,    by   the    grotesque    outbreak  of   personal 
ambition  and  constitutional  factiousness,  known  as   by  the  out- 
the  Fronde.      For  six  years  the  nobles   and   the   •"■^^'^  °f  **>« 
citizens  of  Paris  played  at  revolution,  in  order  to     '^°"  ^' '  <  • 
wrest  power  out  of  the  hands  of  Mazarin  and  transfer  it  to  their 
own.     Maddened  by  the  spirit  of  faction,  they  did  not  hesitate 
to  call  in  the  enemy  and  join  themselves  to  Spain,  if  thereby 
they  could  wreak  their  vengeance  on  the  hated  minister.     Even 
Turenne  and  Cond^  were  found   at   different   times   leading 
armies  against  France.     But  in  the  end  the  cleverness  of  the 
minister,  the  stubbornness  of  the  queen-mother,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  the  royal  authority  prevailed  ;    and  in  1653  Mazarin 
returned  from  his  second  exile  to  take  up  again  the  reins  of 
government  which  he  held  until  his  death. 

How  different  were  the  circumstances  under  which  he  again 
resumed  the  war  against  Spain  !     The„  resources  of  France  had 
been  squandered,  the  armies  of  France  had  be- 
come  demoralised,  the   authority  of  the   govern-   France  after 
ment  weakened,  while  Spain  had  profited  by  the   *^^  Fronde, 
difficulties  of  her  enemy  to  recover  the  Netherlands 
and  Catalonia,  and,  through  the  treason  of  Cond^,  was  enabled 
to  place  one  of  the  best  generals  of  the  day  at  the  head  of  her 
armies.     In  1653  he  invaded  France  and  threatened  Paris,  but 
was  foiled  by  the  superior  strategy  of  Turenne,  and  obliged  to 
retreat.     In  the  three  following  years  France  slowly  won  back 
the  frontier  towns  of  the  Netherlands.     It  was  clear  that  neither 
side  was  able  to  inflict  upon  the  other  such  a  defeat  as  would 
end  the  war.     So  in  1656  Mazarin,  cardinal   and   absolutist 
though  he  was,  sought  for  the  alliance  of  Cromwell,   Alliance  be- 
the    Protestant    hero    of   the    English   revolution,   t^^^"  ^^^z- 

.  arin  and 

Cromwell    looked   upon   Spain   with   the   eyes   of  cromweii, 
Elizabeth,  and  saw  in  her  but  the  chief  supporter  '^s;- 
of   Popery   in    Europe,    and    the    chief    obstacle    to    English 
trade.     An  agreement  was  soon  arrived  at  by  which  6000  of 

PERIOD    v.  I 


130  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Cromwell's  soldiers,  probably  the  best  in  Europe,  were  put 
at  the  disposal  of  Mazarin.  In  1657  a  change  was  quickly 
perceived  in  the  war.  Turenne,  with  the  assistance  of  his  new 
allies,  defeated  the  Spaniards  at  the  battle  of  the  Dunes,  cap- 
tured Mardyke  and  Dunkirk,  which  was  handed  over  to  Eng- 
land, and  over-ran  the  country  almost  up  to  Brussels  in  June 
1658.  This  blow  determined  the  Spanish  government  to  treat 
for  peace.  Conferences  were  held  between  the  ambassadors 
of  the  two  countries  on  the  Bidassoa  during  1659,  and  on 
November  7th  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees  was  signed.  By  it 
The  Peace  of  F'^^"^^  acquired  Artois,  Roussillon,  and  Cerdagne, 
the  Pyre-  and  the  towns  of  Thionville,  Landre9ies,  and 
nees,  i  59.  Avcsncs.  She  agreed  to  restore  the  duke  of  Lorraine 
to  his  duchy,  on  condition  that  the  fortifications  of  Nancy 
were  destroyed,  and  the  armies  of  France  allowed  free  passage 
through  the  country.  Cond^  was  pardoned  and  restored  to 
his  property  and  dignities.  Finally  the  alliance  was  cemented 
by  the  marriage  of  Louis  xiv.  to  Maria  Theresa,  the  daughter 
of  Philip  IV.,  who  on  her  marriage  renounced  on  the  part  of 
herself  and  her  children  all  claim  to  the  throne  of  Spain,  on 
receipt  of  a  dowry  of  500,000  crowns.  This  dowry  was  never 
paid,  and  in  consequence  it  became  a  question  whether  the 
renunciation  was  of  any  effect  at  all. 

The  peace  of  the  Pyrenees  is  the  complement  of  that  of 
Commanding  Westphalia.  It  marks  the  completion  of  the  sci- 
position  of  entific  frontier  of  France  to  the  south.  The  pri- 
rance,  1660.  j-j-,^j.y  -^york  of  Richclieu  had  been  accomplished. 
On  the  south,  on  the  south-east,  and  on  the  east,  France  was 
now  possessed  of  a  frontier  not  merely  defensible,  but  equally 
available  for  offence  or  defence.  Through  the  passes  of  the 
Pyrenees,  the  Alps,  and  the  Vosges,  her  armies  could  pour  at 
a  moment's  notice  into  the  valleys  of  the  Ebro,  the  Po,  and 
the  Rhine.  Only  to  the  north  was  the  frontier  still  unmarked 
by  natural  boundaries.  The  annexation  of  Artois  removed  the 
danger  some  few  miles  further  away  from  Paris,  but  that  was 
all.     So  grew  up  on  the  side  of  the  Netherlands  a  desire  for 


The  Aggrandisement  of  France  131 

the  Scheldt  and  the  Demer  as  the  natural  boundaries  of  France 
to  the  north,  analogous  to  the  passion  so  fondly  cherished  by 
all  French  statesmen  with  regard  to  the  Rhine  to  the  east. 
The  politics  of  the  future  were  coloured  and  affected  by  the 
rivalry  of  the  French  and  the  Dutch  on  the  Scheldt,  as  by  the 
rivalry  of  the  French  and  the  Germans  on  the  Rhine.  Among 
the  fondest  dreams  of  French  statesmen,  second  only  to  the 
acquisition  of  the  Rhine,  has  been  the  annexation  of  the  Neth- 
erlands as  a  legitimate  object  of  French  ambition,  and  it  may 
be  questioned  whether  any  policy  has  cost  France  more  blood 
and  treasure  than  that  which  has  turned  some  of  the  fairest  and 
richest  districts  of  the  world  into  the  cockpit  of  Europe.  To 
Spain  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees  is  a  great  epoch.  The  peace 
of  Vervins  marked  her  failure,  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees  marked 
her  fall.  She  had  once  bid  for  supremacy  over  Europe  and 
had  failed.  She  had  then  entered  the  lists  as  the  equal  and 
rival  of  France  and  had  been  beaten.  France  issued  from  the 
contest  victorious  both  by  land  and  sea,  and  could  condescend 
to  take  her  former  rival  into  protection  and  partnership.  After 
the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees,  France  and  Spain  from  being  deadly 
rivals  tended  to  become  more  and  more  the  closest  of  friends, 
until  the  time  came  when,  owing  to  the  provisions  of  the  peace, 
France  stretched  out  its  hands  to  absorb  its  mighty  neighbour, 
and  the  family  compacts  of  the  Bourbons  dominated  the  politics 
of  the  world. 


CHAPTER   VII 

FRANCE   UNDER    RICHELIEU  AND   MAZARIN 

Character  of  Richelieu  —  The  principles  of  his  government  —  Defects  of  his 
policy —  Character  of  Louis  xiii. —  Position  and  organisation  of  the  Hugue- 
nots — ■  The  rising  of  1625  —  Edicts  against  the  nobles  —  Conspiracy  of 
VendSme  —  War  with  England  — Siege  of  La  Rochelle — Destruction  of  the 
political  power  of  the  Huguenots  —  Administrative  reforms  —  The  Day  of 
Dupes  —  Rising  of  Montmorency  —  Conspiracy  of  Cinq  Mars  —  Centralising 
policy  of  Richelieu  —  The  regency  of  1643  —  Character  of  Mazarin  —  Out- 
break of  the  Fronde  —  Constitutional  claims  of  the  Parlement  —  Unpopu- 
larity of  the  prime  ministership  —  Weakness  of  the  Parlement  —  The  lead 
taken  by  the  nobles — Factiousness  of  the  movement — Flight  of  Mazarin 
—  The  Fronde  in  the  provinces  —  End  of  the  Fronde  —  Last  years  of 
Mazarin. 

The  well-known  portrait  of  Richelieu  in  the  gallery  of  the 
Louvre  shows  us  the  features  of  a  man  who  under  the  outside 
Character  of  of  an  aristocratic  calm  conceals  a  highly  nervous 
Richelieu.  ^nd  anxious  temperament.  There  is  not  a  trace 
of  brutality,  not  a  suggestion  of  coarseness,  in  the  finely 
moulded  features.  At  the  first  glance  there  seems  almost  a 
want  of  power  in  the  dehcate  oval  of  the  pale  and  attenuated 
face.  Here  is  no  Henry  viii.  to  trample  on  the  laws  alike  of 
God  and  man  in  order  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  an  imperious 
will,  and  rivet  the  chains  of  slavery  on  a  panic-stricken  people. 
Here  is  no  Cromwell  to  march  ruthlessly  to  his  goal,  over 
the  constitution  of  his  country,  through  the  blood  of  his  king, 
in  the  fervid  enthusiasm  of  a  divine  mission.  Here  surely  is 
no  Napoleon  to  treat  in  callous  selfishness  human  life  and 
national  faith  as  nothing  in  comparison  to  military  glory  and 
personal   ambition.     Yet   the   charges  against   Richelieu   writ 

132 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  133 

large  on  the  page  of  history  are  precisely  those  which  his 
portrait  repudiates.  Indiscriminate  severity,  ruthless  barbarity, 
inordinate  ambition,  personal  tyranny,  such  are  the  accusa- 
tions levelled  against  him  as  a  statesman  and  as  a  man.  He 
is  depicted  as  one  v^^ho  governed,  and  who  preferred  to 
govern,  by  terrorism  and  espionage,  who  struck  down  remorse- 
lessly and  indiscriminately  all  who  dared  to  oppose  him,  who 
established  the  ascendency  of  a  gaoler  over  the  weaker  nature 
of  the  miserable  king,  who  made  France  drink  deep  of  the 
intoxicating  potion  of  military  glory  in  order  that  she  might 
not  feel  the  ever  tightening  chains  of  civil  slavery.  Even 
those  who  applaud  his  patriotism,  and  recognise  him  as  the 
author  of  the  greatness  of  France  admit  the  charges  of  ruth- 
lessness  and  barbarity  made  against  his  government  by  apolo- 
gising for  them. 

The  home  policy  of  Richelieu,  less  perhaps  than  that  of  any 
other  statesman,  admits  of  palliatives  and  excuses.  It  is 
etched   sharply  on  the  plate  of  history  in  white   „  .    .  . 

^  -'  ^  ■'  Principles  oi 

and  black.  There  are  no  neutral  tints.  He  took  his  govern- 
for  his  motto  that  of  the  Romans  of  old,  Parcere  '"^"*- 
subjectis  et  debellare  superbos,  and  if  ever  such  a  principle  is 
admissible  in  human  affairs  'it  was  admissible  in  France  in 
the  days  of  Richelieu.  But  it  is  clear  the  principle  must  be 
pronounced  justifiable,  not  merely  excusable,  before  the  muse 
of  history  can  smooth  over  the  harsh  black  lines  of  the 
portrait  which  she  has  been  accustomed  to  draw.  A  states- 
man may  in  the  course  of  difficult  affairs  be  betrayed  into  the 
commission  of  a  great  crime,  as  was  Theodoric  in  his  par- 
ticipation in  the  murder  of  Odoacer,  and  his  character  may 
yet  stand  out  from  among  men  noble  and  true,  though  his 
name  must  go  down  to  posterity  linked  with  a  thousand 
virtues  and  one  crime.  But  the  conduct  of  a  ruler,  who 
deliberately  from  first  to  last  acts  upon  an  immoral  principle 
of  government,  and  steadily  carries  it  out  through  his  whole 
career,  admits  of  no  palliation.  He  may  blunder  perhaps 
into  a  noble   and    patriotic   action  as  did    Napoleon   in   the 


1 34  European  History,   1 598- 1 7 1 5 

restoration  of  Christianity  in  France,  but  that  cannot  affect  the 
general  severity  of  the  condemnation.  So  it  is  with  RicheUeu. 
We  cannot  pick  and  choose  among  his  actions,  admit  that  in 
one  execution  he  was  right,  in  another  he  was  wrong.  We 
cannot  plead  that  a  policy  of  terrorism  is  criminal,  but  in  his 
particular  case  there  was  much  to  diminish  the  guilt.  He 
will  have  none  of  such  compromises  and  such  excuses. 
Deliberately,  unhesitatingly,  in  his  lifetime  he  chose  a  policy 
stern,  terrific,  pitiless,  and  he  carried  it  out  relentlessly  but  not 
revengefully.  Men  accuse  him  of  never  sparing  even  the  dupe 
and  the  fool,  they  do  not  accuse  him  of  destroying  the  inno- 
cent. Not  like  Henry  viii.  did  he  ever  put  men  to  death 
because  they  might  at  some  future  time  prove  seditious.  Not 
like  Charles  11.  did  he  permit  innocent  lives  to  be  sworn  away 
wholesale  rather  than  face  the  danger  of  a  popular  tumult. 
No,  all  who  suffered  under  him  were  legally  guilty,  but  nearly 
all  who  were  legally  guilty  suffered.  It  was  a  terrible  policy 
—  the  extermination  of  the  evil  doer,  the  establishment  of  the 
structure  of  firm  government  in  the  blood  of  its  enemies,  — 
but  it  is  the  policy  which  Richelieu  adopted  and  defended  in 
his  lifetime,  and  for  which  for  two  centuries  and  a  half  he  has 
stood  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion,  pleading,  as  every  line  in 
his  portrait  shows,  not  palliation,  not  excuse,  but  the  calm 
conviction  of  a  man  who  knows  that  he  is  in  the  right. 

There  are  times  in  the  history  of  nations  as  in  the  history  of 
individual  man,  when  the  only  possibility  of  safety  and  health 
Their  justifi-  lics  in  the  rigorous  application  of  the  knife.  Such 
cation.  ^  State  of  disease  the  body  politic  had  reached  in 

France,  as  it  seemed  to  Richelieu,  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
The  poison  of  separation  and  anarchy  had  been  imbedded  too 
deep  in  the  system  by  the  civil  wars  of  the  last  century,  for  the 
ordinary  remedies  of  steady  and  firm  government  to  have  any 
effect.  As  long  as  the  Huguenots  were  forming  themselves 
into  a  political  organisation  in  rivalry  to  the  government  of 
France,  and  as  long  as  the  nobles  were  bent  upon  making  all 
government  impossible   in  order  that  they  might  personally 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  135 

profit  from  the  evils  of  anarchy,  there  was  a  cancer  eating  into 
the  heart  of  France  which  made  national  death  inevitable. 
The  only  hope  of  saving  life  lay  in  the  unsparing  excision  of 
the  malignant  tissue.  If  only  one  fibre  was  left  it  would  soon 
become  a  fresh  root  of  the  fell  disease.  For  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  Richeheu  had  to  deal  with  a  nation  which  had 
no  power  of  defending  itself  against  the  evils  which  threatened 
to  destroy  it.  There  was  too  little  cohesion  among  the  various 
provinces  seignories  and  towns,  of  which  France  was  made  up, 
to  admit  of  any  united  action.  Excepting  so  far  as  the  royal 
authority  made  itself  felt,  the  administration  of  the  country 
districts  was  still  feudal,  in  the  hands  of  the  seigneurs  and 
their  officers,  and  that  of  the  towns  was  aristocratic,  in  the 
hands  of  the  richer  citizens  and  their  officers.  The  whole  of 
the  local  administration  was  thus  absorbed  by  the  aristocracy 
and  the  official  classes.  Intensely  jealous  both  of  the  king 
,above  them  and  of  the  people  below  them,  they  were  still  too 
divided  in  rank  and  too  narrow  in  sympathies  to  take  the 
direction  of  affairs  into  their  own  hands.  When  they  met 
together  as  in  the  States  General  of  1614  they  disclosed  the 
most  deep  seated  rivalries.  The  days  of  the  political  triumphs 
of  their  natural  leaders,  the  great  nobles,  had  been  the  darkest 
and  most  miserable  which  France  had  ever  experienced.  In- 
capable of  good  they  were  potent  only  for  evil.  Their  privi- 
leges, their  authority,  their  prestige  barred  the  way  of  the 
simplest  administrative  reforms.  Equal  administration  of  jus- 
tice, equal  taxation,  free  circulation  of  commodities  within 
the  country  were  impossible  as  long  as  the  seigneurs  held  their 
special  fiscal  and  judicial  powers  in  their  own  districts.  From 
classes  whose  one  idea  of  government  was  the  maintenance  of 
personal  and  class  privilege  nothing  could  be  hoped.  They 
formed  an  impenetrable  barrier  of  obscurantism  in  the  way  of 
good  government.  Interested  in  the  maintenance,  not  in  the 
suppression,  of  abuse,  they  kept  the  people  down  with  one 
hand  in  misery  and  degradation,  while  with  the  other  they 
sought   to  terrify  the   king  into   tutelage.     Duller   eyes  than 


136  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

those  of  Richelieu  might  easily  have  seen  that  with  such  an 
enemy  there  was  no  middle  course  possible.  Feudalism  as  a 
political  power  must  be  stamped  out  or  it  would  kill  France. 

If  Richeheu  had  lived  three  centuries  earlier  or  a  century 
later  he  might  have  endeavoured,  as  Edward  i.  or  Burke  would 
Limitations  havc  cndcavoured,  to  plant  the  roots  of  his  new 
of  his  policy,  government  deep  in  the  affections  of  the  people  by 
enshrining  it  in  permanent  institutions.  A  wise  and  thought- 
ful statesmanship,  which,  in  destroying  the  power  of  feudahsm 
utterly,  could  have  replaced  it  by  an  alliance  of  the  powers  of 
the  Crown  and  of  the  people,  would  have  been  indeed  an 
unique  blessing  not  only  for  France  but  for  Europe.  Institu- 
tions which  could  have  brought  into  mutual  contact  the 
interests  of  the  peasant,  the  bourgeois,  and  the  roturier,  and 
could  have  combined  them  with  the  interests  of  the  Crown, 
would  soon  have  given  a  quick-witted  people  like  the  French 
what  they  most  wanted  —  political  education.  An  aristocracy 
as  capable  and  as  generous  as  the  French  noblesse  would  not 
long  have  sulked  like  Achilles  in  his  tent,  but  would  soon 
have  been  found  in  its  proper  place  as  the  leader  of  the 
people,  claiming  the  privilege  of  the  post  of  danger  by  the 
right  of  truest  worth.  But  a  policy  such  as  this  was  possible 
only  for  one  who  combined  sympathy  for  the  people  with  rare 
political  foresight.  Richelieu  possessed  neither,  and  was  born 
in  an  age  unfavourable  to  both.  A  clear  sharp  eye  to  the 
present  and  immediate  future,  indomitable  courage,  quick 
decision,  inflexible  will,  such  were  the  gifts  he  brought  to  the 
service  of  France.  For  her  service  he  used  them  without  a 
thought  for  any  one  else.  He  gave  her  national  unity.  He 
secured  for  her  religious  peace.  He  centralised  all  the  forces 
of  the  natien  under  the  Crown.  He  made  that  Crown  the 
chief  among  the  powers  of  Europe.  He  planted  the  seeds  of 
a  colonial  empire,  and  nourished  the  budding  germs  of  artistic 
and  literary  excellence.  But  he  effected  no  financial  or  judi- 
cial reform.  He  stirred  "not  a  finger  to  relieve  the  social 
burdens  of  the  people.     He  even  increas'jd  their  misery  and 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  137 

would  not  listen  to  their  comglaints^  Everything  for  the 
people  and  nothing  by  the  people  has  been  taken  as  the  motto 
of  beneficent  despotism.  Richelieu  cannot  lay  claim  even  to 
that.  For  France  collectively  he  had  an  intense  and  vivid 
love.  For  her  greatness  he  willingly  spent  himself.  For  the 
French  people  considered  as  social  units,  as  individuals,  or  as 
classes,  he  cared  not  an  atom.  He  struck  to  the  earth  the 
pohtical  power  of  the  nobles,  because  as  long  as  it  existed 
France  could  neither  be  great  nor  united.  He  never  attempted 
to  interfere  with  one  of  their  social  privileges,  though  it  was 
by  those  that  they  made  the  lives  of  the  bulk  of  the  French 
peasants  hideous  and  miserable.  As  a  benefactor  of  the 
French  people  he  is  as  infinitely  below  Sully  and  Colbert  as 
he  is  above  them  in  statesmanship.  A  wretched  financier,  an 
incapable  administrator,  prompt  to  demand  the  obedience 
of  the  people  whom  he  governed,  and  careless  of  their  hap- 
piness, without  one  spark  of  sympathy,  without  one  touch 
of  weakness,  Richelieu  stands  before  us  as  the  embodiment 
of  intellect  and  of  will.  His  business  was  with  la  haute  poli- 
tique. That  he  understood.  To  that  he  devoted  all  his 
energies.  In  that  he  shone  supreme.  With  unerring  quick- 
ness of  intellectual  judgment  he  singled  out  at  once  the  true 
obstacles  to  the  greatness  of  France.  He  found  them  in  the 
national  disintegration  brought  about  by  the  civil  wars,  and 
largely  fostered  by  the  Huguenots,  and  in  the  anarchical  ten- 
dencies of  the  higher  nobility.  With  true  political  insight  he 
saw  that  with  a  professional  army  at  his  back  and  the  senti- 
ments of  loyalty  and  national  unity  to  support  him,  there  was 
nothing  which  could  stop  the  ultimate  victory  of  the  Crown, 
save  the  weakness  of  the  Crown  itself.  For  some  years  the 
struggle  was  intense,  but  his  indomitable  will  in  the  end  gained 
the  day.  When  he  had  once  won  the  confidence  of  the  cau- 
tious and  suspicious  king  the  contest  was  practically  over,  and 
he  was  free  to  turn  his  attention  almost  wholly  to  foreign 
affairs.  By  a  policy  eminently  skilful,  if  morally  unjustifiable, 
he  contrived  to  hide  the  scars  of  civil  dissension  by  the  lustre 


138  European  History,   1 598-1 715 

of  military  glory,  and  to  provide  a  more  congenial  and  patri- 
otic sphere  for  the  energies  of  a  nobility  whom  he  had  deprived 
of  poUtical  influence,  by  summoning  them  to  win  for  France 
the  victories  which  were  to  make  her  king  the  leader  of  Europe. 
The  greatness  of  the  reign  of  Louis  xiii.  begins  with  the 
ministry  of  Richelieu,  and  the  death  of  the  king  followed  so 
Character  of  close  upon  the  death  of  the  minister  that  the  fame 
Louis  XIII.  of  the  master  has  become  wholly  overshadowed  by 
the  greatness  of  the  servant.  When  Richelieu  was  on  the  stage 
there  was  indeed  but  little  room  for  any  one  else.  Yet  it  does 
not  appear  on  closer  inspection,  that  Louis  was  either  the  per- 
sonal or  political  nonentity  which  he  has  often  been  described. 
His  character  was  indeed  singularly  unlike  that  of  his  father  or 
his  son,  and  in  so  many  respects  different  from  the  ordinary  French 
type,  that  perhaps  French  historians  have  done  him  but  scant 
justice.  His  temperament  was  cold,  heavy,  and  passionless, 
his  mind  slow  and  reserved,  but  tenacious,  and  at  times  obsti- 
nate. A  man  of  few  friends  and  no  intimates,  hardly  if  at  all 
susceptible  to  the  influence  of  women,  without  strong  desires 
or  ambitions,  without  many  interests,  yet  one  who  kept  a  shrewd 
and  watchful  eye  upon  the  world.  Very  cautious  and  patient 
in  making  up  his  mind,  suspicious  of  all  but  a  very  few,  when 
his  decision  was  taken  he  acted  firmly,  boldly,  straightforwardly, 
and  never  went  back.  Strangely  enough  his  real  interests  were 
in  the  more  strenuous  affairs  of  out-door  life.  Like  James  i. 
he  was  passionately  fond  of  hunting,  unlike  him  he  was  almost 
more  fond  of  war.  No  mean  soldier  himself,  he  was  a  very 
good  judge  of  military  capacity  in  others,  and  was  never  so 
well  and  never  so  happy  as  when  on  campaign.  Many  of  the 
officers  who  did  so  much  to  establish  the  credit  of  the  French 
armies  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  reign,  like  Fabert,  owed 
their  promotion  to  the  skilled  eye  and  firm  friendship  of  Louis 
XIII.  His  relations  with  his  mother  Marie  de  Medicis  and  his 
great  minister  show  him  to  have  been  a  man  of  more  than 
ordinary  tact.  It  was  by  no  means  easy  to  keep  the  peace 
between  the  two,  when  Marie  beheved  herself  to  have  been 


France  under  Richelieji  and  Mazarin  139 

basely  deserted,  and  Richelieu  had  not  a  friend  at  court  save 
the  king  himself.  It  was  still  less  easy  to  maintain  the  minister 
against  the  incessant  and  malevolent  attacks  of  his  enemies, 
and  yet  preserve  the  independence  of  action  and  reserve  of 
judgment  necessary  to  prevent  the  king  from  degenerating  into 
the  partisan.  But  in  this  he  succeeded  remarkably  well.  He 
trusted  Richelieu  far  more  sincerely  than  Richelieu  trusted  him, 
and  it  is  interesting  to  notice  in  their  correspondence  at  critical 
moments,  that  it  is  the  king  who  becomes  more  calm,  more 
collected,  more  dignified,  as  the  intensity  of  the  crisis  increases, 
while  Richelieu  is  torn  by  doubts  and  hesitations  and  seems 
overwhelmed  by  anxieties  and  fear.  But  in  reality  Richelieu 
never  had  any  good  reason  to  doubt  the  friendship  or  support 
of  the  king.  Louis  had  the  gift,  rare  in  men  in  his  position,  of 
knowing  when  to  act  and  when  to  remain  quiet.  He  never 
suffered  his  minister  to  forget  that  he  was  a  minister  and  not 
a  king.  Richelieu  never  assumed  so  large  a  part  of  the  func- 
tions of  royalty  as  did  Buckingham  in  England.  He  was  a 
Wolsey,  not  a  tnaire  du  palais.  But  on  the  other  hand  Louis 
had  the  sense  to  see  that  if  a  king  is  fortunate  enough  to  have 
a  Richelieu  for  his  minister  he  must  give  him  a  free  hand.  He 
held  the  scales  of  justice  even  between  his  minister  and  his 
court,  he  suffered  no  mean  motives  of  jealousy  to  detract  from 
the  fulness  of  his  confidence,  and  he  was  content  to  be  classed 
by  posterity  among  the  makers  of  the  French  monarchy,  be- 
cause he  had  had  the  fortune  to  be  the  maker  and  master  of 
the  greatest  of  French  ministers. 

The  peace  of  M,ontpellier,  concluded  between  Louis  and  the 
revolted  Huguenots  in  October  1622,  was  one  of  those  treaties 
which  are  not  so  much  a  conclusion  of  a  struggle   position  ^f 
as  a  preliminary  to  its  recommencement.     It  left  the  Hugue- 
the  questions   at   issue    not    merely  unsolved   but  "°*^' 
intensified.     Huguenotism,  always  quite  as  much  a  pohtical  as 
a  religious  movement,  had  derived  its  aspirations  and  drawn 
much  of  its  strength  from  the  desire  of  independence  arising 
from  the  jealousy  of  the  king  of  Paris,  which  was  characteristic 


140  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

of  the  south  of  France,  and  from  the  jealousy  of  the  French 
crown,  which  was  characteristic  of  the  French  nobiUty.  It  was 
among  the  towns  of  the  south  of  France  and  among  the  smaller 
nobility  —  the  country  seigneurs  —  that  it  spread  with  the 
greatest  rapidity.  Its  strongly  self-centred  and  individualistic 
creed  fell  in  naturally  with  their  passionate  love  for  their  priv- 
ileges and  their  intense  dread  of  the  central  government.  Ever 
since  the  Huguenots  became  a  power  in  the  land,  the  tendency 
of  their  policy  had  been  towards  independence,  all  the  more 
significant  because  it  came  about  without  any  defined  cry  for 
separation.  Aided  by  the  weakness  of  the  crown  Huguenot 
towns,  such  as  La  Rochelle  Montauban  and  Nismes,  during 
the  civil  troubles  became  self-governing  communities  indepen- 
dent of  the  French  government,  and  had  been  practically 
recognised  as  such  by  various  treaties  during  the  wars,  and 
Their  organi-  by  the  Edict  of  Nautcs.  Huguenot  organisations 
sation.  under  the  name  of  '  circles  '  parcelled  France  out 

into  districts  under  regular  officers  for  the  purposes  of  defence 
and  offence  from  end  to  end.  In  many  parts  of  the  country 
this  organisation  consisted  merely  upon  paper,  but  in  the  north 
where  the  influence  of  the  duke  of  Bouillon  was  great,  and 
over  large  districts  of  the  south  it  was  a  dangerous  and  mena- 
cing reality.  In  the  strong  words  attributed  to  Richelieu,  the 
_Huguenots  shared  the.  government  of  France  with  the  king. 
In  the  revolt  of  1621,  although  the  leaders  probably  never 
intended  to  do  more  than  frighten  the  Crown  and  secure  their 
own  political  position,  many  of  the  rank  and  file  were  openly 
fighting  for  independence.  To  the  Crown  therefore  it  had 
become  essential  to  crush  the  power  of  the  Huguenots  if  it 
wished  to  be  supreme  over  France.  To  the  Huguenots  it  was 
no  less  essential  to  conquer  the  Crown  if  they  wished  to  secure 
their  independence. 

In  such  a  state  of  affairs  the  treaty  of  Montpellier  was 
obviously  but  a  breathing  space  in  the  combat.  Both  sides 
saw  that  at  that  moment  neither  of  them  could  win  a  decisive 
victory,  and  both  were  content  to  wait  for  a  more  favourable 


France  under  Richelieic  and  Mazarin  141 

opportunity.  That  opportunity  seemed  to  have  come  to  the 
hot-headed  Soubise.  the  brother  of  Rohan  and  the  head  of  the 
circle  of  La  Rochelle  in   162?.     The  new  minister  „.  . 

,,.,.,  Rising  of  the 

was  hardly  yet  settled  m  his  saddle.  It  was  no  Huguenots, 
secret  that  he  was  surrounded  by  enemies  of  all  '^^^" 
kinds,  from  the  king's  brother  Gaston  of  Orleans  down  to  the 
pages  of  the  royal  household.  He  had  just  engaged  the  forces 
of  France  in  the  question  of  the  Valtelline,  and  had  incurred 
the  enmity  of  the  more  strenuous  of  the  Catholic  party  by 
making  war  upon  the  soldiers  of  the  Pope.  Surely  a  rising  of 
the  Huguenot  organisations  at  such  a  moment  could  not  fail 
to  be  successful  at  least  in  overturning  the  rash  and  unpopular 
minister.  Since  Richelieu  had  been  in  power  he  had  been 
diligently  forming  a  nucleus  of  a  royal  navy,  and  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1625  the  six  vessels  of  war,  which  were  the  outcome  of 
his  efforts,  were  gathered  in  the  little  port  of  Blavet  in  Brittany. 
Soubise  by  an  act  of  happy  daring  seized  the  whole  of  them 
on  the  17th  of  January  1625,  and,  establishing  himself  on  the 
islands  of  Rh^  and  Ol^ron,  prepared,  now  that  he  was  undis- 
puted master  of  the.  sea,  to  defy  any  attack  which  the  royal 
forces  might  direct  against  the  walls  of  La  Rochelle.  But 
Richelieu  was  not  so  easy  out-generalled.  He  at  once  with- 
drew from  the  affairs  of  Italy,  procured  ships  from  Holland 
and  England,  after  long  and  tortuous  negotiations  in  which  he 
completely  outwitted  Buckingham,  and  manning  them  with 
French  sailors  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon  Soubise  in  Sep- 
tember 1626,  and  forced  him  to  take  refuge  in  England.  The 
crisis  had  been,  however,  sufficiently  acute  to  show  Richelieu 
that  it  was  not  safe  to  undertake  responsibilities  abroad  as  long 
as  his  enemies  at  home  were  so  watchful  and  unsubdued.  He 
must  establish  his  authority  on  a  firm  basis  in  France,  before 
he  could  run  the  risk  again  of  having  to  deal  with  foreign  war 
and  internal  revolts  together.  On  the  5th  of  February  he  put 
an  end  to  the  Huguenot  rising  by  renewing  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  Montpellier.  In  March  the  treaty  of  Monzon  relieved 
him  for  the  moment  of  all  danger  from  the  side  of  Spain,  and 


142  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

he  felt  that  the  time  had  then  arrived  when  he  might  safely 
proceed  to  strike  the  first  blow  at  the  power  of  the  nobles. 

In  the  summer  of  1626  two  edicts  were  issued  in  pursuit  of 
Edicts  this  policy.     By  the  first  all  duelling  was  declared 

against  duel-  punishable  by  death.  By  the  second  the  destruc- 
private  tion  of  all    fortified   places   not   situated   on   the 

castles,  ti626.  frontier  was  ordered.  These  two  laws  struck  at 
two  of  the  most  cherished  privileges  of  the  nobles  and  the 
greatest  dangers  of  the  state.  The  right  of  an  independent 
tribunal  of  arms,  by  which  all  personal  questions  arising  in 
their  own  order  should  be  adjudicated,  was  one  incompatible 
with  civilised  and  authoritative  government.  The  fortified 
town  and  the  fortified  castle  formed  the  natural  home  of  both 
sedition  and  oppression,  and  Richelieu,  in  determining  to 
sweep  them  away  in  France,  was  merely  taking  a  course  which 
all  restorers  of  order  in  all  countries  had  felt  themselves 
obliged  to  take.  Like  Henry  11.  of  England  he  found  that 
fortresses  in  the  hands  of  a  territorial  nobility  were  inconsis- 
tent with  the  power  of  the  Crown.  But  the  nobles  were  not 
going  to  submit  to  legislation  of  this  sort  without  attempting  a 
counter  stroke.  Gaston  of  Orleans,  the  king's  brother,  with 
the  due  de  Vendome  the  son  of  Henry  iv.  and  Gabrielle 
Suppression  d'Estr^es,  the  comte  de  Soissons  another  prince  of 
of  the  con-      j^g  House  of  Bourbon,  the  duchesse  de  Chevreuse 

spiracy  of  .  .        ,        .     ,  ,  ,  .         .  . 

Vendome  and  2.  friend  of  the  queen  and  a  born  intrigante  and 
Chaiais,  1626.  tireless  enemy  of  the  cardinal,  became  the  leaders 
of  a  plot  to  depose  the  king,  to  assassinate  RicheUeu,  and  put 
Gaston  on  the  throne.  It  was  soon  discovered.  Gaston  to 
save  his  own  life  basely  surrendered  his  friends  and  associates 
to  the  ruthless  mercy  of  Richelieu.  The  comte  de  Chaiais 
suffered  for  him  on  the  scaffold,  another  of  his  associates, 
Ornano,  in  prison.  The  due  de  Vendome,  the  due  de  la 
Valette  son  of  the  old  due  d'Epernon,  Madame  de  Chevreuse, 
the  comte  de  Soissons  were  all  banished,  and  Richelieu  rid 
himself  at  one  blow  of  the  most  dangerous  of  his  enemies. 
The  nobles  were  astonished  at  bis  audacity.     They  could  not 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  143 

believe  that  any  one  would  dare  so  to  treat  the  noblest  of  their 
order,  but  in  the  following  year  they  received  a  lesson  which 
startled  them  still  more.     The  comte  de  Montmorency-Boute- 
ville,  one  of  the  famous  family  of  Montmorency 
and  a  noted  duellist,  fought  a  duel  in  open  day  in   Montmor- 
the  midst  of  Paris  in  disregard  of  the  royal  edict.   ency-Boute- 
Richelieu  had  him  immediately  arrested  and  put  to  ^'  '^' '  ^^' 
death  on  the  scaffold  on  the  21st  of  June  1627.    The  execution 
of  one  of  the  noblest  of  French  subjects,  for  the  exercise  of  one 
of  the  commonest  and  most  cherished  privileges  of  the  French 
nobility,  showed  them  more  clearly  than  anything  else  had  yet 
done,  that  the  minister   at  the  head  of  the  government  was 
determined  to  be  their  master. 

Hardly  had  RicheUeu  emerged  in  triumph  from  his  first 
contest  with  the  nobles,  than  he  found  himself  involved  in  an 
unnecessary  war  with  England  and  the  ttuguenots.  y^^^  ^^^^ 
The  treaty  between  France  and  England  on  the  oc-  England, 
casion  of  the  marriage  between  Henrietta  Maria  and  '^*^' 
Charles  i.  contained  provisions  which  were  absolutely  certain 
to  lead  to  mutual  recriminations  sooner  or  later,  Charles  had 
promised  publicly  to  permit  his  wife  to  keep  her  French  house- 
hold, and  have  complete  control  over  the  education  of  the 
children  till  they  were  thirteen  years  of  age.  Privately  he  had 
bound  himself  to  tolerate  Roman  Catholicism  in  England. 
But  he  very  soon  found  that,  in  the  excited  and  unreasonable 
temper  of  the  English  people,  it  was  impossible  for  him  even 
to  pardon  Roman  priests  condemned  under  the  penal  laws. 
Neither  in  the  interests  of  his  domestic  Hfe  could  he  permit  a 
band  of  mischief-making  women  to  aUenate  from  him  the 
affections  of  his  child-wife.  In  both  these  matters  he  found 
himself  compelled  to  break  his  word.  Louis  on  his  side  set  at 
naught  his  own  verbal  promise  to  permit  Mansfeld  and  the 
English  contingent  to  march  across  France  to  attack  the  Palat- 
inate, and  so  in  the  eyes  of  the  English  court  became  largely 
responsible  for  the  tenrible  misfortunes  of  the  year  1626  in 
Germany.     When  Richelieu  in  further  pursuance  of  the  treaty 


144  European  History ^   15  98-171 5 

had  demanded  from  Charles  a  loan  of  ships  to  use  against 
Soubise  and  the  revolted  Huguenots,  Buckingham  had  set  his 
wits  against  those  of  Richelieu  to  avoid  carrying  out  his  obli- 
gation in  fact,  while  he  outwardly  professed  to  be  eager  to  do 
so,  and  even  condescended  to  the  trick  of  organising  a  sham 
mutiny  on  b®ard  the  fleet.  But  in  the  end  he  was  outwitted, 
and  the  spectacle  of  English  ships  in  the  French  fleet,  which 
defeated  Soubise  and  the  Huguenots,  so  exasperated  the 
Protestant  party  in  the  English  Parliament,  that  Buckingham 
from  motives  of  self-defence  as  well  as  from  those  of  wounded 
pride  declared  war  against  France  in  order  to  shift  the  odium 
from  himself  to  Richelieu,  and  to  pose  before  the  world  as  the 
champion  of  the  Protestant  cause.  In  July  1627  Buckingham, 
f  La  at  the  head  ofa  large  but  ill-appointed  fleet,  appeared 
Rocheiie,  before  La  Rochelle,  and  occupying  the  island  of  Rh^ 
'^^7-  besieged  the  fort  of  S.  Martin.      The   Rochellois 

much  against  their  will  felt  compelled  to  make  common  cause 
with  the  English,  and  the  Huguenots  in  the  south  of  France 
seized  the  opportunity  once  more  to  rise  into  revolt  under 
Rohan.  Richelieu  found  himself  again  threatened  by  a  for- 
midable combination  of  foreign  and  domestic  enemies,  and 
determined  this  time  to  have  recourse  to  no  half  measures. 
In  November  Buckingham  was  obliged  to  withdraw  from 
before  the  unconquered  S.  Martin  and  sail  back  to  England 
for  reinforcements.  Richelieu  himself  formed  the  siege  of  La 
Rochelle.  Recognising  at  once  the  impossibility  of  capturing 
a  city  open  to  the  sea  and  surrounded  by  marshes  by  attack  on 
the  land  side  only,  he  began  the  gigantic  work  of  building  a 
mole  right  across  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  Thus  he  hoped 
to  cut  off  the  city  wholly  from  the  possibility  of  relief  from 
the  sea,  while  the  rigid  lines  of  circumvallation  drawn  round  the 
town  prevented  any  attempt  at  introducing  provisions  from  the 
land  side.  For  five  months  the  weary  work  went  on.  It  was 
a  race  against  time.  All  depended  on  the  question  whether 
the  mole  could  be  finished  before  the  English  fleet  reappeared. 
Day  and  night  in  spite  of  many  blunders  and  some  misfortunes 


France  under  Richelierc  and  Mazarin  145 

the  huge  mass  slowly  grew.  The  two  wings  approached  nearer 
to  each  other,  garnished  with  towers  and  palisades  and  bat- 
teries, until  by  the  end  of  April  1628  the  aperture  between  the 
two  was  small  enough  to  be  closed  by  a  bridge  of  boats  made 
into  floating  batteries,  and  fastened  together  by  stout  iron 
chains  and  defended  by  wooden  stockades.  It  was  hardly 
finished  when  the  EngHsh  fleet  was  sighted.  For  fifteen  days 
the  EngHsh  hurled  themselves  with  renewed  and  despairing 
vigour  against  the  fortifications,  but  without  success.  On  the 
1 8th  of  May  they  sailed  home  and  left  La  Rochelle  to  starve. 
Victory  was  now  but  a  question  of  time.  Early  in  October  the 
English  fleet  reappeared,  but  did  not  even  dare  to  _ 
face  the  now  impregnable  defences  of  the  besiegers.  La  Rocheiie, 
On  the  28th  the  heroic  Guiton  worn  out  by  famine  '^**' 
accepted  the  inevitable.  La  Rochelle  surrendered  to  the  royal 
forces,  its  municipal  privileges  were  abolished,  its  fortifications 
destroyed,  its  government  placed  in  the  hands  of  royal  officials. 
Liberty  of  conscience  was  guaranteed  to  the  citizens,  but  all 
vestige  of  independent  authority  was  absolutely  taken  away. 

After  the  capture  of  La  Rochelle  it  was  a  comparatively  easy 
matter  to  crush  out  the  rebellion  in  the  south.  Early  in  1629 
the  king  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  army,  pacification 
marched  into  Languedoc  and  the  district  of  the  of  the  south, 
Cevennes,  capturing  the  towns  and  destroying  the  '^^^' 
castles.  Rohan  and  the  Huguenot  leaders  finding  they  could 
get  no  material  assistance  from  Spain  were  obliged  to  submit. 
By_the  peace  of  Alais  concluded  in  June  1629  the  Huguenots 
ceased  to  retain  any  political  power  in  France.  Their  guaran- 
teed towns  were  handed  over  to  the  royal  government,  their 
fortresses  were  razed,  their  organisation  was  destroyed,  their 
right  of  meeting  was  taken  away,  but  their  liberty  of  worship 
remained  unimpaired. 

The  peace  of  Alais  marks  the  end  of  the  first  act  of  the 
great  drama  which  was  being  played  by  Richelieu  in  the  his- 
tory of  France,  the  completion  of  the  first,  if  not  the  most 
difficult,  of  the  tasks  to  which  he  had  devoted  himself     By 

PERIOD  V.  K 


146  European  History,  1 598-1715 

it  the  policy  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  was  carried  to  a  legiti- 
mate conclusion.  Religious  peace  was  ensured  by  the  recog- 
Destruction  nition  of  religious  division,  while  the  danger  that 
of  the  poiiti-    religious  division  should  impair  the  national  unity 

cal  power  of  „  „  ,  ^  ... 

the  Hugue-  was  enectually  removed.  It  was  a  policy  of  na- 
nots.  tional  unity,  not  of  national  uniformity.     Richelieu 

did  not  care  that  all  Frenchmen  should  be  made  outwardly 
to  profess  the  same  religious  or  political  creed,  should  wear 
outwardly  the  same  religious  or  political  dress,  as  long  as  they 
were  whole  hearted  in  the  service  of  the  Crown,  as  long  as 
their  liberty  was  not  a  weakness  to  the  State.  That  it  could 
not  fail  to  be  a  source  not  merely  of  weakness,  but  of  serious 
danger,  to  the  State,  as  long  as  it  was  based  upon  political 
privilege  and  defended  by  political  organisation,  had  already 
been  abundantly  proved  in  the  course  of  the  reign  of  Louis  xiii. 
Every  time  that  France  had  been  threatened  by  the  hostihty 
of  her  neighbours,  whether  of  Spain  or  England,  a  rising  of  the 
Huguenots  had  turned  a  serious  foreign  war  into  an  acute 
national  crisis.  Every  time  that  the  Huguenots  had  risen  in 
revolt  they  had  allied  themselves  with  the  national  enemies. 
Twice  already  had  Richelieu's  plans  for  the  development  of 
France  been  thwarted  by  the  determination  of  the  Huguenots 
to  prefer  their  independence  to  their  patriotism,  and  to  look 
upon  the  foreign  entanglements  of  the  government  merely  as 
their  opportunity.  When  a  powerful  political  organisation 
deliberately  sets  itself  to  profit  by  the  dangers  of  the  nation, 
and  to  pursue  its  own  interests  to  the  detriment  of  those  of 
the  nation,  it  must  either  crush  the  government  or  be  crushed 
by  it.  Richelieu  enlisted  the  whole  forces  of  the  State  in  the 
campaign  against  the  Huguenots,  because  he  saw  clearly  that  as 
long  as  their  reHgious  privileges  were  based  on  the  possession 
of  political  power,  the  political  exigencies  of  their  position,  and 
the  fancied  necessities  as  well  as  the  inherent  tendencies  of 
their  religion,  must  make  them  the  enemies  of  France.  The 
destruction  of  La  Rochelle  and  the  peace  of  Alais  changed 
them  at  once  from  a  formidable  political  party  into  a  harmless 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  147 

religious  sect.  They  ceased  to  be  a  danger  to  the  state  through 
their  want  of  patriotism  and  desire  for  independence.  They 
became  a  strength  to  France  through  their  frugahty,  their 
manual  skill,  and  their  morality.  Grateful  for  religious  tolera- 
tion and  satisfied  with  it,  in  less  than  a  generation  they  were 
found  among  the  staunchest  supporters  of  the  monarchy,  and 
effectually  proved  their  gratitude  by  never  stirring  a  finger  to 
increase  the  embarrassments  of  the  Crown  in  the  perilous  days 
of  the  Fronde. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  1629  Richelieu  might  well  look  back 
with  pride  at  the  success  which  had  attended  his  efforts  to 
establish  the  unity  of  the  nation  by  consolidating  Administra- 
its  forces  under  the  power  of  the  Crown.  He  had  ^'^^  reforms, 
crushed  a  plot  of  the  most  formidable  of  his  enemies  at  court. 
He  had  established  his  ascendency  over  the  mind  if  not  over 
the  affections  of  the  king.  He  had  purified  the  financial  ad- 
ministration so  that  a  larger  proportion  of  the  taxes  found  their 
way  into  the  treasury.  He  had  put  down  a  dangerous  right  of 
private  war  on  a  small  scale  under  the  guise  of  duelling.  He 
had  destroyed  the  castles  and  fortresses  over  large  districts  of 
France,  notably  in  Brittany  and  the  southern  provinces.  He 
had  laid  the  foundation  of  the  French  navy.  He  had  destroyed 
the  political  power  and  organisation  of  the  Huguenots.  But 
there  was  still  much  to  be  done.  As  long  as  the  administration 
of  the  country  and  the  raising  and  control  of  the  army  were  in 
the  hands  or  under  the  direction  of  the  territorial  nobility,  all 
that  he  had  hitherto  accomplished  was  dependent  upon  his  own 
precarious  life  and  the  still  more  precarious  favour  of  the  king. 
A  successful  court  intrigue  might  destroy  the  whole  structure 
at  a  blow,  and  throw  France  back  into  the  slough  of  anarchy 
and  peculation  from  which  he  had  raised  her.  To  obviate  this 
danger  he  apphed  himself  during  the  rest  of  his  Hfe,  as  far  as 
internal  politics  were  concerned,  to  two  special  objects,  the 
//'establishment  of  a  bureaucracy  —  a  civil  service  under  the^\ 
^  direct  control  of  the  Crown  —  and  the  organisation  of  the  army  ^  \Yj 
upon  a  professional  basis.     In  carrying  out  this  latter  object  he 


148  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

had  to  proceed  very  carefully,  partly  owing  to  financial  con- 
siderations, and  partly  to  the  necessity  he  felt  for  providing  in 
the  army  a  sphere  of  activity  for  the  nobihty,  whose  political 
and  administrative  power  he  was  taking  away ;  and  it  was  not 
till  the  time  of  Louvois  that  the  French  army  became  thor- 
oughly professional.  But  the  active  and  open  warfare  in  which 
France  became  engaged  after  1635,  ^^  '^^^  ^^  the  growing  im- 
portance of  the  infantry,  enabled  him  to  do  much  in  the  way 
of  raising  and  organising  infantry  regiments  directly  by  the 
Crown,  without  the  interposition  of  any  noble  as  colonel,  and 
of  appointing  and  promoting  officers  such  as  Fabert  and  Cati- 
nat,  who  did  not  belong  to  the  noble  class.  For  many  years 
the  nobles  considered  it  below  their  dignity  to  serve  in  infantry 
regiments,  a  fortunate  prejudice  which  made  it  easier  for  the 
government  to  get  direct  control  over  that  important  depart- 
ment of  the  army. 

The  year  1630  saw  a  vivid  illustration  of  the  danger  to 
which  the  new  system  of  government  was  exposed  from  the 
...  .         possible  success  of  a  court  intrigue  or  the  death 

Louis  XIII.,  of  the  invalid  king.  On  his  way  back  from  the 
'^3°'  army  in  Italy  to  Paris,  Louis  was  taken  suddenly 

ill  at  Lyons  with  dysentery.  For  some  days  he  hung  between 
life  and  death.  On  the  2  2d  of  September  all  hope  was  given 
up.  Gaston  hurried  to  Paris  to  secure  the  government.  The 
queen  and  the  queen-mother  made  arrangements  for  the 
arrest  of  the  cardinal,  while  Richelieu  himself,  seeing  the 
labours  of  his  life  at  an  end,  prepared  to  fly.  But  the  king's 
constitution,  much  more  vigorous  than  historians  have  sup- 
posed, triumphed  not  only  over  the  disease  but  over  the 
physicians.  In  spite  of  having  been  bled  seven  times  in  one 
week  he  still  retained  strength  enough  to  rally,  and  Richelieu 
remained  for  the  moment  safe.  His  enemies  had  to  alter 
their  plans.  Determined  not  to  be  baulked  of  their  prey  the 
The  Day  of  quecn-mother  and  the  queen  organised  a  plot 
Dupes,  1630.  against  the  minister,  which  was  joined  by  the 
two   Marillacs,   Bassompierre,   and  Orleans.     On  the   nth  of 


France  tinder  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  149 

November  Marie  in  the  presence  of  the  king  poured  forth  a 
torrent  of  furious  invective  against  Madame  de  Combalet  the 
niece  of  the  cardinal.  On  RicheHeu's  entrance  the  storm  was 
directed  against  him.  Accusing  him  of  treason  and  perfidy, 
she  demanded  from  Louis  his  instant  dismissal,  and  called 
upon  the  king  to  choose  between  his  minister  and  her.  For 
some  hours  Louis  was  in  great  doubt,  and  the  fate  of  Richelieu 
hung  in  the  balance.  He  even  signed  an  order  entrusting  the 
command  of  the  army  to  the  mar^chal  de  Marillac.  .Ml  the 
courtiers  thought  the  reign  of  Richelieu  was  over.  Worn  out 
and  sick  at  heart  the  king,  to  free  himself  from  fresh  importu- 
nities, retired  to  his  hunting-box  at  Versailles  ;  but  once  away 
from  the  pressure  of  the  courtiers  his  good  sense  and  patriotism 
re-asserted  their  power,  and  he  determined  to  support  his 
minister  even  against  his  wife  and  his  mother.  Sending  for 
Richelieu  privately  to  join  him  at  Versailles,  he  put  himself 
entirely  into  his  hands,  and  the  Day  of  Dupes  was  over.  The 
vengeance  of  the  outraged  minister  was  terrific.  Gaston  of 
Orleans  fled  to  Lorraine,  Marie  to  the  Spaniards  at  Brussels, 
the  mar^chal  de  Marillac  was  executed,  his  brother  the  chan- 
cellor died  soon  afterwards  in  exile,  Bassompierre  was  impris- 
oned, the  duchesses  of  Elboeuf,  and  Ornano  banished,  and  the 
household  of  the  queen  filled  with  the  cardinal's  nominees. 

But  exile  increased  rather  than  appeased  their  hatred  of 
their  conqueror.  Gaston  of  Orleans,  who  had  married  the 
sister  of  the  duke  of  Lorraine  strongly  against  the 

.  ,  Rising  of 

wishes  of  Louis,  who  would  not  recognise  the  mar-    Orleans  and 
riage,  organised  a  fresh  plot  against  the  cardinal   Montmor- 
in   1632.     To  bring  about  the  ruin  of  his  hated 
enemy,  he  did  not  scruple  to  ally  himself  with  the  enemies  of 
his  country.     A  combined  force  of  Lorrainers  and  Spaniards 
was  to  invade  France  from  the  north-east,  while  the  mar^chal 
de    Montmorency,    the   governor   of    Languedoc,    raised   the 
south.     But   Richelieu's   good    fortune    did    not    desert   him. 
The  Swedes  defeated  the  Spanish  force  on  the  Rhine,  before 
it  had  even  reached  the  frontiers  of  France.     Lorraine,  instead 


150  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

of  France,  had  to  bear  the  brunt  of  invasion,  and  25,000  men 
under  Louis  himself  quickly  overran  the  country,  and  brought 
it  permanently  under  French  administration,  although  it  was 
not  formally  united  to  the  French  monarchy  till  a  century 
later.  Meanwhile,  Gaston  of  Orleans,  at  the  head  of  a  few 
thousand  horsemen,  had  made  his  way  to  Montmorency  in 
Languedoc,  endeavouring  to  raise  the  country  as  he  went 
against  the  iniquities  of  the  minister.  Not  a  man  stirred. 
France  had  begun  to  realise  that,  harsh  and  oppressive  as 
the  government  of  Richelieu  might  be,  it  was  far  more  just 
and  far  more  tolerable  than  that  of  the  nobles.  In  Languedoc 
Montmorency  had  succeeded  in  collecting  a  small  army  through 
his  own  personal  popularity  and  the  support  of  the  estates,  but 
the  people  refused  to  move,  and  he  was  powerless  in  the  face 
of  Schomberg  and  the  royal  troops.  At  Castlenaudary,  on  the 
I  St  of  September  1632,  he  was  defeated  and  captured.  On 
the  30th  of  October  the  last  representative  of  the  most  illus- 
trious of  the  great  territorial  nobles  of  France  bowed  his  head 
before  absolute  monarchy  on  the  scaffold. 

A   fresh   proscription    instigated    by  the    implacable  justice 
of   the   cardinal    decimated    Languedoc.      The    estates   were 
dispersed,  many  of  the  nobility  and  gentry  executed 
cf  the  ene-       or  seut  to  the  galleys,  five  bishops  deposed,  the 
mies  of  castles   and    fortifications  of  the  towns  destroyed. 

The  hateful  and  miserable  author  of  all  this  mis- 
ery, Gaston  himself,  alone  escaped.  Protected  by  his  birth 
and  his  readiness  to  betray  his  friends,  he  was  permitted  to 
take  refuge  in  Brussels.  There,  in  conjunction  with  the  queen- 
mother  and  the  Spaniards,  he  renewed  his  plots  against  France 
and  the  cardinal.  But  Richelieu  now  felt  himself  so  thor- 
oughly the  master  both  of  the  nobles  and  of  the  nation, 
that  Gaston  was  more  dangerous  to  him  as  an  open  enemy 
than  he  would  be  as  the  leader  of  the  disaffected  at  home. 
The  promise  of  the  king's  favour,  and  renewed  gifts  to  him- 
self and  his  friends,  soon  induced  him  to  betray  the  queen- 
mother  and  his  hosts.     In  October  1634  he  left  his  wife  and 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  151 

his  mother,  was  formally  reconciled  to  the  king  and  the 
cardinal,  and  retired  into  private  life  at  his  castle  of  Blois. 
Marie  took  refuge  with  her  daughter  in  London,  and  Riche- 
lieu, freed  for  the  time  from  all  anxiety  as  to  revolts  and 
court  intrigues,  was  enabled  to  turn  his  whole  attention  to 
the  aggrandisement  of  France.  In  the  following  year,  1635, 
he  entered  openly  into  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

Once  more  but  a  few  months  before  his  death  had  RicheHeu 
to  defend  himself  against  a  court  intrigue,  but  it  was  one 
which  had  its  roots  far  more  in  personal  ambition   ^ 

^  Conspiracy 

than  m  serious  political  rivalry.  Cinq-Mars,  the  ofCinq- 
son  of  the  marquis  d'Efifiat,  the  superintendent  ^^^^>  '^42- 
of  finance,  chafing  under  the  stern  and  all-pervading  master- 
fulness of  the  cardinal,  abused  his  position  of  intimacy  with 
the  king,  to  try  and  poison  his  mind  against  his  minister,  who 
at  that  time  was  thought  to  be  dying.  Gaston,  that  veteran 
intriguer,  and  the  due  de  Bouillon  the  lord  of  the  feudal 
dependency  of  Sedan,  gave  some  political  importance  to 
the  intrigue  by  lending  it  their  countenance.  The  system 
of  espionage  established  by  Richelieu  was  far  too  good  to 
permit  intrigues  of  that  sort  to  pass  unnoticed.  Still  neither 
Richelieu  nor  the  king  interfered  until  they  received  proof  that 
Cinq-Mars  was  actually  in  communication  with  the  national 
enemy,  the  Spaniards.  Then  they  struck,  and  as  usual  struck 
hard.  The  due  de  Bouillon  was  compelled  to  surrender  Sedan 
to  France.  Cinq-Mars  and  his  friend  de  Thou  perished  on 
the  scaffold,  the  last  of  a  long  list  of  victims,  including  five 
dukes,  four  counts,  and  a  marshal  of  France,  who  were  sacri- 
ficed by  the  pitiless  cardinal  to  the  genius  of  his  country. 

It  is  easy  to  fix  the  eyes  so  intently  upon  the  destructive  side 
of  Richelieu's  war  with  the  nobles  as  to  forget  that  in  his  sight 
it  was  by  far  the  least  important  part  of  his  work,  centraiisine 
The  execution  of  traitors  and  peculators,  the  banish-  policy  of 
ment  of  conspirators  and  i^itrigantes,  were  necessary  ^•'='''''*="- 
steps  towards  the  abolition  of  their  political  power,  not  the 
satisfaction  of  private  vengeance.     As  with  the  Huguenots,  so 


152  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

with  the  nobles,  he  did  not  wish  to  root  them  out,  but  to  make 
them  powerless  for  evil.  As  long  as  they  enjoyed  in  right  of 
their  birth  political  power,  based  upon  personal  privilege  and 
territorial  possessions,  so  long  would  they  refuse  absolutely  to 
render  themselves  amenable  to  the  new  institution  of  the  prime- 
ministership,  and  would  be  always  in  danger  of  preferring  the 
interests  of  their  order  to  those  of  the  State.  When  once  they 
had  been  deprived  of  territorial  power,  they  would  naturally 
become  the  foremost  servants  of  that  Crown  of  which  they  had 
before  been  the  rivals.  They  would  be  eager  to  serve,  where 
before  they  had  been  determined  to  rule.  Throughout  the 
government  of  Richelieu  the  work  of  centralisation  goes  steadily 
on.  A  powerful  structure  of  royal  government  is  gradually 
built  up,  and  the  abortive  plots,  and  the  subsequent  executions, 
mark  the  chafings  of  those  who  felt  that  power  was  slipping 
steadily  away  from  them,  and  by  a  sure  instinct  directed  their 
efforts  against  the  man  who  was  identified  with  the  system 
which  they  hated.  The  destruction  of  the  feudal  castles,  the 
development  of  the  professional  army,  the  substitution  of  royal 
administrative  officers  for  those  of  the  territorial  nobles  in 
Brittany  and  Languedoc,  after  the  rebellions  of  Vendome  and 
Montmorency,  the  administration  by  the  Crown  directly  through 
its  own  officials  of  the  Huguenot  towns,  after  the  peace  of 
Alais,  and  of  Lorraine  and  Sedan  after  their  conquest,  the 
A  oi  tment  establishment  of  a  royal  post  throughout  the  king- 
of  intendants,  dom,  were  all  steps  in  the  direction  of  undermining 
'^^^'  the  political  power  of  the  nobles.     Finally  in  1637 

came  the  greatest  blow  of  all.  For  many  years  Richelieu  had 
been  in  the  habit  of  appointing  royal  commissioners,  under  the 
name  of  Intendants,  to  take  cognisance  of  certain  matters  of 
local  administration,  usually  of  a  judicial  nature.  In  1637  by  a 
royal  edict,  he  appointed  Intendants  in  each  province,  and 
placed  in  their  hands  the  whole  financial  judicial  and 
police  administration.  The  effect  of  this  was  to  concentrate 
powers,  which  had  hitherto  been  enjoyed  by  the  territorial 
nobility  and  the  local  administrative  bodies,  wholly  in  the  hands 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  153 

of  officials  appointed  by  the  minister  and  responsible  to  him 
alone.  It  created  in  fact  a  permanent  civil  service  of  profes- 
sional men  of  the  middle  class,  entirely  dependent  upon  the 
royal  favour,  and  thus  did  much  to  foster  the  growth  of  absolute 
power,  and  to  give  stability  to  the  government,  while  checking 
the  separatist  tendencies  of  the  local  authorities. 

The  value  of  the  administrative  system  organised  by 
Richelieu  soon  became  evident,  when  in  the  year  1643  France 
found  herself  once  more  threatened  by  the  minority  of  the  king 
and  the  weakness  of  a  regency.  The  great  cardinal  maintained 
after  his  death  the  social  and  political  order  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  which  he  had  devoted  his  life.  The  strength  of  the 
bureaucracy  and  the  memory  of  the  government  of  Richelieu 
alone  preserved  the  authority  of  the  monarchy  amid  the  follies 
and  the  treasons  of  the  Fronde.  Richelieu  himself  died  on  the 
4th  of  December  1642,  and  Louis  followed  him  to  the  grave 
on  the  14th  of  May  1643,  leaving  the  crown  to  his  The  Regency 
infant  son  only  four  and  a  half  years  old.  It  was  °f  '^43- 
an  anxious  crisis  for  France.  Louis  xiii.  in  his  distrust  of  his 
wife,  Anne  of  Austria,  whose  influence  had  been  from  the  time 
of  her  marriage  uniformly  exercised  against  the  policy  of  the 
king  and  Richelieu,  had  endeavoured  to  control  her  exercise  of 
poUtical  power  after  his  death  by  nominating  in  his  will  a  coun- 
cil of  state,  without  whose  advice  she  was  powerless  to  act.  But 
Anne,  whose  character  developed  with  her  responsibilities,  would 
have  none  of  such  restrictions.  Going  to  the  Parlement  de 
Paris  she  asked  them  boldly  to  annul  the  will  of  her  husband  in 
the  interests  of  herself  and  her  son.  The  Parlement  were  by  no 
means  loth  to  add  to  their  political  privileges  that  of  pronoun- 
cing a  decisive  word  on  the  government  of  France.  Without 
hesitation  in  their  own  interests  they  cancelled  the  will  of  the 
late  king,  suppressed  the  council  of  regency,  and  handed  over 
the  government  of  the  country  to  Anne  absolutely.  It  was  an 
ominous  thing  that  so  soon  after  the  death  of  Richelieu  personal 
interests  should  again  come  to  the  front.  But  fortunately  for 
France  among  those  personal  interests  one  was  quickly  seen  to 


154  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

predominate  over  all  others,  which  ensured  the  continuation  of 

the  policy  of  the  great  cardinal.     Ever  since  the  death  of  the 

Pere  Joseph,  Richelieu  had  entrusted  the  details  of  his  foreign 

policy  to   the   management   of  the   astute    Italian 

Mazann  ap-      r  J  o 

pointed  chief  GiuUo  Mazzarini,  who  attracted  his  notice  in  the 
mimster.  negotiations  with  the  Pope  in  1628,  entered  the 
service  of  France  at  his  request  in  1639,  was  rewarded  with  a 
cardinal's  hat  in  1641,  and  was  recommended  to  Louis  by 
Richelieu  as  his  successor  in  the  prime-ministership  on  his 
deathbed  in  1642.  By  his  cleverness,  tact,  and  the  gracefulness 
of  his  manners,  Mazarin  succeeded  in  making  a  deep  impression 
upon  the  fastidious  and  loveless  Anne  of  Austria.  Surrounded 
by  interested  and  selfish  nobles,  anxiously  solicitous  for  the  wel- 
fare of  her  son,  she  felt  the  necessity  of  a  stronger  arm  on  which 
to  lean,  and  a  sympathetic  heart  to  which  she  might  cling,  and 
she  chose  Mazarin  as  the  person  whom  she  could  entrust  with 
the  confidences  of  her  womanly  nature.  Whether  they  were 
eventually  secretly  married  or  not  is  one  of  the  unsolved 
problems  of  history,  but  that  during  the  rest  of  their  lives  they 
were  united  by  the  strongest  bonds  of  mutual  affection  and 
respect  is  beyond  a  doubt.  To  the  astonishment  of  all  who 
were  not  in  the  secret,  Anne  signaHsed  her  assumption  of  power 
by  confirming  Mazarin  in  the  position  of  chief  minister  to  which 
he  had  been  designated  by  Richelieu,  by  continuing  the  foreign 
and  domestic  policy  of  the  great  cardinal,  and  by  exiling 
afresh  the  dukes  of  Vendome  Mercoeur  and  Guise  and  the 
duchess  of  Chevreuse,  who  were  already  portioning  out  the 
vengeance  they  would  take  on  the  cardinalists. 

Cardinal  Mazarin  was  c  very  different  character  to  his  great 
predecessor.  lie  was  altogether  of  meaner  mould.  Richelieu 
was  a  man  of  original  genius,  who  had  made  for  himself  his 
own  position  in  the  world,  and  had  been  the  architect  of  his 
Character  of  own  fame.  Mazarin  would  never  have  emerged 
Mazarin.  ixQm.  the  ruck  of  mankind  had  not  Richelieu  led 
the  way  and  given  him  a  task  to  perform.  It  was  his  business 
to  maintain,  carry  on,  develope,  that  of  Richelieu  to  create  and 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  155 

establish.  Soft  and  conciliatory  in  manner,  graceful  in  address, 
tactful  and  considerate  in  business,  deferential  without  being 
obsequious  in  conversation,  he  disarmed  his  opponents  instead 
of  conquering  them,  he  persuaded  instead  of  frightening  them. 
Management  not  action  was  his  strong  point,  finesse  and  diplo- 
macy not  the  scaffold  and  the  sword  his  weapons.  An  abso- 
lute master  of  dissimulation,  he  crept  catlike  through  life,  the 
outward  picture  of  trustful  innocence,  concealing  a  callous 
heart  and  poisoned  claws.  It  was  a  character  as  hateful  to 
the  open-hearted  Frenchman  as  to  the  honest  Englishman, 
and  even  if  it  had  not  been  disfigured  by  the  grossest  avarice, 
could  never  have  made  itself  tolerable  to  either.  Italian  to 
the  backbone  in  his  suppleness  of  character,  his  love  of  finesse, 
his  courtly  manners,  his  advancement  of  his  relations,  his  art 
collections  of  rare  books  and  sculptures,  in  the  meanness  of 
his  avarice  and  in  the  prodigality  of  his  display,  he  was  looked 
upon  by  the  French  nobles  and  the  bulk  of  the  French  people 
as  a  foreigner,  who,  having  by  unworthy  arts  made  himself  the 
master  of  the  affections  of  a  silly  woman,  a  foreigner  like  him- 
self, had  fastened  like  a  leech  upon  France  and  was  sucking 
its  lifeblood  with  insatiable  voracity.  Nothing  can  exceed  the 
virulence  of  the  hatred  with  which  Mazarin  was  regarded. 
Not  even  the  triumphs  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  and  the  peace 
of  Westphalia,  not  even  the  battle  of  Rocroy  and  the  intoxi- 
cating cup  of  glory  which  he  offered  to  France  could  save  him 
from  the  indiscriminating  and  loathsome  abuse  showered  on  him 
by  that  strange  outburst  of  patriotism  and  selfishness,  liberty 
and  frivolity,  known  as  the  Fronde,  of  which  hatred  to  him 
was  the  chief  factor. 

Ever  since  the  dissolution  of  the  Estates  General  of  16 14, 
the  Parlement  de  Paris  had  been  growing  in  political  import- 
ance. The  hereditary  nature  of  the  ofifices  of  its  outbreak  of 
members,  the  increased  consideration  shown  to  the  **"=  Fronde, 
classes  from  which  they  sprang  by  Richelieu  in  his  war  against 
the  nobility,  the  double  appeal  to  them  in  1610  and  1643  ^^ 
settle  the  government  of  France  had  all  done  much  to  per- 


156  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

suade  them  of  their  power.  The  success  of  the  rebellions 
against  the  royal  authority  in  Spain  and  in  England  no  doubt 
stimulated  their  desire  to  strike  a  blow  for  themselves  and  for 
liberty.  An  ill-advised  imposition  of  an  octroi  duty  upon  all 
commodities  entering  Paris,  issued  in  January  1648,  gave  them 
the  opportunity  of  playing  the  part  of  constitutional  leaders. 
The  Parlement  refused  to  register  the  edict.  The  court  on 
this  brought  the  boy-king  down  to  the  Parlement,  and  in  a  /// 
de  justice  the  registration  was  effected.  But  the 
tiona/ciaims  absurdity  of  trying  to  settle  a  grave  constitutional 
of  the  Parle-  question  by  the  intervention  of  a  boy  of  nine  years 
^^^  '  '  old  was  too  patent  even  for  lawyers  to  swallow,  and 
on  the  1 6th  of  January  the  Parlement  solemnly  pronounced 
the  registration  illegal  and  invalid.  A  compromise  was  arrived 
at  with  regard  to  the  particular  question  at  issue,  but  the  Parle- 
ment, so  far  from  surrendering  its  political  claims,  appointed  a 
committee  consisting  of  representatives  of  its  three  chambers 
to  take  the  reform  of  the  state  into  consideration.  On  the 
2gth  of  June  this  representative  committee  called  the  Chambre 
Its   ro-  ^^  ^"  Louis  issued  its  programme.     It  demanded 

gramme  of  the  supprcssion  of  the  Intendants,  the  reduction  of 
re  orm.  ^|^g  fai//e  by  a  quarter,  that  every  one  arrested  by 

order  of  the  government  should  be  brought  before  a  magistrate 
within  twenty-four  hours  of  his  arrest,  and  that  the  Parlement 
should  have  control  over  taxation.  Here  were  the  germs  of  a 
constitutional  reform,  which,  if  it  could  have  been  carried  out, 
might  have  saved  France  from  the  worst  evils  of  despotism 
without  seriously  impairing  the  royal  authority.  The  establish- 
ment of  a  check  on  the  financial  administration,  and  of  the 
principle  of  Habeas  Corpus,  even  though  lodged  in  an  unrep- 
resentative body  like  the  Parlement,  would  have  at  least  saved 
France  from  the  collapse  of  the  next  century,  and  might  have 
been  the  beginning  of  true  constitutional  Hfe.  But  it  was  not 
to  be.  Mazarin  appeared  to  yield  to  the  storm,  issued  some 
of  the  decrees  asked  for,  and  waited  his  opportunity.  The 
news  of  Condi's  victory  at  Lens  seemed  to  be  the  opportunity 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  157 

he  desired.  Under  cover  of  a  Te  Deum  sung  in  Notre 
Dame  for  the  victory,  Broussel  the  leader  of  the  agitation 
against    the    court    was    arrested    and    put    into    . 

•  -iTTi  1-1  Arrest  and 

pnson.     When  this   became    known  all  Paris  was   release  of 
seized  with  uncontrollable  excitement.     The  long   ^'■°"ssei. 
suppressed    hatred  of  Mazarin  burst  out  in  fury.     Barricades 
were  raised.     The    citizens   were   armed   and   the    Parlement 
accompanied  by  a  furious  and  enthusiastic  crowd  marched  in 
a  body  to  demand  the  release  of  Broussel.     The  court  was 
again  obliged  to  yield,  and  Broussel  was  set  at  liberty,  but 
as   before    Mazarin   only   drew  back  in  the  hope  of  making 
his   final   spring    more   effective.      The    peace   of   Westphalia 
would  shortly  put  a  disciplined  army  at  his  disposal,  and  then 
the  position  of  the  government  would  be  impregnable.     Paris 
might  rage  as  much  as  it  liked,  but  the  days  had  gone  by 
when  the  caprice  of  Paris  decided  the    fortunes  of  France. 
Never  was  politician   more  mistaken.      On  the  13th  of  Sep- 
tember the  court  withdrew  to   Ruel  to  free   itself  from   the 
constant   danger   of  tumults,      Paris   was   immediately  in  an 
uproar.     Persuaded  by  the  clever  and  unscrupu- 
lous Gondi,  bishop-coadjutor  of  Paris,  a  man  who   of  the  re- 
had  nothing  ecclesiastical  about   him    except  his   forms  by  the 
title,  Cond6  the  military  hero  of  the  hour  declared 
for  the   Parlement,   and   the  court  once   more   following   the 
favourite  pohcy  of  Mazarin  had  to  procrastinate.     It  returned 
to  Paris,  and  on  the  24th  of  October  1648  published  an  edict 
accepting   and    enforcing   the  whole  of  the  demands  of  the 
Chambre  de  S.  Louis. 

Thus  far  the  struggle  had  been  in  its  main  aspects  consti- 
tutional. The  Parlement  de  Paris,  aided  by  the  populace  of 
the  city,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  unpopularity  unpopularity 
of  Mazarin,  was  endeavoring  to  curb  the  caprice  of  of  the  prime- 
an  irresponsible  prime  minister  by  assuming  to  itself  '"•"'stership. 
control  over  the  finances,  and  obtaining  for  all  Frenchmen 
security  against  arbitrary  arrest.  Men  felt  vaguely  that  the 
constitution  of  France  had  altered  in  a  way  contrary  to  their 


158  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

interests  of  recent  years.  It  was  one  thing  to  acknowl 
edge  the  personal  authority  of  the  king  as  supreme,  when  it 
had  to  be  exercised  largely  through  local  governors  who  were 
practically  independent,  and  was  from  its  very  nature  sub- 
ject to  the  limitations  which  necessarily  followed  from  the 
different  characters  of  the  supreme  rulers.  It  was  quite  another 
thing  to  acknowledge  that  that  personal  supremacy  could  be 
delegated,  and  to  be  required  to  pay  the  same  implicit  obe- 
dience to  a  prime  minister  ruling  through  a  bureaucracy  of  his 
own  nominees  when  the  king  himself  was  a  minor.  The  pres- 
sure of  despotic  rule  had  hitherto  been  little  felt  in  France  by 
the  noble  or  the  professional  classes.  They  did  not  object  to 
acknowledge  and  obey  the  will  of  a  Henry  iv.,  while  a  Henry 
III.  hardly  presumed  to  ask  them  to  do  so.  It  was  quite  a 
different  thing  when  they  were  called  upon  to  pay  implicit 
reverence  to  a  Mazarin  following  a  Richelieu,  when  Louis  xiii. 
seemed  a  faiiieant  and  Louis  xiv.  was  a  boy.  And  behind 
the  actual  revolt  against  the  irresponsible  will  of  the  minister 
lay  the  old  rivalry  between  local  authority  and  centralised 
administration.'  All  local  authorities  whether  of  the  governors 
or  of  the  estates  or  of  the  Parlements  had  suffered  under  the 
centralising  hand  of  Richeheu.  In  many  cases  they  had  been 
rooted  out.  France  was  becoming  a  tabula  rasa,  on  which 
the  hand  of  the  king,  or,  worse  still,  of  the  minister,  was  alone 
visible.  So  the  Parlement  de  Paris  felt,  when  it  embarked  on 
the  struggle  with  the  Crown,  that  it  had  behind  it  not  merely 
Importance  ^^  turbulence  of  a  great  city,  or  the  bastard 
of  the  enthusiasm  produced  by  professional  agitators,  but 

re  orms.  ^^^  ^  mass  of  thoughtful  public  opinion,  traditions 

which  lay  deep  in  French  history,  and  the  political  instincts  of 
a  growing  nation.  The  example  of  England  was  sufficient  to 
show  that  if  it  could,  by  whatever  machinery,  put  an  effectual 
check  on  the  power  of  arbitrary  taxation  and  the  power  of 
arbitrary  imprisonment  enjoyed  by  the  government,  it  would 
have  planted  a  seed  from  which  the  tree  of  liberty  would 
assuredly  spring.     Of  the  four  chief  points  of  the  charter  of 


France  tinder  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  159 

reform  wrung  from  the  Crown  in  October  1648,  two,  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  taille  and  the  aboHtion  of  the  Intendants,  were 
merely  passing  remedies  for  special  grievances  of  the  time  ;  the  ' 
other  two,  the  control  over  taxation  and  the  Habeas  CorpusX  / 
enunciated  principles  of  government  for  the  future,  which  if 
they  could  have  been  enforced,  would  have  infallibly  altered 
the  whole  history  of  France. 

Unfortunately  the  Parlement  itself  was  a  body  wholly  unfit 
to  lead  a  constitutional  struggle.    A  close  corporation  of  magis- 
trates   without    representative    character,    without   ^ 
legislative    or    political    rights,    without    traditions   of  the 
to  which   to   appeal,  without   force   on  which   to   p*'^'^'"*"*- 
rely,  was  ludicrously  unfit  to  stand  forth  as  the  champion  of 
national  interests  against  a  Crown,  which  at  that  very  moment 
had  assumed  the  headship  of  European  politics.     Its  ally  the 
city  of  Paris  was  more  unfit  still.     The  close-fisted  bourgeoisie, 
anxious  for  its  privileges,  and  trembling  for  its  money-bags, 
the  turbulent  populace  of  the  streets  intoxicated  with  its  own 
importance,  a  small  knot  of  interested  agitators  like  Gondi,  a 
larger  body  of  selfish   aristocrats   and  frivolous  women,   half 
fools,  half  knaves,  like  the  duke  of  Beaufort  and  the  duchesse 
de  Longueville,  were  not  the  stuff  of  which  successful  consti- 
tutional revolutions  are  made.     As  a  natural  result  the  move- 
ment began  at  once  to  deteriorate.     Hatred  of  Mazarin  was  a 
common  factor  between  the  constitutionahsts  of  the  Parlement, 
the  populace  of  the  streets  and  princes  of  the  blood  royal  and 
the   nobility.     To   gain   the   support   necessary   to   meet    the 
forces  of  the  Crown,  the   Parlement  had  to  rely 
on   the   city  and    to   appeal  to   the  nobles.     The   taken  by  the 
latter   eagerly  joined   the   movement  in   order   to   "obiiity  and 

1-11  ^■  ■      ^    ■    n  J  the  populacc. 

recover  their  old  political  influence  and  to  oust 
the  hated  minister.  They  cared  not  a  sou  for  the  Parlement. 
In  their  heart  of  hearts  they  hated  and  they  dreaded  the 
noblesse  de  la  robe  and  their  constitutional  ambitions.  They 
wanted  back  the  old  days  of  private  anarchy  and  public 
plunder.     They  loathed  the  very  idea  of  constitutional  reform 


l6o  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

and  common  right.  From  the  moment  that  the  nobles  took 
the  direction  of  the  movement  it  loses  its  constitutional  char- 
acter, it  becomes  only  the  last  and  the  basest  act  in  the  long 
drama  of  the  struggle  between  the  nobles  and  the  royal  author- 
ity, it  has  for  its  direct  and  most  unmistakable  object,  not  the 
amelioration  of  a  down-trodden  people,  but  the  overthrow  of 
an  unpopular  minister. 

From  this  point  then  the  Fronde  loses  its  chief  interest  and 
its  story  may  be  briefly  told.  Seeing  the  weakness  of  the 
^    ,.  court,  the  nobles  flocked  to  take  the  leadership 

Factiousness  '  '^ 

of  the  move-  of  the  movement  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Parle- 
'"^"'"  ment  and  Gondi.     The  prince  de  Conti,  the  due 

de  Bouillon,  the  due  de  Beaufort  the  popular  roi  des  halles, 
the  due  de  Longueville  and  his  intriguing  fascinating  wife,  all 
rushed  to  Paris.  Even  Turenne,  the  patriot  and  the  incor- 
ruptible, was  for  the  moment  seduced  by  the  duchesse  de 
Longueville  to  draw  his  sword  against  the  court.  Mazarin 
however  succeeded  in  detaching  Cond6  from  the  side  of  the 
rebellion.  On  the  6th  of  January  1649  ^^  court  fled  secretly 
to  S.  Germain,  and  nominating  Cond^  to  the  command  of  its 
army  prepared  to  bring  Paris  to  its  senses  by  open  war.  But 
for  the  time  both  sides  shrunk  from  so  terrible  an  alternative, 
and  through  the  intervention  of  M0I6,  the  president  of  one  of 
the  chambers  of  the  Parlement  and  a  man  of  unblemished 
integrity,  the  peace  of  Ruel  was  arranged  on  the  ist  of  April 
1649  o^  ^^  basis  of  the  status  quo.  For  nearly  a  year  quiet 
The  Peace  of  was  restored,  but  it  was  a  peace  only  in  name,  the 
Ruel,  1649.  intrigues,  the  libels,  and  the  agitation  continued 
as  before.  Cond6  in  particular  made  himself  odious  to  every 
one  by  the  insolence  of  his  pride  and  the  theatrical  ebulli- 
tions of  his  passionate  nature.  Even  the  patience  of  Mazarin 
Imprison-  became  exhausted,  and  on  the  i8th  of  January 
ment  of  the  1650  he  astonishcd  France  by  suddenly  commit- 
pnnces,  1  50.  ^^^^  Cond6  Conti  and  Longueville  to  prison.  It 
was  a  gross  blunder.  The  imprisonment  of  the  princes  gave 
his  enemies  what  they  most  wanted,  a  common  rallying  cry. 


France  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  l6l 

while  the  arbitrary  character  of  the  proceeding  disgusted 
moderate  men.  The  feehng  became  general  that  France 
would  never  gain  peace  as  long  as  Mazarin  remained  at 
the  head  of  affairs.  The  provinces  of  Normandy  Guienne 
and  Burgundy  declared  against  the  court,  and  the  Fronde 
recommenced  with  a  definite  programme  of  the  release  of  the 
princes  and  the  banishment  of  Mazarin.  Like  so  many  other 
risings  against  royal  authority,  it  took  the  outward  form  of  a 
rising  in  the  true  interests  of  the  Crown  to  rid  it  _..     .  . 

°  The  risings 

of  a  bad  and  incapable  minister.  The  revolts  were  in  the 
put  down  in  Normandy  and  Burgundy  without  p^°^»""s. 
difficulty,  in  Guienne  by  the  capture  of  Bordeaux  after  a  pro- 
tracted siege  by  the  queen-mother  and  the  young  king  in  person, 
but  the  flame  continued  to  spread.  Paris  declared  against  the 
court.  The  due  d'Orl^ans  joined  the  movement.  Turenne 
invaded  France  at  the  head  of  a  Spanish  army,  but  was 
defeated  by  Duplessis  near  Rethel  on  the  17th  of  December. 
Mazarin,  ever  timid,  determined  to  yield.  In  Flight  of  Ma- 
January  1 65 1  he  left  France  secretly,  having  zarin,  1651. 
ordered  the  release  of  the  princes,  and  betook  himself  to 
Briihl  in  the  electorate  of  Koln  from  whence  he  still  directed 
affairs  by  correspondence  with  the  queen-mother  and  the 
ministers.  Lionne  Letellier  and  Servien.  On  the  news  of  the 
retirement  of  Mazarin,  the  Fronde  was  beside  itself  with  joy, 
the  Parlement  passed  a  decree  of  banishment  against  him,  and 
sold  his  library  and  works  of  art.  Paris  treated  the  court  as 
its  prisoners,  and  received  the  princes  in  triumph  on  their 
return  from  prison  in  February  1651.  But  Cond^  soon  made 
himself  more  intolerable  to  the  leaders  of  the  Fronde  by  his 
rapacity  and  violence  than  he  had  been  before  to  Mazarin  ; 
and  Anne  by  a  clever  move  was  able  to  detach  the  Frofideurs 
from  him  and  drive  him  into  open  rebellion  against  the  young 
king  who  had  just  been  declared  of  age. 

The  quarrel  now  openly  appeared  in  its  true  light  of  a 
struggle  between  the  nobles  and  the  king.  Cond6,  supported 
by  Nemours,    La   Rochefoucauld,   La  Tremouille   and   others 

PERIOD    V.  I. 


i62  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

of  the  nobles,  raised  the  south  in  revolt.     Anne  and  the  king 

on  their  side  put  three  armies  in  the  field.     Turenne  came 

back  to  his  alleeiance,  and  Mazarin  returned  from 

The  move-  °  ' 

ment  a  his    sclf-imposed    exile    and   joined   the   court    at 

struggle  be-     poitie^s  on  the  28th  of  February  1652.     For  eight 

tween  the  j  j  o 

nobles  and  months  civil  war  raged  and  France  lay  at  the 
the  Crown,  mercy  of  rival  armies,  while  the  foreign  enemy  took 
advantage  of  her  misery  to  advance  his  frontiers  in  the  north- 
east. It  looked  as  if  the  very  policy  which  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin  had  carried  out  so  ruthlessly  at  the  expense  of 
Germany  was  about  to  recoil  on  the  head  of  France.  But 
no  sooner  were  the  two  sides  definitely  arrayed  against  each 
other  as  the  party  of  Condd  and  the  nobility  against  the 
party  of  Mazarin  and  the  royalists,  than  it  was  seen  that 
though  Paris  would  fight  to  the  death  against  Mazarin,  France 
would  not  fight  against  the  king.  Cond6  found  no  adequate 
support  in  the  country.  Foiled  by  the  superior  military 
genius  of  Turenne  near  Blenau  in  April,  he  was  defeated  at 
the  Faubourg  S.  Antoine  in  July,  and  must  have  been  utterly 
destroyed,  had  not  the  energy  and  enthusiasm  of  Mademoi- 
Ouarrei  be-  selle,  the  daughter  of  Gaston  of  Orleans,  persuaded 
tween  Conde'  the  citizeus  of  Paris  to  admit  him  and  his  beaten 
^  and  Pans.  ^^^^  within  the  walls.  But  Paris  had  no  love  for 
Cond6.  It  simply  cherished  an  undying  hatred  for  Mazarin, 
and  a  supreme  conviction  of  its  own  importance.  It  was 
the  only  force  in  France  still  opposed  to  the  court,  and 
Mazarin  found  himself  in  consequence  the  only  obstacle  to 
peace.  By  a  voluntary  retirement  to  Sedan  in  August  1652, 
he  built  a  bridge  by  which  the  Parisians  could  return  to  their 
allegiance  to  the  king  without  compromising  their  opposition 
to    the    minister.      They    eagerly    availed    them- 

Flight  of  .  .  . 

Cond^,  and      selvcs  of  it.     Cond^,  finding  himself  deserted  on 
the  end  of  the  ^^   sides,   opculy   ioiued  the   enemies  of  France, 

Fronde,  1652.  .  ■    j  /  ■    ,  r        • 

and  carried  on  for  eight  years  more  a  foreign  war 
against  his  country  as  the  leader  of  the  armies  of  Spain.     On 


Frmice  under  Richelieu  and  Mazarin  163 

the  2 1  St  of  October  Louis  entered  Paris  at  the  head  of  his 
army  and  the  Fronde  was  at  an  end.  From  that  moment  the 
royal  authority  shone  out  pre-eminent  over  all  the  forces  of 
the  country  until  the  Revolution.  Constitutionalism  as  well  as 
privilege,  local  feeling  as  well  as  legal  right  lay  helpless  before 
the  all-mastering  Crown.  The  leaders  of  the  Fronde  were 
exiled,  many  of  its  supporters  put  to  death  on  various  pretexts, 
none  of  them  admitted  even  to  the  shadow  of  political  power. 
The  Parlement  were  forbidden  to  deal  either  directly  or 
indirectly  with  the  affairs  of  State.  For  a  century  it  became 
but  the  registration  office  of  the  royal  edicts  and  the  channel 
of  the  royal  justice,  while  the  nobles,  deprived  of  all  political 
power  and  sadly  weakened  in  local  influence,  accepted  the 
service  of  a  splendid  court  in  wiUing  exchange  for  the  pre- 
carious dignity  of  half-independent  feudatories. 

When    the   triumph   of    the    court   was    assured,   Mazarin 
emerged  from  his  retirement  and  again  took  up  the  reins  of 
government.     For  the  nine  years  that  were  left  to   Rg^urn  of 
him  of  life    and   power,  he   strove   to  repair  the   Mazarin  to 
havoc  wrought  by  the  Fronde  in  his  private  fortune   p°^^''" 
and  his  public  policy.     His  best  efforts  vvere  directed  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  war  with   Spain,  which  with  the   help  of 
England  was  brought  to  such  a  successful  issue  by  the  peace 
of  the  Pyrenees  in  1660.     In  domestic  affairs  he  paid   little 
attention  to  anything  except  the  amassing  of  a  prodigious  for- 
tune in  the  management  of  which   Colbert  received  his  first 
lessons  of  finance.     He  had  none  of  Richelieu's  love  for  the 
greatness  of  France.     He  did  nothing  for  her  arts,  her  htera- 
ture,  or  her  sciences.     He  cared  even  less  than  Richelieu  for^ 
the  welfare  and  happiness  of  the  people.     His  financial  admin- 
istration was  corrupt  to  the  core  ;  offices  were  sold,  revenue 
anticipated,  state  property  alienated  for  the  personal  advantage 
of  the  cardinal.     Had  it  not  been  that  he  was  soon  succeeded 
by  the  best  finance  minister  that  France  ever  produced,  the 
world  would  not  so   lightly  have   passed   over   the   fact   that 


164  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Mazarin  on  his  death  in  March  1661  bequeathed  to  Louis  xiv., 
not  merely  absolute  power  at  home  and  the  leadership  of 
Europe  abroad,  but  a  home  administration  at  once  so  oppres- 
sive and  so  corrupt,  that  had  it  lasted  but  a  few  years  longer, 
France  could  hardly  have  escaped  hopeless  bankruptcy  and 
irretrievable  ruin. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

NORTHERN    EUROPE  TO  THE  TREATY   OF  OLIVA 

Character  and  policy  of  Oxenstjerna — The  Form  of  Government  —  War 
between  Sweden  and  Denmark — Treaty  of  Bromsebro  — Christina  of 
Sweden — Her  character  and  ability  —  Frederick  William  of  Branden- 
burg—  His  character  and  political  aims  —  The  question  of  Pomerania  — 
Condition  of  his  dominions  at  his  accession — His  withdrawal  from  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  —  Acquisition  of  east  Pomerania — Establishment  of 
his  personal  authority — His  intrigues  against  Charles  X.  of  Sweden  — 
Acknowledgment  of  Swedish  suzerainty  —  He  joins  Charles  X.  against 
Poland  —  Obtains  independence  by  the  treaties  of  Labiau  and  Wehlau  — 
Death  of  Charles  X.  —  The  pacification  of  the  north. 

While  the  great  powers  of  Europe  were  battling  for  the 
Rhine  and  the  Pyrenees,  the  smaller  nations  of  the  north 
were  struggling  for  the  command  of  the  Baltic.  It  was  a 
contest  in  which  Denmark  played  the  part  of  the  Position  of 
Empire,  the  traditional  but  feeble  possessor  of  Sweden,  1632. 
rightful  authority,  while  Sweden,  like  another  France,  strong 
in  her  new-found  national  unity,  was  impelled  by  her  geo- 
graphical position  to  claim  a  freedom  which  could  not  fail 
to  end  in  leadership.  When  Gustavus  Adolphus  fell  on  the 
field  of  Liitzen  in  1632  he  had  succeeded  in  winning  for  his 
country  supremacy  on  the  Baltic  and  a  foothold  on  German 
soil ;  but  his  Hfe  had  been  too  short,  his  career  too  meteor-like 
for  him  to  have  had  time  to  consolidate  by  his  statesmanship 
what  he  had  won  by  his  genius.  That  task  was  left  to  his 
friend  and  confidant.  Axel  Oxenstjerna,  during  character 
the  minority  of  the  young  Christina  who  was  and  policy  o( 
only  four  and  a  half  years  old  when  her  father  o^^^stjema. 
died.     The   man  was  well  fitted  to  the  task.     Cautious,  de- 

165 


1 66  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

liberate,  and  cold-blooded,  complete  master  of  his  emotions, 
he  was  a  man  of  fixed  ideas  and  tenacious  policy.  Nothing 
moved  him,  nothing  changed  him.  Twice  only  in  a  long  and 
anxious  life  did  he  know  what  it  was  to  be  sleepless,  once 
after  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  once  after  the  battle  of  Nordlingen. 
Patriotism  in  him  took  bodily  form  in  the  House  of  Vasa  and 
Gustavus  Adolphus.  During  the  hfe  of  the  king  his  whole 
energies  were  devoted  to  carrying  out  his  master's  wishes, 
after  his  death  to  the  completion  of  his  master's  policy.  In 
the  Thirty  Years'  War,  as  we  have  seen,  he  was  the  most 
strenuous  and  uncompromising  enemy  of  peace.  The  mis- 
eries of  Germany,  the  dangerous  ambition  of  France,  even 
the  deterioration  of  his  own  country,  were  as  nothing  to  him 
compared  with  the  duty  of  obtaining  for  Sweden  all  that 
Gustavus  might  fairly  have  claimed.  It  required  the  personal 
intervention  of  the  young  queen  herself  to  prevent  her  minister 
from  ruining  the  coimtry  in  order  to  preserve  its  dignity.  At 
home  his  chief  work  was  to  place  on  a  permanent  basis  the 
alliance  of  the  Crown  with  the  official  nobility,  which  it  had 
been  the  special  object  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  to  create  as  a 
counterpoise  to  the  influence  of  the  hereditary  nobility  and  the 
clergy. 

In  the  Form  of  Government  adopted  in  1634,  Sweden 
received  from  Oxenstjerna's  hands  the  first  of  modern  written 
The  Form  of  Constitutions.  By  it  Lutheranism  in  the  form  of 
Government,  the  Confcssion  of  Augsburg  was  imposed  upon 
'  ^'  the  sovereign  and  all  his  subjects.     Government 

was  vested  in  the  king,  advised  by  a  senate  of  twenty  members 
chosen  by  him  from  the  nobility,  to  whom  were  added  five  ex 
officio  members  being  the  great  officers  of  state,  i.e.  the  steward, 
the  marshal,  the  treasurer,  the  chancellor,  and  the  admiral. 
The  whole  direction  of  affairs  during  the  illness  or  minority 
of  the  king  was  placed  in  their  hands,  subject  only  to  the 
provision  that  all  laws  passed,  privileges  conferred,  and  aliena- 
tion of  Crown  lands  effected  during  the  incapacity  of  the  king 
must  receive  his  subsequent  ratification.     Other  provisions  of 


Northern  Europe  to  the  Treaty  of  Oliva        167 

a  less  important  nature  regulated  the  administration  of  justice 
but  in  all  of  them  the  same  care  for  securing  the  supremacy 
of  the  noble  and  official  class  is  everywhere  observable.  In 
fact,  the  result  of  the  Form  of  Government  was  to  place  the 
chief  direction  of  affairs  in  Sweden  for  nearly  fifty  years  in 
the  hands  of  a  narrow  aristocratic  clique  of  official  families. 
During  the  minority  of  Christina,  no  less  than  three  out  of  the 
five  great  officers  of  State  were  members  of  the  Oxenstjerna 
family  alone.  The  policy  of  the  regency  was  con- 
ceived in  the  interests  of  the  nobility.  They  prof-  menf  a^^'"' 
ited  by  the  continuance  of  the  war  in  Germany,  for  narrow 
to  them  fell  the  high  commands  in  the  army,  and  °  '^^'^'^  ^' 
the  opportunities  of  amassing  wealth  by  plunder  and  con- 
fiscation. They  profited  equally  by  the  necessities  of  the 
Crown  at  home,  for  they  became  the  possessors  either  by 
purchase  or  grant  of  large  tracts  of  Crown  lands  made  over  to 
them  by  the  government,  partly  to  secure  their  loyalty  and 
partly  to  relieve  its  embarrassments.  But  what  was  meat  to 
the  nobles  was  poison  to  the  peasantry.  The  people  soon 
found  that  the  court  noble  or  the  successful  general  was  a  far 
harder  master  to  serve  than  ever  the  Crown  had  been.  The 
long  continued  war  raised  the  taxes,  checked  the  growth  of 
manufactures,  and  drained  the  country  of  its  best  peasant 
blood,  only  to  return  to  it  a  body  of  brigand  soldiers  ruined 
in  morals  and  incapable  of  honest  industry.  Had  it  lasted 
but  a  few  years  longer,  it  is  by  no  means  improbable  that 
Oxenstjerna  would  have  found  that  he  had  purchased  a  for- 
eign empire  at  the  cost  of  a  domestic  revolution.  The  quick 
intelligence  of  Christina,  brought  up  as  she  was  in  Sweden, 
while  the  Chancellor  was  forced  to  spend  a  large  part  of 
his  time  in  Germany,  appreciated  the  danger ;  and  this, 
quite  as  much  as  her  natural  humanity,  prompted  her  to  put 
an  end  to  a  war,  which  had  ceased  to  have  a  serious  political 
object,  and  was  being  waged  in  the  interests  of  a  class  and  in 
honour  of  a  memory. 

In   the  war  with  Denmark  which  broke  out   in   1643   the 


l68  European  History,   1598- 1 71 5 

narrow  but  unflinching  patriotism  of  Oxenstjerna  showed  itself 
to  better  advantage.  Free  passage  through  the  Sound  and  the 
.^  .^j^  Belts  for  Swedish  ships  was  as  much  a  commercial 
Denmark,  necessity  for  the  development  of  Swedish  trade,  as 
1643-  fj.gg  passage  through  the  passes  of  Savoy  was  a  mili- 

tary necessity  for  the  aggrandisement  of  France.  But  Denmark 
seated  astride  of  the  islands,  with  one  foot  on  Halland  and  the 
other  on  Jutland,  by  merely  raising  the  dues  payable  for  the 
passage  of  ships,  could  crush  the  nascent  trade  at  its  birth. 
In  doing  so  it  had  to  reckon  not  merely  with  Sweden  but  with 
the  more  important  maritime  countries  of  Holland  and  England 
who  carried  on  with  Sweden,  through  the  Sound,  a  prosperous 
and  growing  trade  in  skins,  fur,  and  copper,  and  were  therefore 
keenly  interested  in  the  question  of  the  Sound  tolls.  But  in 
1639,  seeing  England  involved  in  domestic  trouble,  and  Hol- 
land fully  occupied  in  the  ceaseless  struggle  with  Spain,  Chris- 
tian IV.  thought  the  opportunity  had  come  for  vigorous  ac- 
tion. He  raised  the  tolls  on  the  Sound,  attempted  to  take 
lead  in  German  affairs  by  putting  himself  forward  as  medi- 
ator in  the  negotiations  for  peace,  and  in  July  1640  directly 
insulted  the  government  of  Sweden  by  openly  assisting  the 
queen-mother,  Maria  Eleonora  of  Brandenburg  to  escape  from 
the  dignified  seclusion  in  which  she  was  kept.  For  the 
moment  Oxenstjerna  had  to  temporise,  for  the  affairs  of  Ger- 
many absorbed  his  whole  energies,  but  two  years  later  the 
opportunity  came.  Torstenson  was  suddenly  directed  upon 
Holstein  without  any  declaration  of  war,  and  in  conjunction 
with  Horn  quickly  overran  the  whole  of  the  mainland.  Chris- 
tian taken  by  surprise  had  to  betake  himself  to  his  islands 
and  his  ships.  There  he  fought  like  a  hero,  holding  his  own 
manfully  for  two  summers  against  the  combined  efforts  of 
Tu  *     »     t   Swedish  fleets  and   Dutch  sailors.     But  the  odds 

1  he  treaty  of 

Brbmsebro,  were  too  many  for  him,  and  after  a  severe  defeat 

'^''5'  in  October  1644  he  found  himself  obliged  to  sue 

for   peace.  The   next   year,    in   August    1645,  the    treaty  of 

Bromsebro  was  negotiated  through  the  mediation  of  France 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        169 

between  Christian  and  Oxenstjerna.  By  it  Sweden  was  en- 
tirely relieved  from  the  payments  of  tolls  on  the  Sound  and 
the  Belts,  and  acquired  the  province  of  Halland  on  terms 
which  practically  involved  its  annexation.  How-  Acquisition 
ever  questionable  on  the  score  of  public  faith  its  °f  Haiiand 
beginning  may  have  been,  there  is  no  doubt  that  from  the  °^ 
this  was  one  of  the  most  important  and  useful  Sound  dues, 
wars  waged  by  Sweden  in  the  seventeenth  century.  At  very 
little  expense  to  herself,  she  completed  the  work  of  national 
consolidation  by  making  Denmark  retire  across  the  natural 
frontier  of  the  sea,  and  secured  for  the  future  the  free  and  un- 
hampered development  of  her  commerce.  Both  of  them  were 
acquisitions  essential  for  her  national  well-being,  and  when 
once  gained  were  gained  for  all  time.  The  more  showy 
rewards  of  the  peace  of  Westphalia  on  the  contrary,  though 
they  mark  the  zenith  of  the  political  glory  of  Oxenstjerna,  were 
in  no  way  the  best  gifts  which  Sweden  received  at  his  hands. 
They  contained  in  themselves  the  fruit  of  future  contests. 
Like  the  battles  of  Creci  and  Poitiers  and  the  peace  of 
Bretigni,  the  battles  of  Breitenfeld  and  Wittstock  and  the 
peace  of  Westphaha  covered  the  conqueror  with  military  glory 
at  the  cost  of  an  hundred  years  of  war. 

In  this  long  drama  of  dull  warfare,  the  reign  of  Christina  is 
a  short  but  picturesque  interlude.  Alone  among  Swedes  and 
almost  alone  among  sovereigns,  she  loved  to  live  Christina  of 
a  life  of  culture  among  men  of  culture.  She  was  Sweden, 
not  a  student,  but  a  master  of  classical  literature,  not  the 
patron  of  men  of  letters,  but  herself  a  member  of  the  sacred 
band.  It  is  therefore  easy  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of 
her  reign  as  an  epoch  in  the  civiHsation  of  her  country.  The 
learning  and  the  culture  which  gathered  round  Christina  at 
Stockholm  fixed  no  roots  in  the  country,  answered  to  no 
demand  even  in  the  university.  It  was  a  pure  exotic,  called 
into  existence  by  the  strange  accident  that  Sweden  had  a  cul- 
tured queen.  It  died  on  her  abdication.  It  was  personal  and 
artificial  not  national  and  spontaneous,  as  unlike  the  great  out- 


170  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

burst  of  English  literature  under  Elizabeth  with  which  it  has 
sometimes  been  compared,  as  the  bouquet  of  the  theatre  to  the 
flowers  of  the  Alps.  The  men  of  letters  themselves  formed,  it 
is  to  be  feared,  an  unwelcome  and  unpopular  element  in  the 
half  barbaric  court.  To  the  rough  nobles  they  were  but  a 
coterie  of  the  queen's  friends,  a  clique  with  whom  she  liked  to 
live,  a  sort  of  superior  race  of  pet  animals  which  Sweden  had 
to  feed  and  maintain  in  order  to  please  the  queen.  But  the 
very  fact  that  some  of  the  most  intellectual  minds  of  the  day 
were  content  to  endure  the  cold  and  discomforts  of  Swedish 
simplicity,  and  the  hardly  concealed  dislike  of  a  barbarous 
and  homely  people,  rather  than  lose  the  distinction  of  being 
numbered  among  the  friends  of  Christina,  is  no  mean  tribute 
to  her  character  and  her  mind.  To  be  with  her,  to  be  received 
into  her  friendship,  to  listen  to  her  conversation,  to  take  part 
in  her  studies,  this  was  the  attraction  which  made  Stockholm 
for  the  moment  the  Athens  of  the  north. 

Christina  is  one  of  those  few  sovereigns  who  have  made 
history  by  sheer  force  of  personal  character.  In  the  whole 
Character  of  range  of  the  seventeenth  century,  there  is  no 
Christina.  crowned  head  who  can  pretend  to  equality  with 
her  in  the  rare  gifts  of  originality  and  distinction.  A  sworn 
foe  to  conventionality  in  all  forms,  with  a  mind  uncompromis- 
ingly logical,  she  went  straight  to  the  root  of  a  matter  to  the 
horror  of  diplomatists  and  courtiers.  The  salient  point  of  her 
character  is  her  straightforwardness.  There  was  nothing  arti- 
ficial about  her  and  singularly  little  which  was  not  original.  She 
formed  her  own  conceptions  of  pohcy,  of  religion,  of  culture,  of 
manners.  She  adhered  to  them  at  all  costs.  She  carried  them 
out  unhesitatingly.  When  one  of  them  came  into  collision 
with  another,  instantly  she  surrendered  the  less  to  the  greater. 
She  abdicated  the  crown  of  Sweden  because  she  was  convinced 
that  she  ought  to  become  a  Roman  Catholic.  She  procured 
the  recognition  of  Charles  Gustavus  as  her  successor  because 
she  was  determined  not  to  marry.  At  the  age  of  eighteen  she 
forced  the  all-powerful  Chancellor  into  making  a  peace  which 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        171 

he  loathed.  Ten  years  later,  after  her  abdication,  she  murdered 
her  steward  Monaleschi  through  a  wilfully  mistaken  view  of  her 
sovereign  rights.  Throughout  her  life  she  was  the  same, — 
clear-minded,  self-willed,  of  keen  decision  and  petulant  temper, 
warm-hearted  and  true  to  those  she  loved,  mahcious  to  those 
she  disliked,  a  hater  of  humbug,  a  despiser  of  conventionality, 
cynical  in  speech,  generous  in  action,  prodigal  with  money, 
avaricious  of  fame,  hating  and  hated  by  women,  always  attrac- 
tive to  men.  In  truth  Christina  was  one  of  nature's  mistakes. 
She  was  intended  for  a  man.  Masculine  in  intellect,  masculine 
in  will,  masculine  in  bodily  endurance,  mascuhne  in  the  rough- 
ness of  her  sensibilities,  she  showed  her  sex  mainly  in  her  dis- 
like of  women.  She  knew  herself  to  be  a  man,  and  resented 
bitterly  the  freak  of  nature  which  had  clothed  her  with  a 
woman's  form.  She  dressed  like  a  man,  rode  like  a  man,  at 
times  swore  like  a  man,  and  confessed  that  one  of  her  greatest 
desires  was  to  see  a  battle.  No  noble  at  the  Swedish  court 
could  tire  her  when  hunting,  or  could  surpass  her  presence  of 
mind  in  the  hour  of  danger.  She  knew  not  what  fear  was,  she 
was  never  seen  in  tears.  Yet  there  was  something  feminine 
in  her  love  of  intrigue,  her  passion  for  notoriety,  her  want  of 
shame.  At  the  French  court  she  busied  herself  in  making  mis- 
chief between  the  young  king  and  his  mother  by  encouraging 
his  infatuation  for  Marie  Mancini.  She  delighted  in  shocking 
the  etiquette  of  the  royal  circle  by  the  freedom  of  her  conver- 
sation and  the  unconventionality  of  her  attitudes,  and  she  went 
out  of  her  way  to  outrage  all  sense  of  propriety  by  choosing  the 
famous  courtesan  Ninon  de  L'Enclos  as  the  only  Frenchwoman 
to  whom  she  would  be  decently  civil.  When  a  queen  demeans 
herself  thus,  she  must  expect  to  make  enemies,  and  Christina 
had  only  herself  to  thank  if  she  was  afterwards  denied  permis- 
sion to  visit  the  French  court  at  Paris,  and  found  among  French 
women  her  most  persistent  detractors. 

Abdications  among  sovereigns  are  so  rare  that  the  attention 
of  historians  has  been  naturally  attracted  by  the  picturesqueness 
of  that  of  Christina  to  the  detriment  of  her  real  title  to  fame. 


1 72  European  History,   1 5  98-  1 7 1 5 

In  the  ten  years  of  her  rule  over  Sweden  she  conducted  a  great 
war  to  a  glorious  end,  she  established  her  authority  by  sheer 
Her  political  ascendency  of  character  over  a  narrow  and  jealous 
ability.  oligarchy,  she  settled  a  most  difficult  constitutional 

question,  that  of  the  devolution  of  the  Crown,  in  the  best  way 
for  the  nation,  by  her  own  firmness  of  will.  She  made  herself 
beloved  by  her  people,  and  easily  suppressed  the  conspiracy  of 
Messenius  in  spite  of  its  wide  ramifications  among  the  democ- 
racy. She  made  Stockholm  for  the  time  the  most  learned 
and  cultured  court  of  Europe.  Above  all  when  her  own  re- 
ligious convictions  forced  her  into  antagonism  with  the  consti- 
tution of  her  country,  she  never  hesitated  to  prefer  the 
interests  of  her  country  to  her  own  dignity.  She  recognised 
from  the  first  that  in  the  seventeenth  century  it  was  impossible 
for  Sweden  to  permit  her  sovereign  to  be  of  any  religion  except 
that  of  Luther,  and  when  she  had  made  up  her  mind  to  become 
a  Roman  Catholic  she  accepted  the  inevitable  and  abdicated 
her  throne.  There  are  few  sovereigns  who  can  claim  to  have 
done  more  for  their  country  by  activity  or  by  renunciation 
than  Christina.  Her  abdication  was  right  and  unavoidable. 
The  mistake  she  made  lay  in  not  carrying  it  far  enough.  She 
ought  to  have  retired  into  private  life,  but  this  was  too  great 
a  self-denial  for  so  active  a  mind  and  so  vigorous  a  personality. 
She  ceased  to  be  queen  of  Sweden,  but  she  determined  still 
to  be  queen.  She  maintained  royal  state,  she  claimed  royal 
rights,  she  plunged  into  intrigue,  she  interfered  in  politics, 
she  tried  to  dominate  over  literature  and  taste.  Deprived 
of  all  right  to  express,  and  shorn  of  all  power  to  enforce, 
her  wishes,  she  soon  sank  into  becoming  the  common  bore 
of  Europe,  and  found  herself  politely  relegated  to  her  palace 
at  Rome,  where  she  became  one  of  the  sights  of  the  city  and 
the  leader  of  a  fashionable  and  artistic  coterie. 

While  Christina  was  witching  the  northern  world  by  the 
vigour  and  charm  of  her  personality,  Brandenburg  under  the 
cautious  and  unscrupulous  Frederick  William  was  slowly  win- 
ning its  way  to  predominance  in    north    Germany.     No    two 


NortJiern  Europe  to  t/ie   Treaty  of  Oliva        173 

persons  could  well  be  more  different  than  the  queen  and  the 
elector,  whom  at  one  time  a  marriage  project  of  Gustavus 
Adolphus  had_  attempted  to  unite  in  a  most  unequal  yoke. 
Christina,  worldly  .though  she  might  be  in  her  love  prederick 
of  mischief-making  and  petulance  of  disposition,  wiiiiam  of 
was  essentially  a  woman  of  noble  character  and  Brandenburg, 
lofty  aspirations.  She  lived  amongst  great  thoughts  and  high 
ideals.  Frederick  William  grovelled  upon  the  earth,  and  cher- 
ished its  mire  and  its  dirt  if  only  he  could  possess  himself  of 
one  acre  the  more  of  it.  A  true  Hohenzollern  in  his  absolute 
identification  of  his  country  with  his  own  crown,  he  never  rose 
above  the  pure  selfishness  of  patriotism.  Not  one  spark  of 
generosity  illuminated  his  policy,  not  one  grain  of  idealism 
coloured  his  ambition,  no  sentiment  of  moral  right  ever  inter- 
fered with  his  judgment,  no  fear  of  future  retribution  arrested 
his  action.  Mean-minded,  false,  and  unscrupulous,  he  was  the 
first  sovereign  to  display  the  principles  of  seventeenth  century 
Machiavellianism,  stripped  of  their  cloak  of  Italian  refinement, 
in  all  the  hideous  brutality  of  German  coarseness.  Yet  the 
political  world  was  not  the  worse  for  the  rule  of  the  Great  Elec- 
tor. Putting  all  questions  of  right  and  wrong  on  one  side,  the 
success  achieved  by  Frederick  William  was  in  the  direction  of 
progress.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  left  Germany  shattered  into 
fragments  as  if  by  the  stroke  of  a  giant's  hammer,  at  a  time 
when  all  Europe  was  drawing  itself  together  and  ultimate  aim 
coalescing  into  powerful  states.  Had  that  disinte-  "^  ^''^  policy, 
gration  continued,  had  no  one  come  forward  to  establish  a 
power  in  northern  Europe,  which  might  at  any  rate  form  a 
nucleus  round  which  the  floating  atoms  of  northern  Germany 
and  northern  Protestantism  might  gather,  central  Europe  must 
have  fallen  a  prey  to  French  ambition  or  Russian  barbarism. 
Events  have  shown  clearly  enough,  that  neither  Sweden,  nor 
England,  nor  the  United  Provinces,  could  have  saved  Europe 
from  such  a  catastrophe,  had  there  not  been  in  northern  Ger- 
many itself  a  power,  centralised  in  government  and  military  in 
spirit,  which  could  unfurl  the  flag  of  German  nationality.     To 


174  European  History,    1598-1715 

found  such  a  power  was  the  work  of  the  Great  Elector's  life, 
and  before  his  death  the  results  had  made  themselves  visible 
in  European  politics.  He  it  is  who  is  the  real  founder  of  the 
state  of  Prussia.  Cradled  in  the  horrors  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War,  nourished  by  the  falseness  and  the  tyranny  of  Frederick 
William,  ushered  into  manhood  by  the  cynical  ambition  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  she  has  yet  become  in  her  steady  protest 
against  French  domination  one  of  the  chief  bulwarks  of 
European  order,  in  her  assertion  of  German  unity  the  centre 
of  the  noblest  of  German  aspirations. 

When  Frederick  William  succeeded  his  father  in  the  elec- 
torate of  Brandenburg  in  1640  no  one  would  have  predicted 
„.    ,     .         that   from  that  desolate   discredited    and    divided 

Rivalry  be- 
tween Bran-  State  was  to  arisc  the  hope  of  Germany.  The 
denburgand  pQij^y  of  neutrality  in  the  earlier  years  of  the  war, 
the  Thirty  adopted  not  without  a  certain  amount  of  shrewd- 
Years'  War.  j^ggg  ^y  QgQi-ge  William  in  conjunction  with  his 
friend  John  George  of  Saxony,  had  broken  down  under  the 
menace  of  the  guns  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  and  the  invasion  of 
Tilly.  But  the  league  between  the  Swedes  and  the  elector 
could  never  be  anything  more  than  hollow,  unless  the  former 
were  prepared  to  surrender  the  rights  of  a  conqueror  over 
Pomerania.  George  William  was  the  acknowledged  heir  of 
the  old  duke  Boguslav.  Pomerania,  with  its  extensive  sea- 
board, was  just  what  Brandenburg  wanted  for  her  national 
development,  and  the  elector  had  been  accustomed  to  look 
upon  it  as  his  own.  The  landing  of  Gustavus  Adolphus 
changed  the  whole  face  of  affairs  in  a  moment.  Pomerania 
became  just  as  important  to  the  Swedes  as  a  basis  of  communi- 
cation with  Sweden  and  the  Baltic,  as  it  was  to  Brandenburg 
as  a  step  in  her  aggrandisement.  Why  should  the  Swedes, 
who  had  saved  the  country  from  the  hands  of  Wallenstein,  sur- 
render it  tamely  to  George  William  who  had  not  stirred  one 
finger  of  his  own  free  will  on  behalf  of  the  Protestant  cause  ? 
Naturally  enough  the  Swedes  stuck  obstinately  to  their  rights 
of  conquest.     Never  would  Oxenstjerna  yield  to  the  technical 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        175 

claims  of  Brandenburg,  what  Gustavus  Adolphus  had  wrested 
from  the  enemy  by  force  of  arms.  Never  would  Brandenburg 
abate  her  just  and  legal  demands  in  the  face  of  a  selfish  and 
brutal  conqueror.  So  as  time  went  on  Sweden  became  far 
more  the  national  enemy  of  Brandenburg  than  the  Emperor 
had  ever  been.  The  unfortunate  mark,  lying  as  it  did  on  the 
straight  road  between  Bohemia  and  the  Baltic,  was  harried 
alternately  by  the  armies  of  both  sides  as  the  fortune  of  war 
ebbed  and  flowed.  In  1635  George  William  accepted  the 
treaty  of  Prague,  but  that  gave  no  respite  to  his  unlucky 
domain.  In  1638,  unable  to  find  sustenance  in  the  impov- 
erished mark,  he  removed  his  court  to  Konigsberg  in  east 
Prussia,  where  he  died  worn  out  with  misery  and  failure  in 
1640,  leaving  his  son  Frederick  William  at  the  age  of  twenty 
the  possessor  of  Httle  land  and  many  claims. 

The  territories  owned  by  Frederick  William  on  his  accession 
were  divided  into  three  quite  separate   districts.^  ^      ^    ,. 

^  ^  Brandenburg 

The  old  possessions  of  the  house  of  Hohenzollern  in   at  the  acces- 
north  Europe  consisted  of  the  mark  of  Brandenburg,   p°"j°^-  . 
subdivided  for  administrative  purposes  into  the  old   wiiuam, 
mark,  the  middle  mark,  and  the  new  mark,  which   *^^°" 
they  had  ruled  as  margraves  and  as  electors  since  the  beginning 
of  the  fifteenth  century.     This  country,  purely  German,  was 
like  other  German  states  part  of  the  Empire,  sub-    The  mark  of 
ject  to  the  legal  authority  of  the  Emperor  and  had    Brandenburg, 
its  own  diet  with  vague  powers  of  counsel  and  control  over  the 
elector  in  local  affairs.     On  the  east  of  the  Vistula,  altogether 
outside  of  the  limits  of  the  Empire,  was  the  duchy    xhe  duchy  of 
of  east  Prussia,  which  had  become  the  hereditary    ^ast  Prussia, 
possession  of  the  Hohenzollerns  by  one  of  the  accidents  of  the 
Reformation.     The  country  belonged  to  the  Order  of  the  Teu- 
tonic Knights,  and  was  subject  to  the  suzerainty  of  Poland,  but 
in  1525  the  Knights  accepted  the  Lutheran  Reformation,  dis- 
solved  the   Order,  and    formed    their   territory  into  a  duchy 
hereditary  in  the  house  of  the  grand  master  of  the  time,  count 
1  See  Map  facing  p.  124. 


176  European  History.,    1598-17 15 

Albert  of  Hohenzollern.  At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century  his  hne  became  merged  in  that  of  the  Brandenburg 
branch  of  the  family,  and  the  elector  of  Brandenburg  became 
also  duke  of  east  Prussia.  Here,  as  in  the  mark,  the  existence 
of  a  diet  in  which  sat  both  nobles-  and  burghers  formed  a  con- 
stitutional check  on  the  will  of  the  ruler,  a  check  all  the  more 
effective  because  of  the  reluctance  with  which  the  people  of 
east  Prussia  and  their  feudal  suzerain  the  king  of  Poland  had 
acknowledged  the  rights  of  the  'Brandenburg  branch  to  the 
duchy.  But  the  territorial  claims  of  the  young  elector  did  not 
stop  with  the  German  mark  of  Brandenburg,  the  Polish  duchy 
of  east  Prussia,  and  the  succession  to  the  German  duchy  of 
Pomerania.  Within  the  limits  of  the  Empire,  stretching  along 
both  banks  of  the  Rhine,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Koln,  lay  the 
Duchy  of  duchies  of  Cleves,  Jiilich,  Berg,  and  Mark,  to  which 
cieves.  the  elector  of  Brandenburg  and  the  count  of  Neu- 

burg  had  put  in  claims  as  we  have  seen  in  1609  and  thereby 
very  nearly  precipitated  the  great  war.  By  the  treaty  of  Xan- 
ten,  concluded  in  1614  and  practically  renewed  in  1630,  the 
disputed  territory  was  divided  between  the  claimants,  and  the 
duchies  of  Cleves,  Mark,  and  Ravensberg  fell  to  the  share  of 
Brandenburg.  During  the  war,  however,  Brandenburg  was 
unable  to  make  its  power  recognised  over  its  new  domains. 
The  country  was  for  some  time  the  battle  ground  of  the 
Spaniards  and  the  Dutch.  As  the  tide  of  war  rolled  away  from 
the  lower  Rhine  it  was  occupied  and  practically  administered 
by  the  Dutch,  and  when  peace  was  restored  Frederick  William 
found  himself  obliged  to  assert  what  was  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses a  new  sovereignty. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  scattered  character  of  the  Brandenburg 
possessions,  a  glance  at  the  map  is  sufficient  to  show  how 
Aims  of  geographical  considerations  dictated  to  the  young 

Frederick        elcctor  his  policy,  and  inspired  his  territorial  ambi- 
*^'"'        tions.     If  only  he  could  make  good  his  claims  on 
Pomerania,  or  at  least  on  the  eastern  part  of  it,  there  would 
be  nothing  but  the  strip  of  west  Prussia  along  the  banks  of  the 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        lyy 

Vistula  to  separate  his  German  dominions  from  his  duchy  of 
east  Prussia.  A  successful  war,  or  a  lucky  diplomatic  stroke, 
might  raise  him  at  once  into  the  position  of  the  greatest  power 
in  the  north.  Side  by  side  with  the  territorial  dream  went  as 
was  natural  in  a  prince  of  the  seventeenth  century  a  dynastic 
ambition.  Already  events  had  made  his  dependence  upon  the 
Emperor  almost  nominal,  the  same  success  which  won  him 
west  Prussia  and  united  his  dominions  would  also  free  him 
from  his  feudal  vassalage  to  Poland.  Once  thoroughly  inde- 
pendent of  foreign  authority  he  could  turn  his  attention  to  his 
own  subjects,  and  on  the  ruins  of  the  effete  and  discredited 
diets  raise,  like  Richelieu  in  France,  a  highly  centralised  miU- 
tary  sovereignty  in  which  the  Crown  should  be  all  in  all.  Such 
was  the  policy  laid  down  for  himself  and  his  house  by  the 
Great  Elector,  and  adhered  to  unflinchingly  by  his  descendants 
ever  since.  Centralisation  of  the  government,  military  rule, 
constant  territorial  aggrandisement  have  been  the  character- 
istics of  the  Prussian  monarchy,  and  have  ended  in  making 
out  of  the  disjointed  and  turbulent  dominions  of  Frederick 
William,  a  united  and  peaceful  kingdom,  which  stretches  from 
Russia  to  Belgium,  and  embraces  in  its  ample  folds  the  valleys 
of  the  Rhine,  the  Elbe,  the  Oder,  and  the  Vistula. 

Directly  in  the  way  of  the  realisation  of  the  least  of  these 
designs,  as  the  Great  Elector  well  knew,  lay  the  hostile  powers 
of  Sweden  and  of  Poland.     He  could  not  touch 

T-,  ...  .,,..,  Unavoidable 

Pomerania  without  encountering  the  bitter  jealousy  hostility  of 
of  Sweden,  he  could  not  advance  an  inch  towards  Sweden  and 
the  union  of  east  Prussia  and  Brandenburg  without 
first  destroying  the  integrity  of  Poland.  Over  the  prostrate 
bodies  of  these  formidable  neighbours  lay  the  only  road  to 
his  territorial  ambition.  It  was  a  road  beset  with  difficulties. 
What  chance  could  the  barren  ravaged  and  disunited  Branden- 
burg have  in  an  unequal  contest  with  Sweden,  at  that  time 
admittedly  the  first  military  power  in  northern  Europe?  How 
could  the  half-starved  German  peasant  withstand  the  onslaught 
of  the  brave  though  undisciplined  masses  of  Polish  cavalry? 

PERIOD   V.  M 


178  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Frederick  William  knew  that  he  must  wait  for  a  favourable 
opportunity  and  spent  the  time  in  anxious  preparation.  His 
first  care  was  to  transfer  the  conduct  of  affairs  in  the  mark 
from  the  hands  of  his  father's  minister,  Schwartzenburg,  who 
was  devoted  to  the  Emperor,  to  his  own,  and  to  reorganise 
the  army  under  himself.  In  this  he  was  aided  by  the  death 
of  Schwartzenburg  in  1641,  and  the  subsequent  revolt  of  his 
son  and  the  discontented  officers.  Having  thus 
ment  of  his  got  at  his  back  a  force  upon  which  he  could  de- 
personai  peud  he  opcnly  broke  with  the  Emperor,  and  with 

authority  in         ,        ,-  ,-,  i        •  r     i  t  i   ■ 

Brandenburg  the  fuU  approbation  of  the  diet  entered  into  nego- 
and  East         tiations  with  the  Swedes  for  a  treaty  of  neutrality. 

Prussia,  1641.    _,,  ...  •  .         1  1       1  r  . 

Then  turning  his  attention  to  the  duchy  of  east 
Prussia,  where  the  estates  were  trying  to  establish  their  superi- 
ority over  him,  with  a  diplomatic  skill  rarely  found  in  a  man  of 
twenty,  he  succeeded  in  sowing  dissensions  between  the  nobles 
and  the  representatives  of  the  towns,  who  took  the  lead  in 
opposing  his  authority.  By  winning  the  former  over  to  his 
side  he  was  able  to  procure  the  recognition  of  his  rule  from 
John  Casimir,  king  of  Poland,  in  spite  of  the  protest  of  the 
towns,  and  thus  to  enter  legally  upon  his  sovereignty.  In  1643 
His  with-  the  treaty  with  Sweden  was  successfully  concluded, 
drawai  from    ^nd  for  the  rcst  of  the  war  Brandenburg  was  prac- 

the  Thirty  .       ,,       ^  ^  .      ,  7      ,  . 

Years'  War,  tically  free  from  the  ravages  of  the  rival  armies. 
»643-  The  breathing  space  thus  gained  was  devoted  by 

Frederick  William  to  the  reorganisation  of  the  finances  and 
the  training  of  the  army,  and  Brandenburg  was  in  consequence 
enabled  to  assert  her  claims  to  consideration  in  the  negotia- 
tions at  Mlinster  and  Osnabriick  with  a  force  which  would  have 
Gains  of  appeared  incredible  in  the  days  of  George  William. 

Brandenburg  When  the  pcace  of  Westphalia  was  finally  settled  it 
of  West-  was  found  that  Brandenburg  was  given  the  right  of 
phaiia,  1648.  annexing  the  secularised  bishoprics  of  Magdeburg, 
Halberstadt,  Minden  and  Camin,  and  the  duchy  of  eastern 
Pomerania.  But  the  larger  part  of  the  lands  were  at  the  time 
of  the  conclusion  of  peace  in  the  military  occupation  of  the 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        179 

Swedes,  and  they  were  not  at  all  disposed  to  evacuate  them, 
until  they  had  been  paid  the  indemnity  for  their  expenses 
which  had  been  secured  to  them  by  the  peace. 

„.       ,,      ,  r  1  •      •  1  Occupation 

Fmally  however,  after  much  negotiation  and  many   of  Eastern 

delays,  the  patience  and  skill  of  the  Great  Elector   Pomerania, 

prevailed  over  all  obstacles,  and  the  year  1653  saw 

the  back  of  the  last  Swedish  soldier  in  retreat  from  eastern 

Pomerania. 

The  year  1653  closes  the  first  chapter  of  the  story  of  the 
aggrandisement  of  Brandenburg.  The  territory  of  the  elector 
now  stretched  in  a  compact  mass  across  north  posj^ion  of 
Germany  from  Halberstadt  to  the  Baltic.  It  com-  Branden- 
prised  parts  of  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Elbe  the  ''"'^^'  '^^^' 
Havel  and  the  Oder  with  their  industrious  populations,  as  well 
as  the  important  coast  line  of  eastern  Pomerania  with  its  nu- 
merous harbours.  Detached  from  the  central  mass  lay  the 
duchy  of  east  Prussia  beyond  the  Vistula  and  the  scattered 
districts  of  Cleves  and  Mark  upon  the  Rhine  and  of  Ravens- 
berg  and  Minden  upon  the  Weser.  Inferior  in  prestige  and 
military  power  to  Sweden,  inferior  in  extent  to  Poland,  Bran- 
denburg nevertheless  emerged  from  the  Thirty  Years'  War 
stronger,  both  actually  and  relatively,  than  she  was  when  the 
struggle  began.  There  was  no  German  power  in  north  Ger- 
many her  equal  in  strength,  and  no  power  in  north  Europe  her 
superior  in  government.  Since  he  had  come  to  the  throne 
Frederick  William  had  steadily  followed  the  policy  of  central- 
ising the  administration  under  himself  and  crushing  the  inde- 
pendent rights  of  the  diets.  In  Brandenburg  itself,  where  the 
advantages  of  centralisation  under  so  able  and  keen-sighted  a 
ruler  were  quickly  seen,  the  opposition  was  never  formidable, 
and  in  1653,  the  very  year  of  the  annexation  of  eastern  Pome- 
rania, the  ancient  diet  went  quietly  into  perpetual  sleep  for 
want  of  being  summoned.  In  east  Prussia  and  in  Cleves  the 
work  was  far  more  difficult,  and  the  elector  had  to  content 
himself  for  a  time  with  crushing  all  serious  opposition  by  the 
employment  of  Brandenburg  soldiers  to  keep  order,  a  proceed- 
ing which  although  illegal  was  extremely  effective. 


l8o  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

In  1655  occurred  an  event  which  called  forth  all  the  Great 
Elector's  powers  of  statesmanship.  The  old  hostihty  between 
Poland  and  Sweden,  the  two  most  dangerous  neighbours  of 
Brandenburg,  suddenly  flamed  out  again.  John  Casimir,  king 
of  Poland,  refused  to  acknowledge  Charles  Gustavus,  who  had 
,.,    ^  ,  succeeded  to    the  Swedish  throne  on  the  abdica- 

War  between 

Sweden  and  tion  of  Christina.  Charles,  who  had  been  brought 
Poland,  1655.  yp  jj^  j-j^g  school  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  and  was 
no  mean  soldier,  determined  to  avenge  the  insult,  and  de- 
manded from  the  Great  Elector  the  right  of  passage  through 
eastern  Pomerania  into  Poland,  in  order  to  avoid  the  difficult 
task  of  the  siege  of  the  sea  fortress  of  Dantzig,  which  had  cost 
Gustavus  Adolphus  many  weary  hours  some  twenty-five  years 
before.  Frederick  William  was  not  in  a  position  to  resist,  and 
after  making  a  few  demonstrations  to  cover  appearances,  gave 
the  required  permission.  The  Swedes,  using  Pomerania  as 
their  basis  of  operations,  poured  across  Brandenburg  into 
Poland,  defeated  John  Casimir,  drove  him  back  on  Cracow 
and  then  returned  leisurely  into  west  Prussia  to  form  the  siege 
,  ,  of  Dantzig.     The  Great  Elector  now  thought  he 

Unsuccessful  °  ° 

intrigue  of  saw  his  opportunity.  The  Poles  were  beaten,  not 
f/,^'!^"'^'^        conquered.     Denmark  was  ever  ready  to  strike  a 

William  ^  ■' 

against  blow  at  her  old  enemy  across  the  Baltic.     Charles 

Sweden.  y^    ^^^^    ^jjjjy   Qccupied    Tound    Dantzig.     A   well- 

planned  alliance  and  a  well-timed  stroke  might  bring  Sweden 
to  her  knees  and  win  his  own  independence  of  Poland.  But 
Acknowied  Charlcs  was  too  quick  for  him.  Hearing  of  the 
ment  of  negotiations  in  the  middle  of  the  winter  of  1655-56 

Swedish         j^g  ^^  once  broke  up  his  camp  and  marched  into 

suzerainty  ^  ^ 

over  East  east  Prussia  on  Konigsberg.  Frederick  William 
Prussia,  1656.  j^^^  J.Q  make  his  peace  as  best  he  could.  By  the 
treaty  of  Konigsberg,  developed  by  the  treaty  of  Marienbad, 
concluded  in  June  1656,  Brandenburg  was  forced  to  acknowl- 
edge the  suzerainty  of  Sweden  over  east  Prussia,  instead  of 
that  of  Poland,  to  grant  to  the  Swedes  free  passage  through 
the  country,  and  to  provide  a  contingent  to  serve  under 
Swedish  orders  in  the  Polish  war. 


Northern  Europe  to  the  Treaty  of  Oliva        i8i 

It  was  a  bitter  lesson  to  the  Great  Elector,  but  ever  patient 
and  ever  trustful  of  his  own  diplomatic  skill,  he  continued  his 
policy  and  awaited  a  more  favourable  opportunity,  but  for  the 
present  he  had  to  submit  to  the  inevitable.     The   war  with 
Brandenburg  contingent  marched  with  Charles  x.   Poland,  1656. 
and  the  Swedish  army  to  Warsaw,  and  did  their  share  in  the 
winning  of  the  great  three  days'  battle  in  July  1656,  which 
placed  Poland  at  the  feet  of  the  Swedes.     But  the  victory  of 
Charles  x.  was,  as  is  so  often  the  case,  the  beginning  of  his 
difficulties.     It  was  always  easy  to  defeat  a  Polish  army,  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  reduce  the  country  to  submission.     The 
intrigues  of  the  Great    Elector   began   to   bear   fruit.     While 
Charles  was  planning  the    pursuit   of  John  Casimir   into  the 
recesses  of  the  forests  of  Galicia,  the  king  of  Denmark  was 
preparing   to   invade    Sweden    itself,  the  Russians   ^    j.  . 
declared  war,  and  a  horde  of  Tartars  and  Lithu-   against 
anians  poured  into  east  Prussia.     Charles  x.  found   ^^^'^^"• 
himself  in  the  middle  of  a  hostile  country,  with  a  doubtful  ally, 
surrounded  by  a  host  of  enemies.     Frederick  William  insisted 
on  an  immediate  return  to  defend  east  Prussia  from  the  invad- 
ers.    Charles  could  not  resist  so  plausible  a  demand.     With  a 
heavy  heart  he  retired  from  the  scene  of  his  victory   Treaty  of 
into  west  Prussia,  where  he  took  ship  for  Denmark,    ^abiau. 

■,        .         ~  1  -T-ii-i      Acknowledg- 

havmg  first  done  what  he  could  to  retam  Frederick   ment  of  the 
William  in  his  enforced  alliance  by  recognising  the   independence 

_,..,  -Ti-  °f  East 

independence  of  east  Prussia  in  the  treaty  of  Labiau,   Prussia  by 
signed  in  November  1656.     Directly  his  back  was   Sweden, 1656. 
turned,  the  Great  Elector  threw  off  the  mask,  and  offered  his 
friendship  and  assistance  to   John  Casimir,  if  only  he  would 
follow  the   example  of  Sweden,  and  release   east  Treaty  of 
Prussia  from  all   claims  of  feudal  vassalage.     As  Wehiau. 
long  as  he  obtained  his  independence,  Frederick  ment  of  the 
William  did  not  trouble  about  the  honesty  of  the  independence 

_    ,  „      .      .  ,       ,  of  East 

transaction.     John    Casimir    accepted    the    terms.  Prussia  by 
By  the  treaty  of  Wehlau,  concluded  in  September  Poland,  1657 
1657,  the  Great  Elector  cynically  reversed  the  treaty  of  Labiau, 


1 82  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

made  only  ten  months  before,  became  the  ally  of  Poland  and 
the  enemy  of  Sweden,  and  received  as  the  reward  of  his  dis- 
simulation, the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  east  Prussia 
by  his  legitimate  suzerain. 

The   anger   of  Charles   x.  when   he   heard   of  it   knew  no 

bounds.     Thirsting  for  revenge  he  nerved  himself  to  attempt 

the  feats  of  a  hero.     In  the  depth  of  the  winter  of 

Attack  upon  ^ 

Denmark  by  1 65  7-5  8,  he  Suddenly  marched  his  army  of  20,000 
Sweden,  1657.  j^^j^  across  the  ice  of  the  Belts  upon  Denmark,  and 
captured  the  islands  of  Fiinen  and  Zealand  on  his  way  without 
ships,  crossing  it  is  said  some  runlets  of  open  water  by  bridges. 
Denmark,  paralysed  with  astonishment,  hastened  to  make 
peace,  and  Charles  directed  his  army  upon  east  Prussia.  But 
fortunately  for  the  Great  Elector,  Europe  had  become  tired  of 
incessant  war ;  and  the  great  states,  especially  the  maritime 
powers  of  England  and  Holland,  had  no  wish  to  see  their  trade 
interfered  with  by  the  conquests  of  a  new  Alexander  of  the 
north.  They  interfered  to  impose  negotiations  for  peace 
Treaties  of  upon  the  combatants.  The  death  of  Charles  x.  in 
ciiva,  Copen-  February  1660  made  their  task  the  easier,  and  on 
Kardis,  1660-  May  3rd  1660  was  signed  the  treaty  of  Oliva, 
^661.  between   Sweden   Poland   and   Brandenburg.      In 

the  following  month  the  treaty  of  Copenhagen  restored  peace 
to  Sweden  and  Denmark,  and  in  1661  the  north  was  finally 
pacified  by  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  Kardis  between 
Sweden  and  Russia. 

By  these  treaties  John  Casimir  of  Poland  renounced  all 
claims  upon  the  throne  of  Sweden,  and  acknowledged  the  inde- 
pendent sovereignty  of  Frederick  William  in  east  Prussia. 
Frederic  iii.  of  Denmark  surrendered  almost  all  the  remaining 
possessions  of  Denmark  on  the  Scandinavian  peninsula  to 
Terms  of  the  Sweden,  and  all  other  conquests  made  were 
pacification  restored.  Sweden  thus  attained  the  geographical 
of  the  north.    ^^-^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^  j^^^  j^^^^  dcsired,  and  the  Great 

Elector  had  guaranteed  to  him  by  European  treaty  the  inde- 
pendent  sovereignty   over  the   duchy  of   east  Prussia   which 


Northern  Europe  to  the   Treaty  of  Oliva        183 

he  had  risked  so  much  to  gain.  If  the  peace  of  WestphaHa 
marks  the  first  great  step  in  the  territorial  aggrandisement  of 
Brandenburg,  the  peace  of  OHva  marks  the  first  great  step 
towards  the  dynastic  aggrandisement  of  the  elector.  Already 
absolute  and  sovereign  in  Brandenburg,  he  now  became  sove- 
reign in  east  Prussia,  and  only  one  step  remained  to  be  taken, 
to  make  the  united  state  of  Brandenburg- Prussia  the  most 
formidable,  because  the  most  centralised  power  of  the  north. 


CHAPTER   IX 

LOUIS   XIV.   AND   COLBERT 

Alteration  of  political  ideals  in  the  middle  of  the  century  —  Seventeenth-csn- 
tury  kingship  —  Character  of  Louis  XIV.  —  His  government  —  The  organisa- 
tion of  France  under  him  —The  training  of  Colbert —  Nicholas  Fouquet  — 
Colbert  becomes  minister  of  finance  —  His  financial  reforms  —  The  prin- 
ciples of  his  financial  policy  —  Advantages  and  dangers  of  his  system  — 
Character  of  Colbert  —  The  choice  before  Louis  in  1671  between  commercial 
and  military  supremacy  —  Preference  of  military  supremacy. 

The  eighteen  months  which  followed  the  peace  of  the 
Pyrenees,  form  the  turning-point  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
Up  to  that  time  the  ideas  and  the  policy  which  sprang  from 
.J       ,  the   controversies   of  the    sixteenth    century   had 

political  made  themselves  felt,  albeit  but  dimly.     As  long 

ideals,  1660.  ^g  ^j^g  battle  between  the  Church  and  Puritanism 
was  being  waged  in-  England,  as  long  as  Spain  with  her 
uncompromising  Catholicism  was  still  in  the  front  rank  of 
European  states,  as  long  as  Sweden,  strong  in  the  traditions 
of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  was  still  the  first  power  in  the  north, 
it  was  impossible  to  say  that  the  interest  of  religious  questions 
had  quite  ceased  to  be  the  dominant  interest  in  European 
politics.  But  the  years  1660  and  1661  saw  a  great  change, 
not  so  much  in  the  motives  and  ambitions  which  really 
actuated  nations,  as  in  the  men  who  were  called  upon  to 
express  them  in  politics.  From  the  peace  of  the  Pyrenees, 
Spain  retired  from  the  arena  of  politics  into  a  sleep  of  decay 
and  decline,  and  ceased  to  be  of  importance  in  the  affairs  of 
Europe,  until  the  ill-omened  day  when  were  seen  gathering 
round  her  carcase  the  eagles  of  the  world  prepared  for  deadly 
strife.     From  the   Restoration  in  May  1660,  England  wholly 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  185 

surrendered  any  claim  to  be  thought  to  be  guided  by  moral 
ideals  in  her  policy  at  home  or  abroad,  and  offered  herself  to 
the  highest  bidder,  under  the  guidance  of  a  king  whose  sole 
thought  was  for  his  own  personal  comfort.  The  peace  of 
Oliva  and  the  death  of  Charles  x.  left  Frederick  William  of 
Brandenburg  the  foremost  figure  in  northern  Europe,  and 
consecrated  by  the  rewards  of  success  the  policy  of  pure 
selfishness  in  its  most  shameless  form.  History  often  has  to 
note  how  among  the  contests  inspired  by  religion,  liberty  and 
patriotism,  there  is  much  of  selfish  intrigue  and  personal 
ambition ;  how  in  the  most  sacred  causes  the  dictates  of 
humanity  and  of  justice  are  not  unfrequently  forgotten  ;  and  it 
may  well  be  said,  that  the  spectacle  of  a  Charles  n.  bartering 
away  his  country's  honour  to  gain  for  himself  immunity  from 
trouble,  or  of  a  Frederick  William  cynically  breaking  faith 
with  the  ally  of  yesterday  because  he  could  obtain  more  from 
the  ally  of  to-day,  is  only  more  repulsive,  because  less  hypo- 
critical, than  the  ambition  of  an  Elizabeth  or  a  Philip  11., 
which  attempted  to  conceal  itself  under  nobler  ideals.  But 
after  all,  taking  men  at  their  worst,  which  is  always  the  most 
untrue  of  estimates,  it  is  something  in  international  politics, 
where  self-interest  must  necessarily  play  so  large  a  part,  that 
its  working  should  be  concealed  as  much  as  possible,  even 
from  those  who  are  actuated  by  it.  Moral  conventions  are 
necessary  where  an  agreed  standard  of  moral  principle  is 
impossible,  and  bad  faith  is  as  reprehensible  in  diplomacy  as 
the  employment  of  savages  is  in  war.  Those  who  use  them 
ma^  gain  the  battle,  but  at  the  cost  of  civilisation. 

The  monarchs  and  statesmen  who  were  succeeding  to  the 
responsibilities   of  government   in    the    middle  of  the  seven- 
teenth  century  found    themselves   in   a  very  dif-   Personal 
ferent  position  from  that  which  their    fathers   had   P°werand 

^  territorial 

inherited.      No   longer   were    there    great   ideals   aggrandise- 
around   them   to   take   captive  their  imaginations   '"^".*'  ^^^ , 

^  °  motives  of 

and  absorb  their  energies.     No  longer  were  there   policy, 
obvious  difficulties  of  home  government  to  conquer  or  avoid. 


1 86  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

There  were  no  struggling  nationalities  like  that  of  Holland 
to  protect,  no  overgrown  dominating  tyranny  like  that  of 
Spain  to  oppose,  no  turbulent  territorial  baronage  to  crush, 
or  be  crushed  by,  the  Crown.  These  questions  had  worked 
themselves  out  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  century  and  had 
left  a  blank  behind  them.  A  young  king,  who  took  up 
the  reins  of  government  after  the  middle  of  the  century. 
Unique  po-  found  an  open  map  before  him^'His  country 
sition  of  the  was  much  exhausted  by  war,  longing  above  every- 
Crown.  thing   for   rest,  ready  to  make    any  sacrifices    for 

order.  The  nobles,  thinned  and  impoverished  by  war,  were 
not  in  a  position  to  dispute  his  authority.  The  army,  well 
organised  and  obedient,  gave  him  a  power  over  the  lives  and 
property  of  his  subjects,  wholly  unknown  to  former  genera- 
tions. A  highly  developed  system  of  diplomacy  enabled 
him  to  conduct  negotiations  secretly  with  all  the  important 
states  of  Europe,  while  as  yet  the  comity  of  nations  had 
established  no  general  moral  standard  to  which  diplomatists 
were  expected  to  conform.  Under  these  circumstances  it 
was  only  natural  that  the  ambition  of  sovereigns  should  im- 
pel them  to  try  and  make  their  own  power  supreme  at  home, 
and  to  enlarge  the  boundaries  of  their  territories  abroad. 
Absolute  power  and  territorial  aggrandisement  become  the 
main  objects  of  European  kings.  The  nation  is  identified 
with  the  king,  the  larger  and  the  richer  the  territory  he 
rules,  the  greater  his  glory  and  circumstance.  Before  that 
all  things  give  way.  Differences  of  speech,  differences  of 
race,  differences  of  religion,  differences  of  government,  count 
for  nothing,  and  whole  peoples  are  tossed  about  from  one 
ruler  to  another  like  counters  at  the  table  of  the  diplomatists, 
not  in  cynicism  but  in  sheer  unconcern.  Wrapped  up  in  the 
supreme  importance  of  gaining  for  their  respective  masters  one 
district  or  one  town  the  more,  politicians  have  become  wholly 
oblivious  of  everything  else ;  until  from  the  sheer  necessity 
of  having  some  principle  to  which  to  appeal,  they  eventually 
evolved  the  doctrine  of  the  balance  of  power,  which,  when 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  187 

pushed  to  its  logical  development  in  the  succeeding  century, 
meant  little  else  than  that,  if  one  European  state  managed  to 
steal  something,  all  the  other  states  had  the  right  of  stealing 
something  too.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  the  cause  of  op- 
pressed nationalities  has  most  powerfully  influenced  the  map 
of  Europe.  It  is  the  glory  and  the  boast  of  the  greater 
powers  to  have  assisted  in  the  unification  of  Italy,  or  the 
liberation  of  the  Christian  states  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula, 
At  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  it  was  quite  otherwise. 
To  establish  beyond  all  question  the  authority  of  the  Crown, 
to  maintain  a  powerful  and  perfectly  equipped  army,  to 
astonish  the  world  by  the  splendour  of  the  court,  to  push 
ever  further  and  further  away  the  frontiers  of  the  nation,  to 
extend  a  lordly  protection,  litde  short  of  vassalage,  to  weaker 
countries,  —  such  were  the  objects  of  a  patriot  king,  such  the 
rewards  of  successful  statesmanship.  The  nation  was  focussed 
and  crystaUised  into  the  person  of  the  king.  It  worked, 
fought,  lived,  conquered  for  him  alone.  In  his  glory  it 
saw  its  own  reflected,  it  recognised  him  as  its  representative 
and  its  champion,  it  surrendered  its  independence  to  him  un- 
grudgingly, and  in  his  success  it  reaped  its  reward.  The  rights 
of  peoples  were  not  so  much  set  aside,  as  not  even  thought  of, 
for  everything  was  absorbed  in  the  personality  of  the  king. 

Of  this  type  of  kingship  Louis  xiv.  is  always  looked  upon  as 
the  representative  if  not  the  founder.     Its  founder  he  certainly 
was  not,  for  his  was  not  the  mind  to  found  any-    Louis  xiv. 
thing.     There    is    nothing    original,    no   initiative,   '^'^^  ^yp^  °f 

-  T        .  ,  seventeenth 

about  Louis  xiv.  He  can  use,  he  cannot  pro-  century 
duce.  The  productive  power  seems  wholly  want-  kingship, 
ing  in  him.  He  is  essentially  a  barren  man,  singularly  skilful 
in  making  use  of  the  material  with  which  he  is  provided,  but 
unable  to  add  to  it.  It  has  often  been  pointed  out  how  he 
inherited  everything  which  has  made  him  great,  and  left  noth- 
ing great  behind  him.  Cond6  and  Turenne,  Lionne  and  Ser- 
vien,  Colbert,  Corneille,  and  Racine  were  the  products  of  the 
age  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  and  only  utilised  by  Louis,  while 


1 88  European  History,   1598-17 15 

Villeroy  and  Tallard  and  Boileau  were  the  work  of  his  own 
hands.    The  statement  requires  some  modification, 

Louis  a  man  ^  _  ' 

of  second-  but  the  principle  which  underUes  it  is  true.  Nearly 
rate  abilities,  gygi-ythj^g  which  was  great  in  France  at  the  time 
of  his  accession  to  power  Louis  had  the  ability  to  use.  For 
the  most  part  what  became  great  in  France  during  his  reign 
was  not  trained  by  him,  and  indeed  in  the  case  of  Port  Royal 
attained  its  greatness  in  spite  of  him,  and  what  was  directly 
trained  by  him  was  not  grest.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek. 
It  is  the  vice  of  an  absolutely  centralised  monarchy,  where  the 
king  is  all  in  all,  that  it  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things  tolerate 
any  one  greater  than  the  king.  The  ministers  are  servants, 
and  no  servant  can  be  greater  than  his  master.  Even  in  the 
Prussian  monarchy  of  to-day  there  is  no  room  for 

His  determi-  i  -n     i  11  1 

nation  to  3-  Bismarck,  Still  less  could  one  have  been  per- 
admit  of  no  mittcd  to  exist  at  the  court  of  Louis  xiv.  An 
absolute  monarch  sets  the  standard  of  his  minis- 
ters, if  he  absorbs  the  whole  state  into  himself  as  did  Louis, 
and  does  not  merely  let  things  govern  themselves  as  is  the 
fashion  among  Oriental  despots.  From  the  time  of  the  death 
of  Mazarin,  Louis  determined  he  would  never  have  another 
prime  minister.  He  himself,  like  Napoleon  after  him,  would 
be  the  head  and  motive  power  of  the  whole  of  the  govern- 
mental and  social  machinery.  He  kept  his  word  with  singular 
patience  and  pertinacity,  and  working  harder  probably  than 
any  sovereign  had  worked,  since  the  days  of  Philip  ii.,  never 
permitted  a  minister,  not  even  Louvois,  to  rise  above  the 
merest  departmental  independence.  The  result  was  inevita- 
ble. A  commonplace  man  himself,  without  insight,  without 
originaUty,  without  independence  of  mind,  he  could  not  inspire 
genius,  and  could  not  tolerate  it  if  he  found  it.  He  wanted 
diligence  and  accuracy,  not  genius  and  statesmanship,  clerks 
not  ministers  of  state,  and  he  got  what  he  wanted.  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  in  all  departments  of  administration  except  one, 
when  he  had  used  up  the  men  whom  Richelieu  and  Mazarin 
had  left  to  him,  he  found  no  others  to  take  their  places.     In 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  189 

diplomacy  alone  France  remained  unrivalled  to  the  end  of  the 
century,  the  one  department  of  which  Louis  himself  was  com- 
plete master,  and  in  the  conduct  of  which  he  was  thoroughly 
competent  to  take  the  lead. 

But  in  spite  of  his  deficiencies  in  the  higher  qualities  of 
statesmanship,  not  Aristides  better  deserved  his  title  of  the 
Just,  than  did  Louis  xiv.  that   of  le  Grand  Ma.--   „. 

J         '  _  _ ^ "^      His  great 

narque.  It  was  essentially  as  a  king  that  Louis  was  kingiy 
great.  No  sovereign  of  modern  days  has  had  the  i"*''*'^^- 
kfngly  gifts  in  such  rich  profusion.  Dignity  without  awkward- 
jiess,  courtesy  without  familiarity,  gallantry  without  coarseness, 
a  winning  manner,  ready  tact,  chivalrous  bearing,  refined  mind, 
an^i'  modest  demeanour,  made  the  young  king  at  once  the 
pride  of  the  French  court  and  the  boast  of  the  French  nation. 
But  something  more  than  this  was  required  to  make  him  the 
pattern  and  type  of  European  kingship.  It  was  not  merely 
that  his  social  insight  brought  instinctively  to  his  Hps  the  word 
which,  within  the  bounds  of  good  breeding,  would  proY;e  most 
pleasing  or  most  effective  to  those  whom  he  wished  to.  impress, 
or  that  his  knowledge  of  character  taught  him  almost  intuitively 
the  best  mode  of  approaching  those  whom  he  wished  to  win. 
It  was  not  only  that  his  elaborate  and  punctual  care. for  the 
etiquette  and  ceremonial  of  the  court  could  not  fail  to  aifect 
the  mind  with  a  sense  of  the  perfection  of  regal  state,  and 
attract  it  by  a  polished  order  of  courtly  magnificence.  Ver- 
sailles was  not  the  first  court  in  Europe  to  be  distinguished  by 
the  splendour  of  its  ceremonial,  and  the  refinement  of  its  man- 
ors, but  Louis  XIV.  was  the  first  great  sovereign  in  Europe 
who  made  the  perfection  of  his  court  an  essential  part  of  hii 
system  of  poHcy.  When  the  Popes  had  ceased  to  -His  theory 
be  the  common  fathers  of  Western  Christendoni  kingship.  ,. 
they  appHed  themselves  to  make  the  seat  of  their  pow^r  the 
centre  of  the  wider  realm  of  art.  Rome  deposed  from  the 
throne  of  universal  faith  was  to  be  recompensed  by  the  sceptre 
of  universal  culture.  So  when  France  was  assuming  the  head- 
ship of  Europe,  and  was  preparing  to  strike  for  the  dominion 


3'/ 


190  European  History,   1598-17 15 

of  the  civilised  world,  her  court  was  to  be  the -epitome,  the 
representation  of  the  world's  greatness.  Mirrored  there  in  a 
tiny  but  radiant  sphere  was  to  be  found  all  which  makes 
humanity  noble  and  life  beautiful.  Intellect  and  birth,  genius 
and  beauty,  culture  and  statesmanship,  art  and  devotion,  all 
were  to  be  there  marshalled  in  an  admirable  perfection  of 
order,  but  shining  one  and  all  with  a  reflected  light,  illuminated 
by  the  rays  of  the  king,  their  sun^  Not  unthinkingly  did  Louis 
adQpijhe^sjin_as_his_ty£e/,  According  to  his  theory  of  govern- 
ment he  was  the  centre,  the  life-giving  principle  of  the  system 
in  which  he  ruled.  All  that  was  young  and  beautiful  in  France 
sprang  into  life  at  his  bidding,  and  withered  into  decay  when 
he  averted  his  face,  all  that  was  powerful  drew  its  vigour  from 
his  favour,  while  from  less  privileged  lands  the  kings  of  the 
earth,  like  the  Magi  of  old,  drawn  by  the  light  of  his  compel- 
ling rays,  were  to  come  from  the  ends  of  the  world  to  find 
under  his  protecting  care  the  pattern  of  life  and  the  home  of 
faith. 

Sarcasm  comes  easy  to  the  lips  when  dealing  with  a  theory 
such  as  this.  ]\Ien  cannot  stop  the  course  of  the  winds  of 
Truth  of  heaven  by  building  houses  of  cards,  and  no  arti- 

Thackeray's  ficial  arrangements  of  a  court  can  conceal  national 
caricature.  wcakncss  or  physical  decay.  The  sturdy  English 
pencil  of  Thackeray  has  drawn  out  the  hollowness  of  this 
theory  of  seventeenth  century  kingship  in  the  bitter  sarcasm 
of  the  well-known  sketches  of  Louis  le  Roi  in  his  later  years. 
In  the  first  appears  the  real  Louis,  insignificant,  decrepit,  bald, 
and  old,  shaking  and  feeble  with  age,  a  living  corpse  rather 
than  a  man.  Opposite  to  him  stands  le  Roi  —  the  flowing 
peruke  curled  and  oiled,  the  royal  robes  bedecked  with  rib- 
bons, flashing  with  jewels,  the  tailor-made  divinity  that  doth 
hedge  a  king,  standing  ready  for  the  monarch's  use  on  its  skel- 
eton frame.  Lastly  we  see  the  human  atom  and  its  gorgeous 
artificial  covering  united  in  Louis  le  Roi,  and  are  bidden  to 
reflect  how  much  of  the  Grand  Monarque  is  the  work  of  the 
tailor  and  the  wigmaker,  and  how  little  of  God.     The  argu- 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  191 

ment  is  true,  the  sarcasm  is  just.  Where  the  splendour  of  a 
court  is  part  of  the  system  of  government,  represents  and 
enforces  the  national  dignity,  sets  the  fashion  to  foreign  ambi- 
tion, is  the  living  embodiment  of  the  power  and  genius  of  the 
state,  king  and  courtiers  must  not  grow  old.  Queen  Eliza- 
beth, encouraging  protestations  of  love  at  the  age  of  sev- 
enty, and  Louis  xiv.  attempting  artificially  to  conceal  the 
advance  of  years,  are  spectacles  offensive  because  unnaturally 
theatrical.  But  their  loathsomeness  never  struck  contempo- 
raries as  it  does  us.  Louis  xiv.  never  lost  the 
respect  of  Europe  or  the  love  of  his  subjects.  His  court  at  the 
kingliness  was  a  fact  which  had  so  impressed  itself  ^^^^_  °^ 
upon  Europe,  as  both  the  cause  and  effect  of  the 
greatness  of  France  and  the  success  of  his  policy,  that  men 
became  insensible  to  the  physical  incongruity.  And  they  were 
right.  From  the  court  of  Louis  flowed  out  influences  far  more 
potent  than  those  which  followed  the  feet  of  his  soldiers  or 
the  coaches  of  his  diplomatists.  Versailles  set  the  fashion  to 
the  civilised  world.  French  manners,  French  dress,  French 
speech,  French  art,  French  literature,  French  preaching,  French 
science  became  the  property  and  the  models  of  civilised  Europe. 
For  a  hundred  years  in  every  department  of  life,  from  the  turn- 
ing of  a  couplet  to  the  drilling  of  recruits,  from  the  composi- 
tion of  a  panegyric  to  the  design  of  a  card  table,  every  thing  is 
ruled  by  the  French  instinct  of  order,  cramped  by  the  French 
love  of  artificial  completeness,  refined  by  the  French  genius 
for  finish,  illuminated  by  the  justness  of  French  taste.  There 
are  few  kings  to  whom  it  has  been  given  to  dictate  to  civilisa- 
tion for  a  century  the  principles  by  which  she  is  to  live. 

The  secret  of  the  wonderful  success  of  Louis  xiv.  in  all  those 
departments  of  life  and  of  government  which  he  understood 
lay  in  the  close  personal  attention  which  he  gave  to   Louis's  at- 
the  matter  in  hand.     His  genius  certainly  lay  in  his  tention  to 
infinite  capacity  for  taking  trouble.     Even  in  his   ^"^'""^• 
earlier  years,  when  his  court  was  the  gayest  in  Europe,  not 
only  would  he  listen  to  all  the  despatches  of  his  ambassadors 


192  European  History,   1598-17 15 

and  personally  dictate  the  answers,  but  he  actually  kept  up  a 
private  correspondence  with  the  more  favoured  of  the  envoys 
on  matters  of  which  he  did  not  wish  the  foreign  office  to 
have  cognisance.  Of  important  negotiations,  especially  those 
in  connection  with  the  great  treaties  of  his  reign,  he  took  entire 
management  himself,  and  frequently  wrote  his  directions  to  his 
representatives  with  his  own  hand.  He  was  equally  punctilious 
about  the  smaller  questions  of  etiquette  which  occupied  so 
much  of  the  time  and  thought  of  ambassadors  in  the  seven- 
teenth century.  The  order  of  an  ambassador's  entry,  the  rules 
by  which  he  is  to  be  guided  in  the  decisive  matters  of  cover- 
ing and  uncovering,  giving  or  denying  the  ^ pas,^  the  supreme 
necessity  of  trying  to  get  in  front  of  the  Spanish  ambassador, 
if  it  could  possibly  be  managed,  are  all  laid  down  and  com- 
mented upon  by  Louis  with  the  utmost  sense  of  their  impor- 
tance. Nothing  was  too  great,  nothing  too  small,  for  his  per- 
sonal care.  The  negotiations  for  a  partition  treaty,  the 
arrangements  for  a  fete  at+Marli,  the  design  for  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Lille,  the  rebuke  to  be  administered  to  a  malapert 
courtier  or  a  forgetful  servant,  were  alike  the  subject  of  careful 
consideration.  '  I  have  almost  been  obliged  to  wait '  is  a 
phrase  which  has' become  proverbial. 

This  minute  attention  to  detail  on  the  part  of  the  Crown  in 
a  nation  gifted  like  the  French  with  a  genius  for  completeness 

produced  a  corresponding  thoroughness  of  treat- 
Organisation  .  ,,-,,.. 
the  charac-      mcut    m    every    branch    of    the    admmistration. 

teristicof  his   Organisation  was   the  order  of  the  day.     During 

government.        ,  .  . 

the  years  of  Louis  s  greatness,  before  the  constant 
strain  of  the  over-ambitious  wars  had  broken  everything  down, 
organisation  is  the  note  of  his  government.  The  great  minis- 
ters are  organisers  not  statesmen.  They  are  at  the  very  antip- 
odes of  genius  to  Richelieu.  And  they  are  organisers,  not  in 
the  sense  in  which  Sully  was  an  organiser,  merely  the  rooter- 
out  of  patent  abuses,  but  in  the  far  higher  sense  in  which 
Charles  Montague  was  an  organiser,  one  who  laid  down  true 
principles  of  administration  and   constructed    the   machinery 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  193 

necessary  for  carrying  them  out.^'  Lionne  organised  the 
French  foreign  office  and  diplomatic  service,-^Colbert  the 
internal  administration  of  Francey=-Louvois  the  war  office,  on 
principles  which  became  the  acknowledged  principles  of  foreign, 
home,  and  military  administration  among  all  countries  for  more 
than  a  century,  some  of  which  will  remain  acknowledged  prin- 
ciples for  all  time.  It  was  this  which  enabled  France  to  take 
full  advantage  of  her  centralisation,  which  enabled  her  to 
bear  the  extraordinary  strain  of  unsuccessful  war  in  the  way 
she  did,  which  gave  her  such  advantages  in  dealing  with  a 
huge  unorganised  mass  like  the  Empire,  which  left  her  even 
after  all  her  losses  at  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Louis  xiv. 
stronger  than  she  had  been  at  the  beginning.  To  the  minis- 
ters who  planned  and  carried  it  out  belong  justly  the  honours 
of  the  achievement,  but  it  would  never  have  been  carried  out 
at  all  had  it  not  been  for  the  master  who  inspired  them. 

Colbert  had  served  his  apprenticeship  in  the  household  of 
Mazarin.  Early  in  life  the  cardina]  had  noticed  his  singular 
capacity  for  business,  and  had  taken  him  into  his 

r  1  /-  T       rr-.   11-  1  1    1  •  Training  of 

service  from  that  of  Le  1  ellier,  and  entrusted  him  coibert  in  the 
with  the  care  of  his  household.  The  suggestions  household  of 
which  Colbert  made  from  time  to  time  to  his  master 
about  the  conduct  of  his  business  soon  showed  Mazarin  that  he 
had  in  his  new  servant  not  merely  an  accurate  clerk,  but  a 
financial  organiser,  and  gradually  he  placed  in  his  hands  the 
whole  management  of  his  private  affairs.  The  cardinal  was  at 
once  frugal  and  extravagant,  avaricious  and  luxurious,  and  it 
was  the  duty  of  Colbert  to  buy  the  best  of  everything  in  the 
cheapest  market,  and  to  surround  his  master  with  comforts, 
while  he  doubled  and  trebled  his  fortune.  It  was  no  easy 
task,  for  the  cardinal  was  very  particular.  Shirts  for  Mazarin's 
own  use,  the  trousseaux  of  his  nieces,  carpets  for  his  palace, 
his  wedding  gift  to  the  young  queen,  all  had  to  receive  Colbert's 
personal  attention  ;  while  he  was  more  particularly  responsible 
for  the  investments  and  commercial  undertakings  by  means  of 
which  the  cardinal  amassed    his    huge    fortune.     Colbert  was 

PERIOD  v,  N 


194  European  History,   1598-1715 

thoroughly  fitted  for  the  work  he  had  to  do.  Gifted  with  a 
keen  eye  for  business,  great  shrewdness  in  his  estimate  of 
men,  and  unUmited  patience  in  his  attention  to  details,  unham- 
pered by  scruples,  stimulated  but  not  led  away  by  ambition, 
he  unhesitatingly  set  himself  to  satisfy  his  master's  avarice. 
He  used  the  powers  of  the  state  to  give  the  cardinal's  mer- 
chandise priority  in  the  markets,  and  to  relieve  it  from  the 
overwhelming  burden  of  the  dues  which  pressed  so  hardly 
upon  all  other  merchants.  Under  his  guidance  the  state  itself 
as  it  were  went  into  business  for  the  benefit  of  the  prime  min- 
ister, with  the  result  that  only  seven  years  after  the  end  of  the 
Fronde  the  cardinal  died  worth  ^2,000,000  of  money,  and 
bequeathed  on  his  death-bed  the  architect  of  his  fortune  to 
the  young  king  and  to  France  as  his  most  precious  possession. 
When  Mazarin  died  the  finances  of  the  country  were  under 
the  control  of  Nicholas  Fouquet,  the  brother  of  the  Abb6 
Nicholas  Fouquct,  who  had  for  some  years  been  the  head 
Fouquet.  of  Mazann's  secret  police.  .Nicholas  Fouquet  was 
a  man  of  great  ability  and  vaulting  ambition.  Seeing  corrup- 
tion all  around  him  he  quickly  yielded  to  the  prevailing  vice, 
and  used  his  double  position  of  Superintendent  of  the  Finances 
and  Procureur  General  to  collect  a  large  fortune.  But  unlike 
Mazarin  there  was  no  stain  of  avarice  about  Fouquet.  He  was 
the  prey  of  large  schemes  of  ambition,  the  dispenser  of  a  mag- 
nificence more  than  royal.  By  a  lavish  use  of  his  ill-gotten 
wealth  he  became  the  owner  of  colonial  settlements,  the  patron 
of  art  and  literature,  the  builder  of  the  most  magnificent  palace 
in  France,  the  centre  and  head  of  a  social  coterie  which  might 
at  any  moment  become  a  political  danger.  But  if  Fouquet 
had  many  friends  at  court  he  had  many  enemies  in  the  coun- 
try. His  splendour  and  success  made  men  jealous  of  him,  his 
reckless  mismanagement  made  the  business  class  distrust  him, 
the  increase  of  the  debt  made  all  the  bourgeois  hate  him,  his 
unblushing  corruption  gave  his  enemies  the  whip  hand  over 
him,  and  when  it  was  known  that  the  king  would  not  support 
him  a  cabal  was  formed  with  Colbert  at  its  head  to  ruin  him. 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  195 

There  was  no  difficulty  in  proving  charges  of  peculation  and 
mismanagement,  the  question  was  entirely  whether  his  faction 
at  court  was  strong  enough  to  save  him.  The  ladies  were  on 
his  side,  but  the  king,  either  because  he  was  jealous  of  his 
political  power  and  thought  him  dangerous  to  the  Crown,  or 
because  he  was  jealous  of  his  personal  influence  with  Mdlle.  de 
la  Valliere,  who  at  that  moment  exercised  unlimited  sway  over 
Louis's  susceptible  heart,  determined  on  his  destruction.  He^ 
was  induced  to  sell  his  office  of  Procureur  General,  which 
Tarried  with  it  the  privilege  of  being  tried  only  by  the  Parle- 
ment,  and  then  was  suddenly  arrested  only  a  few   „     , 

'  -'  J  Condemna- 

days  after  he  had  entertained  Louis  and  his  court  tion  of  fou- 
with  regal  magnificence  at  his  sumptuous  palace  of  '^"^*' '  '' 
Vaux.  A  special  commission  was  formed  in  order  to  try  him. 
For  three  years  the  tedious  trial  spun  out  its  weary  length.  At 
last  he  was  found  guilty  of  crime  against  the  state  and  banished. 
Louis's  jealousy  and  Colbert's  hate  were  not  to  be  appeased  so 
easily.  By  a  stretch  of  royal  power  almost  unprecedented 
Louis  substituted  a  sentence  of  perpetual  imprisonment  for 
that  of  banishment,  and  men  have  darkly  whispered  since,  that 
even  that  severe  punishment  did  not  exhaust  the  royal' ven- 
geance, and  that  the  Iron  Mask  so  well  known  to  French  ro- 
mance concealed  the  features  of  the  brilliant  Superintendent  of 
Finance  who  had  dared  to  raise  his  eyes  to  the  mistress  of  the 
king  ! 

The  disgrace  of  Nicholas  Fouquet  placed  the  whole  internal 
administration  of  France  in  the  hands  of  Colbert,  and  he  en- 
tered at  once  with  zeal  on  the  business  of  its  coibert  ap- 
reorganisation.  The  finances  demanded  his  first  pointed  to 
attention.  Under  the  mismanagement  of  Richelieu  ^^^^^^^  h""- 
Mazarin  and  Fouquet  all  the  evils  which  Sully  had  suppressed 
had  again  reappeared.  The  tax-gatherers  and  the  financiers 
made  large  fortunes,  while  the  treasury  received  but  a  small 
percentage  of  the  vast  sums  wrung  from  the  people.  The 
expenses  of  the  state  were  defrayed  from  day  to  day  by  the 
sale  of  offices,  by  the  creation  of  offices  for  the  purpose  of  sale, 


196  European  History,   1 598-1715 

and  by  loans  raised  at  ruinous  interest.  There  was  no  check 
Financial  upon  peculation,  no  systcm  of  accounts,  no  thought 
mismanage-  of  ecouomy.  France,  like  a  happy-go-lucky  spend- 
'"^"*'  thrift  in  the  hands  of  the  Jews,  was  drifting  aim- 

lessly into  bankruptcy  without  even  having  money  at  command. 
Colbert  determined  on  severe  measures.  His  experience  in 
Mazarin's  household  had  taught  him  how  fortunes  are  made, 
and  what  sort  of  consideration  was  due  to  those  who  became 
rich  by  lending  money  to  the  state.^At  one  stroke  he  repu- 
Remediai  diatcd  the  worst  of  the  loans  raised  by  Fouquet, 
measures  of  and  diminished  the  interest  payable  on  those  which 
Colbert.  j^^  acknowledged.    Having  thus  reduced  the  burden 

of  the  debt  to  reasonable  proportions  he  proceeded  to  deal 
with  the  collection  of  the  taxes.  He  remitted  the  long  stand- 
ing arrears  of  taille,  forced  the  tax-gatherers  to  render  accounts, 
took  proceedings  against  the  worst  of  the  peculators,  and  made 
them  disgorge  their  stolen  gains.  Order  was  restored  in  the 
administration  as  if  by  magic.  Every  penny  of  expense  was 
carefully  considered,  duly  authorised,  and  properly  accounted 
for.  Intendants  were  again  appointed  to  superintend  the 
farmers  of  revenue,  the  taille  was  reassessed,  the  claims  for 
exemption  inquired  into,  the  receipt  books  duly  audited  and 
checked.  By  these  means  he  procured  sufficient  money  to 
pay  the  interest  on  the  debt,  and  the  expenses  of  the  govern- 
ment without  increasing  the  taxes.  In  1662,  only  a  year  after 
he  became  Controller  General,  he  was  able  to  show  a  surplus 
of  45,000,000  of  francs  without  having  increased  the  financial 
burdens  on  a  single  honest  man. 

But  Colbert  was  not  content  with  merely  restoring  order  in 
the  financial  administration.  It  was  not  sufficient  in  his  eyes 
merely  to  take  care  that  the  receipts  should  exceed  the  expen- 
diture, and  that  opportunities  for  peculation  should  be  reduced 
Principles  of  ^^  ^  minimum.  He  was  one  of  the  first  of  ministers 
his  financial  to  realise  how  intimately  the  greatness  and  pros- 
P°  '"^^"  perity  of  a  nation  are  bound  up  with  a  good  finan- 

cial system,  to  trace    the  wonderful  effect  in  developing   the 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  197 

national  wealth  and  promoting  the  national  happiness,  pro- 
duced by  a  system  of  taxation  which  carefully  adjusts  the 
financial  burden  to  the  shoulders  of  those  best  able  to  bear  it. 
Ministers  of  finance  before  Colbert's  time  had  looked  upon 
taxation  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  government,  had 
taxed  those  things  upon  which  it  was  most  easy  to  levy  taxes, 
and  had  levied  the  taxes  in  the  way  which  ensured  to  the  gov- 
ernment a  certain  income. with  very  little  trouble,  quite  regard- 
less of  the  effect  of  the  system  upon  the  tax  payer.  Colbert 
on  the  contrary  saw  that  the  secret  of  a  good  revenue  lay  not 
in  the  ease  with  which  the  tax  was  collected,  but  in  the  ease 
with  which  it  was  paid.  The  interest  of  the  government  and 
of  the  tax  payer  were  identical  not  antagonistic,  and  the  more 
the  government  could  consult  the  convenience  of  the  tax  payer, 
the  more  the  tax  payer  would  be  able  to  afford  for  the  con- 
venience of  government.  A  good  finance  minister  therefore 
would  not  content  himself  with  restoring  order  in  the  collection 
of  taxes,  and  economy  in  the  disbursements  of  the  treasury, 
but  must  apply  himself  to  far  greater  and  more  difficult  prob- 
lems, must  study  how  to  increase  the  resources  of  the  country 
to  their  utmost  capacity,  and  how  to  adjust  the  necessary  taxa- 
tion so  as  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  their  develop- 
ment. 

In  the  answer  to  these  two  questions  lies  the  whole  secret 
of  scientific  finance.  Colbert  was  the  first  finance  minister  to 
attempt  to  give  a  scientific  answer  to  them,  that  is  character  of 
an  answer  based  upon  reasoned  principle.  The  his  protec- 
reasoned  principles  adopted  by  Colbert  have  been  **^^  system, 
in  the  main  the  principles  acted  upon  by  most  civilised  coun- 
tries from  this  day  to  our  own.  They  are  principles  which 
underlie  the  economical  system  known  as  Protection,  and  are 
the  application  of  the  theory  of  national  sovereignty  to  economi- 
cal subjects.  The  seventeenth  century,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
essentially  governed  in  all  political  thought  by  the  theory  of 
the  solidarity  of  nations  under  their  kings.  All  Europe  was 
coalescing  into  territorial  entities  under  their  respective  sover- 


198  European  History ,   '598-1715 

eigns.  Every  such  territorial  entity  guarded  itself  off  from  its 
neighbours  by  the  acquisition  of  natural  frontiers,  and  by  the 
equipment  of  a  professional  army,  and  emphasised  its  indivi- 
duality by  its  concentration  under  its  king  and  by  the  repre- 
sentation of  its  king  and  his  interests  diplomatically  at  other 
courts.  The  idea  of  a  Europe  united  through  the  Christian 
brotherhood  of  man  had  passed  away.  The  idea  of  a  Europe 
united  through  the  cosmopolitan  brotherhood  of  man  had  not 
yet  come.  Between  those  two  theories  of  brotherhood,  men 
were  content  to  relapse  practically  into  a  condition  of  enmity, 
and  were  engaged  in  building  barriers  against  their  neighbours, 
in  developing  their  own  strength  as  much  as  possible,  and  in 
preventing  their  neighbours  from  developing  theirs.  The  same 
principles  governed  men's  conduct  in  economics  as  in  politics. 
Economic  independence  was  considered  just  as  important  for 
a  nation  as  political  independence.  To  be  as  strong  and  re- 
sourceful as  possible  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  king- 
dom, to  be  as  independent  as  possible  outside  those  limits 
'  were  the  recognised  objects  of  every  statesman.  In  the  eyes  of 
Colbert  it  was  just  as  necessary  for  France  that  she  should  not 
depend  upon  the  foreigner  for  her  bread,  as  that  she  should 
not  owe  him  allegiance  for  her  land.  He  would  have  thought 
it  as  reckless  a  piece  of  criminal  folly  to  derive  the  food  supply 
of  the  nation  from  certain  rivals  and  possible  enemies,  as  to 
entrust  to  them  the  defence  of  the  frontier. 

Following  out  these  principles  Colbert  set  before  himself 
two  great  objects,  to  promote  within  the  limits  of  France  itself 
Encourage-  the  production  of  wealth  by  all  the  means  in  the 
mentofhome  power  of  the  government,  and  to  prevent  the 
tnanufac-  foreigner  by  the  imposition  of  hostile  tariffs  from 
tures.  underselling  the  home  producer  in  any  of  the  com- 

modities necessary  to  the  national  well-being.  He  endeavoured 
to  abolish  the  provincial  customs  and  local  dues  which  impeded 
the  free  circulation  of  trade  from  French  province  to  province, 
and  actually  succeeded  in  abolishing  them  over  three-fourths 
of  the  country,  in  spite  of  the  most  strenuous  local  opposition. 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  199 

He  improved  roads  and  developed  the  canals  which  had  been 
begun  by  Sully  into  a  great  system  of  water  communication. 
Of  this  system  the  celebrated  canal  of  Languedoc,  between  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic,  which  has  done  so  much  to 
promote  the  prosperity  of  France,  was  the  most  striking  example. 
For  more  than  a  century  it  remained  without  a  rival.  When 
at  last  other  nations  began  to  realise  the  importance  of  quick 
and  easy  communication,  French  roads  and  canals  became 
the  models  upon  which  they  worked,  French  engineering  talent 
the  authority  to  which  they  appealed,  and  the  Suez  canal 
in  the  present  day  derives  its  ancestry  from  the  canal  of 
Languedoc  and  the  genius  of  Colbert.  He  encouraged  manu- 
factures of  all  sort.  Under  his  care  French  lace,  glass, 
tapestries,  silks,  and  brocades,  became  the  most  celebrated  in 
the  world.  He  introduced  a  more  scientific  system  of  deahng 
with  the  state  forests,  promoted  large  breeding  establishments 
for  horses,  encouraged  the  formation  of  industrial  and  com- 
mercial companies,  assisted  the  founding  of  colonies,  and 
protected  the  infant  colonial  trade  by  the  formation  of  an 
efficient  navy.  At  the  same  time  he  relieved  the  peasantry 
from  the  heaviest  of  the  fiscal  burdens  which  oppressed  them 
by  reducing  the  taille  nearly  a  half,  and  recouping  the  treasury 
by  imposing  indirect  taxes,  principally  upon  articles  of  luxury 
which  were  paid  by  the  consumer.  He  helped  the  manufac- 
turer by  removing  the  export  duties  on  articles  manufactured 
at  home,  while  he  imposed  heavy  import  duties  on  similar 
articles  imported  from  abroad.  There  was,  however,  one 
serious  exception  to  this  policy.  So  fearful  was  prohibition 
he  lest  France  should  ever  become  dependent  on  of  corn  ex- 
other  nations  for  her  bread,  that  he  absolutely  po""'^*'""- 
refused  to  allow  corn  to  be  exported  under  any  circumstances. 
The  surplus  corn  produced  by  the  rich  corn  fields  of  France 
over  and  above  the  wants  of  the  nation  would  if  freely  exported 
have  formed  one  of  the  most  lucrative  sources  of  the  national 
wealth,  for  France  in  the  seventeenth  century  was  the  corn- 
growing  country  of  Europe,  but  Colbert  deliberately  deprived 


ijoo  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

himself  of  this  source  of  revenue,  and  kept  the  French 
agriculturist  poor,  in  order  to  make  food  cheap  and  ensure  a 
large  surplus  of  corn  in  the  country. 

The  result  of  this  policy  taken  as  a  whole,  was  undoubtedly 

most    beneficial  to  France,  in  spite   of  the    exaggeration   of 

f    Colbert's  protective  measures.     In  the   ten  years, 

France  after    from     1661-71,    during   which   time    Colbert    had 

ten  years  of     ^   ^^^   control   ovcr   the    national    finances,    with 

Colbert's  ' 

government,  the  exception  of  the  court  expenses,  not  only 
*^7'"  was  the  debt  largely  reduced,  peculation  checked, 

and  the  taxation  greatly  lightened  and  better  distributed, 
but  new  and  fertilising  streams  of  prosperity  were  tapped  in 
the  establishment  of  manufactures  and  the  opening  of  means 
of  communication  which  no  misgovernment  could  again  wholly 
close.  By  the  year  1671,  France  had  gained  for  herself 
under  Louis  xiv.,  through  the  abihties  of  Colbert,  a  position  to 
which  history  does  not  afford  any  exact  parallel.  United  and 
concentrated  far  more  thoroughly  than  any  other  country,  with 
the  whole  forces  of  the  nation  absolutely  at  the  control  of  the 
king,  defended  on  all  sides  except  one  by  a  clearly  defined 
and  well-fortified  frontier,  rich  by  the  fertility  of  her  soil  and 
the  industry  and  frugality  of  her  people,  she  was  now  adding 
riches  to  riches  by  the  estabhshment  of  manufactures  and  the 
promotion  of  commerical  enterprise.  Her  colonies  were  spring- 
ing up  in  every  part  of  the  globe,  her  navy  was  formidable 
enough  to  defend  them  from  attack,  her  army  second  to  none 
in  discipline  and  reputation.  Her  people  were  prosperous, 
contented,  and  obedient ;  her  administrators  just,  careful,  and 
honest ;  her  system  of  administration  pure,  and  based  upon 
principles  which  made  the  security  and  independence  of  the 
country  the  first  consideration. 

On  the  other  hand  it  did  not  require  much  foresight  to  see 
Dan  ers  of  ^^^^  ^  System  of  Scientific  finance  which  was  based 
the  protec-  purely  upon  selfish  principles  could  not  fail  to  lead 
tive  system.  ^^  international  complications.  If  every  nation  of 
Europe  were   to   construct   for   its    own    advantage    a   hostile 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  201 

_systern_of  tariffs  against  other  nations,  excuses  for  war  would 
be  endlessly  multiplied.  However  self-sufficient  a  country- 
may  be  there  must  be  many  articles  of  convenience,  if  not  of 
necessity,  for  which  it  depends  upon  its  neighbours.-  Let  a 
nation  increase  its  colonial  empire  as  much  as  possible,  and 
keep  its  trade  wholly  to  itself  by  an  elaborate  code  of  naviga- 
tion laws,  even  then  international  trade  will  not  die  nor  foreign 
smuggling  be  stopped.  Protective  duties  and  prohibitive 
legislation  have  never  yet  succeeded  in  destroying  the  commer- 
cial dependence  of  one  civilised  nation  upon  another.  Nations 
which  wish  to  protect  their  own  trade  by  tariffs  can  only  do 
so  by  constructing  a  system  which  shall  be  injurious  to  that 
of  their  neighbours,  and  is  sure  to  lead  to  smuggling  and 
reprisals.  In  the  sixteenth  century  trade  adventurers  looked 
after  themselves,  and  it  was  rare  for  the  home  government  to 
consider  itself  compromised  by  high-handed  acts  of  piracy 
committed  by  its  subjects  on  the  other  side  of  the  world. 
But  when  it  was  the  action  of  governments  themselves  which 
led  to  collisions  between  their  subjects,  they  were  bound  in 
honour  to  defend  their  own  system.  Tariff  reprisals  were  in- 
stituted, and  claims  made  of  a  right  to  punish  foreign  smug- 
glers, and  search  foreign  ships  for  smuggled  goods,  which  were 
certain  before  long  to  lead  to  war  in  downright  earnest.  It  has 
often  been  said  that  the  wars  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  wars 
of  religion,  but  those  of  the  eighteenth  century  wars  of  tariffs. 
( -<  rnie_I)utch  war  of  1672  is  adduced  as  the  first  great  war  of 
the  latter  class,  which  was  the  first  great  war  waged  in  Europe 
since  the  adoption  of  a  scientific  system  of  protective  duties 
by  a  first-class  power.  There  is  some  exaggeration  in  this 
statement,  but  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  from  the  date  of  the 
adoption  of  a  protective  system  by  France  under  the  guidance 
of  Colbert,  there  is  not  an  important  war  waged  in  Europe  for 
a  century  and  a  half  in  which  considerations  of  tariffs  and 
commerce  do  not  play  a  large  part ;  and  it  may  well  be 
doubted  whether  the  national  organisation  of  finance  any  more 
than  the  national  organisation  of  defence,  though  steps  along 


202  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  path  of  civilisation,  have  proved  movements  towards  the 
attainment  of  peace. 

By  the  time  he  had  completed  his  first  decade  of  personal 

rule  the  administrative  talents  of  his  ministers  and  his  own  gift 

for  governing  had  indeed  raised  Louis  to  a  pinnacle  of  glory 

and  of  reputation  far  exceeding  all  other  sovereigns 

Contrast  -,..  .t-  i  itii 

between  of  his  time.     His  court  was  the  most  splendid  and 

Louis  and  t^g  most  polished  in  Europe.  Round  it  were 
gathered  the  genius  of  Turenne,  the  brilliance  of 
Cond^,  the  dignity  of  Corneille,  the  wit  of  Moli^re,  the  finish 
of  Boileau,  the  art  of  Racine.  From  Italy  Bernini  brought  his 
solid  if  too  dramatic  talent  for  the  embellishment  of  Paris, 
while  the  sweetness  of  Claude  and  the  breadth  of  Le  Brun 
were  called  upon  to  minister  to  the  greatness  of  the  greatest 
of  European  sovereigns.  In  sharp  contrast  to  all  this  magnifi- 
cence and  grace  stood  the  minister  without  whom  it  could  not 
have  existed.  Dour,  grim,  and  harsh,  Colbert  moved  through 
the  world  without  a  friend,  a  man  to  whom  ambition  was  life, 
and  business  pleasure.  Scrupulously  honest,  severely  con- 
scientious, strictly  just,  painfully  accurate,  sincerely  religious, 
he  was  wanting  in  humanity.  He  was  absolutely  without  heart 
and  without  sympathy.  A  man  of  religion,  he  angered  the 
clergy  by  trying  to  reduce  the  number  of  '  religious  '  because 
they  did  not  make  wealth ;  a  man  of  the  people,  he  offended 
the  populace  by  reducing  the  number  of  holidays  ;  a  zealous 
Catholic,  he  displeased  the  orthodox  by  the  favour  he  extended 
to  the  Huguenot  craftsmen,  while  he  made  himself  unpopular 
with  the  Huguenots  because  he  deserted  them  in  the  hour  of 
their  need,  when  the  king  turned  against  them.  A  man  of 
conscientious  probity,  he  had  no  scruples  in  directing  the 
judges  to  convict  strong  and  powerful  prisoners  who  were 
accused  of  crime,  in  order  that  the  king's  galleys  might  be 
well  manned,  and  even  prevented  galley  slaves  who  had  served 
their  time  from  being  set  free  if  they  were  still  useful  for  the 
king's  service.  Less  and  more  than  human  no  wonder  that 
men  felt  instinctively  that  he  was  their  enemy,  however  great 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  203 

the  blessings  of  good  government  which  he  had  conferred  upon 
them,  and  followed  his  coffin  to  the  grave  with  execrations  in 
1683. 

In  that,  however,  they  were  grossly  unjust.  They  were 
visiting  upon  him  their  dislike  of  the  increased  war  taxation 
of  which  he  was  the  mouthpiece  not  the  author-  In  the  year 
1 67 1    France  stood    at   the    parting  of  the  wavs.   ^^     ^  . 

'  X-  o  y         The  choice  of 

On  each  side  stretched  far  into  the  future  a  long  policy  before 
vista  of  glory  and  prosperity,  but  she  had  to  choose  ^°""'  '^7i- 
between  them.  Through  the  victories  of  Richelieu  and  of 
Mazarin,  through  the  administration  of  Colbert,  through  the 
government  of  Louis,  France  stood  at  the  head  of  the  countries 
of  Europe  in  absolute  security,  without  a  rival  who  wished  to 
attack  her,  without  an  enemy  whose  attack  she  might  justly 
fear.  Entrenched  within  the  borders  of  a  frontier  easily 
defensible  by  the  genius  of  a  Vauban,  she  might  sit  free  from 
all  possible  danger  until  the  floodgates  of  Euro- 
pean warfare  should  reopen.  Planting  her  colo-  supremacy 
nies  in  America,  in  Africa,  in  Madagascar,  and  °p«"  ^° 
among  the  islands  of  the  West,  pushing  out  the 
operations  of  her  trading  companies  to  India  and  the  Spice 
Islands  of  the  East,  enjoying  a  pre-eminence  through  treaty 
over  all  other  European  powers  at  the  court  of  the  Sultan  and 
in  the  trade  of  the  Levant,  on  the  point  of  gaining  an  influence, 
hitherto  unparalleled  and  undreamed  of,  over  the  vast  expanse 
of  the  empire  of  China  through  her  Jesuit  missionaries,  she  had 
but  to  stretch  forth  her  hand  to  seize  the  crown  of  colonial 
empire  and  of  commercial  supremacy,  which  was  already 
threatening  to  fall  from  the  head  of  the  Dutch.  In  the  middle 
of  the  seventeenth  century _^she  had  no  rivals  to  fear.  The  day 
of  Spain  and  Portugal  was  over.  Holland,  though  vigorous, 
capable,  and  persevering,  could  not  stand  out  for  long  against 
the  pressure  of  her  greater  neighbours.  She  had  gained  her 
unique  and  glorious  position  through  their  weakness,  she  could 
not  maintain  herself  against  them  in  their  strength.  Already 
she  was  stricken  to  the  knees  by  the  English  Navigation  Act 


204  European  History,   1598-17 15 

and  the  war  of  165 1,  and  had  had  to  recognise  in  England  an 
equal  in  naval  power  and  a  rival  in  commerce.  But  the  day 
of  England  had  not  yet  come.  In  the  lucid  intervals  of  a  mad 
and  despicable  policy,  Charles  11.  did  something  to  encourage 
the  American  plantations,  and  to  promote  the  operations  of 
the  East  India  Company,  but  it  was  quite  certain  that  the 
power  of  the  state  would  never  be  thrown  into  commercial  or 
colonial  competition  with  France,  as  long  as  Louis  retained  in 
his  own  hands  the  means  of  rendering  the  king  independent 
of  parliamentary  control.  It  is  moreover  a  significant  fact  that 
the  most  important  and  permanent  part  of  the  English  colonial 
empire,  which  was  built  up  in  the  eighteenth  century,  was  not 
the  result  of  colonial  enterprise  but  of  war.  Canada,  the  West 
Indies,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  India  itself  were  the  direct 
fruits  of  the  long  wars  with  France,  which  in  their  origin  and 
essence  sprang  from  the  military  and  political  ambition  of 
Louis  XIV.  The  rivalry  with  France,  which  beginning  in  169JD 
did  not  end  till  181 5,  which  produced  during  that  century  and 
a  quarter  no  less  than  seven  distinct  and  prolonged  contests 
between  the  two  nations,  which  gained  for  England  mainly  at 
the  expense  of  France  a  vast  colonial  empire,  which  lost  for 
her  her  only  considerable  plantations,  was  primarily  and  in  its 
essence  a  military  and  European  rivalry.  The  wars  were  pri- 
marily and  essentially  wars  to  check  the  military  and  political 
ascendency  of  France  over  Europe,  and  to  preserve  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe.  They  sprang  from  the  policy  adopted 
by  Louis  xiv.  in  1672,  when  no  longer  satisfied  with  pre- 
eminence in  Europe,  he  deliberately  struck  for  supremacy  over 
Europe.  They  followed  from  the  determination  of  William  iii. 
and  the  Whig  party  in  England  to  prevent  such  a  consumma- 
tion at  all  costs.  Had  Louis  turned  his  ambition  into  other 
directions,  followed  where  the  policy  of  Colbert  pointed  the 
way,  thrown  the  energies  of  his  government  and  the  genius  of 
his  people  into  the  path  of  colonial  development  and  com- 
mercial supremacy,  pushed  his  fleets  and  his  armies  along  the 
savage  tracks  where  the  cupidity  of  his  traders  and  the  self- 


Louis  XIV.  and  Colbert  205 

sacrifice  of  his  missionaries  had  first  marked  the  road,  he  would 
have  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  impotent  stubbornness  of 
the  Dutch,  or  the  venal  indolence  of  England.  And  if  a  cen- 
tury or  half  a  century  later  England  had  awoke  from  her  trance 
and  put  forth  her  claims  to  dominion,  a  very  different  task 
would  have  awaited  her.  She  would  have  found  an  established 
organised  power  to  conquer,  not  a  rival  to  outdo. 

But  it  was  not  to  be.  The  traditions  of  France  lay  in  the 
direction  of  military  conquest  not  of  commercial  supremacy. 
With  an  army  carefully  trained  and  organised  by 
Louvois,  with  generals  at  his  command  like  Turenne,  of  military 
Cond6,  and  Vauban,  with  all  the  traditions  of  the  supremacy 
French  monarchy  behind  him,  with  all  the  longing 
for  glory  within  him,  which  was  the  very  atmosphere  he 
breathed,  with  his  intimate  knowledge  of  European  courts  to 
assist  him,  what  wonder  is  it  that  Louis  determined  on  the 
course  which  seemed  to  combine  the  certainty  of  success  with 
the  maximum  of  glory.  There  was  no  nation  in  Europe  that 
could  resist  him.  A  combination  of  nations  was  alone  to  be 
feared,  and  what  combination  could  long  resist  the  disintegrat- 
ing effects  of  his  diplomacy  and  their  own  selfishness?  What 
league  had  ever  been  a  military  success?  The  resources  of 
France  seemed  inexhaustible,  her  armies  invincible,  her  genius 
irresistible.  In  the  distance  but  not  so  very  far  removed  from 
practical  politics  must  come  some  day  the  great  question  of 
the  succession  to  the  crown  of  Spain.  When  that  question 
was  ripe  for  solution  France  must  be  in  a  position  to  solve  it. 
Impelled  alike  by  the  foresight  of  a  statesman,  the  ambition 
of  a  king,  and  the  flattery  of  a  court,  Louis  took  the  fatal  step 
and  plunged  his  country  into  a  century  and  a  half  of  incessant 
war.  With  singular  ease  he  had  made  himself  master  of 
France,  he  now  determined  to  be  master  of  Europe  too. 


CHAPTER   X 

LOUIS   XIV.   AND  THE   UNITED   PROVINCES 

Humiliation  of  Spain  and  the  Pope  —  Purchase  of  Dunkirk  —  The  war  of 
devolution — Alarm  of  Europe  —  Opposition  of  the  Dutch  —  The  Triple 
Alliance  —  The  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  —  Overthrow  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance—  Origin  of  the  United  Provinces  —  Their  constitution  —  Supremacy 
of  the  burghers  —  Unique  position  of  Holland  —  The  House  of  Orange  — 
Prosperity  of  the  Dutch  —  Rivalry  between  the  republicans  and  the  House 
of  Orange  —  John  Olden  Barneveldt  —  Attempted  revolution  of  William  II. 

—  Supremacy  of  the  republican  party  —  Character  and  policy  of  John  de 
Witt  —  War  with  England  —  The  Act  of  Navigation  —  The  Act  of  Exclusion 

—  Second  war  with  England  —  The  treaty  of  Breda —  Danger  from  France 

—  The  perpetual  edict  —  Popular   movement   in   favour  of  William    III. — 
Murder  of  de  Witt. 

No  sooner  had  Louis  xiv.  taken  the  management  of  affairs 
into  his  own  hands,  than  he  began  to  let  foreign  countries 
„  „.,.  ^.  understand  that  France  was  now  ruled  by  a  sover- 
of  Spain  by  eign  who  intended  his  will  to  be  law,  and  was  not 
ouis,  I  61.  lii^giy  tQ  abate  one  jot  of  the  dignity  which  he 
thought  due  to  his  crown.  In  the  autumn  of  1661,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  solemn  entry  of  a  Swedish  envoy  into  London, 
the  ambassadors  of  France  and  Spain  in  their  eagerness  to 
gain  precedence  of  each  other  came  to  blows  in  the  narrow 
streets.  The  carriage  of  d'Estrades,  the  French  ambassador, 
was  overturned,  his  horse  killed,  and  his  suite  forced  to  take 
refuge  in  the  adjacent  houses  wounded  and  beaten  ;  while  the 
victorious  Spaniard  proudly  took  his  place  in  the  procession 
clothed  with  all  the  insolent  dignity  of  success.  Louis  took 
the  matter  up  fiercely,  dismissed  d'Estrades  for  having  been 
beaten,  recalled  his  own  ambassador  from    Madrid,  and    de- 

206 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces         207 

manded  and  actually  obtained  from  Philip  iv.,  under  threat  of 
war,  the  acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  the  crown  of  France 
to  precede  that  of  Spain. 

A  few  months  later  a  tumult  of  a  less  honourable  character 
brought  Louis  into  sharp  antagonism  to  the  Pope.  The  French 
ambassador  at  Rome,  the  due  de  Cr^qui,  had  made 
himself  very  unpopular  by  his  intolerable  pride,  and  of  the  Pope 
some  of  the  Corsican  guards  of  the  Vatican,  urged  ^y  Louis, 
on  it  is  said  by  the  brother  of  the  Pope,  and 
smarting  under  the  wrong  of  a  personal  insult  rendered  to  their 
body  by  some  of  the  French  suite,  made  themselves  the  organs 
of  the  general  hatred  and  of  private  revenge,  by  a  gross  attack 
upon  the  ambassador's  wife  as  she  was  returning  to  her  palace. 
A  page  was  killed,  many  of  the  servants  wounded,  and  the  due 
de  Cr^qui,  leaving  Rome  in  real  or  assumed  fear  for  his  own 
life,  demanded  from  Alexander  vii.  a  reparation  which  the 
Pope  seemed  very  unwilling  to  give.  Louis  immediately  seized 
Avignon,  assembled  an  army,  appointed  the  mar^chal  du 
Plessis-Praslin  to  the  command,  and  ordered  him  to  form  the 
siege  of  Rome  and  force  the  Pope  to  do  justice  to  the  outraged 
majesty  of  France.  Alexander  was  astonished  at  this  unex- 
pected display  of  energy,  and  sent  his  nephew  the  cardinal 
Chigi  in  all  haste  to  Paris  to  offer  an  humble  apology  and  ob- 
tain the  best  terms  he  could.  He  was  the  first  legate  say  the 
French  historians  ever  sent  by  a  Pope  to  ask  for  pardon.  If  so, 
the  success  of  the  experiment  hardly  warranted  its  repetition. 
Louis  remained  for  some  time  obstinately  irate,  and  was  only 
pacified  by  imposing  upon  the  Pope  the  public  humiliation  of 
banishing  his  brother,  disbanding  his  Corsican  guard,  and  erect- 
ing a  pyramid  in  Rome  as  a  perpetual  memorial  of  his  disgrace. 

More  substantial  additions  to  the  power  of  Louis  than  the 
precedence  of  an  ambassador  or  the  disgrace  of  a  Pope  soon 
followed.     In  1662  he  purchased  the  port  of  Dun-  purchase  of 
kirk  from  England,  and  made  it  a  harbour  for  war-   Dunkirk, 
ships.     In  1663  he  sent  the  count  of  Schomberg,   '^^^' 
supported  by  French  officers  and  French  money,  secretly  to 


2o8  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  assistance  of  Portugal  in  her  war  against  Spain,  and  con- 
tributed materially  to  the  gaining  of  the  victory  of  Villa  Viciosa 
in  1665,  which  established  the  independence  of  the  country. 
.    .  At  the  same  time  he  proceeded  to  read  the  Grand 

Assistance  ^ 

given  by  Louis  Vizicr  a  Icsson  by  breaking  the  ancient  league  of 

to  Portugal  friendship  between  France  and  the  Sultan,  in  con- 
ana  against  ' 

the  Turks,  scqucnce  of  an  insult  offered  to  the  French  ambas- 
1663-64.  sador  in  1661,  sent  French  troops  to  assist  in  the 

defence  of  Candia,  which  wss  then  being  besieged  by  the  Turks, 
and  supplied  the  Emperor  with  a  large  sum  of  money  and  a 
contingent  of  6000  Frenchmen  under  La  Feuillade  and  Coligny 
to  resist  the  incursion  of  the  Ottoman  armies  into  Hungary 
and  Croatia  in  1664.  Chiefly  owing  to  the  irresistible  valour 
of  the  French  troops,  the  imperial  general,  Montecuculli,  was 
enabled  to  inflict  a  crushing  defeat  upon  the  grand  vizier  him- 
self at  the  battle  of  S.  Gothard  on  the  Raab,  and  hurl  the 
invaders  back  behind  their  own  frontiers. 

In  1667  broke  out  the  first  of  the  great  wars  of  Louis  xrv., 
the  war  of  devolution.  In  September  1665  PhiHp  rv.  of 
Th  w  f  Spain  died,  leaving  two  daughters  by  his  first 
Devolution,  marriage,  of  whom  the  queen  of  France  was  the 
'^^^'  elder,  and  one  son  by  his  second  marriage,  who 

succeeded  to  the  crown  of  Spain  under  the  name  of  Charles  11. 
Louis  immediately  laid  claim  to  the  Spanish  Netherlands  in 
virtue  of  what  was  known  as  the  law  of  devolution.  This  law 
was  in  fact  a  local  custom  of  the  province  of  Brabant,  by 
which  private  property  in  land  passed  to  the  female  children 
of  the  first  marriage  in  preference  to  the  male  children  of  the 
second  marriage.  If,  therefore,  Philip  rv.  had  in  his  private 
capacity  bought  a  farm  in  Brabant,  Louis  would  by  the  law  of 
devolution  have  become  entitled  to  it  in  right  of  his  wife  ;  but 
to  assert  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  Low  Countries  followed 
the  rule  of  land  tenure  in  Brabant  was  one  of  the  most 
monstrous  claims  ever  put  forward  by  hypocritical  ambition. 
Nevertheless  Louis  played  his  part  well.  The  rights  of  his 
queen   were   dwelt   upon  with  much  argumentative  force   by 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces         209 

writers  and  diplomatists,  while  Turenne  at  the  head  of  35,000 
men  produced  more  convincing  arguments.  By  August  1667 
Charleroi  Tournay  and  Lille  were  in  his  hands,  and  the  whole 
of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  lay  open  before  him.  Astonished 
Europe  awoke  to  see  the  once  formidable  power  of  Spain 
falling  to  pieces  before  its  eyes,  to  find  itself  threatened  by  the 
overweening  ambition  of  a  prince,  whose  will  was  law  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  ocean,  and  from  the  Scheldt  to  the  Pyrenees. 

It  was  the  first  time  that  European  statesmen  realised  the 
true  nature  of  the  danger  from  France,  the  first  time  they 
understood  the  real  bent  of  French  policy.  Hith-  Alarm  of 
erto  the  shade  of  Philip  11.  had  pressed  upon  Europe- 
Europe  like  a  nightmare.  Hardly  ten  years  had  elapsed 
since  Cromwell  had  declared  war  against  Spain  in  the  spirit 
of  Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  had  actually  allied  himself  with  France, 
had  called  in  the  aid  of  the  lion  to  make  sure  work  of  the 
dying  elephant.  But  five  years  ago  Clarendon  had  made 
over  Dunkirk  to  Louis,  never  dreaming  that  France,  and 
not  Spain,  was  to  be  the  commercial  and  naval  rival  of 
England  in  the  years  which  were  close  at  hand.  The  war  of 
devolution  shattered  these  illusions  somewhat  rudely.  It  was 
a  war  of  pure  ambition,  of  undisguised  rapacity.  It  disclosed 
Louis  to  the  world  as  absolutely  unscrupulous  and  alarmingly 
strong.  If  Spain  thus  crumbled  to  dust  at  his  feet,  what 
power  in  Europe  could  dare  to  withstand  him?  Suddenly, 
from  out  the  calm  which  had  pervaded  all  Europe  since  the 
treaties  of  1660,  there  loomed  in  terrific  proportions  the  black 
shadow  of  the  old  world  wide  tyranny,  which,  so  far  from 
having  been  crushed  to  death  in  the  wars  of  religion,  had 
merely  shifted  the  centre  of  its  power  from  Madrid  to  Paris. 

The    burden  of  organising   the   opposition   to    France    fell 
naturally  upon  the   Dutch.      If  the    French  once 

jioLij        Opposition 

became  masters  of  Antwerp  and  the  bchelclt,  of  the  Dutch 
the   pre-eminence  of  Amsterdam,  and   the    pros-   *°  Louis's 

..-  ,         .,  ,  r      ^         TTj     schemes. 

perity,  if  not   the   independence,    of  the    United 

Provinces  was  gone.     The  Spanish  Netherlands  formed  a  barrier 

PERIOD  v.  c 


/ 


2IO  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

to  the  advances  of  France  which  was  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  the  Dutch  as  a  nation.  It  had  always  been  an 
important  part  of  their  settled  policy  ever  since  they  had 
gained  their  independence  to  keep  the  French  frontier  away 
from  the  Scheldt.  De  Witt,  the  grand  pensionary  of  Holland, 
who  was  at  that  time  the  political  chief  of  the  republic,  was 
fully  alive  to  the  danger.  Before  Louis  had  crossed  the 
frontier  he  was  deep  in  negotiations  with  the  Emperor  and 
the  princes  of  Germany,  as  well  as  with  Sweden  and  England, 
to  put  limits  to  the  aggression  of  the  French.  But  Louis's 
diplomacy  had  been  too  much  for  him.  By  the  bribe  of  a 
partition  treaty  for  dividing  the  Spanish  dominions  between 
France  and  the  Empire  on  the  death  of  the  weakly  king  of 
Spain,  Leopold  was  persuaded  to  remain  neutral  while  Louis 
was  eating  up  his  leaf  of  the  artichoke.  The  German  princes 
were  secured  at  heavy  cost  in  October  1667  and  Sweden  was 
,.  ,.        terrified  into  inaction  by  threats.     England  alone 

Negotiations  ^  ° 

with  remained   dangerous.     The    fall  of  Clarendon    in 

England.  November  1667  had  put  the  chief  direction  of 
foreign  affairs  into  the  hands  of  Arlington  who  was  in  favour 
of  a  Dutch  alliance.  Sir  William  Temple,  the  ablest  of 
English  diplomatists  and  a  sturdy  friend  to  the  Dutch,  was 
sent  as  English  envoy  to  the  Hague.  Charles  himself,  though 
he  never  intended  to  break  with  Louis  and  lose  the  French 
subsidies,  was  not  averse  to  an  occasional  display  of  indepen- 
dence. With  an  impartiality  more  creditable  to  his  cleverness 
than  his  honesty,  he  kept  on  foot  negotiations  for  an  alliance 
with  Spain  France  and  the  Dutch  at  the  same  time,  waiting 
to  see  which  side  would  offer  him  most.  By  December  1667, 
however,  it  became  abundantly  clear  that  the  English  people 
would  not  tolerate  an  alliance  with  France,  or  permit  Louis 
to  make  himself  master  of  the  Low  Countries.  Charles 
accordingly  took  the  line  of  the  least  resistance,  authorised 
Temple  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  the  Dutch,  and  wrote  to 
Louis  to  explain  that  he  had  been  obliged  to  act  against  his 
own  wishes. 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  Unitf.d  Provmces         211 

The  treaty  was  signed  at  the  Hague  on  the  13th  of  January 
1668,  and  on  May  15th  Sweden,  angered  by  the  threats  of 
Louis,  joined  the  alhance  in  order  to  secure  the 

r  ij  T  1    •  r-,       ■       Formation 

payment  of  some  old  standing  clamis  upon  Spam  of  the  Triple 
which  were  guaranteed  by  the  Enghsh  and  Dutch  Aiuance, 
governments.  The  Triple  AUia  nee,  as  the  treaty  was 
then  called,  bound  the  allies  to  help  each  other  if  attacked,  and 
to  endeavour  to  restore  peace  between  France  and  Spain,  on  the 
terrns  of  the  surrender  to  Louis,  either  of  the  districts  in  the 
Low  Countries  which  he  had  conquered,  or  of  Tranche  Comt6 
and  a  few  specified  frontier  towns  in  the  Netherlands.  By  a 
secret  clause  they  further  bound  themselves  to  compel  peace 
on  these  terms,  and,  if  France  refused,  they  agreed  to  make 
war  upon  her  until  she  was  reduced  to  the  boundaries  fixed  by 
the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees. 

This  was  the  first  serious  rebuff  which  the  diplomacy  of 
Louis  had  sustained.  His  minister  at  the  Hague,  d'Estrades, 
had  assured  him  again  and  again  that  he  need  Louis  out- 
not  be  under  any  apprehensions  of  the  formation  witted. 
of  a  confederation  contrary  to  his  interests  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Dutch,  because  by  the  constitution  of  the  United 
Provinces  every  treaty  required  the  sanction  of  the  estates  of 
the  different  provinces,  and  it  would  be  quite  easy  to  ensure 
its  publication,  and  bring  about  its  defeat,  when  it  was  pro- 
posed for  their  acceptance.  He  overlooked  the  fact  that  dur- 
ing the  war  with  England  the  provincial  estates,  in  order  to 
prevent  unnecessary  delays,  had  delegated  their  powers  to  a 
small  commission  of  eight  members,  and  had  never  resumed 
them.  So  while  d'Estrades  was  awaiting  in  confidence  the 
pubhcation  of  the  full  text  of  the  proposed  treaty  before  the 
provincial  estates,  de  Witt  quietly  procured  the  consent  of 
the  commission  of  delegates,  and  the  treaty  was  signed  and 
ratified  before  the  French  knew  that  it  had  been  even  dis- 
cussed. Louis  only  heard  of  the  secret  article  from  Charles 
II.  himself  He  at  once  saw  the  gravity  of  the  crisis,  and 
determined  to    put  himself  in  the  best  possible  position  for 


212  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

subsequent  action.  Though  it  was  the  middle  of  winter  Cond6 
received  orders  to  advance  into  Franche  Comt^  at  the  head 
of  15,000  men.  On  the  ist  of  February  his  soldiers  crossed 
the  frontier.  In  a  fortnight  the  whole  country  was  at  his 
feet,  and  Louis  went  in  person  to  Besangon  to  receive  its  sub- 
mission. Beati  possUentes  is  a  diplomatic  truth  which  was  just 
as  thoroughly  understood  by  Louis  xiv.  as  by  Napoleon. 

But   unlike    Napoleon,  Louis  knew  when  he  had  gone  far 

enough.     He  was  not  going  to  stake  everything  on  the  chance 

of  success  in  a  war  against  a  combination  of  Euro- 

The  Treaty  ,  ■    ,  •  , 

of  Aix-ia-  pean  powers,  which  was  certam  to  grow  larger  as 
chapeiie,  '(\vc\&  wcnt  on.  He  had  already  a  securer  foun- 
dation on  which  ultimately  to  raise  the  edifice  of 
French  domination  over  the  Spanish  Netherlands  in  his  secret 
partition  treaty  with  the  Emperor.  The  terms  of  the  Triple 
x\lliance  guaranteed  to  him  the  possession  of  Lille,  Tournai, 
and  Charleroi,  the  three  fortresses  which  would  make  France 
impregnable  on  her  north-eastern  frontier  and  open  to  her 
the  gate  of  the  Netherlands.  The  show  of  moderation  at  this 
juncture  would  do  much  to  disarm  the  suspicion  of  p]urope, 
would  give  him  time  to  mature  his  plans  for  the  future,  and 
enable  him  to  make  very  substantial  additions  to  his  power  in 
the  present.  So  Louis  declared  himself  willing  to  negotiate 
for  peace,  and  on  May  29th,  1668  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 
was  signed  between  France  and  Spain.  By  it  France  gave 
back  Franche  Comte,  having  dismantled  the  fortresses,  and 
received  Charleroi,  Binch,  Ath,  Douai,  Tournai,  Oadenarde, 
Lille,  .Armentieres,  Courtrai,  Bergues,  and  Furnes,  with  their 
districts.  Some  of  these  towns,  such  as  Courtrai,  Oudenarde, 
and  Ath  lay  within  the  Netherlands,  but  in  the  line  of  fortresses 
which  stretched,  roughly  speaking,  along  the  frontier  from 
Dunkirk  to  Charleroi,  and  included  Lille,  France  had  now  an 
adequate  defence  for  her  capital.  Paris  was  safe  and  the  inva- 
sions of  the  years  of  the  Fronde  could  never  again  recur. 

The  war  of  devolution  added  to  the  ambition  of  Louis  xiv. 
the  passion  of  revenge.     It  ministered  to  his  pride  by  showing 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces         213 

him  the  immense  superiority  of  his  armies,  and  the  predomi- 
nance almost  unchallenged  of  his  diplomacy.  No  soldier  had 
been  found  to  face  his  troops  in  the  field,  no  for-  u  .  ^  f 
tress  had  dared  to  resist  his  attack,  the  success  of  Louis  for  the 
his  diplomacy  had  even  broken  the  traditional  al-  ^"**^'^- 
liance  between  the  Emperor  and  Spain.  (]ermany  had  re- 
mained unconcerned  while  Spain  was  being  devoured.  There 
was  but  one  blot  on  this  fair  picture.  One  power  had  dared 
to  enter. the  lists  with  the  all-powerful  Louis  and  had  given 
him  a  fall.  The  Dutch  had  been  the  heart  and  soul  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  Without  them  it  would  never  have  been 
called  into  existence.  The  assistance  of  England  and  Sweden 
was  merely  fortuitous.  It  was  the  Dutch  who  were  organising 
a  policy  and  laying  down  principles  of  action.  It  was  galling 
enough  to  think  that  they  had  ventured  to  break  away  from 
their  condition  of  humble  tutelage.  To  the  Huguenots  of 
France  and  to  Henry  iv.  the  Dutch  owed  their  very  existence, 
so  every  Frenchman  believed.  That  they  should  be  permitted 
to  thwart  the  cherished  schemes  of  the  king  of  France  un- 
punished, to  show  to  Europe  the  way  by  which  it  could  suc- 
cessfully resist  French  ambition,  and  yet  go  scot-free,  was 
impossible.  From  the  day  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  Louis  set  himself  to  prepare  a  deadly  punishment 
for  the  insolent  republicans  who  had  dared  to  thwart  his  will. 
Europe  should  learn  by  a  terrible  object  lesson  that  the  ven- 
geance of  the  king  of  France  was  as  swift  as  his  spirit  was 
magnanimous. 

This  determination  to  punish  the  Dutch  meant  for  France 
and  for  Louis  the  deliberate  adoption  of  a  policy  which  had  for 
its  object  supremacy  over  Europe.     After  the  sue-    ^^  ^j^._ 
cess  of  the  Triple  Alliance  Louis  could  not  conceal   tionai  incen- 
from  himself  the  probability  that  an  attack  upon  the   *'ia^^°of*^* 
Protestant  maritime  and  republican  power  of  the   European 
United  Provinces  would  almost  certainly  lead  to  a   supremacy, 
coalition  of  European   powers  against  him.     Germany  would 
never  stand  aside  to  permit  the  destruction  of  the  Dutch.     It 


214  European  History,    1598-17 15 

was  more  than  doubtful  if  the  careless  Charles  would  have  the 
inclination  or  the  firmness  to  keep  England  neutral.  Every 
hour  that  Charles  of  Spain  lived  diminished  the  value  of  the 
partition  treaty  as  a  bribe  to  the  Emperor.  Louis  could  only 
wipe  the  United  Provinces  from  out  the  map  of  Europe  by 
making  himself  the  master  of  Europe.  For  four  years  he  hesi- 
tated before  striking  the  final  blow.  But  everything  led  him 
in  that  direction.  In  his  own  court,  besides  the  fulsome  at- 
mosphere of  adulation  in  which  he  lived,  which  must  have 
weakened  his  judgment,  many  influences  were  urging  him  on. 
Lionne,  the  cautious  and  trusted  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  was 
dead.  Louvois,  the  indefatigable  minister  of  war,  had  raised 
the  army  to  a  pitch  of  perfection  hitherto  unknown,  and  was 
anxious  to  prove  its  powers.  The  very  success  of  Colbert's 
finance  made  Louis  too  easily  forget  the  real  limits  of  the 
resources  upon  which  he  was  drawing  so  lavishly.  The  nobles, 
ousted  by  design  from  politics,  now  found  their  only  sphere 
of  activity  in  the  army,  and  were  eager  for  war  and  for  glory. 
Abroad  diplomatic  success  contributed  its  spur  to  his  ambition. 
The  Triple  Alliance  was  already  a  thing  of  the  past. 
Alliance  Ii^  May   1670  the  secret  treaty  of  Dover  bound 

overthrown,    Charles  II.  hand  and  foot  to  France.     In  November 

1670-1672.  ^  1  T^  1  -1 

16  7 1  the  Emperor  agreed  not  to  assist  the  enemies 
of  France.  In  April  1672  Sweden  returned  to  her  old  alliance, 
and  undertook  to  attack  the  Empire  if  the  Emperor  helped 
the  Dutch.  Finally  the  bishop  of  Miinster  and  most  of  the 
smaller  princes  of  Germany  promised  either  assistance  or 
neutrahty.  The  Great  Elector  alone  remained  stubbornly 
aloof.  These  astonishing  results  of  his  diplomacy,  added  to 
the  ceaseless  importunities  of  his  court,  fired  Louis's  ambition 
and  overcame  his  prudence.  Forgetting  that  promises  so 
easily  made  can  be  still  more  easily  revoked,  he  gave  the 
signal  for  a  war  of  aggression  pure  and  simple,  which  brought 
its  appropriate  and  ultimate  reward  in  the  wreck  of  his  am- 
bition and  the  exhaustion  of  France. 

Europe  must  have  been  craven -hearted   indeed  if  it  had 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces  215 

stood  tamely  by,  wrapped  in  the  cloak  of  its  own  selfishness, 
to  watch  the  death  throes  of  the  United  Provinces.  The  his- 
tory of  their  war  of  independence  was  sufficient  to  stir  the 
emotions  of  every  generous  soul,  the  use  which  The  United 
they  had  made  of  the  liberty  which  they  had  won  Provinces, 
such  as  to  guarantee  its  continuance  in  the  mind  of  every  pru- 
dent statesman.  Trained  to  a  rough  and  hard  life  by  a  constant 
struggle  with  nature,  consecrated  to  a  sturdy  individualism  of 
character  by  the  religion  of  Calvin  in  its  most  uncompromising 
and  fatalistic  form,  the  peasants  from  the  marshes  of  Holland 
and  the  fishermen  from  the  sand  banks  of  Zealand  had  found 
in  the  breath  of  liberty  the  elixir  of  a  national  life.  Under 
the  leadership  of  the  burghers  of  Amsterdam  and  Dordrecht, 
at  the  initiative  of  the  nobility  of  Zealand  and  Guelderland, 
with  the  support  of  the  scholars  of  Leyden,  the  Union  of 
Utrecht,  formed  in  1579,  gave  to  Europe  a  new  nationahty, 
and  planted  in  the  very  midst  of  the  great  monarchies  a  con- 
federation of  tiny  republics.  Nothing  could  have  preserved 
their  independence  at  first  except  a  strange  com-  Reasons  for 
bination  of  national  virtues,  natural  advantages,  the  success 
and  political  fortune.  Persecution  had  fanned  the  indepen- 
flame  of  patriotism  till  it  burned  at  a  white  heat,  dence. 
Under  the  pressure  of  a  long  struggle  with  a  superior  power 
even  vices  turned  into  virtues.  Slowness  and  obstinacy  became 
refined  into  patience  and  endurance,  dulness  into  obedience, 
sloth  into  fidelity.  Never  did  men  fight  with  greater  heroism, 
with  more  complete  self-forgetfulness,  than  these  rude  sailors 
and  fishermen  who  wrested  their  hberty  and  their  religion  at 
the  edge  of  the  sword  from  the  pride  of  Spain.  The  physical 
characteristics  of  the  country  aided  them.  Campaigns  were 
difficult  in  a  land  which  at  any  moment  might  be  restored  to 
the  sea  by  the  cutting  of  a  dyke.  Sieges  of  towns  open  to  the 
sea  by  a  power  which  had  no  navy  were  fore-doomed  to 
failure.  Political  complications  aided  them  also.  The  op- 
position of  France  and  the  jealousy  of  England  made  the  task 
of  Spain  far  more  difficult.     But  neither  the  sympathy  of  the 


2i6  European  History,   1598-17 15 

Huguenots,  nor  the  gold  of  Elizabeth,  nor  the  marshes  oi 
Holland,  nor  the  defeat  of  the  Armada,  would  have  availed 
one  jot  to  save  the  confederation  from  ultimate  ruin  had  it  not 
been  for  the  tenacity,  the  patriotism,  and  the  self-sacrifice  of 
the  nation  itself.  Never  since  the  days  of  Miltiades  and 
Themistocles  did  a  people  better  deserve  their  freedom  than 
did  the  patient  Dutch  under  their  silent  prince  when  the 
dagger  of  the  assassin  laid  him  low  in  1584.  They  had  not 
long  to  wait,  for  although  the  formal  independence  of  the 
United  Provinces  was  not  acknowledged  by  Spain  until  the 
peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648,  they  had  ceased  to  be  under  any 
fear  of  subjugation  since  the  death  of  Philip  11.  in  1598,  and 
had  been  able  since  the  beginning  of  the  century  to  transfer 
their  attention  from  the  preservation  of  their  liberty  to  the 
development  of  their  power. 

The  confederation  of  the  seven  United  Provinces,  formed 
by  the  Union  of  Uirecht  in  1579,  was  an  example  of  a  kind 
Constitution  °^  government  seldom  found  in  history  to  be  per- 
of  the  United  manent,  namely  a  loose  confederation  of  sovereign 
Provinces.  states.  The  confederated  states  were  seven  in 
number,  Holland,  Friesland,  Zealand,  Utrecht,  Guelderland, 
Overyssel,  and  Groningen.  Each  of  these  independent  prov- 
inces had  its  own  government  vested  in  its  provincial  estates 
and  its  stadtholder ;  but  the  common  affairs  of  the  whole 
confederation  were  transacted  in  the  estates  general,  which 
was  a  representative  body  consisting  of  delegates  from  the 
provincial  estates.  To  them  appertained  the  right  of  appoint- 
ing the  captain  general  and  the  admiral  general,  who  were 
the  heads  of  the  mihtary  and  naval  forces  of  the  confederation. 
With  them  was  associa.ted  a  council  of  state  in  whom  the 
executive  was  vested.  ,  The  stadtholder,  for  the  chief  prov- 
inces usually  elected  the  same  stadtholder,  in  virtue  of  his 
office,  was  a  member  of  the  council  of  state  and  of  the  pro- 
vincial estates  as  well  as  of  the  estates  general.  He  appointed 
the  burgomasters  of  the  towns,  and  the  principal  magistrates, 
and  had  the  right  of  acting  as  arbiter  in  any  matters  of  differ- 


Lo7iis  XIV.  and  the   United  Provinces  217 

ence  which  arose  between  the  provinces.  In  theory  therefore 
the  constitution  of  the  provinces  was  that  of  a  confederation 
of  sovereign  states,  which  had  entrusted  certain  functions  of 
government,  such  as  the  organisation  of  defence,  to  a  repre- 
sentative body  of  delegates  and  an  elective  chief  magistrate  ; 
but  had  retained  to  themselves  certain  others,  such  as  finance 
and  foreign  affairs.  But  in  practice  the  influences  which  made 
for  unity  were  very  much  stronger  than  the  disintegrating 
forces.  The  independence  of  the  separate  provinces  was 
much  more  apparent  than  real,  and  served  rather  to  increase 
delay  and  multiply  difficulties  than  to  preserve  any  real  inde- 
pendence of  action.  This  came  about  from  various  causes. 
Owing  to  the  spirit  of  republicanism  engendered  by 
the  war  of  independence,  and  the  secularisation  of  of  the'burgh- 
Church  property  and  the  overthrow  of  the  Church  ^^  aristoc- 
system  brought  about  by  the  Reformation,  the  two 
orders  of  the  nobles  and  of  the  clergy  lost  all  share  in  the  gov- 
ernment. Political  power  fell  completely  into  the  hands  of  the 
citizens  of  the  towns,  and  was  exercised  through  the  municipal 
councils,  which  were  in  fact  in  each  town  the  nominees  of 
a  small  burgher  aristocracy.  Each  province  therefore  was 
in  reality,  as  far  as  politics  were  concerned,  nothing  more 
than  a  federation  of  towns,  and  the  provincial  estates  but 
the  delegates  of  the  municipal  councils.  This  limitation  of 
all  political  power  to  one  class,  that  of  the  burgher  aristocracy, 
did  much  to  secure  a  unity  of  interest  among  the  different 
provinces.  This  was  still  further  developed  by  the  unique 
position  of  the  province  of  Holland  in  the  con-    ,,  . 

^  ^  Unique 

federation.  It  was  so  far  superior  to  the  other  position  of 
provinces  in  wealth,  in  population,  and  in  dignity,  ^°"*"^- 
that  in  common  talk  it  has  given  its  name  to  the  whole 
republic.  It  contained  within  its  borders  the  great  trading 
towns  of  Amsterdam,  Rotterdam,  Delft,  and  Dordrecht,  Ley- 
den  the  seat  of  the  university,  and  the  Hague  the  centre 
of  the  government.  It  alone  had  the  right  of  being  repre- 
sented at  the  courts  of  Paris   and  Vienna.     It  paid  in  taxes 


2i8  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

almost  as  much  as  all  the  other  provinces  put  together.  From 
its  ports  issued  year  by  year  the  merchant  ships  which  had 
acquired  for  the  United  Provinces  the  carrying  trade  of  the 
world,  the  navy  which  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  was 
the  undisputed  mistress  of  the  ocean,  and  the  bands  of  hardy 
colonists  who  had  planted  the  Dutch  flag  in  every  quarter  of 
the  globe.  The  great  city  of  Amsterdam  itself,  with  its  banks, 
its  docks,  and  its  thousands  of  fishermen  and  artisans,  founded, 
as  it  was  said,  on  the  carcases  of  herrings,  was  the  centre  of 
the  commerce  and  the  opulence  of  northern  Europe.  The 
Venice  of  the  North,  alike  in  her  commercial  prosperity  and 
her  close  oligarchical  government,  she  so  far  dominated  over 
all  her  colleagues  that  in  the  days  of  her  greatness  the  United 
Provinces  were  little  less  than  Amsterdam  writ  large.  Shorn 
of  the  province  of  Holland,  the  country  certainly  could  not 
have  maintained  its  independence  for  a  moment. 

To  the  unity  of  interest  thus  secured  by  the  ascendency 
of  the  burgher  aristocracy,  and  the  unquestioned  leadership 
T      ,     . .        of  Holland  in  all  national  concerns,  the  House  of 

Leadership  ' 

of  the  House  Orange  added  a  continuity  of  government.  If  the 
o  range.  United  Provinces  owed  their  prosperity  to  Hol- 
land, they  owned  their  very  existence  to  the  House  of  Orange. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  statesmanship  of  William  the  Silent 
they  would  never  have  won  their  independence,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  generalship  of  Maurice  they  would  never  have 
maintained  it.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  patriotism  and  moder- 
ation of  both  they  would  have  lost  their  republicanism  as  soon 
as  they  had  gained  it.  But  fortunately  for  the  Dutch  republic 
the  princes  of  the  House  of  Orange  preferred  to  exercise  most 
of  the  powers  of  limited  kingship  under  the  guise  of  an  elective 
magistracy.  The  head  of  the  House  of  Orange  combined  in 
his  person  by  elections,  which  were  never  questioned  for  seventy 
years,  the  offices  of  stadtholder  of  five  provinces,  of  captain 
general  and  of  admiral  general  of  the  republic.  For  the  first 
and  most  critical  half  century  in  the  history  of  the  nation  the 
supreme  management  of  the  civil  military  and  naval  affairs  of 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces         219 

the  country  were  in  the  hands  of  one  family,  not  indeed  by 
hereditary  right,  but  by  an  elective  custom  which  had  grown  at 
least  strong  enough  to  be  described  as  an  hereditary  right  to 
election.  Under  their  wise  government  the  prosperity  of  the 
United  Provinces  had  grown  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The  de- 
struction of  the  Armada  in  1588  removed  from  the  northern 
seas  all  enemies  to  Dutch  trade.  France,  torn  by  civil  and 
foreign  war,  could  not  man  a  warship  or  despatch  a  merchant 
fleet.  England  was  a  more  serious  rival,  but  political  friendship 
kept  for  a  time  commercial  enmities  in  check.  The  world 
was  found  large  enough  for  both  countries,  and  while  English 
enterprise  tended  to  flow  in  the  direction  of  America  and  the 
West,  the  Dutch  pursued  their  conquests  in  Africa  and  the 
East.  In  the  East  Indies  alone,  the  famous  Spice  Islands  of 
romance,  the  two  nations  found  themselves  in  acute  and  deadly 
rivalry,  and  for  some  years  a  war  raged  on  the  other  side  of 
the  globe  between  the  servants  of  the  two  East  India  com- 
panies, which  was  only  taken  notice  of  by  the  home  govern- 
ments when  some  serious  breach  of  international  rights,  such 
as  the  massacre  of  Amboyna,  forced  them  to  open  their  eyes 
and  lazily  demand  compensation. 

With  the  dawn  of  the  seventeenth  century  everything  seemed 
to  be  conspiring  to  promote  the  prosperity  of  the  country. 
England  became  more  and  more  entangled  in  prosperity  of 
complications  at  home,  and  under  a  weak  and  the  Dutch, 
vain  king  gave  less  and  less  assistance  to  her  '  °°~'  ^°' 
traders.  In  the  north,  Sweden  and  Denmark,  engaged  first 
in  war  among  themselves  and  then  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War, 
easily  let  the  Baltic  trade  imperceptibly  glide  into  the  hands  of 
the  Dutch.  Neither  Germany  nor  France  were  in  a  position 
to  enter  the  lists  with  the  republic,  and  the  decaying  power  of 
the  Hansa  fell  completely  before  the  blast  of  the  great  war. 
The  United  Provinces,  it  is  true,  were  forced  to  take  their  part 
in  the  struggle,  but  under  the  cautious  and  talented  Frederick 
Henry,  the  younger  son  of  William  the  Silent,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded his  brother    Maurice  in   1625,  the    Dutch    contingent 


220  European  History,   1 598-1715 

did  little  more  than  garrison  the  duchy  of  Cleves,  and  keep  the 
Low  Countries  quiet.  Meanwhile  the  whole  world  was  open 
to  their  enterprise.  There  was  literally  not  a  country  to  com- 
pete with  them,  even  feebly,  as  the  troubles  in  England  thick- 
ened. They  captured  Brazil  from  Spain,  and  founded  on  the 
coast  of  North  America  the  colonies  of  New  Holland  and  New 
Jersey,  settled  in  Africa,  in  Ceylon,  and  on  the  mainland  of 
India,  planted  themselves  on  the  rich  island  of  Java,  and 
finally  in  1630  made  themselves  masters  of  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope.  In  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  they 
enjoyed  a  colonial  empire  larger  than  that  of  Venice  in  its 
palmy  days.  They  were  undisputed  masters  of  the  seas,  they 
had  almost  the  monopoly  of  the  carrying  trade  of  the  world. 
V  But  in  this  very  prosperity  lay  the  germs  of  future  trouble 
both  abroad  and  at  home.  The  frog  might  swell  itself  even 
J  to  bursting  point,  but  it  could  not  rival  the  dimen- 

between  the     sions  of  the  OX.     The  wonderful  maritime  success 
republican       ^^  ^j^^  Dutch  was  duc  largely  to  the  fact  that  its 

party  and  the  _  .     o     y 

House  of         two  great  neighbours  of  England  and  France,  who 
Orange.  were  better  situated  geographically  for  the  develop- 

ment of  trade,  were  in  the  throes  of  foreign  and  domestic  war. 
When  peace  was  restored,  and  men  had  leisure  once  more  to 
attend  to  the  affairs  of  commerce,  it  was  not  likely  that  the 
hardy  sailors  of  Brittany  and  Devonshire  would  long  lag  behind 
the  fishermen  of  Zealand  or  the  traders  of  Amsterdam  in  the 
race  for  wealth.  It  was  not  possible  that  the  Dutch,  however 
high  their  courage,  however  great  their  skill,  however  tough 
their  pride,  could  long  compete  on  equal  terms  with  either 
monarchy.  They  could  not  pretend  to  do  so  even  if  they  were 
united  among  themselves,  but  that  was  not  the  case.  The 
great  increase  of  wealth  and  prosperity  intensified  instead  of 
diminishing  their  internal  jealousies.  Ever  since  the  Union  of 
Utrecht  there  had  been  two  distinct  parties  in  the  state,  the 
partisans  of  the  House  of  Orange  and  the  republicans  pure  and 
simple,  the  former  representing  the  political  principles  of  a 
'  limited  monarchy,  the  latter  those  of  a  burgher  oligarchy.     In 


Loiiis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces         221 

the  civil  and  military  authority  enjoyed  by  the  princes  of  the 
House  of  Orange,  through  their  quasi-hereditary  tenure  of  the 
stadtholderate  and  of  the  supreme  military  and  naval  com- 
mand, their  adherents  saw  the  only  guarantee  which  their 
country  possessed  against  the  dangers  of  internal  discord. 
They  looked  upon  this  concentration  of  authority  in  the  hands 
of  one  family  as  essential  to  the  solidarity  of  the  state,  and 
valued  it  all  the  more  because  they  believed  it  to  be  the  only 
effective  counterpoise  to  the  overweening  pride  and  political 
domination  of  Amsterdam.  Their  weakness  lay  in  the  fact  that 
their  adherents  were  mainly  drawn  from  the  classes  of  the 
nobles  the  clergy  and  the  peasantry,  who  had  very  little  politi- 
cal power.  Only  in  the  province  of  Zealand,  where  the  House 
of  Orange  had  large  possessions,  were  the  majority  of  the  town 
councils  in  their  favour.  But  the  very  fact  of  their  political 
weakness  as  compared  with  their  numerical  strength  inspired 
them  with  a  jealousy  all  the  more  intense  of  their  more  fortu- 
nate republican  neighbours  of  the  towns.  These  latter  were 
imbued  with  the  narrowest  spirit  of  burgher  exclusiveness. 
They  feared  alike  the  democratic  tendencies  of  the  populace 
and  the  monarchical  instincts  of  the  House  of  Orange.  Within 
a  small  circle  of  capitalist  famihes  the  functions  of  government 
were  divided  pretty  equally.  Any  member  of  these  privileged 
families,  if  his  capacities  were  equal  to  the  charge,  had  the 
opportunity  of  being  trained  in  the  public  service  from  his 
earliest  years.  He  succeeded  as  naturally  to  the  diplomatic 
or  administrative  business  of  his  father  or  his  uncle  in  the 
political  family  party,  as  he  did  to  the  management  of  the 
family  business  or  the  ownership  of  the  family  ships. 

During  the  first  few  years  of  the  history  of  the  republic, 
while  the  issue  of  the  war  with  Spain  was  still  doubtful,  the 
military  necessities  of  the  country  forced  the  House  of  Orange 
into  prominence,  and  kept  the  republican  spirit  in  check. 
But  as  political  dangers  from  outside  grew  less  serious,  and 
the  wealth  and  importance  of  the  citizen  traders  became  by 
far  the  most  important  factors  of  the  national  life,  the  politicai 


222  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

preponderance  of  the  republican  party,  who  drew  their  strength 
from  the  merchant  class,  soon  threatened  to  be  decisive.  The 
G  th  of  province  of  Holland,  which  was  republican  to  a 
the  Repubii-  man,  assumcd  an  unquestioned  lead  in  the  national 
can  Party.  councils.  It  alone  had  the  right  of  appointing  a 
representative  at  the  courts  of  Paris  and  Vienna.  It  alone 
paid  more  than  half  the  national  taxes.  It  alone  provided 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  national  fleet.  Partly  owing  to  these 
circumstances,  partly  to  his  own  abilities,  as  early  as  the  begin- 
oiden  Barne-  "ing  of  the  century  the  Advocate  of  the  province 
veldt.  of  Holland,  John  Olden  Barneveldt,  had  insensibly 

become  the  foremost  statesman  of  the  republic.  In  theory  he 
was  only  the  spokesman  or  first  minister  of  the  provincial 
estates  of  Holland,  in  fact  he  was  the  leader  of  the  republican 
party  and  for  a  few  years  virtual  ruler  of  the  republic.  He  it 
was  who  negotiated  with  foreign  states  and  determined  the 
national  policy.  Already  then  it  seemed  as  if  the  supreme 
power  in  the  republic  had  shifted  from  the  stadtholder  and 
the  House  of  Orange  to  the  representative  of  the  republican 
merchants  of  Amsterdam.  But  Maurice,  prince  of  Orange, 
the  eldest  son  of  William  the  Silent,  was  not  going  to  let  power 
slip  out  of  his  hands  so  easily.  Taking  advantage  of  a  quarrel 
between  Barneveldt  and  his  staunch  ally  and  protector  Henry 
IV.,  he  very  skilfully  managed  to  direct  upon  him. 
Execution  of    j^f^.    ^j^^^g   defenceless,    the   whole   weight   of    the 

Barneveldt  '  ° 

brought  about  Cruelty  and   fanaticism  of  the   Calvinistic   clergy, 
by  Maurice  of  gy  ^  crime,  more  atrocious  than  that  of  the  assas- 

Nassau,  loio.       /       . 

sination  of  his  own  father,  because  of  the  hypocrisy 
which  accompanied  it,  he  brought  Barneveldt  to  the  scaffold 
in  1 6 10  by  a  sentence  of  judicial  murder. 

The  villainy  was  eminently  successful.  For  forty  years  the 
republican  party  suppressed  itself,  and  the  government  of  the 
republic  remained  without  question  in  the  hands  of  the  stadt- 
holders  of  the  House  of  Orange :  Maurice,  Frederick  Henry, 
and  William  11.  Indeed,  when  this  halcyon  period  came  to 
an  end,  it  was  the  ambition  of  the  stadtholder,  not  the  pride 


Louis  XIV.  and  the   United  Provinces         223 

of  the  republicans,  which  was  at  fault.  William  11.  had 
married  a  daughter  of  Charles  i.  of  England,  and  undeterred 
by  the  fate  of  his   father-in-law  and  the  outbreak   ^„ 

•'  Government 

of  the  Fronde  he  determined  to  effect  a  coup  d'etat  of  Maurice, 
and  turn  the  stadtholderate  into  a  monarchy.     Tust   ^"■^'^""^'^ 

-'        -'  Henry,  and 

before  his  death  Frederick  Henry  had  negotiated  wiiuam  11., 
with  Spain  a  treaty  at  Miinster,  finally  ratified  in  '^'°-'65o. 
January  1648,  by  which  Spain  and  the  United  Provinces  agreed 
to  unite  togeth^  in  defence  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  against 
French  aggression,  on  condition  that  Spain  closed  the  Scheldt 
to  trading  vessels  and  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the 
republic.  A  more  favourable  treaty  to  the  United  Provinces 
cannot  be  imagined,  for  by  it  they  obtained  a  barrier  between 
their  own  territories  and  those  of  France,  and  secured  the 
trade  monopoly  of  Amsterdam.  Yet  William  11.  in  his  insen- 
sate ambition  actually  agreed  to  throw  all  these  advantages 
away,  and  allow  France  to  seize  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  in 
return  for  the  consent  of  Mazarin  to  his  projected  revolution. 
Having  thus  secured  the  neutrality  of  France  he  proceeded  to 
put  his  scheme  into  execution.     He  was   sure  of 

Attempted 

the  support  of  the  army  and  of  Zealand,  and  need  coup  d'etat 
not  fear  the  opposition  of  any  of  the  other  prov-  °^  Wiiiiam 
inces  except  Holland.  His  first  business  accord- 
-ingly  was  to  get  up  a  quarrel  between  the  States-General  and 
the  provincial  estates  of  Holland  about  the  disbandment  of 
some  troops,  then,  posing  as  the  champion  of  the  States- 
General,  obtained  from  them  authority  to  take  measures  for  the 
preservation  of  the  union,  and  to  put  pressure  upon  the  estates 
of  Holland.  This  was  sufficient  for  him.  After  some  negotia- 
tion, on  the  30th  of  July  1650  he  suddenly  arrested  six  of  the 
leading  deputies  of  Holland,  and  directed  his  troops  to  march 
during  the  night  upon  Amsterdam.  The  city  was  saved  by  the 
merest  accident.  The  night  was  dark  and  rainy,  the  troops 
lost  their  way.  When  day  broke  they  were  still  outside  the 
town.  The  alarm  was  given.  Only  one  magistrate  Cornelius 
Bicker  von   Swieten    happened  to  be  in  the  city,  but   it  was 


224  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

enough.  The  gates  were  closed,  the  drawbridges  raised,  the 
militia  called  out,  and  Amsterdam  was  safe,  and  with  Arnster- 
^     .  dam  the  republic.     A  coup  d''etat  was  now  impos- 

wiUiam  II.,  sible.  William  saw  he  could  only  succeed  by  civil 
'^5°'  war  and  he  did  not  dare  to  give  the  signal  for  that. 

For  five  months  both  sides  eyed  each  other  suspiciously,  but 
neither  dared  to  move.  Suddenly,  in  November  1650,  William 
was  seized  with  a  violent  fever,  and  died  in  a  few  days. 

The  tragic  death  of  William  11.  decided  the  crisis  in  favour 

of  the  repubUcan  party.     Some  weeks  after  the  death  of  the 

stadtholder   his   wife   gave    birth    to    a    son,  the 

Supremacy  "  ' 

oftherepub-  futurc  William  III.  of  England.  It  was  obviously 
hcan  party,  impossible  to  appoint  an  infant  in  his  cradle  to 
the  supreme  command  of  the  civil  and  military  affairs  of  the 
country.  It  was  undesirable  to  ignore  the  seriousness  of  the 
danger  from  which  the  republic  had  accidentally  been  saved. 
The  republican  party  at  once  seized  the  opportunity  and 
asserted  their  superiority.  A  grand  assembly  was  held  at 
the  Hague  in  January  1651  to  decide  the  constitutional  points 
which  had  arisen,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  stadtholderate 
should  remain  vacant,  and  the  functions  of  the  office  devolve 
upon  the  provincial  estates  ;  while  the  supreme  military  and 
naval  command  was  divided  between  the  estates  general  and 
the  provincial  estates.  The  real  gainers  by  this  arrangement 
were  the  provincial  estates  of  Holland.  Freed  from  the  rights 
of  the  stadtholder  political  power  naturally  gravitated  to  the 
centre  of  the  wealth  and  intelligence  of  the  nation.  In  the 
provincial  estates  of  Holland  it  found  a  body  of  men  thor- 
oughly capable  of  using  it,  and  a  chief  admirably  adapted  to 
the  task  of  working  its  delicate  machinery.  In  John  de  Witt, 
grand  pensionary  of  Dordrecht,  elected  grand  pensionary  ol 
Holland  in  1653,  the  republican  party  found  a  champion,  and 
the  United  Provinces  a  minister,  second  to  none  in  Europe 
for  skill  honesty  and  acumen. 

Called  at  the  age  of  twenty-eight  to  the  post  of  first  minister 
of  Holland,  John  de  W^itt  brought  to  his  task  quaUties  of  mind 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Proi'inces         225 

and  character  singularly  fitted  to  the  part  he  had  to  play. 
In  him  the  virtues  of  Dutch  republicanism  shone  pre-emi- 
nent.    Homely  and  frugal  in  life,  straightforward 

r  J      ,    •       ^  A-       -c    A    ■  John  de  Witt. 

in  policy,  patient  m  temper,  dignified  in  manner, 
persevering  in  action,  no  reverse  could  daunt  his  spirit,  no 
success  destroy  his  self-control.  To  the  somewhat  phlegmatic 
temper  of  the  Dutch  character  de  Witt  added  also  the  finer 
qualities  of  the  Latin  races.  Shrewd  foresight,  quick  inventive- 
ness, ready  adaptation  of  means  to  the  end  marked  his  man- 
agement of  foreign  affairs.  He  was  the  only  diplomatist  of 
Europe  whose  fertility  of  resource  completely  outgeneralled 
Louis  XIV.,  whose  steadfastness  of  purpose  completely  baffled 
the  shiftiness  of  Charles  11.  Winning  persuasiveness  of  speech 
adorned  with  rich  eloquence  of  phrase  gave  him  perfect  mas- 
tery over  the  assemblies  whom  it  was  his  business  to  lead. 
But  the  dominant  note  in  his  character  and  policy  was  his 
staunch  almost  fanatical  belief  in  republican  principles.  Re- 
publicanism to  him  was  the  whole  of  patriotism,  and  almost 
half  of  religion.  His  own  father,  Jacob  de  Witt,  had  been  one 
of  the  deputies  imprisoned  by  WilHam  11.  during  his  abortive 
attempt  to  make  himself  king.  John  de  Witt  never  forgot  the 
dull  horror  of  those  anxious  days,  when  each  hour  as  it  sped 
seemed  to  be  tolling  the  knell  at  once  of  his  father's  life  and 
of  his  country's  liberty.  From  that  moment  the 
ambition  of  the  House  of  Orange  seemed  to  him  to  sition  to  the 
be  as  great  a  danger  to  his  country  as  the  aggressive-  House  of 
ness  of  France  or  the  rivalry  of  England.  To  keep 
down  the  national  sentiment  in  favour  of  the  young  prince,  to 
resist  his  hereditary  claim  to  the  stadtholderate  and  the  com- 
mand of  the  forces,  to  strengthen  the  hold  of  the  estates  of 
Holland  over  the  government  became  the  keynotes  of  his 
home  policy,  measures  which  he  considered  as  essential  to 
the  well-being  of  his  country  as  the  maintenance  of  a  barrier 
between  France  and  the  Scheldt. 

The  infancy  of  the  young  prince,  and  the  consequent  victory 
of  republican  principles  in  the  great  assembly  of  165 1,  made 

PERIOD  v.  .  p 


226  European  History,   1598-17 15 

the  danger  from  the  House  of  Orange  for  the  time  impercepti- 
ble. When  John  de  Witt  became  Grand  Pensionary  of  Hol- 
land in  1653,  the  safety  of  the  republic  was  threatened  not  by 
civil  dissension  but  by  foreign  conquest.  With  the  restoration 
Quarrel  of  Order  in  England  by  the  defeat  of  the  king  in 

between  the     ^^g  ^ivil  war  had  naturallv  come  a  considerable  in- 

United  Prov-  .  '  .  j       i  t->         i 

inces  and  creasc  HI  commercial  enterprise,  and  the  Dutch 
England.  traders  became  once  more  sensible  of  English 
rivalry  and  opposition  in  every  part  of  the  globe.  To  this 
natural  rivalry  gradually  became  added  special  causes  of 
disagreement.  During  the  interval  between  the  defeat  of  the 
king  and  the  reduction  of  the  EngHsh  possessions  in  the  West 
Indies  by  the  Parliament,  the  loyal  colonists  had  preferred  to 
trade  with  a  foreign  power  whose  chief  was  closely  related  to 
their  king,  rather  than  with  the  rebels  of  their  own  country 
who  had  imprisoned  him.  Consequently  the  Dutch  had  suc- 
ceeded in  withdrawing  from  English  merchants  the  bulk  of 
their  American  trade.  To  settle  this  matter  and  some  others 
the  Parliament  sent  to  the  Hague  in  May  1649  ^^i  envoy. 
Dr.  Dorislaus,  who  had  been  one  of  the  late  king's  judges. 
While  he  was  at  the  Hague  in  the  character  of  ambassador, 
he  was  murdered  by  some  of  Montrose's  men  by  way  of  re- 
prisal for  the  death  of  Charles  i.  In  extreme  anger  at  this 
insult  St.  John  was  sent  in  1651  to  demand  from  the  estates 
general  the  expulsion  of  prince  Charles  and  his  adherents, 
and  their  consent  to  the  union  of  the  two  republics  under  a 
common  government,  which  should  have  its  seat  in  England. 
The  Act  of  '^^^  estates  general  naturally  refused  to  surrender 
Navigation,  on  demand  the  independence  which  they  had 
'^^''  fought   so    hard   to  win,  and  in  August  1651  the 

English  Parliament  passed  the  Act  of  Navigation  which  was  in 
reality  the  signal  for  war.  By  this  famous  act  the  policy  was 
first  enunciated  which  was  to  govern  the  relations  of  the  great 
maritime  powers  to  their  colonies  for  a  century  and  a  half,  the 
policy  namely  which  regarded  colonies  as  the  mere  feeders  of 
the  mother  country.     It  enacted  that  foreign  ships  might  only 


Loiiis  XIV.  and  the   United  Provuices  227 

import  into  England  the  products  of  the  countries  to  which 
they  belonged.  It  was  directed  obviously  against  the  Dutch, 
who  were  at  that  time  the  great  carriers  of  the  world,  and  was 
intended  not  only  to  destroy  the  trade  of  the  Dutch  with  the 
English  colonics,  but  also  to  enable  the  English  ships  to  wrest 
the  bulk  of  the  carrying  trade  from  their  hands.   „, 

■'      °  War  with 

War   at   once    broke  out,  in  which  the  genius  of  England, 
Blake  and  the  superior  guns  of  the  English  fleets   '^51-1654- 
triumphed  over  the  tenacity  of  Tromp  and  the  valour  of  Opdam. 
The  Dutch  merchant  shipping  was  shut  up  behind  the  Texel. 
The  English  remained  masters  of  the  sea.     Even  the  Portu- 
guese dared  to  seize  Brazil,  while  at  home  the  people,  deprived 
of  their  trade,  and  unable   to  fish,  were  beginning  to  suffer 
severely.     De  Witt  saw  the  necessity  of  making  peace.     Crom- 
well, who  had  now  succeeded  to  the  chief  power  in  England, 
proved  an  easier  taskmaster  than   the  Parliament  had  been. 
He  was  willing  to  leave  the  United  Provinces  their  independ- 
ence, but  he  exacted  their  consent  to  the  Act  of  Navigation, 
and    their  acknowledgment  of  the  superiority  of  the  English 
flag.     Sharing  with  de  Witt  his  dislike  to  the  House  of  Orange, 
whom  he  looked  upon  as  the  chief  supporters  of  the  Stuart 
cause   in    Europe,    he    insisted    on   the    perpetual   ^^^  ^^^  ^j 
exclusion  of  that  house    from   the    stadtholderate    Exclusion, 
by  the    estates   of  Holland,  as   a   necessary  pre-   '^^^' 
liminary  to  peace.     After  protracted  negotiations  a  treaty  was 
at  last  signed  on  this  basis  in  1654. 

John  de  Witt  had  thus  succeeded  in  saving  his  country  from 
destruction  and  in  dealing  his  chief  enemy  a  serious  blow  at 
the  same  time.     To  do  away  with  the  rivalry  of  the 

Continued 

two  nations,  and  to  make  the  Dutch  forget  that  a   rivalry  with 
foreign  power  had  compelled  them  to  do  injustice   England, 
to  a  family  which  had  served  them  with  singular 
loyalty  was  beyond  his  power.     The  war  ceased  but  the  causes 
of  the  war  remained.     Each  country  was  ready  to  continue 
the  struggle  when  a  fitting  opportunity  presented  itself,  but  as 
long  as  the  Commonwealth  existed  in  England  an  identity  of 


228  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

interest  between  the  two  governments  served  to  keep  things 
quiet.  The  English  Restoration  in  May  1660  altered  these 
relations,  and  so  far  strengthened  the  partisans  of  the  House 
of  Orange  as  to  enable  them  to  demand  and  gain  the  revoca- 
tion of  the  Act  of  Exclusion  by  the  estates  of  Holland  in 
September  1660.  The  accession  of  Louis  xiv.  to  power  in 
1 66 1  further  weakened  the  republican  party  by  placing  at  the 
head  of  the  councils  of  Europe  one  who  regarded  all  republics 
with  aversion,  and  looked  upon  *  messieurs  les  marchands '  his 
neighbours  with  a  contempt  which  was  born  of  envy.  Every 
month  tidings  came  to  the  English  government  of  some  fresh 
defeat  of  the  East  India  Company  by  its  Dutch  rival,  of  some 
new  indignity  inflicted  on  English  sailors.  Even  the  slave 
trade  to  Barbadoes  had  passed  into  Dutch  hands.  The  time 
seemed  to  have  arrived  when  it  was  necessary  to  make  reprisals. 
In  1664  a  piratical  fleet  was  sent  with  the  cognisance  of  the 
English  government  to  the  Guinea  coast,  which  captured  sev- 
eral Dutch  ships  and  drove  out  the  Dutch  settlers  from  Goree 
and  other  places.  In  the  same  year  a  similar  expedition  to 
America  seized  New  Amsterdam,  which  Charles  unblushingly 
accepted  and  made  over  to  his  brother  James,  from  whom  it 
took  its  better  known  name  of  New  York.     After  this 

Second  war  .  .,,  i-nj-         ^       y  y      ■  r 

with  Eng-  war  was  mevitabie,  and  m  March  1665  it  was  form- 
land,  1665-  ally  declared.  The  Dutch  had  profited  by  the  ex- 
perience of  the  late  struggle  ;  their  ships  were  now 
better  manned  and  their  guns  of  heavier  calibre.  Only  in 
seamanship  did  the  English  have  the  superiority,  but  that 
sovereign  quality  could  not  fail  to  make  itself  felt.  Gradually, 
after  heroic  struggles,  the  Dutch  were  beaten  back.  On  June 
3d,  1665,  Opdam  was  defeated  and  killed  off"  Lowestoft.  A 
year  later  in  the  terrible  four  days'  battle  in  the  Downs  Ruyter 
and  Tromp  were  driven  back  to  the  Texel.  In  August  Ruyter 
was  forced  by  Monk  to  take  refuge  in  the  shallows  of  Zealand, 
and  the  Dutch  merchant  fleet  was  burned  in  the  harbours  of 
Flie.  The  misfortunes  of  the  war  renewed  civil  dissensions. 
Again  was  heard  in  louder  accents  the  cry  for  the  restoration 


Louis  XIV.  and  tJic  United  Provinces  229 

of  the  House  of  Orange,  and  de  Witt  found  himself  obliged 
at  least  to  accept  the  young  prince  as  the  child  of  the  state 
and  educate  him  in  the  affairs  of  government. 

Neither  foreign  war  nor  civil  disturbance  could  damp  the 
energy  of  de  Witt.  He  ceaselessly  endeavoured  to  repair  by 
diplomacy  what  he  had  lost  by  arms,  and  he  partly  Energy  of  de 
succeeded.  Louis  was  bound  by  treaty  to  help  witt. 
the  Dutch,  and,  although  it  was  not  possible  to  induce  him  to 
give  active  assistance  of  any  value  to  a  nation  whom  he  hated 
and  intended  to  ruin,  de  Witt  did  succeed  for  some  time  in 
preventing  him  from  making  common  cause  with  the  P^nglish. 
With  other  nations  he  was  more  fortunate.  Denmark  and 
the  Great  Elector  openly  allied  themselves  with  the  Dutch  in 
1666,  and  compelled  the  warlike  bishop  of  Miinster  to  make 
peace,  who  had  invaded  Overyssel  in  the  interests  of  England 
the  year  before.  Th^^Quadnxple.  ..Alliance  signed  later  in  the 
year  1666  between  the  United  Provinces,  Brandenburg,  Den- 
mark, and  Brunswick- Liineburg,  secured  to  de  Witt  help  in 
the  case  of  French  aggression.  But  the  most  effective  allies  of 
the  Dutch  came  from  the  enemies'  camp.  The  recklessness 
of  Charles's  extravagance  made  it  impossible  properly  to  repair 
the  necessary  ravages  of  even  victorious  war.  The  great 
plague  which  devastated  London  and  its  neighbourhood  in 
1665,  and  the  great  fire  which  destroyed  half  the  city  in  1666, 
made  the  raising  of  supplies  more  difficult  still.  At  the 
beginning  of  1667  England  though  victorious  was  exhausted 
and  almost  bankrupt.  Charles  in  his  isolation  had  recourse 
to  Louis.  By  a  secret  engagement  negotiated  through  the 
queen-mother,  Henrietta  Maria,  Charles  threw  himself  into 
the  arms  of  Louis,  and  promised  him  a  free  hand  in  the  Low 
Countries  in  return  for  Louis's  support  to  his  crown.  At  the 
instigation  of  France  negotiations  for  peace  were  begun  at 
Breda  in  May  1667,  but  Charles,  sure  of  Louis's  secret  help, 
was  in  no  hurry  to  come  to  terms.  De  Witt  determined  to 
read  him  a  lesson.  Quietly  on  the  6th  of  June  the  Dutch 
fleet   under   Ruyter   and   Cornelius  de    Witt   left    the   Texel. 


230  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Next  morning  they  were  sailing  up  the  Thames  in  triumphal 
procession.  They  seized  Sheerness,  sailed  up  the  Medway  to 
Rochester,  captured  the  Royal  Charles,  burned  three  other 
ships  of  war,  and  were  only  checked  on  their  route  to  London 
by  the  sinking  of  boats  across  the  river  above  Chatham.  This 
Treaty  of  unpleasant  reminder  of  his  impotence  brought 
Breda,  1667.  Charles  quickly  to  terms.  The  Act  of  Navigation 
was  relaxed  so  as  to  permit  the  Dutch  to  carry  to  England 
German  and  Flemish  goods.  England  retained  New  York 
and  the  Dutch  the  port  of  Poleroon  in  the  East  Indies. 
Other    conquests  were  restored. 

Once  more  war  had  proved  but  a  sorry  engine  for  putting 
an  end  to  national  rivalry.  The  success  of  the  Dutch  in  1667 
no  more  gave  to  the  United  Provinces  the  monopoly  of  the 
trade  of  the  world,  than  their  defeat  in  1654  had  deprived 
them  of  their  share  in  it.  '  Must  we  then,'  said  the  Dutch 
envoy  to  Monk  before  the  beginning  of  the  war,  '  sacrifice 
our  commerce  to  yours  ?  '  '  Whatever  happens,'  bluntly  re- 
plied the  rough  soldier,  '  we  must  have  our  part.'  And  so  it 
happened.  The  protracted  and  stubborn  duel  between  the 
two  greatest  maritime  powers  of  Europe  only  enforced  the 
truth  that  the  world  was  wide  enough  for  both.  Upon  the  two 
principal  combatants  it  had  more  serious  and  wide-reach- 
ing results.  It  taught  Charles  11.  that  he  could  not  enjoy  life 
and  indulge  his  pohtical  ambition  as  he  liked  without  the 
assistance  of  France.  It  taught  John  de  Witt  the  impor- 
tance of  the  friendship  of  England  in  face  of  the  ambition  of 
Louis  XIV.  It  thus  led  directly  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
helped  to  bUnd  de  Witt's  eyes  to  the  fact  that  that  alliance 
had  not  clipped  Louis's  wings,  because  for  the  time  in  defer- 
ence to  it  he  had  consented  to  fold  them. 

The  whirligig  of  fortune  had  in  fact  made  the  worthless 
Charles  11.  of  England  the  arbiter  of  Europe,  while  both 
Louis  XIV.  and  John  de  Witt  believed  that  the  decisive  voice 
♦vas  with  them.  Louis  had  determined  on  the  ruin  of  the 
Dutch,  but  he  did  not  dare  to  face  the  united  fleets  of  England 


Louis  XIV.  and  the   United  Provinces  231 

and  the  United  Provinces.  John  de  Witt  was  under  no  illu- 
sions as  to  the  dangers  which  were  threatening  him  from 
France.  He  knew  quite  well  that  the  old  rela-  Dangers 
tions  of  friendship  and  dependence  had  passed  ^""""^  France. 
away  with  the  treaty  of  Mtinster  and  the  development  of 
Dutch  trade.  Ever  since  the  treaty  of  Miinster  it  had  been 
the  cardinal  point  in  Dutch  foreign  policy  to  support  the  ^r 
Spanish  government  in  the  Netherlands,  in  order  to  keep  the: 
French  away  from  Antwerp  and  the  Scheldt.  Ever  since  the\ 
peace  of  the  Pyrenees  it  had  been  the  main  object  of  French  )v^ 
foreign  policy  to  gain  the  fortresses  of  the  Spanish  Nether-/ 
lands  as  an  adequate  defence  to  Paris.  Ever  since  the  war 
of  devolution  it  had  been  the  undisguised  ambition  of  Louis 
XIV.  to  seize  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  as  the  first 
instalment  of  his  inheritance  in  the  Spanish  empire.  French 
and  Dutch  interests  were  sharply  antagonistic  on  this  essen- 
tial point  of  policy.  Commercial  differences  were  no  less 
pressing.  Colbert  had  so  arranged  his  protective  system  as  to 
injure  Dutch  trade  as  much  as  possible,  and  the  Amsterdam 
traders  were  furious  at  this  unneighbourly  treatment.  Louis 
himself  never  affected  to  conceal  his  personal  dislike  to  the 
rich  and  Protestant  republic,  which  dared  to  run  athwart  his 
designs.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  in  spite  of  the  continued 
war  preparations  of  Louis,  in  spite  of  his  ceaseless  diplomatic 
activity,  in  spite  of  the  withdrawal  of  Sweden  from  the  Triple 
Alliance,  in  spite  of  the  ominous  sleepiness  of  Leopold,  and 
nonchalance  of  Charles,  de  Witt  could  not  bring  himself  to 
believe  that  Louis  would  ever  be  able  to  turn  Blindness 
his  threats  into  action.  The  success  of  the  Triple  °^  ^^  ^'"• 
AlHance  had  been  so  commanding,  its  effect  so  instantaneous. 
The  temper  of  the  English  people  had  been  so  thoroughly 
roused  against  Louis.  Europe  had  shown  itself  so  sensitive 
of  his  aggressive  policy.  As  long  as  the  ascendency  of  the 
republican  party  in  the  United  Provinces  was  secure,  as  long 
as  no  civil  dissensions  interfered  to  weaken  their  action,  John 
de  Witt  believed   himself  safe    and  Europe  at  his  command. 


232  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

He  did  not  know  that  Charles  had  sealed  his  destruction  in 
the  secret  treaty  of  Dover.  He  had  no  suspicions  of  the 
partition  treaty  between  Louis  and  the  Emperor.  Deceived 
by  the  two  powers  he  most  trusted;  secure  in  the  results  of 
his  own  diplomacy  as  he  saw  them,  he  did  not  even  Lhink 
it  necessary  to  take  ordinary  precautions.  By  the  Perpetual 
Th   Per  Edict,  as    modified    by    the   Project    of   Harmony 

petuai  Edict,  accepted  by  the  republic  in  1668,  he  flattered  him- 
'^^^'  self  he  had  secured  internal  peace  without  sacri- 

ficing the  republican  ascendency.  By  those  acts  it  was  declared 
that  the  same  person  could  not  be  at  once  stadtholder  and 
captain  and  admiral  general,  and  it  was  provided  that  the 
young  prince  should  be  entrusted  with  the  command  of  the 
army  at  the  age  of  twenty-two.  By  this  division  of  the  civil 
and  military  powers  de  Witt  thought  he  had  secured  the 
republic  against  a  renewal  of  the  coup  d^etat,  and  guaranteed 
the  political  ascendency  of  Holland.  Yet,  so  jealous  was  he 
of  the  prince  and  his  party,  that  even  then  he  did  not  dare  to 
strengthen  the  army.  While  Louis  was  forming  vast  maga- 
zines, and  massing  thousands  of  men  on  the  frontier,  the 
Dutch  fortresses  were  being  allowed  to  perish  and  the  Dutch 
army  was  being  deliberately  starved  in  men  and  munitions 
lest  the  republican  supremacy  should  be  endangered.  The 
state  was  being  sacrificed  to  the  government. 

Retribution  was  not  long  in  coming.     Directly  the  thunder 

cloud  burst,  and  the   French   armies  were  in  full   march    on 

Amsterdam,  the  nation  awoke  to  the  fact  that  it 

movement  in   had  been  betrayed.     William  was  at  once  declared 

favour  of         captain  general.     A  reaction  set  in,  wild  and  un- 

WiUiam  III.  ,  ,       •  ,, 

reasonmg  as  such  popular  movements  usually  are. 
A  scapegoat  was  required.  The  popular  vengeance  demanded 
a  victim.  The  faithful  and  glorious  service  of  twenty  years 
was  forgotten,  and  a  blunder  magnified  into  treachery.  For 
the  moment  the  selfish  burgher  governors  of  Holland  trem- 
bled under  the  terror  of  a  popular  outbreak.  They  were 
reUeved  to   find   the    fury  of  the   populace   directed    against 


Louis  XIV.  and  the  United  Provinces  233 

de  Witt  alone.  On  June  21st  1673,  John  de  Witt  was  attacked 
by  rufifians  in  the  streets  of  the  Hague,  who  fled  for  refuge  to 
WiUiam's  camp  leaving  their  victim  half  dead.  In  August 
his  brother  Cornelius  was  arrested  and  put  to  the  torture. 
On  the  20th  John  de  Witt  was  induced  to  visit  his  brother  in 
the  prison.  They  were  caught  like  rats  in  a  trap.  Murder  of  de 
An  infuriated  mob  surrounded  the  prison,  broke  witt,  1673. 
open  the  gates,  dragged  the  victims  forth,  and  beat  their 
brains  out,  while  the  Calvinistic  clergy  hounded  them  on  to 
their  butcher's  work.  William  himself,  cruel,  callous,  and 
calculating  in  1673,  as  he  afterwards  showed  himself  to  be  in 
1692,.  took  care  to  know  nothing  and  to  do  nothing  which 
could  stop  the  impending  outrage.  As  in  the  massacre  of 
Glencoe  he  looked  the  other  way  at  the  time  and  tried  to 
screen  the  perpetrators  from  justice  afterwards.  An  accessory 
before  the  fact,  and  an  accessory  after  the  fact,  all  that  his 
apologists  can  say  for  him  is  that  his  ambition  necessitated 
the  sacrifice  of  his  humanity. 


CHAPTER   XI 

LOUIS   XIV.   AND   WILLIAM    III. 

I 672-1 698 

The  war  between  France  and  the  Dutch  —  The  campaign  of  1672  —  Refusal  oi 
reasonable  terms  —  Coalition  against  France  —  The  campaigns  of  1674- 
1675  —  Exhaustion  of  France  —  The  peace  of  Nimwegen  —  Virtual  defeat 
of  Louis's  policy  —  The  character  and  influence  of  William  III.  —  The 
quarrel  of  Louis  with  the  Papacy  —  The  four  resolutions  of  1682  —  Analogy 
to  the  English  Reformation  —  Settlement  of  the  dispute  —  Policy  of  religious 
uniformity —  Influence  of  Madame  de  Maintenon —  Persecution  of  the  Hu- 
guenots—  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  —  Aggressions  of  Louis  — 
Formation  of  the  league  of  Augsburg  —  Quarrel  between  Louis  and  James 
II.  —  The  war  of  the  league  of  Augsburg — Importance  of  the  naval  opera- 
tions —  Exhaustion  of  France  —  Peace  of  Ryswick. 

The  year  1672  saw  Louis  xiv.  at  the  height  of  his  glory, 
and  France  at  the  summit  of  the  prosperity  to  which  she 
„      ,        ,     attained   under   his   guidance.     He   was    in    the 

Grandeur  of  o 

Louis  XIV.,     prime  of  life,  his  court  was  the  most  magnificent       ' 
'^^*'  and  distinguished  in  Europe,  his  palace  the  most 

splendid,  his  throne  the  most  assured.  As  yet  no  breath  of 
domestic  or  national  misfortune  had  visited  the  complexion 
of  his  fortunes  too  roughly.  Alone  among  the  monarchs  of 
Europe,  thanks  to  the  thrifty  administration  of  Colbert,  he 
enjoyed  the  supreme  satisfaction  of  a  well-filled  treasury;  and 
if  since  the  war  of  devolution  occasional  grumblings  made 
themselves  heard  about  the  reimposition  of  taxes  once 
remitted,  yet  few  of  the  taxpayers  would  not  be  constrained 
on  examination  to  admit  that  if  the  taxes  had  risen,  their 
power  of  paying  them  had  doubled.  Through  the  willing 
service  of  able  negotiators  his  diplomacy  was  triumphant  in 

234 


Louis  XIV.  and   Williavi  III.  235 

all  quarters  of  Europe.  There  was  not  a  state  which  did 
not  dread  his  displeasure,  which  was  not  prepared  to  sacrifice 
something  for  his  friendship.  The  watchful  diligence  of 
Louvois  had  given  to  him  as  the  champion  of  his  honour,  and 
the  instrument  of  his  ambition,  a  professional  army,  superior 
in  discipline,  in  organisation,  in  leadership  to  all  the  other 
armies  of  Europe  put  together.  His  navy,  already  more 
powerful  than  that  of  Spain,  threatened  soon  to  rival  the 
English  and  the  Dutch  on  their  own  element.  England  was 
already  his  vassal,  Sweden  Poland  and  half  the  petty  sov- 
ereigns of  Germany  his  subsidised  allies,  Spain  his  defeated 
enemy.  Only  the  upstart  merchants  of  Amsterdam  ventured 
to  assert  their  independence  of  him  and  to  dispute  his 
authority.  He  had  but  to  stretch  forth  his  hand  and  seize 
the  fruit  of  supremacy  over  Europe  thus  temptingly  lying 
open  to  his  grasp.  He  had  but  to  'travel'  in  the  United 
Provinces  to  reduce  them  to  due  submission. 

Nevertheless  he  was  wise  enough  to  neglect  no  precaution 
to  ensure  the  safety  of  his  travelling  tour.  It  Was  -in,  no 
empty,  braggart  spirit  that  he  made  war  upon  The  Dutch 
so  tough  an  enemy  in  so  difficult  a  country.  ^*'''  *^72- 
Charles  11.,  in  pursuance  of  the  treaty  of  Dover,  declared  war 
upon  the  Dutch  in  March,  and  Louis  trusted  to  him  with  the 
assistance  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  French  vessels  to  keep 
the  formidable  Ruyter  quiet  in  port,  while  the  great  effort  was 
being  made  by  land.  Charleroi  was  chosen  as  the  basis  of 
operations,  and  large  stores  of  every  warlike  necessity  were 
collected  there  by  Louvois  with  the  utmost  diligence.  Further 
magazines  were  established  at  the  advanced  post  of  Neuss 
near  Dusseldorf  in  the  electorate  of  Koln.  No  longer,  as  in 
the  days  of  Wallenstein,  was  war  to  support  war,  but  for  the 
first  time  in  modern  warfare  the  army  was  to  be  regularly 
provisioned  from  its  base  by  means  of  magazines  established 
along  the  line  of  route.  In  the  early  spring  176,000  men 
were  massed  at  Charleroi  under  the  orders  of  Cond6  and 
Turenne.     On  the  5th  of   May  Louis  joined   the  army  and 


236  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  storm  burst  upon  the  devoted  Dutch.-'  Marching  down 
the  Meuse  valley  past  Liege  and  Maestricht,  masking  the 
Campaign  of  latter  fortress  as  he  went,  an  operation  hitherto 
j672-  unconceived   of,  he  turned    sharply  to  the   right 

at  Ruremonde  and  reached  his  magazines  at  Neuss  on  the 
Rhine  safely  on  the  31st.  Having  thus  gained  the  Rhine 
valley  he  pushed  Cond6  over  the  river  at  Kaiserwerth  to 
sweep  the  right  bank  and  capture  Wesel,  while  Turenne 
marched  down  the  left  bc^nk  and  made  himself  master  of 
the  smaller  fortresses  of  Orsoy,  Rhynberg,  and  Biirick.  On 
the  6th  of  June,  Turenne  rejoined  Conde  at  Wesel,  and  the 
whole  army  poured  down  the  right  bank  unchecked  across 
the  frontier  of  Guelderland,  until  it  was  brought  to  a  stop  on 
the  nth,  by  the  little  stream  of  the  Yssel,  behind  which 
William  was  posted  at  the  head  of  all  the  available  Dutch 
troops.  The  hesitation  was  but  momentary.  Instead  of 
forcing  the  line  of  the  Yssel  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  always 
a  most  hazardous  operation,  Turenne  determined  to  turn  it. 
On  his  left  flank  as  he  faced  William  on  the  Yssel  ran  the 
broad  but  fordable  stream  of  the  old  Rhine,  which,  leaving 
the  main  branch  of  the  river,  called  the  Waal,  in  a  northerly 
direction,  receives  the  water  of  the  Yssel  a  few  miles  further 
down  at  Arnheim,  where,  turning  again  to  the  west,  it  flows  on 
to  the  sea.  Half-way  between  Arnheim  and  the  junction  of 
the  Waal  and  the  Rhine,  is  the  ford  of  the  Tolhuys.  There, 
on  the  12th  of  June,  Conde  crossed  the  old  Rhine  with  his 
cavalry  almost  without  opposition.  On  the  next  day  a  bridge 
was  thrown  across  the  stream,  and  the  king  and  the  whole 
army  followed.  After  securing  Nimwegen  in  his  rear,  Louis 
marched  down  the  left  bank  of  the  old  Rhine  and  crossed  it 
again  a  little  below  Arnheim  without  difificulty.  He  had  thus 
completely  turned  William's  position  on  the  Yssel  and  con- 
quered the  far  more  formidable  difficulties  of  the  country. 
When  he  left  Charleroi,  only  six  weeks  before,  he  had, 
between  him  and  the  heart  of  his  enemies'  country,  the  deep 
^  See  Map,  p.  241. 


Lo7ds  XIV.  and   Williavi  III.  237 

difficult  and  treacherous  streams  of  the  Meuse,  the  Waal,  and 
the  Rhine,  defended  at  the  most  critical  points  of  their  course 
by  the  formidable  fortresses  of  Maestricht,  Wesel,  Nimwcgen, 
and  Arnheim.  Well  might  de  Witt  and  the  Dutch  have 
calculated  that,  according  to  the  usual  movements  of  war  in 
those  days,  there  was  material  there  for  two  campaigns  at 
least.  By  the  brilliant  strategy  of  Turenne  —  for  to  him  the 
plan  was  due  —  all  these  difficulties  had  been  surmounted,  and 
Louis  was  within  striking  distance  of  Amsterdam  itself,  with- 
out having  fought  a  battle,  almost  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 
The  crossing  of  the  Rhine  at  Tolhuys  was  indeed  in  itself  a 
military  operation  of  the  fourth  order,  as  Napoleon  called  it. 
So  was  the  blockade  of  Ulm  in  1805,  but  both  marked  the 
successful  conclusion  of  an  offensive  campaign  which  evinced 
the  highest  qualities  of  strategical  skill. 

Just  in  the  very  crisis  of  success  Louis  drew  back.  Cond6 
urged  him  to  make  the  most  of  his  opportunity,  push  on  to  i 
Amsterdam  and  end  the  war  at  a  blow.  There  The  cutting 
was  no  one  to  resist  him.  He  might  have  of  the  dykes, 
'travelled  as  safely'  to  Amsterdam  as  he  had  hitherto 
'travelled  safely  '  to  Arnheim.  But  with  inconceivable  folly 
he  refused,  sent  Turenne  towards  Rotterdam,  and  sat  down 
himself  before  the  petty  forts  on  the  Yssel.  Rochefort,  acting 
on  his  own  initiative,  rushed  forward  with  some  cavalry  to 
seize  Muyden,  and  so  prevent  the  cutting  of  the  dykes  outside 
Amsterdam,  but  he  was  too  late.  A  Dutch  garrison  was  thrown 
in  just  in  time.  De  Witt  had  ordered  all  to  be  in  readiness 
to  let  in  the  water  directly  the  peasantry  had  moved  from  the 
doomed  fields.  For  a  few  days  the  an.xiety  was  intense  lest 
the  French  should  appear  before  all  was  prepared,  but  on  the 
1 8th  the  signal  was  given.  The  sea  resumed  her  ancient 
mastery  and  Amsterdam  was  safe  on  her  island  throne. 

A  breathing  space  was  all  that  was  required.  If  the  Dutch 
could  save  their  independence  until  the  winter  was  passed, 
it  was  pretty  certain  that  a  coalition  against  France  could 
be    formed.       On  the    7th   of   June    the    victory    of    Ruyter 


238  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

over  the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  England  removed 
all  danger  from  the  sea.  Holland  was  safe,  and  stood  firm 
Refusal  of  against  all  suggestion  of  submission,  but  the  other 
reasonable       provinces  either  in  the  hands  of  Louis  or  exposed 

terms  of  ,....,,  i       •        i  t-  i 

peace  by  to  his  irresistible  power  desired  peace.  J^or  the 
Louis.  tin^e    they   prevailed,    and   an    embassy   reached 

Louis  at  the  end  of  June  offering  him  6,000,000  of  livres 
and  the  fortress  and  district  of  Maestricht.  This  would  have 
made  him  absolute  master  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  when- 
ever he  chose  to  occupy  them,  yet  at  the  advice  of  Louvois 
he  deliberately  threw  away  the  solid  results  of  his  success 
merely  to  gratify  his  pride.  He  demanded  that  the  Dutch 
should  acknowledge  their  dependence  on  him,  maintain 
Catholicism  with  public  money,  suppress  all  commercial 
edicts  unfavourable  to  France,  and  pay  24,000,000  of 
livres.  This  was  in  fact  to  demand  the  surrender  of  their 
independence,  and  was  only  another  way  of  saying  that  the 
war  was  to  be  a  duel  to  death.  They  accepted  the 
position,  elected  William  iii.  stadtholder  and  captain  and 
p    ...  admiral  general,  and  began  to  organise  a  coalition 

against  against  the  tyrant  of  Europe.     In  October  1672 

France.  ^j^^    Empcror   Leopold   and    the    Great    Elector 

made  common  cause  with  the  Dutch  and  the  war  became 
European. 

The  difference  was  at  once  noticeable.  Turenne  was  sent 
across  the  Rhine  into  Westphalia  to  prevent  the  imperial 
Campaign  of  troops  Under  Montecuculli  and  the  Branden- 
1673-  burgers  from  crossing  to  the  assistance  of  William 

from  Germany,  while  Cond6  was  told  off  to  guard  Alsace  from 
invasion.  The  French  army  thus  divided  into  three  parts 
lost  its  decisive  superiority.  Yet,  thanks  to  its  superior 
organisation  and  the  genius  of  Turenne,  it  emerged  victori- 
ously from  the  campaign  of  1673.  William  was  kept  quiet 
by  Luxembourg,  while  Turenne,  by  brilliant  manoeuvring, 
checked  MontecucuUi's  advance  on  the  Rhine,  separated  him 
from  the  Great  Elector,  and  driving  the  latter  back  to  Halber- 


Louis  XIV.  and   William  III.  239 

stadt,  forced  him  to  make  peace  on  June  6th.  But  at  sea 
the  Dutch  maintained  their  superiority.  On  August  21st  the 
intrepid  Ruyter  inflicted  a  final  defeat  upon  Rupert  and  the 
English  fleet  off  the  coast  of  Zealand.  He  remained  at 
the  close  of  the  day  master  of  the  channel,  and  as  long  as 
the  water-way  was  open  Holland  was  safe. 

In  spite  of  Louis's  success  in  the  field,  the  coalition  con- 
tinued to  grow.  In  August  1673  it  was  joined  by  Spain  and 
the  duke  of  Lorraine,  in  January  1674  by  Denmark,  in 
March  by  the  Elector  Palatine,  in  May  by  the  diet  of  the 
Empire,  and  in  July  the  Great  Elector  ventured  again  to  draw 
the  sword.  By  the  middle  of  the  year  1674  nearly  all  Europe 
was  engaged  against  France.     Meanwhile  her  own   ^^  ,    ,. 

00  o  Defection 

allies  were  falling  off.  In  the  autumn  of  1673  Mon-  of  Louiss 
tecuculli  succeeded  in  outwitting  Turenne.  Slip-  ^"'^^• 
ping  past  him  he  joined  William  on  the  Rhine  and  captured 
Bonn  on  November  12th.  Frightened  by  this  success  the 
electors  of  Trier  and  Koln  and  the  bishop  of  Miinster  hastened 
to  make  peace.  But  that  was  not  the  worst.  In  February 
1674  news  came  to  Versailles  that  England  had  separated  her 
interests  from  those  of  France,  and  Louis  found  himself  with 
Sweden  as  his  only  ally  alone  against  the  world. 

The  history  of  the  four  remaining  years  of  the  war  is  the 
history  of  a  noble  struggle  against  impossible  odds.  However 
great  the  superiority  of  French  leadership  and  of 

TT-  1  ...  r      ,  .  France  and 

l^rench  organisation,  it  was  out  of  the  question  Sweden 
that  France  could  for  long  maintain  so  unequal  a  aione  against 
struggle.  The  allies  simply  had  to  tire  her  out. 
In  the  end  they  must  be  victorious.  Yet  for  some  time  victory 
was  rendered  doubtful  by  the  skill  and  resource  shown  by 
the  French  commanders.  They  saw  at  once  the  necessity  of 
acting  on  the  defensive  behind  the  protection  of  the  fortresses 
of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  and  the  Rhine.  In  1674  Cond6 
retiring  at  once  from  the  United  Provinces,  out-manoeuvred 
William  on  the  line  of  the  Meuse  and  the  Sambre,  driving  him 
back  and  capturing  his  baggage  train  at  Seneff  on  August 


240  European  History,   1598-17 15 

nth.  Louis  overran  Franche  Comt^,  while  Turenne  assumed 
the  offensive  on  the  Rhine  to  divert  the  attention  of  the 
imperialists.  Crossing  the  river  he  advanced  to  Sinzheim 
and  defeating  the  enemy  there  drove  him  behind  the  Neckar. 
The  troops  at  his  disposal  were,  however,  not  suf^cient  for  him 
to  maintain  his  ground  and  defend  so  large  a  tract  of  country 
as  the  upper  Rhineland.  In  his  difficulty  he  took  a  course 
justifiable  only  by  extreme  necessity.  Devastating  the  pala- 
tinate with  fire  and  sword  he  turned  all  the  rich  smiling 
country  on  both  sides  of  the  Rhine  into  a  desert,  so  that 
the  enemy  could  not  maintain  himself  there.  Having  thus 
limited  the  area  of  the  campaign  he  retired  behind  the  Rhine, 
and  prepared  to  keep  his  opponent  at  bay  on  the  othei  side. 
For  some  months  he  was  successful,  but  late  in  October  the 
imperialist  army,  having  effected  a  junction  with  the  Branden- 
burgers,  managed  to  elude  his  vigilance,  crossed  the  river  at 
Mainz,  and  marching  up  the  left  bank  established  themselves 
securely  in  lower  Alsace.  The  Rhine  barrier  was  lost. 
Unless  Turenne  could  recover  it  before  the  campaigning 
season  of  1675  began,  the  tide  of  war  must  roll  back  to  the 
Vosges  and  the  plain  of  Chalons.  Turenne's  spirit  rose  to  the 
crisis.  Under  his  orders  was  an  army  of  veterans 
campaign  of  Capable  of  cnduraucc  and  devoted  to  himself. 
Turenne,  jjg  determined  on  a  masterly  piece  of  strategy. 
I  74-75-  rpj^g  Vosges  mountains  run  parallel  to  the  Rhine, 

fringing  the  rich  river  valley  at  a  distance  of  some  twenty 
miles  from  the  stream,  and  ever  increasing  in  height  and 
ruggedness  as  they  trend  southwards,  until  from  the  moun- 
tainous, and  in  winter  snow  covered,  group  of  the  Belchen 
they  suddenly  sweep  down  to  the  plain  at  the  famous  Gap 
of  Belfort,  which  divides  them  from  the  Jura.  While  the 
imperialists  were  slowly  dispersing  themselves  among  the 
comfortable  towns  in  the  river  valley  between  Strasburg 
and  Mlihlhausen,  Turenne  at  the  end  of  November  retired 
behind  the  chain  of  the  Vosges,  as  if  to  go  into  winter 
quarters  in  Lorraine.     Having  put  the  mountains  as  a  screen 


Louis  XIV.  and   Williavi  III. 


241 


PERIOD   V. 


242  European  History y    1598-17 15 

between  him  and  his  enemy,  he  suddenly  turned  south  from 
Lixheim,  marched  behind  the  Vosges  until  he  reached  the 
rugged  group  at  the  southern  end  where  rise  the  head  waters 
of  the  Moselle.  Then  dividing  his  veterans  into  four  divisions 
he  sent  them  over  the  mountain  passes  through  the  snow 
in  the  dead  of  winter  to  their  rendezvous  at  Belfort.  On 
the  27  th  of  December  the  operation  was  complete.  Forty 
thousand  of  the  best  soldiers  of  Europe  were  gathered  at  the 
top  of  the  rich  Rhine  valley  of  Alsace,  where  the  enemy  was 
quietly  enjoying  himself  in  unsuspecting  security.  On  the 
28th  Turenne  swept  down  upon  them  through  the  Gap  of  Bel- 
fort,  occupied  Miihlhausen,  defeated  the  Great  Elector  at  Col- 
mar,  and  bundled  the  whole  army  neck  and  crop  out  of  Alsace 
across  the  river  at  Strasburg.  The  Rhine  frontier  was  re- 
gained at  a  blow.  INIontecucuUi  was  sent  for  in  haste  as  the 
only  general  fit  to  cope  with  so  terrible  an  antagonist,  but 
fortune  seemed  to  have  deserted  his  standards.  In  the 
spring  of  1675  Turenne  crossed  the  Rhine  below  Strasburg. 
By  a  series  of  skilful  manoeuvres  he  forced  Montecuculli  from 
Death  of  the  Rhine  to  the  Neckar,  from  the  Neckar  back 
Turenne,  1675.  to  the  Black  Forest.  There  at  Sasbach  he  obliged 
him  to  accept  battle  in  a  position  in  which  success  was  impos- 
sible. 'I  have  him  now,'  said  Turenne  as  he  reconnoitred 
the  enemy  on  July  26th.  Almost  as  he  spoke  a  chance  shot 
struck  him  on  the  breast  and  killed  him  on  the  spot. 

With  Turenne  fell  the  last  hope  of  France  in  the  field. 
Montecuculli  drove  the  dismayed  French  over  the  river  into 
Exhaustion  Alsace,  and  was  only  checked  by  the  skill  of 
of  France.  Conde,  who  arrived  with  reinforcements  in  time 
to  save  Hagenau  and  Philipsburg.  Cr^qui,  who  succeeded 
Cond^  on  the  Moselle,  lost  Trier  in  September.  The  Swedes, 
who  had  made  a  diversion  in  favour  of  France  by  attacking 
the  Great  Elector,  were  soundly  beaten  by  him  on  land  at 
Fehrbellin,  and  by  the  Danish  and  Dutch  fleets  at  sea  in 
the  Baltic.  At  the  end  of  the  year  Conde  tired  of  warfare 
retired  from  the  command.      France  was  growing  exhausted. 


Louis  XIV.  and   VVilliani  III.  243 

Murmurs  were  heard  on  all  sides.  Already  the  reforms  of 
Colbert  were  being  undone,  and  corruption,  the  sure  hand 
maid  of  financial  distress,  was  again  raising  her  head.  Still, 
however,  the  superiority  of  the  French  soldier  showed  itself 
in  battle,  and  both  the  Dutch  and  the  imperialists  became  as 
tired  of  fighting  battles  which  they  never  won,  as  the  French 
were  of  winning  victories  which  they  could  not  utilise. 
Negotiations  were  set  on  foot  between  the  Dutch  and  Charles 
and  Louis  which  followed  the  usual  tortuous  Negotiations 
course.  William  did  his  best  to  prevent  a  for  peace, 
treaty,  and  even  wantonly  fought  a  pitched  battle  with 
Luxemburg  on  August  14th,  1678,  near  Mons,  in  which 
thousands  of  men  were  killed,  in  the  last  desperate  hope  of 
breaking  off  negotiations,  although  he  knew  that  the  peace 
was  almost  certainly  signed,  but  it  was  happily  too  late.  On 
August  loth,  1678,  a  treaty  was  concluded  between  Louis  and 
the  Dutch,  on  September  17th  Spain  and  France  came  to 
terms,  and  on  February  2d,  1679,  peace  was  made  between 
France  and  the  Emperor.  Soon  afterwards  the  minor  com- 
batants followed  suit. 

By  these  treaties,  generally  known  as  the  peace  of  Nimwegen 
the  United  Provinces  were  not  called  upon  to  surrender  one 
acre  of  their  territory,  while  they  gained  the  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^ 
removal  of  the  hostile  restrictions  on  their  trade  Nimwegen, 
with  France.  The  barrier  of  the  Spanish  Nether-  '^^  ' 
lands  was  not  materially  interfered  with,  and  Spain  even 
recovered  Charleroi  and  some  other  towns  which  she  had 
surrendered  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  the  frontier  was  fixed 
on  a  fairly  straight  line,  from  Dunkirk  to  the  Sambre  at 
Maubeuge.  The  Emperor  recovered  Philipsburg,  but  sur- 
rendered Freiburg  with  the  passage  of  the  river  at  Breisach. 
The  only  substantial  gain  to  France  was  the  actual  annexation 
of  Franche  Comt^,  and  the  virtual  annexation  of  Lorraine. 
True  to  his  one  faithful  ally  Louis  insisted  on  the  restoration 
to  Sweden  of  the  territories  in  Germany  taken  from  her  by 
the  Great  Elector. 


244  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

The  treaty  of  Nimwegen  is  often  looked  upon  as  the  sum- 
mit of  the  success  of  Louis  xrv.,  the  pinnacle  of  his  glory. 
It  is  rather  the  first  step  in  his  decline,  for  it  marks  the  limits 
of  his  power.  He  had  made  deliberately  a  bid  for  suprem- 
V  tu  Id  f  t  ^^^  °^^^  Europe,  and  he  had  failed.  He  had 
of  Louis's  determined  on  an  act  of  signal  vengeance  upon 
policy.  ^j^g   petty    nation    which    had    dared    to    thwart 

his  will,  and  he  had  been  baffled.  But  this  was  not  all. 
Not  only  was  his  failure  one  of  fact,  but  it  was  one  of  policy. 
He  had  failed  in  a  way  which  made  it  certain  that  he  would 
fail  again,  if  he  made  a  similar  attempt.  However  carefully 
laid  his  plans,  however  skilfully  conceived  his  campaigns, 
however  brilliantly  led  his  armies,  he  could  not  fight  single- 
handed  against  Europe;  and  Europe  was  as  certain  to  com- 
bine sooner  or  later  against  him,  if  he  continued  his  policy  of 
universal  dominion,  as  the  tides  were  certain  to  ebb  and  to 
flow.  The  selfishness  of  a  Charles  11.,  the  ambition  of  a  bishop 
of  Miinster,  the  greediness  of  a  Swedish  oligarchy,  the  poverty 
of  a  Polish  nobility,  the  cunning  inertness  of  a  Leopold  might 
enable  him  to  purchase  alliance  and  secure  neutrality  until 
the  storm-cloud  actually  burst,  until  the  danger  of  a  French 
tyranny  became  instant  and  menacing.  But  in  the  end  the 
web  of  diplomacy,  however  deftly  woven,  was  certain  to  be 
torn  into  fragments  before  the  rude  shock  of  the  spirit  of 
nationality  and  the  love  of  independence.  De  Witt  with  his 
policy  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  shown  Europe  how  the 
monster  might  be  bridled,  and  Europe  did  not  forget  the 
lesson.  Interests  rival  to  those  of  France  were  too  numerous, 
too  varied,  too  deep  seated  in  national  character,  to  be  for 
long  obscured  by  the  arts  of  diplomacy,  or  quieted  by  the 
alliance  of  governments.  The  principle  of  the  balance  of 
power  was  certain  to  assert  itself  sooner  or  later,  and  as  long 
as  Louis  persisted  in  an  attempt  to  make  himself  dictator  of 
Europe,  whether  by  the  conquest  of  the  maritime  powers,  or 
by  the  annexation  of  the  dominions  of  Spain,  or  by  the  dis- 
integration of  Germany  and  Austria,  so  long  would  Europe 


Louis  XIV.  and  William  III.  245 

combine  against  him  and  prevent  that  dictatorship  from  be- 
coming an  accomplished  fact.  Unfortunately,  like  Napoleon 
after  him,  Louis  could  not  bring  himself  to  acknowledge  the 
permanent  limits  of  his  power.  He  could  not  understand 
that  he  had  embarked  on  a  policy  impossible  in  the  very 
nature  of  things.  He  looked  upon  Nimwegen  as  he  had 
looked  upon  Aix-la-Chapelle,  merely  as  a  check  in  the  game 
which  he  was  playing.  He  knew  he  had  made  some  mis- 
takes in  his  play.  A  fresh  combination  of  pieces  directed 
by  a  riper  experience  could  not  fail  to  succeed.  So,  like 
the  gambler,  who,  convinced  of  the  infallibility  of  his  system, 
attributes  his  losses  to  mere  errors  of  calculation  which 
experience  and  care  must  detect,  Louis  in  no  wise  dis- 
concerted by  the  failure  of  Nimwegen  began  with  increased 
assiduity  to  weave  his  plots  and  repair  his  errors,  so  that  he 
might  again  be  ready  to  assert  his  claims,  when  the  turn  of 
the  cards  seemed  once  more  favourable  to  his  fortune. 

In  reality  while  Louis  was  persuading  himself  that  he  was 
marching  by  steady  and  statesmanlike  steps  to  a  sure  goal, 
his  chances  of  ultimate  success  were  dwindling  character  of 
daily.  The  opposition  to  him  in  Europe  had  "wiiiiam  in. 
acquired  both  a  policy  and  a  leader.  Never  had  a  hero  of  a 
great  cause  less  of  the  heroic  about  him  than  had  William 
of  Orange.  Taught  in  the  school  of  adversity,  he  had  be- 
come a  man  before  ever  he  knew  what  it  was  to  be  a  boy. 
Implicated  from  his  birth  in  a  web  of  intrigue,  nurtured  in  an 
atmosphere  of  suspicion,  surrounded  by  foes  of  his  race  and 
cause,  his  earliest  lessons  were  those  of  deceit  and  fraud, 
(ienerous  instincts  withered  away  in  a  heart  in  which  affection 
had  ever  to  give  place  to  policy.  At  the  age  of  twenty  hf 
was  heartless  as  a  Talleyrand,  unscrupulous  as  a  Walpole, 
cold,  pitiless,  and  self-concentrated  as  Macchiavelli  himself. 
Strange  indeed  was  the  contrast  between  this  puny,  dyspeptic, 
selfish,  taciturn  stripling  of  twenty,  untouched  by  sentiment, 
and  inaccessible  to  love,  and  the  open-hearted,  magnificent 
Louis  in  the  prime  of  life  and  of  glory,  the  prince  of  gallants 


246  European  History,    1598- 171 5 

and  the  pattern  of  chivalry.  Yet  deep  down  in  the  cold 
breast  of  William  there  burned  a  fire  more  enduring  and 
more  intense  than  any  of  the  fitful  flashes  which  illumined 
from  time  to  time  the  soul  of  the  splendid  king.  Love  for  his 
country,  which,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances 

Ennobling  ...  .... 

influence  of  of  the  time,  translated  itself  into  an  undying 
his  enmity  to  and  uucouquerable  hatred  of  the  aggression  and 
tyranny  of  France,  slowly  through  long  years  of 
suffering  and  of  patience,  fused  the  selfish  heartlessness  of 
William  into  metal  of  heroic  stamp.  To  him  was  not  given 
the  power  of  witching  the  world  with  noble  deeds.  He  could 
not  plan  campaigns  like  Turenne,  or  win  battles  like  Cond^ 
or  Luxemburg.  He  could  not  enmesh  two  hemispheres  in 
the  bonds  of  his  policy  like  Chatham,  he  could  not  dazzle 
Europe  with  the  glow  of  his  fame  like  Charles  xii.,  or 
entrance  it  with  the  richness  of  personal  gifts  like  Henry  iv. 
He  could  not  command  admiration  like  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
or  extort  obedience  like  Richelieu.  The  depths  of  mind  and 
of  character  which  move  nations  and  sway  the  world  had  no 
place  within  the  narrow  limits  of  his  mean  and  pedantic 
nature.  But  in  their  stead  were  developed  to  an  almost 
abnormal  extent  the  unyielding  and  tenacious  qualities  of  his 
stubborn  ancestry.  Endurance,  fortitude,  perseverance,  in- 
spiring and  inspired  by  unconquerable  hat'i  and  enlisted  in 
the  noble  cause  of  patriotism  and  liberty,  made  him  a  hero  in 
spite  of  himself.  He  would  not  recognise  failure,  he  would 
not  accept  defeat.  He  knew  not  the  meaning  of  despair. 
Never  for  an  instant  was  he  tempted  to  put  personal  ambition 
before  public  duty,  for  to  him  the  public  duty  of  resistance 
to  France  summed  up  his  personal  ambition. 
,  He  valued  the  crown  of  England  only  because  it  enlisted 
[the  power  of  England  on  his  side  against  the  great  enemy. 
\He  was  prepared  to  abdicate  the  moment  he  found  that 
England  was  but  half-hearted  and  insular  in  her  views  about 
the  war.  To  die  in  the  last  ditch  was  in  his  mouth 
no   empty   or   braggart   boast.      He   would    no    more    have 


Louis  XIV.  and   William  III.  247 

dreamed  of  surrendering  the  religion  and  liberty  of  his 
country  to  Louis  xiv.  than  would  Leonidas  of  submitting  to 
the  Persians  at  Thermopylae.  He  waged  the  military  and 
diplomatic  struggle  of  thirty  years  in  the  spirit  of  that  dec- 
laration. He  fought  throughout  not  as  a  conqueror  but  as 
a  defender,  till  he  won  for  himself  the  position  of  the  saviour 
of  his  country,  and  the  champion  of  the  liberty  of  Europe. 
Concentrating  all  his  faculties  on  the  personal  duel  in  which 
he  was  engaged,  he  never  fully  realised  the  magnitude  of  the 
issues  at  stake,  and  the  far-reaching  effects  of  the  policy  which 
he  had  undertaken.  To  his  successors  fell  the  task  of  reaping 
the  harvest  prepared  by  his  patient  and  painful  husbandry,  to 
resettle  the  map  of  Europe  after  the  overthrow  of  the  tyrant, 
and  to  lay  down  at  Utrecht  a  new  balance  of  power. 
Naturally  he  could  not  know  that  Steinkirk  was  but  the 
prelude  to  Blenheim,  and  that  la  Hogue  alone  made  possible 
the  glories  alike  of  Plassey  and  Quebec,  yet  if  his  spirit  was 
permitted  to  follow  the  Maison  du  Roi  in  their  flight  from 
Ramillies,  or  a  century  later  to  brood  over  the  shattered 
hulks  amid  the  storms  of  Trafalgar,  well  might  he  proudly 
have  claimed  for  himself  his  share  in  the  wreaths  of  laurel 
which  encircled  the  brows  of  Marlborough  and  of  Nelson. 

For   ten   years   Europe  was  at  peace,  but  it  was  a  peace 
which  was   in  reality  little    more    than    a   breathing   space, 
devoted  by  both  parties  to  preparations  for  the  next  round  in 
the  struggle.     While  William  was  plotting  and  scheming  for 
his  father-in-law's  crown,  Louis  was  strengthening  his  frontier 
by  diplomacy  as  well  as  by  arms.     Both    realised    that  the 
duel  was  still  undecided,  both  hesitated   to  be   the   first  to 
loose  again  the  dogs  of  war.     Meanwhile  other   Quarrel  of 
difficulties  of  a  serious  nature  came  up  for  settle-    Louis  with 
ment  in  France  herself.     The  Church  of  France   ^"^^  Papacy, 
had  always  maintained  a  much  greater  independence  of  the 
authority  of  the  Pope,  than  had  been  the  case  in  Spain  or 
in  Italy  or  in  Germany  since  the  Reformation.     The    long 
continued  presence  of    Mohammedanism    in  Spain,  and  the 


248  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

pressure  of  heresy  in  Germany,  had  naturally  tended  to 
augment  the  personal  authority  of  the  Pope  over  those 
countries.  In  France  the  tendency  had  been  the  other  way. 
National  spirit  and  national  pride  called  out  by  the  liberation 
of  the  country  from  the  English  yoke,  and  employed  in  the 
task  of  conquest  in  Italy,  emphasised  national  rights  and 
distinctions.  As  in  England  the  feeling  of  the  people  was 
strongly  anti-papal,  and  it  was  the  Crown  not  the  Church 
which  found  it  to  its  interest  to  make  surrender  to  the  claims 
of  the  Roman  Curias  in  order  to  gain  a  useful  ally  in  its 
struggle  with  the  nobles.  As  however  the  royal  power  in 
France  gradually  made  itself  supreme  over  all  departments  of 
the  national  life,  the  kings  began  in  their  turn  to  take  up  the 
cudgels  against  the  Pope  in  a  quarrel,  which  could 

The  inde-  .    .,    .         ,  ,  .     .  ,      . 

pendence  of  not  fail  lu  the  end  to  minister  to  their  own  great- 
the  Gaiiican  ness.  Fraucis  I.  was  within  an  ace  of  declaring 
France  independent  of  the  Holy  See,  the  Valois 
kings  refused  for  many  years  to  take  any  part  whatever  in  the 
council  of  Trent,  and  when  the  cardinal  of  Lorraine  did  appear 
with  the  French  bishops,  it  was  rather  to  present  an  ultimatum 
than  to  take  part  in  a  discussion.  The  doctrinal  decisions  of 
the  council  were  never  formally  accepted  by  France  at  all. 
Heresy,  in  the  form  of  Huguenotism,  was  suppressed  in 
France  much  more  by  the  Crown  than  by  the  efforts  of 
the  Pope,  and  the  Jesuits  were  only  admitted  into  France 
under  strict  limitations.  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  though 
cardinals  of  the  Roman  Church,  did  not  hesitate  to  pursue  a 
policy  in  strong  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  Pope,  and 
Louis  XIV.  himself  had  not  scrupled  in  the  earlier  years  of  his 
reign  to  put  a  public  indignity  upon  the  Pontiff.  The  very 
orthodoxy  of  the  kings  themselves  and  of  their  government 
made  them  the  more  jealous  of  all  exercise  of  authority  in 
their  dominions  by  another  sovereign,  even  though  he  was  the 
Pope. 

Among  the  acknowledged  rights  of  the  Crown  of  France 
A^as  that  of  receiving  the  emoluments  of  all  benefices  during 


Louis  XIV.  a7id  Willimn  III.  249 

vacancy,  which  was  known  as  the  regale,  but  it  was  a  right 
which  depended  solely  upon  custom,  and  obtained  only  in 
the  ancient  dominions  of  the  Crown  of  France. 

X  •.  r    .1   •         •  ^  T         ■  •  Claim  of  the 

In    spite    of    this,     in    1673,      I-OUIS    XIV,,    pursuing    regale  over 

his  usual  policy  of  royal  aggrandisement,  issued  an  ^'^^  whole 
edict  asserting  that  according  to  law  and  to  custom 
the  7-egale  applied  to  all  the  bishoprics  of  the  kingdom.  On 
this  the  bishops  of  Pamiers  and  Alais,  who  were  theologically 
opposed  to  the  Jesuit  influence  dominant  in  the  court,  protested 
and  appealed  to  the  Pope,  Innocent  xi.,  who  at  once  gave  his 
decision  in  their  favour.  This  action  on  the  part  Denied  by 
of  the  bishops  and  the  Pope  raised  the  question  ^'^^  p°p«- 
out  of  the  category  of  a  money  dispute  between  the  Crown 
and  some  of  the  clergy,  into  that  of  a  grave  constitutional 
question  between  the  Church  of  France  and  the  Pope.  Men 
asked  themselves  in  France  what  right  the  Pope  had  to  interfere 
with  the  emoluments  of  the  Crown,  just  as  in  England  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years  before  they  had  asked  themselves  by 
what  right  the  Pope  claimed  the  first  fruits  of  English  benefices. 
But  Louis  XIV.  was  fortunate  enough  to  find  ready  to  his  hand 
a  champion  of  his  cause  far  more  noble  than  a  Cranmer  or  a 
Cromwell.  To  the  orthodoxy  of  Sir  Thomas  More,  Bossuet, 
bishop  of  Meaux,  added  the  fervid  eloquence  of  S.  Bernard 
and  the  learning  and  taste  of  Erasmus.  In  him  the  flame  of 
patriotism  burned  at  fever  heat.  Deeply  imbued  with  the 
principles  of  his  age  loyalty  was  to  him  the  first  of  virtues,  and 
the  king  dilated  before  his  dazzled  eyes,  not  as  the  grasping 
tyrant  that  he  really  was,  but  as  the  God-given  champion  of  an 
oppressed  Church.  Bossuet  felt  that  the  mantle  of  Gerson 
and  d'Ailly  had  descended  upon  him,  and  at  the  bidding  of  the 
king,  under  his  leadership,  the  French  clergy  set  ^^^  j^^^ 
themselves  to  follow  up  the  work  of  the  council  of  Resolutions, 
Constance  and  put  limits  to  the  autocracy  of  the  *^^*" 
Roman  Pontiff.  Constitutionalism  once  more  raised  its  head 
for  a  brief  period  within  the  bounds  of  the  Roman  obedience. 
In  1682  the  king  summoned  an  assembly  of  clergy  to  meet 


250  Eiiropean  History,   15 98-171 5 

at  S.  Germain  and  consider  the  difficulty.  Bossuet  at  once 
took  the  lead,  and  at  his  instigation  the  assembly  recognised 
the  right  of  the  king  to  the  regale  all  over  France,  and  passed 
four  resolutions  on  the  limits  of  the  power  of  the  Pope. 

(i)  That  sovereigns  are  not  subject  to  the  Pope  in  things 
temporal,  neither  can  they  be  deposed  by  him  nor  their 
subjects  freed  from  their  oaths  of  allegiance  by  him. 

(2)  That  a  general  council  is  superior  to  the  Pope. 

(3)  That  the  power  of  the  Pope  is  subject  to  the  regulations 

and  canons  of  councils,  and  he  cannot  decide  anything 
contrary  to  the  rules  and  constitutions  of  the  Gallican 
Church. 

(4)  That  the  decisions  of  the  Pope  are  not  irreformable,  except 

by  the  consent  of  the  universal  Church. 

These  resolutions  thus  passed  by  the  clergy  were  registered 
by  the  Parlements,  and  accepted  by  the  Sorbonne,  and  became 
law  of  the  land  which  all  loyal  subjects  were  bound  to  obey. 

Thus  was  raised  once  more  the  old  constitutional  question 
between  the  Crown  and  the  Pope.  The  decisions  of  the 
Constitu-  Assembly  of  S.  Germain  had  behind  them  a 
tioRai  ques-     weight  of  authority  and  practice,  unquestioned  in 

tion  between  ...„,,  ,,  -i     ■         i 

the  Crown  the  primitive  Church,  repeatedly  asserted  in  the 
and  the  Pope,  medieval  Church,  formulated  at  the  council  of 
Constance,  lately  vindicated  at  serious  risk  by  the  English 
Church,  but  clean  contrary  to  the  pretensions  of  the  Hilde- 
brandine  Papacy  and  the  decisions  of  the  council  of  Trent. 
It  was  absurd  to  expect  that  a  Pope  however  weak  could  at  a 
moment's  notice  turn  his  back  upon  a  theory  on  which  the 
Papacy  had  continuously  acted  for  six  hundred  years.  Innocent 
felt  that  he  had  no  choice  in  the  matter.  He  at  once  con- 
demned the  decrees,  and  refused  to  issue  the  usual  bulls 
sanctioning  the  consecration  of  priests  who  had  accepted  them 
to  the  episcopate.  Before  many  years  had  passed  there  were 
no  less  than  thirty  sees  in  France  without  a  bishop,  and 
hundreds  of  cur^s  without  canonically  instituted  priests.  The 
condition  of  affairs  was  singularly  like  that  in  England  whei 


Lo2iis  XIV.  and   Williavi  III.  251 

the  statute  in  restraint  of  the  payment  of  Annates  was  passed. 
Each  country  had  solemnly  asserted  a  view  of  the  constitu- 
tional rights  of  the  Church  within  its  borders,  which  was  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  that  of  the  Papacy,  and  p^^^^^^  ^o 
was  denounced  by  the  Curia  as  schismatical.  the  English 
In  support  of  the  national  theory  the  majority  of  ^^f°™^t*°" 
the  clergy  in  each  country  was  prepared  to  enter  at  the  bidding 
of  the  Crown  into  a  contest  with  the  Pope,  which  could  but 
result  in  the  increase  of  the  royal  authority  over  them.  In 
the  mouth  of  Louis  xiv.  as  in  that  of  Henry  viii.  the  liber- 
ties of  the  national  Church  meant  in  reality  the  power  of  the 
national  king.  But  unlike  Henry  viii.  Louis  xiv.  was  too 
wary  to  be  pushed  to  extremes.  He  carefully  avoided  any 
overt  act  which  could  be  construed  into  an  undue  assertion  of 
independence.  He  contented  himself  with  a  purely  negative 
position.  Where  bulls  were  refused  the  sees  remained  vacant, 
and  the  Crown  enjoyed  the  profits  of  the  vacancy.  There  was 
no  divorce  question  to  complicate  matters.  Henry  viii. 
could  not  wait,  Louis  xiv.  could.  Consequently,  in  spite  of 
much  talk  about  a  patriarchate  of  France,  no  definite  steps  had 
been  taken  to  increase  the  difficulties  of  a  settlement,  when  it 
became  the  obvious  interest  of  both  sides  to  restore  peace.  In 
1693,  when  Louis  was  involved  in  the  war  of  the  settlement 
League  of  Augsburg,  and  the  influence  of  Madame  of  the  quar- 
de  Maintenon  had  become  paramount  at  court,  ^^  '  ^^^' 
he  found  the  continuance  of  his  quarrel  with  the  Pope  both 
undignified  and  prejudicial.  Innocent  xii.  the  new  Pope  was 
willing  to  meet  him  half  way.  The  articles  of  S.  Germain 
were  repudiated,  the  Pope  recognised  and  sanctioned  all  the 
royal  nominations,  and  ecclesiastical  affairs  resumed  their 
wonted  channel.  Ten  years  of  warfare  had  done  nothing 
more  for  Louis  than  to  enrich  the  literature  of  France  by  some 
valuable  works  on  church  government,  and  to  assist  his  rival 
William  of  Orange  to  the  throne  of  P^ngland. 

Indirectly,  however,  there  is  little  doubt  that  this  memorable 
quarrel  with  the  Pope  did  much  to  urge  Louis  to  the  committal 


252  European  History,   1598-1715 

of  the  greatest  blunder  and  crime  of  his  reign  —  the  Revoca- 
tion of  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  Since  the  suppression  of  their 
political  power  by  Richelieu  the  Huguenots  had  given  up  all 
political  ambition.  Satisfied  with  the  free  exer- 
Louis toward  cisc  of  their  worship  permitted  by  the  edict,  the 
the  Hugue-  Huguenots  of  the  middle  class  had  devoted  them- 
selves with  great  success  to  industrial  employments 
of  various  kinds,  while  numbers  of  the  nobles,  who  had  only 
embraced  Huguenotism  from  political  motives,  came  back  to 
the  Church  now  that  their  interests  and  associations  led  them 
in  that  direction.  Even  in  the  troublous  days  of  the  Frotide 
the  Huguenots  remained  strictly  and  significantly  quiet,  and 
when  Colbert  took  up  the  reins  of  administration  he  found 
among  them  the  most  skilful  the  most  industrious  and  the  most 
loyal  of  French  artisans.  Unfortunately  in  the  eyes  of  Louis 
XIV.  and  of  Louvois  their  very  loyalty  and  their  wealth  proved 
reasons  for  their  persecution.  The  time  had  come,  as  it 
seemed  to  them,  when  the  work  of  Richelieu  might  be  safely 
pushed  to  completion.  All  that  he  had  been  able  to  do  was 
to  draw  the  poison  fangs  of  the  serpent,  the  time  had  now 
come  when  the  monster  itself  might  be  scotched  and  killed. 
The  very  existence  of  a  special  law  in  favour  of  one  class 
recognised  an  imperfection  in  the  uniformity  of  the  body  poli- 
tic. France  would  not  be  herself  till  she  was  one  in  religious 
as  in  political  allegiance. 

In  the  seventeenth  century  to  a  mind  like  that  of  Louis  xiv., 
small  in  scope  but  concentrated  in  grip,  there  was  much  that 
Desire  for  was  attractive  in  such  an  argument.  Those  were 
uniformity,  days  when  social  distinctions,  trade  interests,  local 
independence  were  all  being  ruthlessly  sacrificed  to  the  soli- 
darity of  the  monarchy.  Why  should  not  religious  distinctions 
be  subject  to  the  same  law?  However  contented  and  loyal 
the  Huguenots  might  be,  their  very  existence  was  an  imper- 
fection in  an  absolute  monarchy,  which  ought  only  to  be  toler- 
ated as  long  as  the  necessities  of  state  required  it.  But  that 
was  not  all.     Louis  himself  was  somewhat  altering  in  character 


Louis  XIV.  and   Willimn  III.  253 

as  he  grew  older.  The  cup  of  pleasure  had  begun  to  pall. 
The  artificiality  of  court  life  was  becoming  a  restraint  to  him. 
The  atmosphere  of  gross  adulation  by  which  he  was  surrounded 
proved  more  distasteful  every  day.  Religion,  always  a  strong 
influence  over  him,  reasserted  her  claims  more  imperiously  as 
the  pleasures  and  vanities  of  life  were  turning  to  ashes  in  his 
hands.  Louis  had  always  been  decorously  orthodox.  He 
now  became  fervently  devout.  His  court  became  more  strict 
in  life,  more  healthy  in  tone.  Simplicity  of  manners,  strong 
sense  of  duty,  sobriety  of  conversation  reigned  in  the  place 
of  luxury  and  frivolity.  Courtiers  complained  that  Versailles 
was  no  better  than  a  monastery.     The  genius  of   ,  „  , 

•'  '-'  Influence  of 

the  change  was  a  woman.  Louis  as  long  ago  as  Madame  de 
1669  had  chosen  as  the  governess  of  his  children  '^3'"*^"°"- 
by  Madame  de  Montespan,  the  young  widow  of  the  deformed 
burlesque  poet  Scarron,  known  to  history  as  Madame  de  Main- 
tenon.  At  first  he  was  piqued  by  the  primness  and  self-restraint 
of  her  demeanour,  but  gradually  the  beauty  of  her  character, 
the  wit  and  grace  of  her  conversation,  the  soundness  of  her 
judgment,  the  force  and  vigour  of  her  nature,  illuminated  and 
sanctified  by  the  purest  flame  of  religious  devotion,  called  out 
a  response  from  his  better  qualities,  and  in  the  end  established 
a  complete  mastery  over  him.  In  1683,  two  years  after  the 
death  of  Maria  Theresa,  he  married  her  secretly,  and  although 
at  her  own  wish  she  never  assumed  the  dignity  of  queen,  her 
position  was  thoroughly  well  understood  both  in  France  and 
in  the  courts  of  Europe,  and  she  received  at  all  hands  the 
respect  due  both  to  her  rank  and  her  virtues.  Her  political 
influence  has  been  much  exaggerated,  for  it  was  of  a  quality 
very  difficult  to  appraise.  She  rarely  if  ever  interfered  directly 
except  in  those  matters  of  personal  patronage  in  which  her 
sex  is  always  so  deeply  interested,  but  her  indirect  influence 
was  very  strong,  not  only  because  Louis  had  a  great  opinion 
of  her  good  sense  and  frequently  consulted  her,  but  more 
especially  because  of  the  power  which  she  wielded  invisibly 
over  the  character  and  mind  of  the  king  himself.     As  under 


254  European  History,    1 598-1715 

her  influence  he  became  more  devout,  he  naturally  allowed  his 
increased  affection  for  the  interests  of  religion  to  mould  his 
policy.  As  his  conscience  became  more  sensitive  to  the  claims 
of  the  Church,  he  felt  more  than  he  had  done  before  the 
scandal  of  his  quarrel  with  the  Holy  See,  he  realised  more 
than  before  the  duties  of  his  position  as  the  first  Catholic 
power  of  Europe.  Probably  had  Madame  de  Maintenon  lived 
out  the  rest  of  her  life  in  poverty  as  the  widow  of  Scarron, 
Louis  would  still  have  revoked  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  have  made 
up  his  quarrel  with  the  Pope,  and  have  persecuted  the  com- 
munity of  Port  Royal.  Still  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  he 
was  impelled  to  that  policy  by  the  knowledge  that  it  was 
approved  of  by  her  mind,  and  strengthened  in  it  by  the  sense 
of  duty  which  he  had  imbibed  from  her  society. 

Impelled  then  by  his  fondness  for  uniformity,  anxious  to 

prove  his  orthodoxy  in  spite  of  his  difficulties  with  Rome,  and 

believing  that  the  Huguenots  themselves  were  ripe 

Disabilities  .  ^        .     .  ,   .  .  , . 

placed  upon  fof  coiiversion,  Louis  began  his  repressive  policy 
the  Hugue-  j^  1681  by  excluding  all  Huguenots  from  public 
couragement  employment.  They  were  to  be  marked  by  the 
of  conver-  law,  as  Roman  Catholics  were  marked  in  England, 
as  people  who  were  unfitted  by  their  religion  to 
hold  positions  of  trust.  But  repression  was  only  one  side  of 
his  policy.  While  those  who  obstinately  adhered  to  their 
independence  and  their  religion  were  stamped  as  persons  un- 
worthy of  trust,  those  who  would  listen  to  reason,  and  be 
obedient  to  the  wishes  of  their  lord  and  father,  were  covered 
with  benefits  and  rewarded  with  pensions.  In  1682  missions 
were  held  throughout  France  to  convert  the  heretics,  Bossuet 
devoted  himself  to  the  work  with  incredible  zeal  and  success. 
An  office  was  established  in  Paris  under  a  convert  named 
Pelisson  to  organise  the  work  of  conversion.  Converts  re- 
ceived their  rewards  in  the  best  of  government  posts,  and  the 
receipt  of  government  pensions.  So  numerous  were  they  that 
Louis  thought  that  he  might  safely  proceed  to  the  next  step 
and  destroy  heresy  at  its  root.     Edicts  were  issued  closing  the 


Louis  XIV.  and  William  III.  25$ 

Huguenot  churches  and  schools  and  making  it  a  penal  offence 
for  a  Huguenot  pastor  to  preach.  It  soon  appeared  that  he 
was  wrong.  Among  the  middle  classes  in  the  south  and  centre 
of  France  there  were  thousands  to  whom  their  religion  was 
of  far  more  moment  to  them  than  their  property  or  even  their 
lives.  In  1682  numbers  of  the  best  and  most  industrious  of  the 
artisans  of   France  began  to  leave  their  country    ^    . 

°  ■'      Emigration 

rather  than  abandon  their  religion.  Louis  at  once  oftheHugue- 
forbade   emigration   under   pain   of   the   galleys.    "°'^  ^"'^ 

°  ^  o  ^         popular  ris- 

There   was   but   one   resource   left   to   the    poor  ings,  1682- 
Huguenots,  deprived  of  all  honourable  employ-   '^^3' 
ment  in  their  own  country  and  prevented  from  seeking  it  in 
another.     In  desperation  the  mountaineers  in  the  Cevennes 
rose   in   tumult  rather  than  revolt   in    1683.     Stifled  almost 
in  its  birth  by  the  royal  troops  it  was  made  the  excuse  of 
inhuman  barbarities.     Dragoons   were   quartered   _. 
upon   the    miserable    inhabitants    until    they   re-   onades,' 
nounced  their  religion.     Many  a  Huguenot  who   ^^^^' 
would  willingly  die  for  his  religion  could  not  bear  to   see 
his   family   and    home   at   the    mercy  of   a   brutal   soldiery. 
During  the  year  1684  this  vile  system  was  in  force  throughout 
the  south   of  France.      Conversions  were  announced  by  the 
thousand.       In    Languedoc    it    was    said    that    as    many    as 
60,000  took  place  in  three  days.     At  last  in  October  1685 
the  coping  stone  was  put  to  this  edifice  of  blood 
and  crime.     An  edict  was  issued  by  which  all  the   of  the  Edict 
privileges   accorded   to   the     Huguenots    by    the   °'  Nantes, 
Edict  of  Nantes  were  withdrawn,   the   reformed 
worship  was  suppressed,  and  the  ministers  expelled.     Hugue- 
notism  became  from  that  moment  in  France,  like  Episcopacy 
a  few  years  later  in  Scotland,  an  illegal  religion  outside  the 
pale  of  the  law  and  proscribed  by  it. 

The  results  of  the  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  were 
very  different   to  what  Louis  and    his  ministers   Results  of 
expected.     So  far  from  crushing  the  Huguenots   the  measure, 
into  submission  it  goaded  them  into  madness.     They  realised 


\; 


256  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

that  now  there  was  no  chance  of  peace  for  them  in  their  own 
country.  One  by  one,  family  by  family,  they  fled  from  their 
homes  leaving  behind  them  their  property,  taking  their  lives 
in  their  hands.  Numbers  were  caught  and  sent  to  the  galleys, 
numbers  more  escaped,  and  carried  to  the  enemies  of  France 
in  England  and  Brandenburg  and  Holland  the  thrift  and  the 
skill  which  under  Colbert's  enlightened  patronage  had  done 
/^sojnuch  to  make  France  the  wealthiest  of  European  states, 
/j  Holland  dates  its  industrial  revival  and  Brandenburg  its 
\ '  industrial  life  from  the  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes. 
Huguenot  soldiers,  like  Ruvigny  and  Schomberg,  brought  the 
discipline  and  training  of  the  French  armies  to  bear  fruit  in 
the  English  and  Dutch  service.  It  is  said  that  fifty  thousand 
families  escaped  in  this  way  to  fertilise  with  their  industry 
the  soil  of  the  enemies  of  France.  Those  who  were  left  behind, 
who  were  too  poor  or  too  ignorant  to  escape,  continued  in  the 
mountains  of  the  Cevennes  a  desultory  and  fanatical  struggle 
with  their  oppressor.  In  the  days  of  Louis's  greatest  need,  in 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  they  kept  the  ablest  of 
French  generals  and  an  army  of  veterans  from  the  theatre  of 
war.  Eventually  in  the  next  reign  they  obtained  and  have 
since  enjoyed  a  grudging  toleration.  Even  the  uniformity  of 
religion  so  dear  to  the  heart  of  Louis  was  not  attained.  Large 
numbers  of  Protestants  and  of  Protestant  children,  it  is  true, 
were  added  to  the  ranks  of  Catholicism,  but  Huguenotism 
lived  on  in  France,  socially  and  politically  insignificant,  but 
still  alive.  France  soon  found  that  persecution  had  bereft 
her  of  her  children  and  her  wealth,  without  even  giving  her  in 
return  that  complete  national  solidarity  which  formed  the 
excuse  for  the  crime. 

The  interest  of  ecclesiastical  questions,  however  intense, 
however  absorbing,  never  diverted  the  jealous  eye 

Acrffrcssivc 

policy  of  of  Louis  XIV.  for  one  moment  from  his  own  ag- 

Louis,  1678-     grandisement.     He  did  not  become  the  less  am- 
bitious because  he  had  grown  devout,  or  the  less 
far-reaching  in  his  plans  because  they  were  now  largely  affected 


Louis  XIV.  and  Willimn  III.  257 

by  his  determination  to  play  the  part  of  champion  of  the 
Church.  No  sooner  was  the  peace  of  Nimwegen  signed  than 
Louis  began  to  cast  about  for  pretexts  for  evading  it.  By  the 
words  of  the  treaty  the  towns  ceded  to  France  were  expressed 
to  be  surrendered  'with  their  dependencies.'  The  ambiguity 
of  this  phrase,  possibly  intentional,  gave  a  great  opportunity 
to  that  kind  of  masterful  diplomacy  which  Louis  loved.  In 
1670  he  appointed  tribunals,  called  Chambres  des  _,,    ^^ 

'  ^  ^^  '  The  Cham- 

R^unions,  consisting  of  members  of  the  parle-  bres  des  Re- 
ments  of  Metz,  Breisach,  and  Besangon  to  ad-  ""'""s,  1679- 
judge  the  territories  in  Alsace,  Franche  Comt^,  and  the 
three  bishoprics  which  were  included  in  this  phrase,  and 
accordingly  appertained  to  France.  The  Chambres  well  un- 
derstood their  duty.  Without  hesitation  the}'  pronounced  all 
Alsace,  Zweibriicken,  Saarbriick  and  other  smaller  districts  to 
be  included  in  the  treaty.  No  sooner  was  the  decision  pro- 
nounced than  French  troops  occupied  the  territories  in 
question,  and  their  annexation  to  France  became  an  accom- 
plished fact.  In  vain  the  diet  and  the  princes  whose  lands 
were  thus  unceremoniously  seized  protested.  Force  and  pos- 
session were  on  the  side  of  Louis  and  he  knew  it.  While 
they  were  protesting  he  was  cynically  preparing  for  a  stroke 
more  audacious  still.     The  great  city  of    Stras-   „ 

°  ■'  Occupation 

burg  was  included  in  the  decision  which  gave  all  of  strasburg, 
Alsace  to  Louis,  but  Strasburg  could  not  be  '^'' 
occupied  in  a  moment  like  Saarbriick  or  Montb^liard.  French 
gold  and  diplomacy  were  set  to  work,  the  magistrates  were 
bribed  or  intimidated,  and  at  the  end  of  September  1681  all 
Europe  rang  with  the  news  that  Louis  xiv.  was  master  of  the 
key  of  the  upper  Rhine.  The  skill  of  Vauban  was  at  once 
enlisted  in  its  defence,  and  before  the  war  broke  out  again 
Strasburg  had  been  added  to  the  impregnable  circle  of 
fortresses,  which  guarded  France  and  threatened  her  enemies 
from  Lille  to  Pignerol.  Like  his  apt  pupil  Napoleon  in  after 
times  Louis  xiv.  thoroughly  understood  the  policy  of  employ- 
ing brute  force  in  the  time  of  peace  against  unwilling  enemies, 

PERIOD    V.  R 


258  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

in  order  to  obtain  advantageous  positions  either  in  diplomacy 
or  war  as  the  basis  of  future  effort.  The  Emperor  threatened 
by  the  Turks  was  unable,  Germany  was  unwilling,  to  renew  the 
war  for  the  sake  of  Strasburg,  and  Louis  proceeded  calmly 
and  steadily  on  his  way.  By  an  arrangement  with  Charles  of 
Mantua  he  occupied  Casale  in  Piedmont  the  same  day  that 
Strasburg  fell  into  his  hands.  By  the  truce  of  Regensburg 
concluded  after  a  short  war  with  Spain  in  1684,  and  approved 
by  the  diet,  he  secured  possession  for  twenty  years  of  his  ill- 
gotten  gains. 

Meanwhile  no  pains  were  spared  by  the  vigilant  and  careful 
mind  of  Louvois  to  bring  the  army  to  a  pitch  of  perfection  hith- 
erto unknown.     Camps  of  instruction  were  formed, 

Improvement      ,  r      i  i  r^^  a,  i     »  i  i 

of  the  army  the  prccursors  of  the  modern  Chalons  and  Alder- 
and  navy,  shot,  where  1 5o,ooo  men  wcre  kept  constantly  at 
^  ^   ^  drill.      Regiments,  no  longer  farmed  as  it  were 

by  their  colonel,  were  paid,  clothed,  armed,  and  victualled  by 
the  war  office.  Stores  were  collected  along  the  frontier.  All 
France  resounded  with  the  clash  of  arms  and  preparation  for 
war.  Through  the  zeal  of  Seignelay,  the  son  of  Colbert,  similar 
energy  was  expended  upon  the  navy.  Arsenals  were  formed 
at  Brest  and  Toulon.  Ships  of  war  were  built  to  the 
number  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  and  fitted  with  all  the 
appliances  of  naval  warfare  as  it  was  then  understood.  Since 
the  decay  of  the  navy  of  Spain  the  command  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean had  been  shared  between  the  Venetians,  the 
macy  in  the  Turks,  and  the  Corsairs  of  Algiers.  Now  under 
Mediter-  Duquesuc  and  de  Tourville  France  stretched  forth 
her  hand  to  win  an  easy  supremacy  over  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  to  claim  partnership  with  England  in  the  rule  of 
the  ocean.  In  1683  Duquesne  destroyed  the  pirates  of  Algiers 
and  Tripoli,  and  liberated  their  Christian  slaves.  In  1685  he 
forced  the  republic  of  Genoa  to  renounce  its  traditional 
alliance  with  Spain  and  to  become  the  humble  vassal  of  France. 
A  policy  of  aggrandisement  so  open  and  so  unmistakable 
could  not  fail  to  arouse  at  length  the  slumbering  jealousy  of 


Louis  XIV.  and   William  III.  259 

Europe,  but  it  was  long  before  the  enemies  of  France  were 
in  a  position  to  take  any  active  steps.  From  1678  to  1685 
the  danger  from  the  Turks  was  too  pressing  to  permit  the 
Emperor  to  involve  himself  in  responsibilities  on  the  Rhine. 
In  1685  the  accession  of  James  11.  to  the  English  Blunders  of 
throne  opened  out  prospects  of  ambition  to  Wil-  Louis. 
Ham  of  Orange,  which  made  him  unwilling  to  have  his 
hands  tied  by  the  necessity  of  defending  the  Low  Countries. 
But  gradually  as  the  months  passed  the  blunders  of  Louis 
himself  gave  the  opportunity  to  his  enemies  which  they  de- 
sired. His  continued  quarrel  with  the  Pope  and  Alienation  of 
his  alliance  with  the  Turks  alienated  the  more  Europe, 
zealous  Catholic  opinion  in  Europe,  and  deprived  him  of  the 
support  of  a  sentiment,  which  at  that  very  time  he  was  most 
anxious  to  obtain.  How  could  he  claim  the  allegiance  of 
zealous  Catholics,  when  he  was  the  enemy  of  the  Pope  and 
the  friend  of  the  Turk?  Yet  with  what  face  could  he  apply 
to  the  supporters  of  Protestantism  or  the  friends  of  religious 
liberty,  when  he  was  stained  with  the  cruelties  of  the  'dragon- 
ades, '  and  had  just  revoked  the  Edict  of  Nantes  ?  His  intrigues 
with  the  Turks  had  lost  him  the  assistance  of  John  Sobieski 
and  Poland.  His  seizure  of  the  duchy  of  Zvveibriicken  had 
alienated  his  old  ally  of  Sweden  to  whom  it  belonged.  His 
attack  upon  Algiers  and  Tripoli  had  forfeited  the  friendship 
of  the  Turks.  The  system  of  tributary  states  beyond  the 
frontiers  of  Germany  had  completely  broken  down.  The  result 
of   this  was  seen  in  the  secret  formation  of  the   _,    ,  , 

1  ne  league  01 

League   of   Augsburg  in  1686,  between  the  Em-   Augsburg, 
peror,    Spain,     Sweden,     the    princes    of    north    '^^^' 
Germany,  and  the  United  Provinces  to  oppose  the  domination 
of  France  threatened  by  the  truce  of  Regensburg.     In  the 
next  year  it  was  joined  by  Bavaria  and  the  princes  of  Italy, 
and  the  Pope,  Innocent  xi.,  even  gave  it  his  secret  support. 

For  the  moment  the  accustomed  political  skill  of  Louis 
deserted  him.  Though  he  knew  of  the  League  he  hesitated 
to  strike  the  first  blow  while  his  enemies  were  unprepared. 


26o  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

He  even  allowed  them  to  deprive  him  by  a  sudden  stroke  of 
his  most  important  ally.  James  11.  of  England  was  a  very 
Quarrel  different  person  from  his  brother  Charles.    Gifted 

between  with   much  greater  energy  and  independence  of 

Louis  and  •    •      ,  i      n       i        •  r         i-    •       i  ^ 

James  II.,  spirit,  he  was  wholly  destitute  of  political  tact  and 
1688.  discrimination.     Louis  quickly  found  that  he  was 

unable  to  bend  him  to  his  will,  and  make  England  humbly 
attend  upon  his  chariot  wheels  as  heretofore.  All  that 
Charles  had  cared  about  was  a  quiet  life  and  plenty  of  money. 
James  on  the  contrary  had  high  political  ambitions.  He 
wished  to  make  England  Roman  Catholic,  and  the  English 
monarchy  absolute,  and  in  comparison  with  these  objects  he 
cared  not  a  fig  for  the  aggrandisement  of  France  or  the  glory 
of  Louis  XIV.  It  was  all  important  to  Louis  that  James 
should  not  embroil  himself  with  his  Parliament  and  people, 
when  France  wanted  the  assistance  of  the  English  fleet  in  the 
Channel  and  English  soldiers  on  the  Rhine.  James  on  the 
contrary  cared  only  for  his  own  home  policy,  and  in  spite  of 
the  urgent  remonstrances  of  Louis,  and  even  of  the  Pope,  was 
busied  in  schemes  for  weakening  the  English  Church,  re- 
moving the  disabilities  of  Roman  Catholics  and  altering  the 
English  constitution.  Louis  determined  to  read  him  a  lesson. 
He  remembered  how  years  before  he  had  had  to  teach 
Charles  11.  that  he  must  obey  French  orders  if  he  wanted 
French  gold.  He  thought  that  a  somewhat  sharper  lesson 
was  needed  by  James  11.  now.  He  knew  that  the  malcon- 
tent politicians  in  England  were  in  close  communication  with 
William  of  Orange.  He  knew  that  William  was  fully  prepared 
to  attack  his  father-in-law's  throne  directly  he  was  sure  that 
his  departure  for  England  would  not  be  the  signal  for  French 
troops  to  overrun  the  Low  Countries  and  march  upon  Amster- 
dam. He  held  the  fate  of  James  11.  at  his  disposal.  William 
could  not  move  without  his  permission.  At  that  very  moment, 
in  1688,  a  disputed  election  to  the  arch-bishopric  of  Koln 
gave  Louis  the  opportunity  of  declaring  war  upon  the  Rhine. 
Persuaded  that  the  invasion  of  England  by  William  of  Orange 


Lojcis  XIV.  and   William  III.  261 

must  bring  about  a  struggle,  which  would   force    James   to 
humble  himself  and  beg  for  French  assistance  to  crush  the 
rebellion,  he  deliberately  allowed  William  to  sail.     The  French 
army  was  moved  from  the  frontiers  of   the  Low  james  driven 
Countries  to  the  Rhine,  and  occupied  the  Palati-   °"*  °f  ^ng- 
nate.     In  the  midst  of  his  triumph  came  the  as-   wiiiiam  111. 
tounding  news   that   James  11.  was  a  fugitive   at   '^^s. 
Versailles,   and  the  strength  of   England  was  added  to  the 
formidable  coalition  which  threatened  France  from  all  sides. 
The  war   of    the  League  of  Augsburg,  which    lasted  from 
1688  to  1698,  is  one  of  the  most  exhausting  and  most  uninterest- 
ing wars  of  which  history  makes  mention.     Louis 
found  himself  alone  against  the  world.     Literally   the  League 
he  had  not  a  single  ally.      By  the  force  of  circum-   "f  Augsburg, 
stances  the  war  on  his  side  was  largely  defensive.  '  ^  ' 

Thanks  to  his  prevision  and  Vauban's  skill,  his  frontier  was 
defended  by  a  string  of  fortresses,  which  in  those  days  of  bad 
roads  and  worse  artillery  were  only  conquerable  by  the  weari- 
some method  of  blockade,  a  method  which  often,  owing  to 
disease  and  exposure,  was  more  fatal  to  the  besiegers  than  the 
besieged.  Using  these  fortresses  as  a  base  of  operations  his 
generals  could  advance  to  deal  a  blow  at  the  enemy  or  retire 
behind  them  to  recruit  as  occasion  demanded.  The  allies, 
seeing  the  immense  defensive  strength  which  this  gave  to  the 
French  operations,  in  their  turn  fortified  fortress  against  for- 
tress, and  Namur  and  Mons  became  under  the  hands  of  Coehorn 
the  equals  of  Lille  and  Charleroi.  The  generals  too  on  both 
sides  were  well  fitted  for  playing  the  game  of  war  on  such  con- 
ditions. No  strategist  worth  the  name  appeared  in  Europe 
between  the  days  of  Turenne  and  Marlborough.  I,uxemburg 
was  a  brilliant  tactician.  On  the  field  of  battle  he  had  not  an 
equal.  But  no  one  knew  less  how  to  win  a  campaign  or  utilise 
a  victory.  William  in.  was  an  excellent  war  minister,  inde- 
fatigable in  preparation,  indomitable  under  reverses,  but  his 
commonplace  leadership  was  never  relieved  by  one  spark 
of  genius  or  even  brilliance.     In  the  Low  Countries  the  tide 


262  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

of  battle  ebbed  and  flowed  about  the  fortresses  of  Mons  and 
Namur.  The  capture  of  them  by  the  French  in  1691  and 
1692  and  the  defeats  inflicted  by  Luxemburg  upon  William 
at  Steinkirk  and  Neerwinden,  after  his  efforts  to  save  Namur  in 
1692,  mark  the  highest  point  of  French  military  success.  The 
recapture  of  Namur  by  William  in  1695  i^  his  chief  title  to 
military  renown,  and  the  evidence  of  the  increasing  exhaustion 
of  France.  On  the  Rhine  there  was  no  great  event  which 
calls  for  notice,  while  in  Italy  the  French,  though  much  weak- 
ened by  constant  drafts  for  the  Netherlands,  managed  to  hold 
their  own  through  the  fine  fighting  qualities  of  Catinat,  who 
completely  defeated  the  duke  Victor  Amadeus  at  Staffarda  in 
1689,  and  drove  Prince  Eugene  out  of  Piedmont  after  the 
bayonet  fight  of  Civita  in  1693, 

The  real  interest  of  the  war  centres  round  the  struggle  at 

sea  between  the  fleets  of  England  and  France.     It  was  the 

first  tilt  in  the  dread  tourney,  which  occupies  the 

Importance  ^ '  ^ 

of  the  naval  wholc  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  extends 
operations.  ^^^^  Bcachy  Head  to  Trafalgar,  and  has  given 
England  her  vast  imperial  position.  The  conquest  of  Eng- 
land and  Scotland  gave  to  William  in.  the  navy  of  England  to 
use  against  Louis  xiv.  The  continued  loyalty  of  Ireland  to 
James  n.  made  the  command  of  the  sea  necessary  to  Louis,  for 
without  it  he  could  not  hope  to  maintain  James  in  Ireland  for 
a  moment  against  the  whole  power  of  England.  The  issue  of 
the  struggle  in  Ireland  depended  therefore  wholly  upon  the 
issue  of  the  naval  war.  The  great  victory  of  Tourville  over  the 
English  fleet  off  Beachy  Head  in  July  1690  made  the  French 
for  nearly  two  years  masters  of  the  Channel,  and  more  than 
counteracted  the  effect  of  the  battle  of  the  Boyne,  by  enabling 
Louis  to  pour  French  troops  and  stores  into  Ireland,  and  even 
threaten  the  invasion  of  England  itself.  The  defeat  of  Tour- 
ville by  Russell  off  La  Hogue  put  a  final  end  of  this  dream  of 
French  ambition.  All  thought  of  invasion  had  to  be  laid 
aside,  and  Ireland  left  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  cruel  con- 
queror.    France  had   to  acknowledge  the  superiority  of  the 


Louis  XIV.  and   William  I  If.  263 

English  at  sea,  to  acquiesce  in  the  capture  and  annexation  of 
its  colonies  in  the  East  and  West  Indies,  to  submit  to  the 
absorption  of  its  trade  by  its  dominant  rival,  and  to  content 
itself  with  the  impotent  but  lucrative  revenge  of  the  legalised 
piracy  of  privateering. 

After  eight  years  of  war  all  sides  were  anxious  for  peace. 
To  France,  exhausted  by  maintaining  year  after  year  four 
armies  at  least  in  the  field,  peace  was  a  necessity,  ^^, 
Already  the  burden  had  become  almost  intoler-  of  France, 
able.  The  coinage  was  debased,  the  taille  had  ^^^' 
been  doubled,  offices  were  openly  sold,  and  indeed  created 
in  order  to  be  sold,  one  tenth  of  the  population  was  without 
means  of  subsistence.  The  government  too  had  fallen  into  very 
inferior  hands.  Colbert,  Louvois,  and  Seignelay  were  all  dead. 
Pontchartrain  who  took  charge  of  the  finances  was  incapable, 
Barbesieux,  the  son  of  Louvois,  who  succeeded  to  his  fathei  af 
the  war  office,  was  young  and  without  experience.  When  he 
pleaded  his  inexperience  to  Louis,  the  infatuated  king  replied, 
'Do  not  disturb  yourself,  I  formed  your  father  and  will  form 
you.'  He  seemed  to  think  human  nature  was  a  blank  sheet 
of  paper  on  which  he  could  write  what  he  liked.  England  too 
was  tired  of  a  struggle  which  brought  her  neither  glory  nor 
profit.  William  himself,  worn  out  by  disease,  hated  by  his 
subjects,  thwarted  by  his  Parliaments,  plotted  against  by  his 
courtiers,  was  willing  if  not  anxious  to  sheathe  the  sword.  In 
1696  Victor  Amadeus  of  Savoy  left  the  League  and  made  a 
treaty  with  France,  and  negotiations  for  a  general  peace  were 
set  on  foot,  which  eventually  were  brought  to  a  successful  issue 
at  Ryswick  in  1698  chiefly  through  the  efforts  of  Bouffiers  and 
Portland. 

By  the  treaty  of  Ryswick  France  surrendered  all  the  towns 
which  she  had  captured  since  the  treaty  of  Nimwegen  except 
Strasburg,  and  agreed  that  the  chief  frontier  for-   ^^^  treaty 
tresses  of   the  Netherlands  should  be  garrisoned   of  Ryswick, 
by  the  Dutch  in  order  to  secure  their  'barrier.'    '^^^" 
Clement  of  Bavaria  was  acknowledged  as  the  lawful  archbishop 


264  European  History,   15  98-171 5 

of  Koln,  and  the  right  of  William  in.  to  the  throne  of  England, 
with  the  succession  to  his  sister-in-law  Anne,  recognised.  The 
peace  of  Ryswick  was  a  serious  blow,  not  merely  to  the  pride 
of  Louis  XIV.,  but  to  his  power.  France  never  had  time  to 
recover  from  the  strain  of  that  terrible  and  heroic  struggle 
before  she  was  again  involved  in  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
Succession.  Her  finances  were  ruined,  her  navy  was  crushed. 
And  the  heir  to  her  greatness  was  her  hated  rival.  William  iik 
by  ousting  the  Stuarts  from  the  English  throne,  by  forcing 
France  to  acknowledge  his  own  right,  had  changed  the  per- 
sonal duel  between  himself  and  Louis  into  a  national  duel 
between  England  and  France,  a  duel  in  which  England  had 
scored  the  first  pass  by  wresting  from  France  the  command  of 
the  ocean,  and  compelling  Louis  to  renounce  his  claim  to  be 
the  dictator  of  Europe  and  the  champion  of  the  cause  of 
Roman  Catholicism  in  England. 


CHAPTER    XII 

SOUTH-EASTERN   EUROPE 

Indifference  of  Europe  to  the  growth  of  the  Turkish  power — Resistance  to  it 
local — Inherent  defects  of  the  Turks  —  Causes  of  their  early  successes  — 
Beginning  of  their  decline — The  struggle  for  the  Danube  valley  —  Their 
antagonism  to  the  House  of  Austria  —  Turkish  misgovernment  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  century  —  Mohammed  Kiuprili,  grand  vizier  —  Revival  of 
Turkish  power  under  the  Kiuprili  —  Attack  upon  Hungary  —  Capture  of 
Candia  —  Condition  and  institutions  of  Poland  —  Decline  of  its  power  — 
War  with  the  Cossacks — Election  of  Michael  —  War  with  the  Turks  — 
Victories  of  John  Sobieski  —  Election  of  John  Sobieski  —  Risings  in  Hun- 
•^ary  against  the  Emperor  —  War  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Turks  — 
Relief  of  Vienna  by  John  Sobieski  —  The  Holy  League  —  Conquest  of  the 
Danube  valley  and  the  Morea- — The  peace  of  Carlovitz  —  Reconquest  of 
the  Morea  —  Peace  of  Passarovitz. 

Few  facts  about  European  history  are  so  strange  as  the  want 
of  interest  shown  by  the  great  powers  in  the  empire  of  the 
Ottoman  Turks  until  the    present  century.     The 

„  r^  .  .  1  1  p    r^  Indifference 

Eastern  Question  as  a  serious  problem  of  Euro-   of  Europe  to 
pean  politics,  affecting  the  peace  and  welfare  of   **^^  estab- 

,  11,  •  ■  •  lishment  and 

the  world,  has  sprung    into    existence    in  conse-   growth  of 
quence   of    the  decay   of    the    Ottoman   empire.    *^^  Turkish 
When  the  Ottoman  Sultans  were  in  the  zenith  of 
their   power,    when  Turkish  armies  were  marching    up    the 
Danube,  when  Turkish    corsairs  were  plundering  the  coasts 
of  Italy  and  Spain,  when  Christian  communities  were  being 
enslaved,  and  compelled  to  pay  to  their  conqueror  a  yearly 
tribute  of  children,  Christian  and  civilised  Europe  took  very 
little  heed  about  the  matter.     Opposition  to  the  advance  of 
the  infidel  was  mainly  local.     The  Popes  occasionally  were 

265 


266  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

enabled  to  fit  out  some  small  expeditions.  Charles  v. 
endeavoured  to  root  out  a  troublesome  nest  of  corsairs  at 
Algiers.  From  time  to  time  small  contingents  of  French  or 
German  or  Burgundian  soldiers  were  sent  to  the  assistance  of 
the  Emperor  or  the  king  of  Hungary.  But  such  efforts  were 
at  the  best  but  fitful  and  self-interested,  and  the  real  work  of 
stemming  the  tide  of  the  Turkish  advance  was  left  to  the  half 
civilised  tribes,  mainly  of  Sclavonic  blood,  scattered  along  the 
valley  of  the  Danube  and  the  hill  country  of  Bosnia  and 
Albania.  The  Wallach  and  the  Serb,  the  Albanian  and  the 
Magyar  were  the  people  who  jeoparded  their  lives  and  sacri- 
ficed their  liberty  for  the  salvation  of  Europe,  while  the 
Roman  Emperor  was  waging  a  death  duel  with  the  most 
Christian  King,  and  the  Vicar  of  Christ  was  dallying  with 
pagan  philosophy.  Statesmen  and  princes  of  the  fifteenth 
and  sixteenth  centuries  could  not  bring  themselves  to  realise 
the  danger  of  the  crisis,  could  not  understand  that  the  East 
was  about  to  avenge  the  days  of  the  Crusades,  and  that  the 
rude  threat  of  Mohammed  11.,  that  he  would  stable  his  horses 
in  S.  Peter's,  might  at  any  moment  be  translated  into  fact. 

Never  was  a  struggle  for  life  and  death  carried  on  in  so 
haphazard  a  fashion.  Resistance  in  the  Mediterranean  was 
Resistance  to  P^^^^Y  local.  The  Knights  Hospitallers  disputed 
the  'Turks  for  years  with  the  conqueror  for  the  possession 
mainly  local,   ^j  ^j^^-^.  j^j^j^j  fortress  of  Rhodcs,  and  hurled  him 

back  eventually  in  confusion  from  the  rocks  of  Malta.  The 
Venetians  kept  the  whole  Turkish  fleet  at  bay  before  Candia 
for  twenty  years  at  a  most  critical  period  of  Ottoman  rule. 
The  Pope  and  the  Venetians  entered  into  piratical  competi- 
tion with  the  corsairs  of  Greece  and  Africa,  in  which  the 
desire  to  gain  money  was  more  conspicuous  than  the  ambition 
to  overcome  the  infidel.  Even  the  great  victory  of  Lepanto 
in  1572,  at  the  news  of  which  all  Christendom  rejoiced,  was 
decisive,  not  so  much  because  it  marked  the  successful  effort 
of  allied  Christian  powers  to  resist  a  common  danger,  but  be- 
cause it  happened  to  take  place  at  the  beginning  of  a  period 


South-Eastern  Europe  267 

of  intestine  troubles  within  the  bosom  of  the  Ottoman  empire 
itself.  On  land  the  story  is  a  similar  one.  Piece  by  piece, 
leaf  by  leaf,  the  artichoke  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  was  eaten 
by  the  invader,  but  the  process  of  digestion  was  a  difficult 
one.  The  crescent  was  first  seen  in  the  plains  of  Hungary 
in  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century,  yet  at  the  time  of 
their  greatest  power  under  Suleiman  the  Magnificent  the 
Turks  never  acquired  the  whole  country.  Transylvania  and 
Moldavia  gave  in  their  adherence  to  the  Porte  early  in  the 
sixteenth  century,  the  Tartars  of  the  Crimea  acknowledged 
Mohammed  11.  fifty  years  earlier,  yet  they  never  became  any- 
thing more  than  vassal  states.  Even  in  Bosnia  and  Servia, 
though  the  Turkish  rule  was  everywhere  established,  a  great 
deal  of  local  independence  was  left.  Nothing  stands  out 
clearer  in  the  history  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  in  Europe  than 
the  fact  that  the  limits  of  their  conquests  were  fixed  not  by 
the  prowess  and  skill  of  their  adversaries  but  by  their  own  in- 
herent defects.  When  the  emperor  Sigismond  and  the  best 
of  German  and  Burgundian  chivalry  went  down  before 
Bajazet  i.  on  the  field  of  Nicopolis  in  1396,  when  the  flag  of 
Mohammed  11.  floated  proudly  over  the  ramparts  of  Otranto 
in  1480,  there  seemed  nothing  to  prevent  the  triumphant 
march  of  the  infidel  to  the  heart  of  European  civilisation,  over 
the  prostrate  body  of  the  Roman  Emperor  and  the  ruins  of 
the  Christian  Papacy. 

But   fortunately   for    Europe   the   Turk  had    two    inherent, 
defects,  which   effectually  prevented   him    from  establishin, 
himself    permanently   among    civilised    nations,    inherent 
He  could   not   assimilate,  he   could  not  govern,    defects  of  the 
Foresight,   perseverance,  organisation  are  denied      "'"''^' 
to  him,  and  they  are  among  the  primary  and  essential  facul- 
ties of  civilised  government.     The  Turks  swept  down  upon 
Europe  as  a  mighty   river   flood    pours   itself   out  from  its 
mountain  gates  into  the  plain  below.     With  an  impetuous, 
irresistible  rush  it  spreads  itself  wide  among  the  fields  and 
the   gardens,    submerging   one    by   one   all   the   accustomed 


268  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

landmarks  of  hedge  and  tree  and  hillock,  till  all  the  horizon  is 
but  a  vast  waste  of  hurrying  water.  But  the  further  the  flood 
finds  its  way  from  the  bed  of  the  stream  the  quieter  is  its 
course,  the  less  the  damage  which  it  causes.  Eddies  and  back 
currents  check  the  whirling  tide,  and  even  turn  its  headlong 
course  at  the  extreme  limit  of  the  flood  into  gentle,  fertilising 
rills  which  irrigate  the  meadows  in  obedience  to  the  will  of 
man.  For  days  or  even  weeks  the  flood  may  last  and  the 
swirl  of  waters  boil  along,  but  in  the  end  it  wears  itself  out, 
the  fountains  of  the  hills  above  dry  up,  the  stream  falls  quickly 
back  into  its  accustomed  channel,  and  one  by  one  again  the 
old  familiar  scenes  reappear.  Trees  and  hedges,  fields  and 
buildings,  greet  the  eye,  but  how  different  indeed  from  what 
they  were.  Torn,  ragged,  desolate,  choked  with  sand  and 
debris,  preserving  a  faint  life  amid  the  desolation,  all  seems 
so  unlike  the  once  smiling  valley.  So  unlike  and  yet  the 
same,  the  same  fields,  the  same  trees,  the  same  vigorous  life, 
only  for  the  moment  obscured  by  the  sudden  catastrophe. 
In  the  light  and  warmth  of  God's  sun,  with  a  little  aid  from 
the  forethought  of  man,  the  promise  of  rich  harvest  will  soon 
be  seen  again.  So  it  has  been  with  the  Turkish  power  in 
•Want  of  Europe.  The  Turks  submerged  the  civilisation 
assimilation,  of  south-eastern  Europe,  they  did  not  uproot  it. 
They  injured  it,  they  did  not  destroy  it.  They  had  nothing 
better  to  put  in  its  place,  and  so  it  lived  on,  damaged  and 
maimed,  but  alive.  They  imposed  their  own  government 
over  the  conquered  lands,  but  underneath,  the  old  laws  the  old 
religion  the  old  customs  were  still  observed.  In  the  extreme 
districts  beyond  the  Danube  they  were  content  merely  to  exact 
tribute,  and  left  their  tributaries  far  more  independence  than 
the  British  government  in  India  allows  to  the  native  states. 
To  the  larger  part  of  the  Turkish  dominions  in  Europe  conquest 
chiefly  meant  the  imposition  of  a  new  governing  class  and  of  a 
new  dominant  religion,  a  governing  class  which  was  intermit- 
tently tyrannical,  but  a  religion  which  was  seldom  persecuting. 
Consequently  many  Christians,  who  laboured  under  the  taint 


I 


South-Easiern  Europe  269 

of  heresy  or  schism,  found  themselves  actually  better  off 
under  Mussulman  than  under  Christian  rule,  and  it  frequently 
happened  in  the  wars  between  Venice  and  the  Sultans  that 
the  orthodox  Christians  of  Greece  and  the  islands  fought 
strenuously  on  behalf  of  their  infidel  conquerors,  in  order  to 
avoid  falling  into  the  hands  of  their  Latin  persecutors. 

To  this  inability  to  assimilate  the  peoples  which  he  con- 
quered, the  Turk  added  an  inability  to  govern  them.  He 
could  neither  weld  together  the  varied  materials  want  of 
of  which  his  loosely  jointed  empire  was  com-  governance, 
posed,  nor  govern  the  separate  parts.  It  is  singular  how  few 
administrators  the  Ottoman  race  has  produced.  It  does  not 
possess  faculties  for  government,  or  for  trade,  or  for  art.  No 
sooner  had  the  Turks  conquered  south-eastern  Europe  than 
they  found  themselves  obliged  to  entrust  the  administration  of 
their  provinces  to  the  children  of  the  people  whom  they  had 
overcome.  Turkish  art  was  but  a  faint  and  spoiled  copy  of 
Christian  and  Arab  models.  Trade  remained  in  the  hands 
of  Christian  merchants,  or  fell  into  the  clutches  of  foreign 
Christian  powers.  When  the  Turks  ceased  to  conquer  they 
ceased  to  prosper.  They  became  idle,  luxurious,  and  inert, 
lying  like  an  incubus  upon  the  country,  deadening  and  crush- 
ing its  civilisation  and  its  spirit,  hindering  all  growth,  stopping 
all  progress,  just  as  incapable  of  calling  out  the  resources  of 
a  people  as  of  rooting  out  their  national  life. 

So  as  the  flood  of  conquest  began  to  abate  the  submerged 
races  began  to  reappear.     Christendom  had  not  to  reconquer 
Turkish  provinces,  as  Germany  has  had  to  recon-    Reasons  for 
quer  French  provinces,  it  merely  had  to  remove   their  early 
the  foreign  incubus  which  was  lying  upon  them   ^"""^• 
and  crushing  them,  to  oust  the  foreign  garrison.     Accordingly 
the   tide  of   Turkish  invasion  had  hardly  ceased  to  flow  in 
south-eastern  Europe  when  it  began  to  ebb.     The  Turks  owed 
their  wonderful  success  to  three  causes.     The   disunion   of 
Christendom,  the    extraordinary   vigour   and    ability    of    the 
earlier  Ottoman  Sultans,  and  the  institution  of  the  Janizaries 


2/0  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

which  gave  them  the  best  disciplined  army  in  Europe.  In 
the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  these  all  combined  to 
advance  their  power.  They  came  as  an  army,  organised  not 
as  a  nation  but  as  a  camp,  led  by  men  second  to  none  among 
the  greatest  sovereigns  of  Europe  for  military  and  personal 
gifts.  The  strength  of  their  forces  lay  in  the  tribute  of 
children  exacted  from  the  Christian  races,  who  were  brought 
up  in  the  faith  of  Islam  to  be  its  special  defenders  and 
champions  in  the  disciplined  life  of  an  army,  half  fanatical 
and  half  professional.  They  hurled  themselves  upon  Europe 
at  a  time  when  the  great  powers  were  slowly  and  painfully 
organising  themselves  into  personal  monarchies  out  of  the 
ruins  of  feudalism,  when  as  yet  professional  armies  were  in 
their  cradle.  Under  Orchan,  the  founder  of  the  institution  of 
the  tribute  children,  they  first  crossed  over  into  Europe  in  the 
middle  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Under  Murad  i.  they  over- 
ran Roumelia  and  Bulgaria,  under  Bajazet  i.  they  carried  their 
victorious  arms  into  Servia  and  across  the  Danube  into 
Wallachia,  and  defeated  the  emperor  Sigismond  at  the  great 
battle  of  Nicopolis  in  1386.  Under  Murad  11.  they  spread 
into  Macedonia  and  Hungary.  To  Mohammed  11.  was 
reserved  the  crowning  honour  of  the  conquest  of  Constanti- 
nople, but  he  also  extended  his  sovereignty  over  Trebizond, 
Greece  and  the  islands  of  the  ^gean,  Bosnia,  Albania,  and 
even  the  Tartars  of  the  Crimea.  At  the  death  of  the  great 
conqueror  in  i486,  the  Turkish  empire  in  Europe  had  reached 
the  dimensions  which  it  retained  in  the  middle  of  the  present 
century.  But  it  still  continued  to  grow.  Under  Suleiman 
the  Magnificent,  who  reigned  from  1520  to  1566,  it  attained 
e  ,  •        ..      its  greatest  power.     He  drove  the  Knights  Hospi- 

Suleiman  the  o  i  ox 

Magnificent,  tallcrs  out  of  Rhodcs,  crosscd  the  Danube,  cap- 
1520-1566.  tared  Belgrade,  and  turned  half  Hungary  into 
a  Turkish  province  under  a  pasha  at  Buda,  while  he  forced 
the  princes  of  Transylvania  and  Moldavia  to  pay  him  tribute. 
So  powerful  had  he  become  that  the  powers  of  Europe  began 
to  realise  his  importance,  and  Francis  i.  of  France  did  not 


I 


South-Eastern  Europe  271 

disdain  to  purchase  by  his  friendship  the  aid  of  the  Sultan 
against  his  great  enemy  the  Emperor,  and  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  French  influence  in  the  East  by  the  privileges  which 
he  obtained  for  his  countrymen  at  Constantinople.  From  that 
time  to  the  present  day  French  policy  has  always  had  for  one 
of  its  chief  objects  the  maintenance  of  a  group  of  alliances  in 
northern  and  eastern  Europe,  which  may  serve  to  threaten 
Germany  with  the  danger  of  being  caught  be-  Alliance 
tween  two  fires,  should  she  find  herself  at  war  with  ^'^^  France. 
France.  For  many  years  Sweden,  Poland,  and  Turkey  formed 
such  a  group,  and  the  endeavour  to  keep  them  in  firm  friend- 
ship with  France  was  always  a  leading  feature  of  French 
diplomacy.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  House  of 
Austria  was  the  chief  opponent  of  France,  the  assistance  of 
Poland  and  of  the  Sultan  was  naturally  of  great  importance. 
In  modern  days,  during  the  decay  of  the  Ottoman  empire  and 
the  growth  of  the  rivalry  with  northern  Germany,  the  Czar 
has  taken  the  place  of  the  Sultan  as  the  necessary  ally  of 
France.  Thus  in  the  sixteenth  century,  mainly  through  the 
selfish  policy  of  the  French  kings,  the  Ottoman  Sultans  found 
themselves  admitted  into  friendship  and  alliance  with  Euro- 
pean sovereigns,  just  at  the  very  time  when  they  seemed  to 
be  threatening  ruin  and  destruction  to  European  civilisation. 
In  reality,  however,  the  flood  had  already  reached  high  water 
mark.  The  Sultans  had  begun  to  prefer  a  life  of  ease  in  the 
palace  of  Stamboul  to  the  active  leadership  of  Beginning  ^f 
the  army,  or  the  laborious  administration  of  the  Turkish 
empire.  Suleiman  himself  farmed  out  the  taxes  '^*'=''"='  's^^- 
and  left  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  state  mainly  to  his 
ministers.  Under  his  feeble  successors  degeneration  grew 
apace.  The  reins  of  power  fell  from  the  listless  hands  of 
the  Sultans  into  those  of  incapable  and  despicable  favourites. 
Palace  intrigues  decided  important  affairs  of  state,  and  minis- 
ters were  made  and  unmade  by  the  cabals  of  women  and 
eunuchs.  Corruption  spread  like  a  cancer  over  the  whole  ad- 
ministration.    Discipline  became  deteriorated  in  the  army, 


2/2  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

and  the  Janizaries,  like  the  Praetorian  guard,  ceased  to  be  the 
champions  of  their  country's  ambition,  and  became  but  the 
heroes  of  domestic  revokitions.  In  a  loosely  organised  empire 
like  that  of  the  Turks,  which  stretched  from  Buda  to  Bagdad, 
from  the  Caspian  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  there  was  no  cohe- 
sive force  except  that  of  the  central  government,  no  centre  of 
unity  except  that  of  the  ruler  of  Stamboul  in  his  double  capacity 
of  Sultan  and  Caliph.  When  the  head  became  effete  and  in- 
capable the  life  blood  of  the  whole  organism  failed  and  decay 
began.  Under  Selim  the  Sot,  the  successor  of  Suleiman,  Chris- 
tendom won  its  great  victory  over  the  Turks  at  Lepanto  in  1 5  7  2, 
a  battle,  which,  though  its  loss  was  repaired  with  incredible 
energy  and  counterbalanced  by  the  conquest  of  Cyprus,  has 
nevertheless  set  for  all  time  the  limits  of  Turkish  rule  in  the 
Mediterranean,  just  as  the  failure  of  Suleiman's  attack  upon 
Vienna  in  1529,  and  the  subsequent  partition  of  Hungary,  had 
fixed  the  extreme  boundaries  of  Turkish  power  in  the  valley 
of  the  Danube. 

The  close  of  the  sixteenth  century  therefore  fixed  the  limits 

of  Turkish  advance.     The  opening  years  of  the  seventeenth 

century  marked  the  first  beginnings   of   Turkish 

Loss  of  the     retreat.     By  the  treaty  of  Sitvatorok,   concluded 

command  of  it-  iir^i 

the  Danube  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Sultan  in  1606,  the 
valley  in  the    annual  tribute  of  30,000  ducats  agreed  to  be  paid 

seventeenth       ,  ,        ^^  ,  ,  .  ^  -r-t  i  •    i 

century.  by  the  Empcror  for  the  portion  of  Hungary  which 

he  still  retained  under  his  own  government  was 
abolished.  From  that  day  to  the  present  the  history  of  the 
Ottoman  Turks  in  Europe  has  been  that  of  a  gradual  but 
steady  decline  in  the  strength  of  their  authority  over  south- 
eastern Europe.  In  the  seventeenth  century  the  struggle  was 
for  the  possession  of  the  valley  of  the  Danube.  The  contest 
was  a  severe  one.  The  Turks  fought  more  strenuously  for  the 
command  of  the  Danube  than  they  did  for  Greece  or  Bulgaria. 
Bit  by  bit  with  many  changes  of  fortune  they  were  slowly 
driven  back,  until  soon  after  the  end  of  the  century  not  an 
acre  of  land  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  river  between  the 


i 


South-Eastern  Europe  273 

Theiss  and  the  Pruth  was  still  in  their  possession.  Since  then 
the  work  of  liberation  has  progressed  steadily  but  slowly.  One 
by  one  the  Crimea,  Wallachia,  Moldavia,  Bessarabia,  Servia, 
Greece,  Bosnia,  and  Bulgaria  have  been  won  back  by  Chris- 
tendom from  the  rule  of  the  Turk,  either  to  complete  indepen- 
dence or  to  subjection  to  a  neighbouring  Christian  power. 
But  just  as  it  was  the  mutual  disunion  of  Christian  powers 
which  enabled  the  Turks  to  conquer  south-eastern  Europe  so 
easily  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  so  it  has  been 
the  mutual  jealousy  of  Christian  powers  which  has  made  the 
task  of  emancipation  so  slow  and  so  difficult  in  the  nineteenth 
century.  For  many  years  the  Ottoman  Sultans  have  lived  in 
Europe  on  sufferance,  because  it  has  seemed  a  lesser  evil  to 
the  great  powers  of  Europe  to  retain  the  Turk  than  to  aggran- 
dise the  Czar. 

Before  the  ambition  of  Russia  gave  rise  to  the  Eastern 
Question  the  House  of  Austria  was  the  Christian  power  chiefly 
interested    in    beating    back    the    Turks.      The    . 

^  Antagonism 

Emperors  no  doubt  felt  somewhat  the  obligation  to  the  House 
which  lay  upon  them,  as  the  traditional  lords  of  °^  Austria. 
Christendom,  to  take  the  lead  in  the  work  of  emancipating 
Christian  lands  and  imperial  vassals  from  the  yoke  of  the 
infidel.  But  much  more  did  they  feel  the  political  necessity 
which  forced  them,  as  kings  of  Hungary  and  Croatia  and 
overlords  of  Transylvania,  to  make  themselves  undisputed 
masters  of  the  valleys  of  the  Danube  the  Drave  and  the  Save. 
With  the  Turks  securely  planted  at  Buda,  and  within  striking 
distance  of  Agram,  Vienna  itself  was  unsafe,  and  the  communi- 
cations between  Austria  and  Italy  liable  at  any  moment  to  be 
cut.  The  more  the  Emperor  was  being  deprived  of  leadership 
in  Germany,  the  more  he  was  being  ousted  from  influence  on 
the  Rhine,  the  more  essential  it  became  to  him  to  retain  his 
hold  upon  the  Danube.  So  during  the  whole  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  the  history  of  south-eastern  Europe  is  the 
history  of  a  duel  between  the  House  of  Austria  and  the  Sultans 
for  political  and  military  supremacy  on  the  Danube  and  the 

PERIOD  v.  s 


274  European  History,   15  98-171 5 

Save.  Other  combatants  such  as  the  French,  the  Venetians, 
the  Poles,  and  the  Russians,  appear  from  time  to  time  and 
take  part  in  the  struggle  from  motives  of  ambition  or  patriot- 
ism or  interest  and  most  powerfully  affect  its  fortunes,  but  the 
essential  character  of  the  contest  remains  unchanged.  Austria 
and  the  Turks  fight  for  pre-eminence  on  the  Danube,  just  as 
Germany  and  France  fight  for  pre-eminence  on  the  Rhine. 

Fortunately  for  the  House  of  Hapsburg  the  time  of  their 

greatest  weakness  was  also  a  time  of  impotence  and  degeneracy 

among  their  foes.     From  the  death  of  Mohammed 

Misgovern-  .  i         i         i        r   i»  «■  i 

ment  at  Con-  HI-  m  1603  to  the  death  of  Murad  iv.  in  1632  the 
stantinopie,  Ottoman  empire  was  the  prey  of  revolution,  anarchy, 
and  crime.  The  Sultans,  effeminate  puppets  of  a  day, 
were  in  no  position  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  given 
to  them  by  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  The  satisfaction  of  their 
own  pleasures  and  the  preservation  of  their  own  lives  were 
much  more  in  their  thoughts  than  the  extension  of  their  power. 
Murad  iv.  during  the  eight  years  of  his  personal  rule  (1632- 
1640)  did  much  by  a  relentless  severity  to  crush  out  the  spirit 
of  faction,  and  reduce  the  turbulent  Janizaries  to  obedience,  but 
on  his  death  after  a  drinking  bout  in  1640,  anarchy  broke  out 
again.  Ibrahim  i.  his  successor,  having  been  with  difficulty 
prevented  from  ordering  a  general  massacre  of  the  Christians 
all  over  the  empire,  contented  himself  by  fitting  out  a  fleet  in 
1645  which  undertook  the  conquest  of  Candia;  but  the  disor- 
ganisation of  the  government  was  far  too  great  to  enable  the 
attempt  to  be  made  with  any  chance  of  success.  It  only  pro- 
voked reprisals  on  the  part  of  the  Venetians  and  the  Knights 
Hospitallers.  The  miserable  Sultan  himself  was  deposed  and 
murdered  in  1648,  the  Ottoman  fleet  was  defeated  in  the 
^gean  in  1649,  ^i^i^  ^^^^  raged  in  Asia  Minor,  while  at  Stam- 
boul  ministers  rapidly  succeeded  one  another  in  obedience  to 
the  caprices  of  the  harem  or  the  demand  of  the  soldiery.  In 
1656  Mocenigo  the  Venetian  admiral  occupied  the  Dardanelles 
and  threatened  Constantinople  itself.  It  seemed  as  if  the  Otto- 
man empire  was  about  to  fall  to  pieces  through  sheer  want  of 
governance. 


South-Eastern  Europe  275 

From  this  fate  it  was  preserved  by  the  firmness  of  one  man  and 
the  genius  of  a  family.  The  Kiuprih  were  of  Albanian  blood  but 
had  long  been  settled  in  Constantinople,  where  the  Mohammed 
head  of  the  family,  Mohammed,  now  an  old  man  of  Kiupriii  ap- 
seventy,  was  universally  respected  for  the  vigour  of  grind  vizier, 
his  mind  and  the  strength  of  his  character.  The  '^s^- 
mother  of  the  young  Sultan,  in  whose  hands  the  chief  political 
power  had  fallen,  turned  to  Mohammed  Kiuprili  in  her  despair, 
and  begged  him  to  accept  the  office  of  grand  vizier  in  1656. 
He  consented  on  the  condition  that  his  authority  should  be 
uncontrolled.  For  twenty  years  he  and  his  family  were  the 
real  rulers  of  the  empire,  and  to  them  is  due  the  astonishing 
revival  of  the  Ottoman  power  in  the  latter  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century.  True  to  the  genius  of  Oriental  monarchies 
they  sought  for  the  sources  of  strength,  not  in  adaptation  to 
new  demands,  but  in  the  resuscitation  of  the  ancient  spirit. 
They  resolutely  shut  their  eyes  to  the  attractions  of  European 
civilisation.  They  refused  as  far  as  possible  to  have  dealings 
with  European  powers.  Treaties,  concessions,  arts  were  evi- 
dences of  weakness,  admissions  of  a  brotherhood  which  could 
never  exist  between  Christianity  and  Islam.  The  ideal  of  gov- 
ernment ever  present  to  their  minds  was  that  of  Mohammed  11. 
and  the  earlier  Sultans.  The  relation  of  governors  to  governed 
was  that  of  master  and  slave  in  a  well-ordered  household, 
where  strict  justice  on  the  one  hand  expected  and  necessitated 
implicit  obedience  on  the  other.  The  mission  of  the  Turks  was 
to  conquer  opponents  and  to  dictate  terms  to  the  vanquished. 
Wherever  there  yet  remained  an  organised  power.  Christian  in  its 
principles  and  Western  in  its  civilisation,  there  was  the  enemy. 

Success  was  instantaneous.  The  Turks  at  once  felt  that  they 
had  got  a  leader  who  understood  them,  who  was  actuated  by 
principles  which  were  their  own.     Obediently  they 

7^  „    .  .         ,        ,  „  .  ,  1-  1       Restoration 

fell  m  to  the   bugle    call.     Anarchy   disappeared,   of  order  and 

Discipline  re-established  itself.     The  Greek  Patri-    discipline, 
,         ,  ^     .      .  ,  ...        1656-1661. 

arch  and   4000   Janizaries  were    the   only  victims 

required.     In  the  very  next  year  the  Venetian  fleet  was  forced 


2/6  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

to  leave  the  Dardanelles,  Mocenigo  was  killed,  and  Lemnos  and 
Tenedos  recovered.  In  1659  the  old  alliance  with  France  was 
broken  by  the  imprisonment  of  the  ambassador's  son,  and  the 
refusal  of  all  compensation.  The  siege  of  Candia  was  pushed 
on  with  redoubled  zeal,  and  preparations  were  made  for  the 
renewal  of  the  war  of  European  conquest.  When  Mohammed 
Kiuprili  died  in  166 1  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the 
Ottoman  empire  once  more  united  from  end  to  end  of  its  vast 
extent,  and  its  energies  once  more  directed  to  a  war  of  aggres- 
sion against  its  hereditary  enemy  the  Emperor. 

The  mantle  of  Mohammed  fell  upon  his  son  Achmet,  who 
succeeded  him  in  his  office,  inherited  his  ability,  and  pursued 
Attack  upon  his  policy.  Placing  himself  at  the  head  of  200,000 
Hungary  j^g^  he  burst  into  Austrian  Hungary  in  1663, 
met  Kiuprili,  crosscd  the  Danube  at  Gran,  captured  the  fortress 
1663-  of    Neuhausen,  and    ravaged  Moravia   up  to   the 

walls  of  Olmutz.  But  Louis  xiv.,  irritated  at  the  insult 
offered  to  his  ambassador  by  Mohammed  Kiuprili,  came  to 
the  aid  of  the  Emperor.  With  the  assistance  of  30,000  men 
in  French  pay  MontecucuUi  the  imperialist  general  felt  him- 
self strong  enough  to  threaten  the  Turkish  flank  by  an  advance 
from  Vienna.  Achmet  at  once  retired  south  to  cover  Buda, 
and  the  two  armies  met  at  S.  Gothard  on  the  Raab,  where 
Achmet  and  his  army  proved  themselves  no  match  for  the 
talents  of  his  opponent  or  the  wild  valour  of  the  French  cav- 
alry. Leopold,  however,  saw  only  in  this  great  victory  the 
opportunity  of  making  peace,  and  of  ridding  himself  of  any 
further  obligations  to  France.  Ten  days  after  the  battle  of 
S.  Gothard  he  signed  the  treaty  of  Vasvar  (loth  August  1664), 
Treaty  of  by  which  he  recognised  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sul- 
Vasvar,  1664.  t^n  over  Transylvania,  and  permitted  him  to  re- 
tain the  important  fortress  of  Neuhausen  in  Hungary.  Elated 
with  this  success  Achmet  turned  his  attention  to  the  war  with 
Venice.  He  took  personal  charge  of  the  siege  operations 
before  Candia,  and  in  spite  of  all  that  European  engineering 
skill  could  do,  it  soon  became  obvious  that  the  end  could  not 


So7iiJi'Eastcrn  Eiirope  277 

long  be  delayed.  Morosini  the  heroic  defender  of  the  town 
made  the  capitulation  the  occasion  of  negotiating  a  general 
treaty.  On  the  17th  September  1669  Crete  passed  capture  of 
into  the  hands  of  the  Ottomans,  and  peace  was  Candia,  1669. 
restored  between  Venice  and  the  Porte.  It  was  the  last  con- 
quest Islam  has  made  from  Christianity. 

No  sooner  was  the  war  with  Venice  over  than  Achmet  found 
himself  involved  with  a  very  different  Christian  power  in  the 
extreme  northern  frontier  of  the  empire.  The  condition  of 
kingdom  of  Poland,  to  which  was  joined  the  grand  Poland, 
duchy  of  Lithuania,  had  discharged  during  the  Middle  Ages  the 
olEce  of  the  sentinel  of  Western  civilisation  on  its  northern 
frontier.  But  the  civilisation  to  which  it  had  itself  attained 
was  very  inferior  to  that  of  its  southern  and  western  neighbours. 
Extending  as  it  did,  so  late  as  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  from  Livonia  and  Courland  on  the  Baltic  to  Podolia 
and  the  lower  waters  of  the  Dniester  on  the  confisies  of  the 
Black  Sea,  it  could  not  fail  to  be  subject  to  the  dangers  of 
disunion  and  disorganisation.  Its  interests  were  so  varied,  its 
territories  so  impassable  and  heterogeneous,  its  people  so 
untameable  and  independent,  that  it  was  almost  a  hopeless 
task  for  even  a  great  statesman  to  inspire  the  country  with  a 
sense  of  national  unity,  and  to  lead  it  along  the  path  of 
national  progress.  Yet  forces  which  under  happier  circum- 
stances might  have  led  to  centralisation  were  not  wanting. 
Poland  occupied  geographically  the  centre  of  Europe.  LIntil 
the  rise  of  Russia  on  the  north  and  Prussia  to  the  west  it  was 
free  from  serious  danger  of  conquest.  Its  people  were 
Sclavonic  by  race  and  Catholic  hy^  religion.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  years  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  it  was 
untroubled  by  religious  or  racial  discord.  Brave  and  chivalrous 
by  nature  the  Poles  were  distinguished  for  their  personal  loyalty 
and  their  affection  for  their  country.  Btit  all  these  Turbulence 
promising  elements  of  union  and  strength  weighed  °f  ^^^  ^ox^^. 
as  nothing  in  the  balance,  when  compared  with  the  evils  of  their 
political  and  social  institutions.     The  Poles  were  absolutely 


2/8  Ejiropcan  History,   1598-1715 

deficient  in  the  capacity  for  being  governed.  They  never 
appreciated  the  advantages  of  the  reign  of  law.  They  never 
understood  that  individuals  must  submit  to  some  restrictions 
if  the  community  is  to  prosper.  Discipline  was  a  virtue  wholly 
unrecognised  by  them.  This  lawless  and  turbulent  spirit  was 
fostered  instead  of  being  checked  by  their  social  institutions. 
There  were  but  two  classes  in  Poland,  the  aristocracy  in  whose 
hands  lay  the  whole  of  the  wealth  and  the  whole 

Their  social 

and  constitu-  of  the  political  power,  and  the  serfs  who  were  little 
tionai  institu-  better  than  slaves,  and  had  no  rights  of  life  or 

tions.  ...  A      •         11 

property  against  their  masters.  As  in  all  countries 
where  one  class  is  dominant,  justice  and  patriotism  shrank 
and  withered  before  the  claims  of  privilege  and  selfishness. 
The  determination  to  use  the  power  which  it  has  got  solely  for 
its  own  purposes,  is  not  the  monopoly  of  one  class  more  than 
another.  It  has  been  the  characteristic  of  the  petty  democracy 
of  Florence,  as  of  the  trading  aristocracy  of  Amsterdam,  or 
the  militant  democracy  of  modern  France.  The  landlord 
aristocracy  of  Poland  pushed  it  to  excess.  They  mistook 
licence  for  liberty,  and  put  personal  power  in  the  place  of 
patriotism  as  unhesitatingly  as  a  Robespierre  or  a  Napoleon. 
Their  great  fear  was  to  find  that  they  had  unwittingly  given 
themselves  a  master,  so  they  did  all  they  could  to  divest  the 
kingship  of  all  real  power,  and  wilfully  deprived  the  country 
of  the  only  possible  centre  of  unity.  During  the  Middle  Ages 
the  kingship,  though  always  nominally  elective,  was  in  fact 
hereditary,  but  on  the  death  of  Sigismond  Augustus  in  1572 
it  became  wholly  elective,  and  on  his  election  the  king  was 
obliged  to  sign  a  compact  by  which  he  practically  divested 
himself  of  all  the  usual  functions  of  royalty  except  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  officials  and  the  command  of  the  army. 
The  government  of  the  country  was  really  vested  in  the  senate, 
in  which  the  bishops  and  the  higher  magistrates  as  well  as  the 
twelve  great  executive  officials  sat,  and  in  the  diet.  Origi- 
nally the  whole  adult  nobility  had  the  right  of  attending  the 
diet,  but  since  1466  it  had  become  merely  a  body  of  dele- 


South-Eastern  Europe  279 

gates,  who  received  the  mandate  from  the  provincial  assem- 
blies of  nobles,  and  were  not  permitted  to  vary  it  in  the  least. 
The  diet  sat  for  six  weeks  and  all  its  decisions  had  to  be 
unanimous,  consequently  it  was  in  the  power  of  every  member 
of  the  diet  to  put  a  stop  to  all  business  whatever  either  by 
obstructing  all  progress  for  six  weeks  (drawing  out  the  diet), 
or  by  voting  against  the  proposal  (the  veto),  or  by  simply 
withdrawing  altogether,  which  of  course  rendered  all  decision 
impossible  and  so  practically  dissolved  the  assembly. 

A  constitution  such  as  this  might  have  been  thought  to  have 
been  the  work  of  some  cynical  philosopher  anxious  to  exhibit 
on  a  large  scale  the  inconceivable  folly  of  human  nature. 
In  reality  it  was  dictated  by  the  malignant  spirit  Poland  the 
of  fear  and  selfishness.  In  the  hands  of  a  quick-  battleground 
tempered  and  turbulent  people  it  could  not  fail  and  Austrian 
to  lead  to  anarchy,  and  anarchy  quickly  proved  interests. 
itself  the  parent  of  corruption.  France  soon  saw  the  advan- 
tages which  the  command  of  a  great  central  warlike  state  like 
Poland  would  be  to  her  in  her  duel  with  the  House  of  Austria. 
The  Emperor  was  alarmed  by  the  prospect  of  seeing  his  heredi- 
tary dominions  almost  encircled  by  the  vassal  states  of  France, 
and  strained  every  nerve  to  secure  the  election  of  a  king  op- 
posed to  French  interests.  But  the  purse  of  France  was  deeper, 
and  the  policy  of  France  was  more  continuous  than  that  of 
the  embarrassed  Emperor,  and  so  it  happened  that  except  under 
the  pressure  of  some  special  danger,  the  diplomacy  and  the 
gold  of  France  could  always  maintain  a  close  alliance  between 
the  two  countries,  and  prevent  the  election  of  a  strongly  im- 
perialist candidate.  It  thus  became  the  interests  of  the  greater 
powers  of  Europe  to  keep  Poland  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  in 
order  that  they  might  the  easier  obtain  a  decisive  voice  in  her 
destinies.  Her  neighbours  were  not  slow  to  recognise  the 
advantage  thus  offered  to  them.  Poland  was  getting  weaker 
and  weaker  through  the  increase  of  anarchy,  as  they  were  get- 
ting stronger  and  stronger  through  centralisation.  The  rise 
of  Sweden  to  pre-eminence  on  the   Baltic   under   Gustavus 


28o  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

Adolphus,  the  restoration  of  peace  to  Russia  after  the  'troub- 
lous times  '  under  the  House  of  Romanoff,  the  successful  war 
and  cunning  diplomacy  of  the  Great  Elector  all  had  among 
their  other  results  the  effect  of  weakening  Poland.  By  the 
treaty  of  Wehlau,  1657,  Poland  lost  her  suzerainty  over  east 
Prussia.  By  the  peace  of  Oliva  in  1660  she  had  to  surrender 
Livonia  to  Sweden.  By  the  treaty  of  Andrusoff  in  1667  she 
was  obliged  to  give  up  to  Russia  almost  all  her  posses- 
sions east  of  the  Dnieper,  including  the  important  towns  of 
Smolensk  and  Kief,  which  she  had  gained  from  her  earlier 
in  the  century,  and  the  suzerainty  over  half  the  tribes  of  the 
Cossacks  of  the  Ukraine. 

It  was  through  her  relations  with  these  wild  horsemen  of  the 

borderland  that  Poland  became  eventually  involved  in  a  war 

with  the  Ottoman  Turks.      The  yoke  of  Poland 

Warwiththe    ,       ,       ,  i  -i  ^        r^  \  •^ 

Cossacks  of  had  always  sat  heavily  upon  the  Cossack  tribes, 
the  Ukraine,  Proud  independent  and  high  spirited  by  nature, 
""  '  they  could  not  brook  the  insolence  of  the  Polish 
nobles,  or  tamely  submit  to  the  rapacity  and  extortion  of  their 
Jewish  stewards.  In  1648  they  boldly  rose  in  rebellion  and 
assisted  by  the  Tartars  offered  their  allegiance  to  Alexis  of 
Russia.  The  rising  was  well  timed,  for  owing  to  the  arjbi- 
tion  of  Charles  x.  of  Sweden,  John  Casimir  of  Poland  soon 
found  his  country  attacked  on  all  sides  by  Sweden  Branden- 
burg and  Russia,  his  capital  in  the  hands  of  his  foes,  and  him- 
self a  fugitive  in  Silesia.  When,  however,  peace  was  restored 
on  the  Baltic  by  the  treaties  of  Oliva,  Copenhagen,  and 
Kardis  in  1660,  Poland  found  herself  able  to  cope  with  her 
revolted  subjects  and  their  protector.  Through  the  consum- 
mate generalship  and  high  personal  qualities  of  John  Sobieski, 
who  was  sprung  from  one  of  the  oldest  and  staunchest  of 
Polish  noble  families,  Alexis  and  his  allies  were  compelled  to 
sue  for  peace,  and  accept  the  compromise  concluded  at  Andru- 
soff in  1667.  Two  years  later  John  Casimir  abdicated  the 
throne,  and  the  usual  intrigues  began  between  the  adherents 
of   France  and  the  Empire  to  secure  a  favourable  election. 


South-Eastern  Europe  281 

But  at  the  moment  through  the  misfortunes  of  John  Casimir, 
and  the  unpopularity  of  Louise  de  Nevers,  his  French  wife, 
the  Poles  would  have  no  one  of  French  blood  or  French  con- 
nections, and  even  John  Sobieski  who  had  married  a  French 
woman,  and  belonged  to  the  French  interest,  was  passed  over 
in  favour  of  a  national    representative,  Michael    ^, 

•         1  •         1         I       1  1  Election  of 

Wiesnowiescki,  who  had  nothing   but   his   good   Michael  as 
looks   and   his   name  to  recommend  him.     The   '""^'  '^®'- 
Cossacks  regarded  the  election  as  an  earnest  of  the  recom- 
mencement of  persecution,  for  the  new  king  was  the  son  of 
one  of  their  greatest  oppressors.     In  1670  they  rushed  to  arms 
but  were  easily  defeated  by  Sobieski.     Despair-   Request  for 
ing  of   all  hope   of   justice   from   the   king  they   protection  by 

1  1        rr-'      1  1       !•/•  1  -1         ^^^  Cossacks 

turned  to  the  lurks,  and  offered  to  recognise  the   to  the  Turks, 
suzerainty  of  the  Sultan  if  he  would  protect  them   ^^7i- 
from  the  tyrant  of  Poland.     Achmet  Kiuprili  gladly  seized 
the  opportunity,  and  in  167 1  declared  war  against  Poland  as 
the  champion  of  her  oppressed  subjects. 

In  June  1672  the  preparations  were  finished  and  the  Sultan 
himself  accompanied  by  the  grand  vizier  appeared  before  the 
almost  impregnable  fortress  of  Kaminiec,the  key 

r-r-.li-  -ri  1  i-rii  ii  'War  betwecH 

of  Podolia.     In  less  than  a  month  it  fell,  and  the    Pdand  and 
craven-hearted   king  Michael,    dismayed    at  the    ^^^  Turks, 
blow,  negotiated  a  treaty  at  Buczacz  by  which  he 
surrendered  Podolia  and  the  Ukraine  and  consented  to  pay 
tribute.     Stung  with  indignation  at  such  a  disgrace  the  diet 
refused  to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  rallied  all  the  forces  of  the 
nation  under  John  Sobieski  to  resist  to  the  uttermost.     For 
four  years  the  heroic  struggle  continued.     Without  receiving 
any  help  from  the  great  powers,  now,  through  the  ambition  of 
Louis  XIV.,  engaged  in  a  deadly  conflict  on  the  Rhine  and 
the  Scheldt,  threatened  by  intrigues  behind  his  back  at  court, 
endangered  by  insubordination  in  his  camp,  John  Sobieski, 
by  sheer  ascendency  of  personal  character  and  commanding 
military  talent,  managed  not  only  to  stem  the  Turkish  advance 
into    Podolia  and  Galicia,  but  to  inflict  on  the  best  of  the 


282  European  History,    1598-17 15 

Turkish  generals  crushing  defeats  at  Choczim  and  Leopol,  and 
to  drive  them  back  in  confusion  across  the  Danube.  In  1674 
in  the  very  midst  of  the  struggle  the  incapable  Michael  died, 
and  the  Poles  hailed  with  enthusiasm  their  hero  as  their  king. 
Yet  characteristically  enough  they  did  not  for  that  serve  him 
lohn  sobieski  *-*'^^  ^^^^  ^^  better.  Two  ycars  later  he  found 
elected  king,  himself  in  the  direst  straits,  with  his  small  army 
'^"^^  hemmed  in  by  the  swarming  enemy  at  Zurawno  on 

the  Dniester,  unable  to  break  out  of  the  enclosing  lines,  with- 
out any  hope  of  timely  relief.  But  even  at  this  crisis  the 
magic  of  his  name  prevailed,  and  Ibrahim  the  Turkish  general 
preferred  to  make  peace  rather  than  to  run  the  risk  of  encoun- 
ter with  the  lion  in  his  den.  The  peace  of  Zurawno,  con- 
cluded in  October  1676,  secured  to  the  Sultan  the  possession 
Pe  ce  of  °^  Kaminiec  and  part  of  the  Ukraine,  but  it  marks 

Zurawno,  by  these  very  concessions  the  failure  of  Achmet 
*^'^^'  Kiuprili's  great  design  of  binding  upon  the  brows 

of  his  master  the  laurel  wreath  of  Mohammed  11. 

Seven  days  after  the   peace  of   Zurawno  Achmet  Kiuprili 
died,  but  his  policy  did  not  die  with  him.     His 

KaraMus-  •,,,•, 

tafa  made  successor  and  brother-in-law,  Kara  Mustafa,  was 
grand  vizier,  fired  with  an  equal  ambition,  but  was  not  possessed 
of  equal  talent.  Haughty  luxurious  and  boastful 
he  soon  began  to  destroy,  while  seeking  to  extend,  the  power 
which  Mohammed  and  Achmet  had  so  diligently  built  up. 
He  determined  to  win  his  way  to  the  heart  of  Christendom  at 
a  blow  by  the  conquest  of  Vienna  itself.  Preparations  for  an 
invasion  on  a  scale  unexampled  and  irresistible  were  secretly 
set  on  foot.  The  old  alliance  with  France  was  renewed  by  the 
grant  of  fresh  trade  and  diplomatic  privileges.  Peace  was 
made  with  Russia  and  ratified  with  Poland.  By  these  meas- 
ures the  grand  vizier  hoped  to  procure  the  isolation  of  the 
Emperor,  and  he  very  nearly  succeeded.  For  some  years  the 
Hungarians  had  been  on  bad  terms  with  the  Emperor.  Leo- 
pold had  pursued  a  policy  both  of  religious  and  political  re- 
pression.    With  the  object  of  introducing  more  centralisation 


South-Eastern  Europe  283 

into  the  government,  he  abolished  the  ofifice  of  palatine,  and 
ruled  Hungary  through  Viennese  officials.  With  the  object 
of  rooting  out  Protestantism  he  handed  over  the  management 
of  religious  affairs  to  the  Jesuits,  and  banished  and  sent  to 
the  galleys  Protestant  ministers  on  the  pretext  of  seditious 
agitation.  Measures  so  high-handed  and  unjust  brought  about 
the  usual  result.  The  Hungarians  took  advan-  Risings 
tage  of  the  war  with  France  on  the  Rhine,  rose   a&ainst  the 

•       ,    ^1      •  •  r  1        rr^-M  •■!•  1     Emperor  in 

against  their  oppressor  in  1674  under  Tokoli,  and   Hungary, 
were  joined  by  Apafy,  the  prince  of  Transylvania.    1674-1681. 
In   1 68 1    they  found  themselves  strong  enough  to  force  the 
Emperor  to  revive  the  office  of  palatine  and  grant  religious 
toleration.     But  Tokoli  was  not  content  with  this.     He  de- 
sired  to   become   ruler  of    Hungary  himself,    and   willingly 
listened  to  the  persuasions  of  Kara  Mustafa  to  join  the  Turk- 
ish invasion,  and  accept  the  government  of  Hungary  as  the 
tributary  of  the  Porte.     All  was  now  ready.     Trusting  to  Louis 
XIV.    to   keep    Germany  from   assisting  the    Em-   warbe- 
peror,  and  to  Tokoli  to  raise  Hungary  against  him,    tween  the 
Kara  Mustafa  threw  off  the  mask  in  1682,  declared   the  Turks, 
Hungary  tributary  to  the  Sultan,  and  crossed  the   '^^j. 
Danube  in  the  spring  of   1683  at  the  head  of   150,000  men. 

He  had  not  reckoned  on  his  allies  in  vain.     Wherever  the 
anxious  Emperor  turned  for  help  in  his  extremity,  he  found 
himself  thwarted  by  the  diplomacy  of  France.     In   Alliance 
Germany  Louis  was  completely  successful.     The   between 

,  ,     1  T^       •    ,  1  •   ,  Poland  and 

diet  assembled  at  Ratisbon  separat/^d  without  the  Emperor, 
granting  any  aid  to  its  chief.  In  Poland  the  '^83. 
struggle  was  intense,  but  in  the  end  the  indomitable  energy 
and  quick  tact  of  John  Sobieski  prevailed.  All  grumbling  at 
the  selfishness  and  cowardice  of  Austria  in  the  days  of 
Poland's  need  was  chivalrously  silenced  in  the  presence  of 
the  common  danger  to  Christianity  and  civilisation.  On 
March  31st  an  alliance  was  concluded  with  the  Emperor  by 
which  Poland  bound  herself  to  place  40,000  men  in  the  field. 
Meanwhile    the    Turkish   war    rolled    on,     Leopold  and   the 


284  European  History,   1598- 171 5 

court  removed  for  safety  to  Passau.  The  duke  of  Lorraine,  the 
imperialist  general,  abandoning  Hungary  entrusted  the  de- 
fence of  Vienna  to  count  Stahremberg,  and  posted  himself 
a  little  lower  down  the  Danube  to  wait  for  the  Polish  rein- 
forcements. On  July  9th  the  Turkish  standards  appeared 
before  the  walls,  on  the  14th  the  city  was  invested  and 
trenches  opened. 

The  city  was  ill  prepared  for  a  siege.  The  garrison  only 
numbered  14,000  men,  the  town  was  crowded  with  peasants 
Siege  of  from  the  country,  the  walls  were  old  and  out  of 

Vienna,  1683.  repair,  while  the  Turkish  engineers  and  artillery 
were  among  the  best  in  Europe.  But  Mustafa  was  in  no 
haste  to  seize  the  prize.  On  the  yth  of  August  he  drove  the 
imperialists  from  their  fortification  on  the  counterscarp,  and 
the  city  lay  open  to  the  attack  from  all  sides.  Yet  he 
hesitated  to  give  the  word.  He  wanted  the  glory  of  a  capit- 
ulation, and  the  booty  of  the  town  for  himself.  Meanwhile 
John  Sobieski  was  collecting  his  forces  with  all  haste  at 
Cracow.  Lorraine  did  not  dare  to  move  till  he  came.  As 
usual  money  was  short,  delays  were  long.  It  was  the  15th 
August  before  Sobieski  could  begin  his  march,  and  even  then 
he  had  to  leave  the  Lithuanians  behind.  On  the  2nd  of 
September  he  was  on  the  Danube  at  the  head  of  his  cavalry. 
On  the  5th  he  took  over  the  command  of  the  united  armies 
of  the  Empire  and  of  Poland.  On  the  6th  he  crossed  the 
Danube  by  the  bridge  at  Tuln.  On  the  nth  he  reached  the 
height  of  the  Kahlenberg  and  looked  down  on  the  vast  carnp 
of  the  Turks  encumbering  the  plain  which  stretches  between 
the  heights  and  the  spire  of  St.  Stephen's.  He  had  come  not 
a  moment  too  soon.  The  Turkish  engineers  had  already 
undermined  the  walls,  disease  had  broken  out  in  the  crowded 
city,  but  when  they  saw  his  signal  fires  from  the  mountain  the 
besieged  felt  that  the  end  of  their  trials  had  come  and  victory 
was  within  their  grasp.  They  were  not  disappointed.  On 
the  morning  of  the  12th,  after  having  received  the  Holy 
Communion  at  the  chapel  of  the  Leopoldsberg,  John  Sobieski 


South-Eastern  Europe  285 

ordered   the   attack.     Quickly  driving   the   Turkish  advance 
guard  from  the  vineyards  which  clothe  the  sides  of  the  Kah- 
lenberg  he  found  himself  opposite  the  main  Turk- 
ish battle  in  the  plain  about  noon.     As  his  Poles   Turks  by 
charged  with  the  war  shout  'Sobieski  for  ever  '  the   J°^"  sobi- 
Turkswere  seized  with  a  panic  at  the  sound  of  the   ^^  '' '   ^' 
dreaded  name  and   fled  on  all   sides.     Sobieski   seized   the 
favourable  moment  with   his  usual   tactical  skill,    and  threw 
his  whole  army  upon  the  retreating  masses  with  a  tremendous 
shock  before  they  had  time  to  recover  themselves.     The  battle 
was  won,  Vienna  was  saved,  and  Christendom  preserved.     The 
whole  camp  of  the  invader  with  its  streets  of  tents,  its  bazaars, 
its  mosques,  its  luxury,  all  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victor. 
Kara  Mustafa  himself  hardly  escaped  with  his  life  in  the  gen- 
eral confusion,  and  only  rallied   the   remains  of  his  beaten 
army  at  Belgrade. 

From  the  date  of  the  failure  of  the  great  attempt  upon 
Vienna  in  1683  the  fortunes  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  in  Europe 
quickly  declined.  Kara  Mustafa  paid  the  penalty  of  his 
defeat  with  his  head,  but  Ibrahim  who  succeeded  him  fared 
no  better  in  the  war.  John  Sobieski  himself  inflicted  another 
defeat  upon  the  Turks  in  the  October  of  the  same  year  at 
Parkan,  and  drove  them  out  of  Hungary.  In  the  following 
year  Venice  joined  in  the  pursuit  of  the  beaten  infidel,  and  the 
Holy  League  was  formed  between  the  Emperor  The  Hoiy 
Poland  and  Venice  against  the  Sultan.  Its  League,  1684. 
effects  were  quickly  seen.  In  spite  of  the  retirement  of  John 
Sobieski  in  1685,  through  ill  health  and  increasing  infirmity, 
the  tide  of  conquest  continued  to  flow  steadily  on  the  Danube 
and  was  augmented  by  new  victories  on  the  Mediterranean. 
In  1685  the  duke  of  Lorraine  won  back  the  whole  of  Turkish 
Hungary  except  the  fortress  of  Euda,  while  Morosini,  the  hero 
of  Candia,  at  the  head  of  the  Venetian  fleet,  seized  several 
places  on  the  Albanian  coast.  The  years  1686  and  1687  were 
still  more  unfortunate  for  the  Sultan.  On  the  Danube,  Buda 
fell  into  the  hands  of  Lorraine  in  September  1686.     Pushing 


286  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

back  Tokoli  and  his  rebel  army  before  him  into  Transylvania, 
the  imperialist  general  once  more  united  all  Hungary  under 
the  Emperor,  and  left  the  Hungarian  rebels  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  Leopold  and  his  Jesuit  advisers.  In  1687  he  in- 
flicted a  crushing  defeat  upon  the  grand  vizier  on  the  histori- 
cal field  of  Mohacz  and  recovered  possession  of  Croatia  and 
Con  uest  of  Sclavonia.  In  1688  he  procured  the  submission 
Turkish  Hun-  of  Transylvania  and  crossing  the  Danube  captured 
gary,  1686.  Belgrade  and  even  penetrated  as  far  as  Nisch. 
During  the  same  time  Morosini  was  no  less  active  in  the 
Mediterranean.  In  1686  he  made  himself  master  of  all  the 
Conquest  of  ^^ief  towns  in  the  Morea.  Corinth  and  Athens 
the  Morea,  next  acknowledged  his  sway,  where  the  Parthe- 
*^  ^'  non,  which  had  hitherto  survived  so  many  sieges 

of  Romans  and  barbarians  almost  unhurt,  was  hurled  into 
ruins  by  the  explosion  of  a  Venetian  bomb.  To  the  spoils  of 
Athens  were  soon  added  those  of  Negropont,  Thebes,  and 
Dalmatia,  until  by  1694  the  Turks  were  stripped  of  all  their 
possessions  in  Greece  and  on  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic. 

So  continuous  a  series  of  misfortunes  demanded  a  victim. 

In  1688  a  palace  revolution  replaced  Mohammed  iv.  by  his 

brother   Suleiman  11.,   and  the  new  Sultan   once 

Mustafa 

Kiupriii  more   entrusted   the   affairs  of    the    empire    to  a 

grand  vizier,  KiupriH.  Mustafa  Kiupriii,  the  brother  of  Ach- 
met,  showed  the  vigour  of  character  for  which  his 
family  were  noted.  By  pursuing  a  policy  of  toleration  for 
the  Christians  and  restoring  stern  discipline  to  the  army,  he 
was  soon  enabled  to  bring  victory  back  to  the  Turkish  stand- 
ards, although  he  was  but  two  years  in  his  office.  In  1690  he 
recovered  Nisch  and  Belgrade  and  invaded  Hungary,  but  he 
was  met,  defeated,  and  killed  by  the  margrave  of  Baden  at 
the  battle  of  Szcelankemen  in  1691.  With  him  perished  the 
last  chances  of  the  Turks.  Although  the  war  continued  for 
eight  years  with  varying  success  the  imperialists  and  the  Vene- 
tians never  really  lost  their  hold  upon  Hungary,  Transylvania, 
and  the  Morea.     In   1697  prince    Eugene  won   one   of   the 


South-Eastern  Europe  287 

gi-eatest  of  his  victories  over  Sultan  Mustafa  11.  in  person,  at 
Zenta,  and  Peter  the  Great  marked  the  first  serious  entrance 
of  Russia  into  the  politics  of  south-eastern  Europe  by  the  cap- 
ture of  Azof.  The  Sultan  realised  that  with  the  Kiuprili  the 
possibility  of  fresh  conquests  had  passed  away,  and  he  must 
content  himself  with  the  boundary  of  the  Danube.  By  the 
peace  of  Carlowitz,  concluded  in  January  1699,  the  Emperor 
recovered  the  whole  of  Hungary,  except  the  district  of  Temes- 
var,  the  larger  part  of  Croatia  and  Sclavonia,  and   ^^ 

.  The  peace  of 

the  suzerainty  over  Transylvania.  Poland  re-  Cariowitz, 
tained  Podolia,  including  Kaminiec,  and  Russia  '^^^' 
Azof,  while  the  Morea  fell  to  Venice.  Thus  the  Turkish  fron- 
tier was  practically  reduced  to  the  Danube,  and  the  seeds  of 
the  Eastern  Question  were  sown  in  the  decay  of  the  Ottoman 
empire  and  the  advance  of  Russia,  and  a  new  epoch  in  the 
history  of  south-eastern  Europe  began. 

The  conquests  on  the  Danube  were  more  permanent  than 
those  in  the  Mediterranean.  Fifteen  years  later  the  grand 
vizier,  Ali  Cumurgi,  flushed  with  an  unexpected  ^5^^^  uest 
triumph  over  the  Czar  Peter  on  the  Pruth  in  of  the  Morea, 
171 1,  and  trusting  in  the  exhaustion  of  the  '^'^' 
Empire  after  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  determined 
to  make  a  great  effort  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  of  Carlowitz, 
and  recover  Hungary  and  the  Morea.  The  Venetians  had 
no  longer  a  hero  like  Morosini  to  lead  them.  The  Greek 
population  in  spite  of  the  benefits  they  had  received  from 
Venetian  administration  were  too  faithless  and  too  dispirited 
to  offer  serious  opposition.  One  campaign  proved  sufficient 
for  the  work.  In  June  17 15  Ali  Cumurgi  passed  the  isthmus 
of  Corinth.  In  September  he  returned  in  triumph  to  Con- 
stantinople the  conqueror  of  the  Morea.  But  there  his 
success  stopped.  On  the  Danube  he  met  more  than  his 
match.  In  August  17 16  the  Turks  were  completely  defeated 
by  prince  Eugene  at  Peterwardein  in  Hungary  and  the  grand 
vizier  himself  was  killed.  In  1717  Belgrade  again  passed 
into  the  Emperor's  hands,  and  the  road  into  the  heart  of  the 


288  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Ottoman  empire  was  open.  The  Porte  saw  the  necessity  of 
peace.  By  the  treaty  of  Passarovitz  signed  in  17 18  the  Turks 
„.  J    left  Austria  in  possession  of  Temesvar  and  Bel- 

Passarovitz,  grade  but  retained  the  Morea.  More  than  a 
^^'^'  century  was  to  elapse,  and  the  proud  republic  of 

Venice  pass  herself  into  slavery,  before  Greece  could  win  her 
freedom. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE   NORTHERN   NATIONS   FROM   THE  TREATY   OF 
OLIVA  TO  THE   PEACE  OF  UTRECHT 

1660-1715 

The  rivalry  between  Sweden  and  Brandenburg — Monarchical  revolution  in 
Denmark  —  Weakness  of  the  aristocracy  in  Sweden — Frederick  William 
makes  himself  absolute  in  Prussia,  Brandenburg,  and  Cleves — His  policy 
of  centralisation  —  W^ar  between  Sweden  and  Brandenburg  —  Battle  of 
Fehrbellin —  Monarchical  revolution  in  Sweden  — The  rise  of  Russia  —  The 
reign  of  Alexis  —  Regency  of  Sophia  —  War  with  the  Turks — Peter  the 
Great  becomes  absolute  ruler —  His  character  and  policy —  Coalition  against 
Sweden — Career  of  Charles  XII.  —  His  invasion  of  Russia  —  Battle  of  Pul- 
tava — -The  campaign  on  the  Pruth  —  Treaty  of  Nystadt  —  Supremacy  of 
Russia —  Reign  of  Frederick  in.  of  Brandenburg  —  Frederick  recognised  as 
king  of  Prussia  —  Condition  of  the  north  in  1720. 

The  treaties  of  Oliva  and  Copenhagen  were  to  the  smaller 
nations  grouped  round  the  Baltic,  what  the  peace  of  West- 
phalia and  the  treaties  of  the  Pyrenees  were  to  the  great  powers 
of  Europe.  They  not  only  put  an  end  to  a  long  period  of  war 
and  disturbance,  but  also  decided  the  relations  of 
the  northern  powers  to  each  other  for  more  than  between 
half  a  century.     To  use  the  language  of  a  later    Sweden  and 

•     11  T  1111  r  -1         Brandenburg. 

period  they  adjusted  the  balance  of  power  m  the 
north.  They  mark  the  end  of  Danish  domination  over  the 
Baltic,  they  mark  the  beginning  of  the  supremacy  of  Branden- 
burg in  northern  Europe,  they  mark  the  first  great  failure  of 
Sweden  to  maintain  the  pride  of  place  gained  for  her  by  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus.  So  far  the  alterations  in  the  relations  of  the 
northern  powers  to  each  other  are  clearly  defined.     So  far  no 

PERIOD    V.  289  T 


290  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

sense  of  impending  danger  from  the  half  barbarous  and  dis- 
tracted kingdom  of  Russia  has  made  itself  felt.  Until  that 
event  happens  there  is  a  breathing  space  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Baltic  states  for  fifty  years,  and  during  that  time  the  main  ques- 
tions of  interest  in  their  external  politics  are  whether  Branden- 
burg will  be  able  to  maintain  the  supremacy  which  he  has 
acquired,  and  whether  Sweden  will  be  able  to  recover  the  lead 
which  she  has  lost.  The  rivalry  between  Sweden  and  Denmark 
is  therefore  no  longer  the  leading  feature  of  the  poUtics  of  the 
Baltic  states,  the  rivalry  between  Sweden  and  Russia  is  still  in 
the  womb  of  futurity,  the  rivalry  between  Sweden  and  Branden- 
burg remains  for  the  time  the  only  serious  question  unsettled. 

The  respite  thus  gained  from  foreign  war  was  occupied  by 
all  the  powers  concerned  in  altering  their  domestic  institutions. 
,,        , .    ,    The  first  to  move  was  Denmark.     In  that  country 

Monarchical  J 

revolution  in  as  in  Poland  the  authority  of  the  elected  king  was 
Denmark.  completely  ovcrshadowed  by  that  of  the  nobihty. 
They  were  in  possession  of  political  power  as  well  as  of  social 
privilege.  They  owned  most  of  the  wealth  of  the  country,  paid 
no  taxes,  and  held  all  the  chief  posts  in  the  kingdom.  Con- 
sequently at  each  election  of  a  king  they  were  able  not  only  to 
decide  the  election,  but  to  make  bargains  with  the  elected 
candidate  exceedingly  profitable  to  themselves  and  burden- 
some to  the  rest  of  the  people.  There  was  no  country  in 
Europe  where  the  nobles  had  made  themselves  so  justly  hated 
by  all  the  other  classes  of  the  community.  National  misfor- 
tune led  naturally  to  the  desire  for  national  revenge.  Freder- 
ick III,  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  movement,  and  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  diet  in  1661  successfully  carried  out  a  coup  d'etat, 
with  the  applause  of  the  clergy,  the  burghers,  and  the  peasantry. 
The  revolution  was  entirely  in  favour  of  the  king.  The  Crown 
was  made  hereditary  and  transmissible  to  females  as  well  as 
to  males.  The  privileges  of  the  nobles  were  abolished,  the 
capitulation  signed  by  the  king  on  election  annulled,  and  the 
government  vested  in  the  Crown.  At  one  blow  and  without 
bloodshed  the  monarchy  in  Denmark  was  remodelled  on  the 


The  Northern  Nations  291 

pattern  of  that  of  France,  and  Frederick  iii.  became  an  absolute 
king  with  all  the  powers  of  government  centralised  in  himself, 
and  his  throne  secured  by  a  professional  army. 

In  Sweden  matters  took  a  different  turn.  During  the  mi- 
nority of  Charles  xi.,  as  during  the  minority  of  Christina,  the 
administration  fell  wholly  into  the  hands  of  the  great 

r        •!■  TT    r  11  Misgovern- 

aristocratic  famines.  Unfortunately  there  was  no  ment  of  the 
Oxenstjerna  at  their  head.  The  council  of  regency,  nobles  in 
under  the  nominal  leadership  of  the  queen-mother, 
found  it  necessary  to  propitiate  the  nobles  in  everything.  The 
suicidal  policy  of  making  grants  of  the  crown  lands  to  them 
was  again  weakly  adopted,  and  the  Crown  was  impoverished 
while  its  most  dangerous  rivals  were  enriched.  The  itching 
palms  of  the  great  nobles  found  in  the  gold  of  Louis  xiv.  the 
loadstone  of  their  country's  policy,  and  as  long  as  the  French 
supplies  lasted  Sweden  remained  true  to  the  French  alliance. 
Once  only,  like  Charles  11.,  in  the  hope  of  greater  spoils  she 
showed  a  momentary  independence,  when  she  yielded  to  the 
persuasions  of  de  Witt,  and  joined  the  Triple  Alliance.  In  a 
few  months  she  returned  in  penitence  to  her  old  allegiance, 
and  when  the  young  king  took  the  reins  of  government  into 
his  own  hands  in  1672,  he  found  that  if  eleven  years  of  aristo- 
cratical  rule  had  secured  for  him  abroad  the  friendship  and 
support  of  the  greatest  prince  in  Europe,  it  had  made  him  the 
heir  at  home  to  an  empty  treasury  and  a  discredited  adminis- 
tration. 

While  Sweden  was  falling  into  bankruptcy,  and  was  being 
threatened  with  disruption,  Frederick  William  of  Brandenburg 
was  diligently  employing  the  time  in  making  his 
authority  over  his  various  dominions  absolute  and   policy  of  the 
unquestioned.     He  had  already  succeeded  in  re-   Great  Elector 

.  ,1.  r    -r-.  1       1  1/^1  '"  Prussia. 

ducing  the  diets  of  Brandenburg   and    Cleves    to 
impotence,  and  organising   an   administration   dependent   on 
himself  alone  outside  the  scope  of  their  interference.     But  in 
Prussia  the  task  was  far  more  difficult,  and  directly  the  treaty 
of  Oliva  was  signed  he  applied  himself  seriously  to  the  business. 


292  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Under  the  suzerainty  of  Poland  the  nobles  and  burghers  ol 
Prussia  had  been  accustomed  to  exercise  a  considerable  amount 
of  independence,  but  now  that  the  Great  Elector  had  been 
recognised  as  immediate  sovereign  over  Prussia  by  the  treaties 
of  Wehlau  and  of  Oliva,  both  sides  understood  that  the  old 
relations  between  the  duke  and  his  subjects  would  have  to  be 
modified.  The  Prussian  diet  determined  to  yield  as  httle  as 
possible.  It  refused  to  ratify  the  treaty,  it  drew  up  a  constitu- 
tion to  secure  its  own  authority.  By  the  treaty  Frederick 
William  only  succeeded  to  the  same  rights  over  Prussia  which 
Poland  had  enjoyed,  i.e.  those  of  a  feudal  suzerain,  but  he  was 
determined  if  possible  to  make  himself  absolute  sovereign,  and 
reduce  the  diet  to  insignificance.  Most  foolishly  the  diet  played 
into  his  hands.  The  two  parties  of  which  it  was  composed, 
the  landed  gentry  and  the  burghers,  quarrelled  over  the  nature 
of  a  tax  which  was  to  be  imposed.  Each  side  wanted  the  other 
to  bear  the  burden,  and  Frederick  William  was  enabled,  under 
cover  of  settling  the  dispute,  to  march  troops  into  Konigsberg, 
and  arrest  Rhode,  the  leader  of  the  burgher  party,  in  1662. 
This  display  of  determination  awed  the  burghers  into  submis- 
sion, but  the  nobles  and  the  landed  gentry  still  remained  to  be 
dealt  with.  Led  by  Kalkstein,  and  secretly  favoured  by  Poland, 
they  were  too  strong  to  be  crushed. 

Frederick  William  had  recourse  to  the  arts  of  diplomacy 
and  dissimulation  of  which  he  was  so  consummate  a  master. 
The  Charter  I^  1 663  the  diet  accepted  at  his  hands  a  charter 
of  1663.  which  defined  its  rights.     It  was  expressed  in  am- 

ple but  vague  phraseology.  By  it  the  Great  Elector  agreed 
that  his  own  powers  of  government  should  be  only  those  for- 
merly enjoyed  by  himself  and  the  king  of  Poland,  that  the  diet 
should  be  summoned  at  least  once  in  six  years,  and  should  be 
consulted  in  all  important  business,  and  that  no  new  taxes 
should  be  imposed  without  its  consent.  But  by  the  very  defi- 
nition of  its  powers  the  diet  lost  all  which  was  not  expressed, 
while  the  elector  gained  all  that  was  not  refused.  The  balance 
of  authority  in  the  state  had  clearly  shifted  from  the  diet  to 


The  Northern  Nations  293 

the  elector.  Frederick  William  had  only  to  avoid  for  a  few 
years  giving  the  diet  the  opportunity  of  exercising  the  rights 
secured  to  it,  while  the  authority  of  his  own  adn>inistrative 
officers  was  being  established,  and  he  need  no  longer  fear  the 
diet  when  it  did  meet,  than  the  kings  of  France  need  fear  the 
States-General.  It  might  be  troublesome  but  it  could  not  be 
dangerous.  So  gradually  by  thrifty  management  and  careful 
policy  Frederick  William  succeeded  in  extending  his  personal 
authority  more  and  more  over  the  country,  until  in  1672  he 
felt  himself  strong  enough  to  strike  a  final  blow.  Kalkstein, 
the  head  and  front  of  the  opposition  to  him,  had  been  banished 
to  his  estates  for  treasonable  correspondence  with  Poland  in 
1669,  but  breaking  his  parole  he  escaped  across  the  frontier  to 
Warsaw,  Frederick  William  demanded  his  surrender  from  the 
king  of  Poland,  but  it  was  refused.  Taking  the  Execution  of 
law  into  his  own  hands,  he  had  him  arrested  on  Kalkstein. 
Polish  ground,  brought  to  Memel,  and  there  beheaded,  A 
more  flagrant  breach  of  the  rights  of  nations  could  not  have 
been  conceived,  but  the  Great  Elector  well  knew  it  could 
not  fail  to  be  successful,  and  with  him  success  justified  every- 
thing. Poland  was  in  no  condition  to  declare  war,  and  the 
death  of  Kalkstein  was  the  one  thing  wanted  to  make  the 
submission  of  Prussia  complete. 

By  these  measures  Frederick  William  succeeded  in  crush- 
ing all  open  opposition  to  his  will  over  the  whole  of  his 
incongruous  dominions.  In  Cleves  and  in  Prussia,  as  in  Pome- 
rania  and  Brandenburg,  he  was  the  centre  and  the  main- 
spring of  government.  There  was  no  local  or  Establishment 
constitutional  authority  which  could  legally  claim   °^  personal 

.      ,,  ...         government 

superiority  to  him,  or  practically  exercise  equality  by  the  Great 
with  him.  But  though  he  was  the  supreme  power  Elector, 
in  the  state  he  had  not  yet  gained  absolute  power  over 
the  state.  There  were  still  many  local  bodies  of  advice  and 
administration,  with  well  ascertained  powers,  whose  assist- 
ance was  necessary  to  him  in  carrying  his  will  into  effect, 
though  they  had  no  right  to  dictate  to  him  the  policy  which 


294  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

he  was  to  pursue.  He  had  given  to  his  state  poUtical  unity, 
he  had  gained  for  himself  and  his  successors  pohtical  inde- 
pendence, he  had  won  for  himself  and  his  family  within  his 
own  dominions  political  leadership,  but  he  had  not  as  yet 
established  administrative  uniformity.  That  was  necessarily 
a  work  of  slow  growth,  of  a  century  rather  than  a  lifetime.  It 
was  not  completed  till  the  days  of  Frederick  William  i.  and 
Frederick  the  Great  but  it  was  begun  by  the  Great  Elector. 
The  important  department  of  patronage  he  at  once  took 
under  his  personal  control,  and  appointed  all  the  chief  ad- 
ministrative officers  in  his  various  dominions.  As  head  of 
the  army,  he  separated  the  military  from  the  civil  revenues, 
and  placed  the  former  entirely  under  the  management  of 
the  minister  of  war,  who  was  of  course  his  own  nominee. 
War  expenditure  was  thus  wholly  removed  from  the  con- 
trol of  the  civil  authorities,  and  the  army  was  organised  on 
.a  professional  basis.  By  a  series  of  ordinances  he  established 
an  elaborate  system  of  social  distinctions  and  privileges,  which 
tended_to  centralise  society  under  him,  and  attach  the  nobles 
to  him  by  social  distinction  now  that  he  had  deprived  them 
of  political  power.  In  these  ways  the  government  of  Bran- 
denburg-Prussia received  from  him  that  military  and  aristocra- 
tic character  which  its  greater  prosperity  has  only  increased. 

Frederick  William  was  also  by  no  means  unmindful  of  the 

general  welfare  of  his  people.     The  constant  want  of  money 

under  which   he    laboured,  was  in  itself  enough  to  draw  his 

attention  to  the  fact,  that  the  real  weakness  of  his 

Encourage-  ...  -i  i  •    i 

ment  of  trade  powcr  lay  m  the  Sterile  and  poverty-stricken  state 
and  manu-  of  his  country.  To  improve  this,  he  set  an  ex- 
cellent example  of  economy  in  the  wise  and  care- 
ful management  of  his  own  domains,  he  promoted  numerous 
schemes  of  industrial  and  commercial  enterprise,  and  he 
cordially  welcomed  the  Huguenot  exiles  from  France,  after 
the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  who  brought  into  Bran- 
denburg many  of  the  finer  manufactures,  of  which  France  had 
for  some  time  had  the  monopoly. 


The  Northern  Nations  295 

This  policy  of  steady  but  quiet  centralisation  and  industrial 
development  was  rudely  interrupted  by  the  war  of  aggression 
undertaken  by  Louis  xiv.  against  the  Dutch,  warwith 
Frederick  William  was  closely  connected  with  the  Sweden,  1674. 
Dutch  by  marriage  and  by  trade  interests,  and  was  one  of  the 
first  of  European  sovereigns  to  draw  the  sword  in  their  favour 
in  1673.  Beaten  hopelessly  in  the  field  by  Turenne,  he  was 
obliged  to  withdraw  from  the  struggle  six  months  after  he 
had  declared  war ;  but  in  the  next  year  the  increasing  diffi- 
culties of  Louis  emboldened  him  again  to  enter  the  field. 
Louis,  however,  was  prepared  for  this  move,  and  the  presence 
of  16,000  Brandenburgers  on  the  Rhine  was  the  signal  of  the 
advance  of  Charles  xi.  with  a  Swedish  army  on  the  road  to 
Berlin.  Frederick  William  at  once  hastened  back  to  defend 
his  capital,  reached  the  Elbe  in  June  1675,  and,  dashing 
forwai-d  his  cavalry  between  the  two  divisions  of  the  Swedish 
army,  seized  Rathenow,  and  prevented  their  junction  on  the 
Havel.  To  do  this  he  had  been  forced  to  leave  the  bulk  of 
his  infantry  behind.  Nevertheless,  with  the  bril-  ga^tieof 
liance  of  decision  which  marks  a  great  general,  Fehrbeiun, 
he  determined  to  throw  himself  with  the  few  '^^^' 
troops  which  he  had  with  him  upon  the  Swedish  column, 
which  was  retreating  from  Brandenburg,  before  they  reached 
the  pass  of  Fehrbellin.  Pursuing  them  by  forced  marches, 
he  came  up  with  their  rear-guard  on  the  1 7th  of  June,  and 
on  the  1 8th  forced  them  to  accept  battle.  The  weight  of 
numbers  was  sadly  against  him.  He  had  but  6000  men 
against  double  the  number  of  his  enemies,  but  the  Swedes 
were  dispirited,  and  the  elector,  in  spite  of  the  advice  of 
his  generals,  insisted  on  the  attack.  The  battle  was  hotly 
contested,  but  Frederick  William  had  the  better  position  and 
the  more  effective  artillery,  and  by  nightfall  a  counter-charge, 
promptly  delivered,  carried  destruction  into  the  ranks  of 
the  enemy.  They  broke  and  fled  in  complete  rout  through 
the  pass.  The  day  of  Fehrbellin  is  the  first  great  victory 
of  the  power   of  Brandenburg- Prussia,  the  fiist    step    in    the 


296  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

ladder  which  has  led  to  Sadowa  and  Sedan.  It  is  also  the 
death  day  of  the  military  prestige  of  the  Swedes  in  Europe. 
From  the  battle  of  Lutzen  to  the  battle  of  Fehrbellin,  they 
had  never  been  defeated  except  by  superior  numbers.  They 
were  now  seen  not  to  be  able  to  hold  their  own  with  Bran- 
denburg, for  Fehrbellin  was  no  isolated  victory.  The  elector 
pushed  on  into  Swedish  Pomerania,  victorious  and  almost 
unchallenged,  —  Wohlgart,  Stettin,  Stralsund,  and  Greifswald 
fell  successively  into  his  hands.  By  October  1678  Sweden 
held  not  a  foot  of  territory  in  Pomerania.  Had  it  not  been 
for  her  potent  ally  at  Paris,  the  work  of  Gustavus  Adolphus 
Treat  of  ^^^  °^  Oxcnstjema  would  have  been  completely 
S.Germain  en  undonc  long  before  the  close  of  the  century, 
Laye,  1679.  ^j^^  Frederick  William  would  have  been  admit- 
tedly the  master  of  the  nortli.  But  Louis  xrv.  insisted  upon 
the  full  restoration  to  Sweden  of  all  which  she  had  lost  as 
the  price  of  peace,  and  the  Great  Elector  had  to  sign  the 
treaty  of  S.  Germain  en  Laye  in  June  1679,  by  which  France 
evacuated  Cleves,  which  she  had  occupied  and  paid  to  Bran- 
denburg the  sum  of  300,000  crowns,  while  Brandenburg  re- 
stored to  Sweden  all  her  conquests  in  Pomerania,  except  a 
small  strip  of  land  on  the  Oder. 

Sweden  thus  emerged  from  an  unsuccessful  and  mismanaged 

war,  without  payment  of  indemnity  or  substantial  loss  of  terri- 

. .    ,    tory.     As  things  turned  out  she  proved  to  be  the 

Monarchical  j  o  r 

revolution  gainer  rather  than  the  loser  for  her  misfortunes,  for 
in  Sweden.  ^^^  enabled  her  to  rid  herself  of  her  incapable 
aristocratical  government.  Charles  xi.  did  for  Sweden  what 
Frederick  iii.  had  done  for  Denmark.  Taking  advantage  of 
the  unpopularity  of  the  government,  he  effected  a  revolution 
in  favour  of  the  Crown  without  difficulty.  With  the  help  of 
the  clergy  and  the  people  the  royal  power  was  made  absolute, 
and  the  domain  lands,  which  the  nobles  had  divided  among 
themselves,  were  ordered  to  be  restored.  This  destroyed  at 
a  blow  a  large  part  of  the  wealth  of  the  noble  class,  and 
reduced  them  to  a  position  of  dependence  upon  th  j  Crown. 


The  NortJiern  Nations  297 

Charles  proved  himself  worthy  of  the  responsibility  which  he 
had  undertaken.  Until  his  death  in  1697  Sweden  was  at 
peace,  commerce  revived,  the  abuses  of  the  administration 
were  rooted  out,  and  the  government  carried  on  without  the 
assistance  of  French  subsidies.  For  eighteen  years  tranquiUity 
reigned  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic.  The  Great  Elector  and 
his  son  Frederick  iii.  were  busy  with  schemes  of  internal  reform 
and  personal  aggrandisement.  Denmark  under  Christian  v. 
was  mainly  occupied  with  the  pleasures  and  extravagances  of 
a  courtly  magnificence,  while  Sweden  was  recovering  from  the 
evils  of  administration,  brought  about  by  the  corrupt  rule  of 
the  nobles  during  the  king's  minority.  The  interest  of  the 
politics  of  the  Baltic  veers  further  north,  where  behind  the 
swamps  of  the  Neva  and  the  Dniester  the  barbaric  power  of 
Russia  was  preparing  to  enter  upon  the  stage  of  the  civilised 
world. 

Russia    is   the    last    born  child    of    European    civilisation. 
While  the  nations  of  the  west  were  painfully  hammering  out 
their  culture   and   their   polity,  under  the   leader-   condition  of 
ship  of  the    Church,  in   the  school  of  feudalism,   Russia, 
through  the  inspiration  of  Roman  law,  the    thinly  populated 
expanse  of  forest  and   morass,  which   stretches   between   the 
Baltic  and  the  Ural  mountains  was  subject  to  Tartar  rule  and 
made   no    claim   to   civilised    life.     Even    Christianity,  which 
might  under  happier  circumstances    have   become  a  bond  of 
union   between  the   backward   north  and  the  cultured  south, 
proved    rather  a   hindrance    than  a  help,  on   account  of  the 
enmity  between  the  East  and  the  West.     As  long  as  Constan- 
tinople stood,  Moscow  was  its  disciple  and  its  ally ;  ivan  the 
when  Constantinople   fell,  Moscow  claimed  to  be   Terrible, 
its  heir,  and  its  avenger.     It  was  not  till  the  days  of  Ivan  the 
Terrible  in  the  sixteenth  century  that  the  domination  of  the 
Tartar  was  overthrown,  and  Russia  began  to  be  a  nation  and 
to    enter   into   relations   with    other   nations.     Its   The  troub- 
prosperity  was  short  lived.     Hardly  had  the  breath   '°"s  times, 
left  the  body  of  the  savage  autocrat  in   1584,  than  a  period  of 


298  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

anarchy  and  misery  began,  which  has  left  its  mark  upon  the 
country  in  the  legal  establishment  of  serfdom,  and  was  only 
ended  by  the  accession  of  the  Romanoff  dynasty  to  the  throne 
in  1612. 

Michael,  the  first  of  that  ill-fated  house,  could  do  little  more 
Michael  than  repress  the  elements  of  disorder,  and  restore 

Romanoff.  j^g  authority  of  the  Czar,  but  so  well  was  this  work 
done,  that  he  was  enabled  to  hand  on  to  his  son  Alexis,  on  his 
death  in  1645,  a  crown  which  was  at  once  popular  secure  and 
despotic.  Two  dangers  only  threatened  the  infant  state ;  one 
from  the  turbulent  spirit  of  the  local  nobles,  the  boyars,  the 
other  from  the  physical  power  wielded  by  the  national  guard, 
called  the  Streltsi,  who  played  the  part  of  the  Praetorian  guard. 
Reign  of  Or  the   Janizaries,    of  the  court   of  Moscow,  and 

Alexis.  ^gj-g  always  as  ready  to  intimidate  as  to  protect 

their  sovereign.  In  the  earlier  years  of  the  reign  of  Alexis, 
however,  all  went  well.  In  1648  he  began  the  march  of  Russia 
towards  the  south-east  of  Europe  by  assuming  the  protectorate 
of  the  Cossacks  of  the  Ukraine,  then  in  revolt  against  Poland, 
and  succeeded  in  obtaining  legal  sanction  for  the  absolute 
autocracy  of  the  Czar,  by  the  passing  of  a  code,  or  constitution, 
which  concentrated  all  the  powers  of  the  state  in  his  hands. 
By  these  two  measures,  which  estabhshed  the  internal  polity 
of  Russia,  and  indicated  the  direction  of  her  foreign  policy, 
Alexis  may  with  some  justice  claim  to  have  been  the  real 
founder  of  the  greatness  of  his  country.  Unfortunately  a 
change  soon  took  place.  The  weak  and  amiable  Czar  fell 
quickly  into  the  hands  of  courtiers  and  favourites.  Corruption 
and  faction  asserted  themselves  among  the  boyars.  The  gov- 
ernment became  disorganised.  Sedition  broke  out  in  the 
chief  towns,  and  more  than  once  Alexis  had  to  sacrifice  his 
ministers  to  the  fury  of  the  populace,  in  order  to  save  his  own 
life.  Even  the  Church  was  split  into  two  by  an  ill-managed 
effort  to  revise  the  antiquated  service  books,  and  the  evils  of 
ecclesiastical  schism  and  religious  persecution  were  added  to 
those  of  domestic  strife. 


The  Northern  Nations  299 

Such  was  the  condition  of  Russia  when  the  Czar  Alexis  died 
suddenly  in  1676,  leaving  behind  him  by  his  first  marriage 
two  sons,  Theodore  and  Ivan,  both  extremely  deli-    Reign  of 
cate  in  health  ;  and  one  sturdy  little  boy  of  four  Theodore  i. 
years  of  age,  named  Peter,  by  his  second  wife  Natalia  Narysh- 
kin,  whom  he  had  married  in  1669.     The  death  of  Alexis  was 
the  signal  for  the  outbreak  of  a  series  of  palace  revolutions, 
which  afflicted  the  unfortunate  country  for  some  years.     The 
Naryshkins,  who  had  absorbed  all  places  of  profit  and  influence 
during  the  later  years  of  Alexis,  were  banished  at  the  accession 
of  Theodore  in  1676,  but  on  the  death  of  that  prince  without 
children  in  1682  they  came  back  to  power,  and  with  the  assist- 
ance of  the  boyirs  were  able  to  procure  the  recog-    Recognition 
nition  of  the   young   Peter  as  Czar,  in  exclusion   of  Peter  as 
of    his    elder   brother    Ivan,    who   was   physically   ^^*'''  '^**' 
deformed  and  intellectually  incapable.     An  act  so  high  handed 
naturally  created  many  enemies.     The  opposition  party  among 
the  nobles  called   in  the    aid  of  the   Streltsi,  espoused    their 
grievances,  fanned  their  discontent,  and,  persuading  them  that 
the  hfe  of  Ivan  was  in  danger  hurled  them  sud-    Revolt  of  the 
denly  in  riotous    fury  against  the  palace,  in    May   streitsi. 
1682.     The  Naryshkins  were  murdered.     Ivan  was  proclaimed 
Czar  in   company  with   his   brother   Peter,  and   the   princess 
Sophia,  the  most  capable  of  his  sisters,  was  made  regent  during 
the  infancy  of  the  Czars.     The  regency  lasted  for  seven  years. 
During  that  time  the  real  power  was  in  the  hands  of  prince 
Basil   GoUtsin,  the  head  of  one  of  the  oldest  of  the   noble 
famines  of  Russia,  and  the  acknowledged  lover  of  Regency  of 
the  princess  Sophia.     His  talent  however  proved    Sophia, 
unequal  to  his  opportunities.     In  1686  a  definitive  peace  with 
Poland,  called   the   treaty  of  Eternal   Peace,  put  a   finishing 
touch  to  the  truce  brought  about  by  the  treaty  of  Andrusoff  in 
1667,  on  terms  which  secured  the  important  town  of  Kief  to 
Russia,  but  obliged  her  to  join  the   Emperor  and  the    Poles 
in  their  efforts  to  beat  back  the  Ottoman  Turks.     In  conse- 
quence of  this  pledge,  Golitsin  waged  two  campaigns  against 


300  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  Tartars  of  the  Crimea,  who  were  subjects  of  the  Porte,  in 
1687  and  1689,  the  unsuccessful  issue  of  which  filled  up  to 
overflowing  the  cup  of  hatred  which  was  preparing  for  him. 
Peter  allowed  himself  to  be  put  at  the  head  of  the  opposition. 
On  September  17th,  1689,  the  regency  came  to  an  end.  The 
princess  Sophia  was  sent  to  a  convent,  prince  Basil  Golitsin 
banished  to  an  obscure  village  in  the  inaccessible  north,  and 
the  government  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  rival  aristocratic 
faction. 

At  the  age  of  seventeen,  in  the  year  when  William  iii. 
made  himself  master  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  war  of  the 
league  of  Augsburg  really  began,  Peter  the  Great  became 
nominally  the  head  of  the  government  of  Russia.  In  reality 
Peter  be-  he  exerciscd  but  little  influence  upon  the  fortunes 
comes  the  q{  ^jg  country  for  some  years.  He  was  as  yet  but 
government,  ^  boy,  brimming  over  with  health  and  spirits,  ex- 
1689.  ulting  in  the  physical  enjoyment  of  life,  supremely 

happy  when  he  could  get  away  from  the  wearisome  routine 
of  the  palace  to  his  forge  and  his  carpenter's  shop,  or  his 
ship-building  yards  at  Pereyaslavl  and  Archangel.  The  demon 
of  ambition  had  not  yet  waked  in  his  breast,  and  his  ships  and 
his  military  sham  fights,  like  his  displays  of  fireworks  and  his 
theatricals,  were  the  amusements  of  a  spoilt  child's  fancy, 
rather  than  the  materials  of  a  man's  policy.  The  rude  touch 
of  actual  war  quickly  brought  about  a  change.  In  1695  the 
government  determined  to  revive  the  slumbering  war  with  the 
War  with  the  Turks,  and  attack  the  port  of  Azof  on  the  Black 
Turks,  1695.  Seji_  Peter  threw  himself  into  the  scheme  with 
characteristic  impetuosity,  worked  as  a  bombardier  in  the 
army  like  a  common  soldier,  and  took  his  place  as  Czar 
in  the  councils  of  the  generals.  But  the  result  was  un- 
fortunate. Partly  through  sheer  bad  management,  partly 
through  the  inexperience  and  impulsiveness  of  the  Czar, 
the  attack  on  the  fortress  completely  failed,  and  the  Russian 
army  had  to  retreat  as  best  it  could  across  the  frozen  steppes 
amid    great   privations.       But    Peter   was    one    of    those    who 


TJie  NortJiern  Nations  301 

earn  best  by  experience.  The  campaign  taught  him  the 
necessity  of  forethought  and  preparation.  Next  year  all 
was  different.  A  flotilla  of  boats,  constructed  especially  for 
the  river  service  at  Voronezh,  occupied  the  mouths  of  the 
Don  under  Peter's  own  orders,  and  prevented  the  Turks  from 
relieving  Azof  from  the  sea ;  while  the  engineering  works  on 
land  were  pushed  on  by  General  Gordon.  On  July  29th, 
1696,  a  general  assault  was  ordered,  but  the  Turks  seeing  that 
the  town  was  no  longer  tenable  surrendered,  and  Peter  found 
himself  to  his  great  joy  the  master  of  a  port  on  the  Black  Sea. 
The  capture  of  Azof  is  the  turning-point  in  the  life  of  Peter 
the  Great.  His  imagination  was  fired  by  the  opportunities 
opened  out  to  his  country  by  the  possession  of  an  outlet  for 
her  commerce  and  a  harbour  for  her  fleet  in  southern  waters. 
The  death  of  his  brother  Ivan  without  male  heirs  in  Feb- 
ruary left  him  undisputed  master  of  his  vast  dominions. 
From  that  moment  he  bent  all  the  energies  of  his  powerful 
intellect  and  iron  will  to  the  service  of  Russia.  He  took  the 
reins  of  government  into  his  own  hands,  and,  without  regard 
to  precedent,  to  tradition,  to  public  or  private  right,  he  drove 
the  chariot  of  the  state  straight  towards  the  goal  of  his  own 
ambition,  and  his  country's  greatness. 

Peter  himself  was  well  fitted  to  become  the  hero  of  such  a 
policy.     His  friendship  with    Gordon  and  Lefort   character  of 
and    others  of  the    foreign   residents   at    Moscow   Peter  the 
had   taught   him    how   far   Russia   lagged   behind   *^''^^*- 
all    other    European    countries   in    the    march    of   civilisation. 
His  quick  wit  showed  him  that  he  must  organise  his  country 
on  the  European  model,  and  make  it  formidable  by  its  army 
and  navy  to  its  enemies,  and  useful    by  its    resources  to   its 
friends,  before  it  could  be  admitted  into  the  brotherhood  of 
European    nations.      To   change    the    institutions   and    over- 
throw the  traditions  of  a  country  like  Russia  was  a  revolution, 
but  Peter  was  not   the    man  to  shrink  back  appalled  at  the 
consequences,  when  he   had  once  made  up  his  mind  to  act. 
Sunny  jovial  and  open-hearted  under  ordinary  circomstances, 


302  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

in  the  presence  of  opposition,  when  his  blood  was  up,  he 
became  a  fiend  incarnate.  No  savage  could  be  more  cruel, 
no  tyrant  more  brutal,  no  criminal  more  lustful  and  drunken. 
He  knew  not  what  it  was  to  accept  a  rebuff,  or  deny  himself 
a  desire.  To  incur  his  suspicion  was  torture,  to  thwart 
his  will  was  death.  After  the  revolt  of  the  Streltsi  in  1698 
more  than  a  thousand  men  were  put  to  death  and  eighteen 
hundred  tortured  by  the  knout  and  roasted  at  the  fire,  many 
of  them  in  the  presence  of  the  Czar  himself.  He  allowed 
his  eldest  son  Alexis  to  be  knouted  to  death  in  1718,  and 
personally  superintended  the  torture  of  many  of  his  alleged 
accomplices.  His  drunken  orgies  lasted  for  days,  and  were 
worthy  only  of  Comus  and  his  crew.  Yet  with  all  this  hate- 
ful savagery  there  was  much  that  was  attractive  about  Peter. 
When  free  from  his  fits  of  depression,  there  was  a  buoyancy 
and  vivacity  of  intellect,  which,  combined  with  singular  sim- 
plicity of  thought,  made  him  a  most  delightful  companion. 
No  one  could  be  a  truer  friend,  if  no  one  could  be  a  more 
brutal  enemy.  He  was  perfectly  natural.  If  there  was 
much  of  the  barbarian  about  him,  there  was  nothing  of  the 
schemer.  He  was  free  from  the  civilised  vices  of  deceit 
and  double  dealing.  Rough,  honest,  and  quick-tempered,  he 
moved  through  society  like  a  lion  cub  among  pet  dogs, 
dangerous  but  noble. 

His  two  years  of  foreign  travel  enabled  him  to  see  with  his 
Objects  of  ^^"^  ^y^^  ^^^  advantages  of  European  civilisation 
his  home  and  government,  and  to  learn  how  to  make  with 
governmen  .  j^j^  ^^^  hands  the  ships  which  were  to  spread  the 
greatness  of  the  Russian  name  round  the  shores  of  the 
Black  Sea.  Neithei  lesson  was  thrown  away.  Directly  he 
got  back  to  Russia  he  began  to  foster  everything  western 
at  the  expense  of  everything  national.  He  introduced 
western  dress,  western  habits,  western  dancing,  and  even 
western  shaving.  He  encouraged  the  settlement  of  for- 
eigners, and  spent  a  good  deal  of  his  time  in  the  German 
suburb   of    Moscow  with    his    foreign   friends.      Directly   he 


The  Northern  Nations  303 

obtained  possession  of  the  mouth  of  the  Neva,  he  bnilt  his 
new  capital  S.  Petersburg,  to  take  the  place  of  conservative 
and  traditional  Moscow,  as  the  centre  of  his  new  polity.  At 
the  same  time  he  took  good  care  to  make  the  foundations  of 
his  government  secure.  The  revolt  of  the  Streltsi  in  1698 
gave  him  the  opportunity  of  abolishing  a  force,  which  was  too 
much  mixed  up  with  the  old  aristocracy  of  Russia  ever  to 
be  really  loyal  to  the  new  regime,  and  to  replace  them  by 
a  professional  army  trained  on  the  European  model  under 
foreign  officers.  He  tried  as  much  as  possible  to  depress  the 
power  of  the  boyars,  surrounding  himself  with  friends  and 
ministers  like  Menschikoff,  who  were  drawn  from  a  lower 
class  of  society.  So  successful  was  this  policy  that  in  1711 
he  felt  himself  able  to  bring  the  political  power  of  the  boyars 
to  an  end  by  forbidding  their  council  to  meet  any  longer. 
With  a  similar  object  he  refused  to  nominate  a  successor 
to  the  patriarch  Adrian  on  his  death  in  1 700,  but  placed  the 
powers  of  the  patriarchate  in  the  hands  of  a  commission, 
afterwards  called  the  Holy  Governing  Synod,  which  brought 
the  affairs  of  the  Church  more  definitely  under  his  own 
control. 

While  Peter  was  thus  engaged  in  winding  the  chains  of 
despotism  more  tightly  round  the  necks  of  his  sub-  His  foreign 
jects  at  home,  he  was  equally  busy  in  trying  to  po''cy. 
extend  the  frontiers  of  Russia  to  the  sea,  at  the  expense  of  his 
neighbours  abroad.  No  one  could  doubt  that  the  first  essen- 
tial of  the  due  development  of  Russia  was  to  obtain  a  footing 
upon  the  Baltic.  The  port  of  Archangel  on  the  frozen  White 
Sea,  and  the  port  of  Azof  on  the  Black  Sea,  closed  as  it  was 
to  the  trade  of  the  Mediterranean  by  the  straits  of  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  the  Dardanelles  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks,  were 
not  sufficient  to  enable  Russia  to  expand  into  a  commercial 
nation.  But  since  the  treaties  of  Stolbovo  and  Kardis,  re- 
newed as  late  as  1684  by  the  princess  Sophia,  Russia  had 
acquiesced  in  the  annexation  of  the  Baltic  lands  by  Sweden, 
and  it  was  certain  that  Sweden  would  not  tamely  surrender 


304  European  History,   1598-17 15 

her  treaty  rights.  But  in  the  year  1697  an  opportunity  offered, 
which  was  too  tempting  for  Peter's  slender  stock  of  virtue 
to  resist.  Charles  xi.  of  Sweden  died,  leaving  as  his 
heir  and  successor  his  youthful  son  Charles  xii.,  only 
^    ,.  .  fifteen    years    of    age.      Patkul,    a    nobleman   of 

Coalition  -  °  ' 

against  Livonia,  who  was  eager  to  restore  the    indepen- 

Sweden.iegg.  (^gjjce  of  his  country,  applied  to  Denmark,  Poland, 
and  Russia,  the  hereditary  enemies  of  Sweden,  for  assistance. 
Each  power,  thinking  only  of  its  own  aggrandisement,  caught 
willingly  at  the  chance  of  crushing  Sweden  when  she  was 
weak,  and  in  1699  this  nefarious  alliance  was  concluded,  in 
which  the  independence  of  Livonia  was  used  merely  to  cloak 
a  policy  of  pure  aggression. 

But  the  allies  soon  found  that  they  had  reckoned  without 
their  host.  Charles  xii.  of  Sweden  was  one  of  those  rare 
spirits  who  are  born  with  a  perfect  genius  for  fighting.  With- 
out any  gifts  as  a  strategist,  without  any  studied  knowledge  of 
r^  r    .  r  .u    the  art  of  war,  he  was  a  born  fighter.     He  loved 

Defeat  of  the  '  ° 

allies  by  fighting  for  fighting's  sake.     He  was  never  happier 

Charles  XII.  ^^.xv  when  on  campaign.  He  enjoyed  the  very 
hardships  of  war,  and  every  soldier  in  his  army  knew  that  what- 
ever might  be  his  own  privations,  his  king  was  sharing  them 
all.  With  an  unlimited  belief  in  his  own  fortunes  he  succeeded 
in  making  every  one  else  beUeve  in  them  too.  The  enthusi- 
asm of  his  army  was  unbounded.  They  willingly  rendered  to 
him  an  unquestioning  obedience,  and  followed  him  gladly  wher- 
ever he  pointed  the  way.  A  man  with  such  gifts  was  not  going 
to  wait  until  his  unwieldy  antagonists  had  united  their  forces. 
Early  in  May  1 700  he  sailed  straight  to  Copenhagen  and  ended 
the  Danish  war  at  a  blow.  Frederick  iv.  could  not  defend  his 
capital,  and  was  obliged  to  accept  the  mediation  of  England 
and  Holland,  and  to  conclude  the  treaty  of  Travendal,  by 
which  he  withdrew  from  the  alliance  with  Poland  and  Russia. 
Leaving  Denmark,  Charles  sailed  to  the  Gulf  of  Finland  where 
Peter  was  besieging  the  important  fortress  of  Narva.  Although 
he  had  only  some  8000  men  against  Peter's  60,000  Russians, 


The  Northern  Nations  305 

he  did  not  hesitate  to  order  an  attack.  The  huge  undisciplined 
masses  of  Peter's  army  were  quickly  thrown  into  confusion,  and 
fled  panic-stricken  to  their  own  country,  leaving  Charles  the  un- 
disputed master  of  the  Baltic  coast.  Turning  southwards  the 
Swedish  king  marched  through  Livonia  and  Courland  into 
Poland,  occupied  Warsaw  in  1 702,  defeated  the  king,  Augustus 
the  Strong  of  Saxony,  who  had  been  elected  to  the  Polish 
crown  on  the  death  of  John  Sobieski  in  1697,  at  the  battle  of 
Clissow,  and  drove  him  into  Saxony.  In  1703  he  captured 
Thorn  and  Dantzig,  procured  the  deposition  of  Augustus  in  an 
assembly  held  at  Warsaw  in  February  1 704,  and  imposed 
Stanislas  Leczinski  upon  the  Poles  as  king  in  his  stead.  He 
then  resumed  his  course  of  military  triumph,  overran  Lithuania, 
driving  out  the  Russians  in  1705,  defeated  Schulenberg  at 
Frauenstadt  in  1706,  and  finally  invaded  Saxony  in  1707,  where 
he  forced  Augustus  to  conclude  the  peace  of  Altranstadt  in 
the  September  of  that  year,  by  which  Stanislas  Leczinski  was 
recognised  as  king  of  Poland,  and  the  unfortunate  Patkul  was 
surrendered  as  a  victim  to  the  cruelty  of  Charles,  who,  in  defi- 
ance of  every  principle  of  humanity,  had  him  broken  on  the 
wheel  as  a  traitor. 

When  Charles  xii.  rested  at  Altranstadt  in  the  winter  of 
1707-8,  at  the  age  of  twenty-five,  he  felt  himself  position  of 
with  reason  to  be  the  wonder  of  the  world.  He  Charles  xii., 
was  courted  on  all  sides  by  the  great  powers,  at  '''°^' 
that  time  distracted  by  the  throes  of  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  and  had  he  cared  to  play  the  role,  might  have  posed 
as  the  arbiter  of  Europe.  From  Versailles  came  one  of  the 
most  trusted  diplomatists  of  Louis  xiv.,  to  remind  the  young 
prince  of  the  long  friendship  of  Sweden  and  France,  and  to 
entreat  him  to  acknowledge  the  benefits  of  S.  Germain  en  Laye 
by  drawing  his  sword  manfully  for  Louis  at  the  crisis  of  his  fate. 
But  on  behalf  of  the  allies  there  appeared  at  the  court  of 
Charles  metal  still  more  attractive.  Marlborough,  the  greatest 
soldier  of  the  age,  came  personally  to  Altranstadt  to  plead  the 
cause  of  Europe  before  Charles,  with  the  laurels  of  Blenheim 

PERIOD  V,  u 


3o6  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

and  of  Ramillies  still  green  upon  his  brow.  His  task  was  the 
easier  one.  He  wanted  not  the  assistance  but  the  neutrality  of 
Sweden.  Charles  was  flattered  by  the  attention  paid  to  him, 
fascinated  by  the  address  of  the  hero  diplomatist,  and  lent  a 
willing  ear  to  his  suggestions.  His  Protestantism  rejected  the 
idea  of  an  alliance  with  the  author  of  the  '  dragonades.'  His 
desire  for  vengeance  impelled  him  to  come  to  close  quarters 
with  his  enemy  in  the  north.  His  soldierly  pride  shrank  from 
committing  himself  to  a  war  in  which  he  would  have  to  take 
a  subordinate  place.  So  in  the  spring  of  1708  he  turned  his 
back  deliberately  on  Germany  and  the  Rhine,  and  marched  to 
his  ruin  in  the  inhospitable  north. 

While  Charles  had  been  engaged  in  the  conquest  of  Poland 
and  Saxony,  Peter  had  well  employed  the  breathing  space 
allowed  to  him  in  the  diligent  training  of  his  undisciplined 
armies,  and  the  occupation  of  the  Baltic  sea-coast  on  either 
side  of  the  Neva.  He  had  already  overrun  Ingria  and  Carelia, 
His  invasion  and  had  begun  the  fortifications  and  houses  of  a 
of  Russia.  town  at  the  mouth  of  the  Neva,  which  was  one  day 
to  be  his  capital  city.  Charles  did  not  disturb  himself  over 
trifles  of  that  sort.  He  struck,  as  was  his  wont,  straight  at  the 
heart  of  his  enemies'  power,  and  having  made  an  alliance  with 
Mazeppa,  a  hetman  of  the  Cossacks,  who  promised  to  join 
him  with  a  large  force  of  those  questionable  allies,  marched 
straight  upon  ISIoscow  at  the  head  of  30,000  men.  Misfortune 
dogged  his  steps  from  the  first.  The  roads  were  incalculably 
bad,  the  weather  unexpectedly  severe,  progress  was  hopelessly 
slow.  When  no  news  had  been  heard  of  Mazeppa  for  some 
time,  Charles,  in  order  to  try  and  open  communications  with 
him,  left  the  main  track,  and  plunged  into  the  expanses  of 
forest  and  morass  which  lie  between  Little  Russia  and  the 
Ukraine.  Winter  surprised  him  on  the  march  when  he  was 
still  many  hundreds  of  miles  from  Moscow.  Food  and  supplies 
became  very  difficult  to  procure.  Disease  ravaged  his  army. 
Still  with  the  courage  of  despair  he  pushed  on.  Spring  found 
him  exhausted  but  with  his  face  still  set  towards  Moscow.     He 


The  Northern  Nations  307 

was  destined  never  to  see  it.  Peter,  at  the  head  of  immensely 
superior  forces,  fell  upon  Levenhaupt  who  was  bringing  a  con- 
voy to  his  aid  and  cut  him  to  pieces.  Eventually  he  came 
up  with  the  king  himself  at  Pultava  in  the  month  Battle  of 
of  June  1709.  The  defeat  of  Narva  was  quickly  Puitava,  1709 
avenged.  Surrounded  by  the  Russian  forces,  outnumbered  two 
to  one,  the  Swedes  could  only  sell  their  lives  dearly.  Twenty 
thousand  officers  and  men  surrendered.  Charles  himself 
wounded  in  the  foot  made  his  way  with  a  few  companions 
across  the  frontier  and  took  refuge  with  the  Turks.  The  dream 
of  his  ambition  was  shattered  at  a  blow,  the  work  of  Gustavus 
x'\dolphus  was  finally  overthrown.  Livonia  and  Esthonia  with 
the  important  towns  of  Riga  and  Revel  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Czar.  Russia  made  good  her  hold  upon  the  Baltic,  and 
took  the  place  of  Sweden  as  the  leading  power  of  the  north. 

The  battle  of  Pultava,  if  it  destroyed  the  power  of  Sweden, 
did  not  put  an  end  to  the  war.     Charles  xii.,  from  his  refuge 
at  Bender  on  Turkish  soil,  tried  to  stir  up  his  hosts  to  take 
his   part   and    declare  war   against    Russia.     Peter 
himself,  flushed  with  triumph  and  ever  steady  to   tween  Rus- 
the   policy  of  enlarging  the  sea  boundary  of   his   ^'^  ^"^^  **^"= 

,  ,  ^        ^1  •  J  r    Turks,  1711. 

country,  was  by  no  means  averse  to  the  idea  of 
driving  back  the  Turkish  empire  from  the  Dniester  to  the 
Danube.  The  intense  religious  spirit  of  the  Russians,  always 
a  potent  factor  in  the  pohcy  of  Russia  in  the  East,  impelled 
the  Czar  to  put  himself  forward  as  the  liberator  of  the  op- 
pressed Christians  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia.  But  he  was 
too  wary  to  take  the  first  step.  After  much  hesitation  the 
Sultan  made  up  his  mind.  Urged  on  by  his  fear  of  seeing 
a  Russian  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea,  he  declared  war  against  Peter 
in  1 710,  and  the  next  year  saw  the  Czar  at  the  head  of  a  large 
army  on  the  Pruth.  Fortune  however  now  declared  against 
him.  By  sheer  bad  management  Peter  contrived  to  get  his 
army  completely  hemmed  in  between  the  river,  the  marshes, 
and  the  Turkish  army,  and  was  completely  at  the  mercy  of  his 
enemies.     Luckily  for  him  the  grand  vizier  was  willing  to  treat 


3o8  Eiii'opean  History, _  1 598-1715 

for  peace,  and  Peter  was  enabled  to  save  himself  and  his  army 
from  an  ignominious  surrender,  by  giving  back  to  the  Turks 
the  port  of  Azof,  and  destroying  all  Russian  fortresses  on 
Turkish  territory.  Charles  xii.  was  sent  back  to  his  own  domin- 
ions, which  he  found  threatened  from  all  sides  by  the  Russians, 
the  Danes,  and  the  Poles.  For  seven  years  he  struggled  in 
vain  against  superior  forces  abroad,  and  the  disaffection  of  the 
nobles  at  home.  By  1716  he  had  lost  every  acre  of  German 
„    .^    ,.        soil.     In  1718  a  bullet  shot  by  one  of  his  own  men 

Pacification  '  -'  _ 

of  the  North,  terminated  his  career  as  he  was  besieging  the  for- 
'^*°'  tress  of  Friedrickshall  in  Norway.     The  death  of 

Charles  xii.  put  an  end  to  many  intrigues,  and  made  the  restora- 
tion of  a  general  peace  more  easy.  Sweden  had  learned  the 
lesson  which  her  king  had  refused  to  learn.  By  a  succession  of 
treaties,  which  culminated  in  the  peace  of  Nystadt  between 
Sweden  and  Russia  in  1720,  Hanover  became  the  possessor  of 
Bremen  and  Verden ;  Augustus  of  Saxony  was  recognised  as 
the  rightful  king  of  Poland,  Prussia  obtained  part  of  Swedish 
Pomerania,  with  the  islands  of  Usedom  and  Rugen,  and  the 
towns  of  Stettin  and  Dantzig ;  Frederick  of  Denmark  was  per- 
mitted to  annex  the  duchy  of  Schleswig,  but  had  to  restore  the 
rest  of  his  conquests  and  possessions  to  Sweden,  while  Russia, 
the  largest  gainer  of  all,  obtained  Ingria,  Esthonia,  Livonia,  and 
part  of  Carelia,  and  promised  to  surrender  Finland. 

While  Russia  was  engaged  in  claiming  the  supremacy  of 
the  north  at  the  hands  of  Sweden,  Brandenburg-Prussia  was 
pursuing  a  policy  of  steady  and  quiet  growth  under  her  undis- 
tinguished ruler.  It  was  the  business  of  Frederick 
the  kingdom  "I-  to  Consolidate  what  the  Great  Elector  had  won. 
of  Prussia,  Under  him  national  prosperity  quickly  increased 
in  a  land  which  was  no  longer  the  theatre  of 
war.  The  court  became  more  splendid,  roads  and  canals 
more  numerous,  manufactories  more  active,  while  the  foun- 
aation  of  the  university  of  Halle  in  1694  marks  a  distinct 
advance  in  German  culture.  In  foreign  affairs  he  adhered 
steadily  to  the  policy  of  his   father,  and  sent  his  contingent 


TJie  Northern  Nations  309 

of  sturdy  Brandenburgers  to  the  assistance  of  the  League 
of  Augsburg  with  praiseworthy  regularity.  But  the  treaty  of 
Ryswick  contributed  nothing  either  to  his  dignity  or  his 
possessions,  and  Frederick,  profoundly  dissatisfied,  proclaimed 
aloud  that  if  the  great  powers  wanted  his  aid  again  he  should 
exact  his  reward  beforehand.  In  two  years'  time  the  oppor- 
tunity came,  and  Frederick,  true  to  his  word,  insisted  on 
the  title  of  king,  as  the  condition  of  supporting  the  Emperor 
in  the  matter  of  the  partition  treaties  in  1 700.  It  was  some 
time  before  Leopold  gave  way.  The  thought  of  a  kingdom  in 
north  Germany  within  the  limits  of  the  Empire  itself  was 
hateful  to  him,  and  opposed  to  the  traditions  of  the  Empire. 
He  would  have  preferred  to  diminish,  rather  than  to  augment, 
the  dignity  and  influence  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern.  But 
necessity  knows  no  law.  Leopold  wanted  the  aid  of  the 
Brandenburgers  in  the  field,  and  could  get  them  on  no  other 
terms.  To  save  appearances  it  was  arranged  that  Frederick 
should  take  his  title  from  Prussia,  which  lay  outside  the 
German  Empire,  and  accordingly  in  the  year  1700  Fred- 
erick III.  elector  of  Brandenburg,  became  Frederick  i.  king  of 
Prussia.  In  the  following  year  the  Grand  Alliance  was  set  on 
foot,  and  the  allied  powers  all  recognised  the  new  king  in 
order  to  gain  his  help.  Frederick  fulfilled  his  part  of  the 
bargain  faithfully  enough.  As  long  as  the  war  lasted  the 
Prussians  fought  steadily  and  well  on  the  side  of  the  allies,  and 
the  peace  of  Utrecht  set  the  stamp  of  an  international  treaty 
to  the  newly  made  dignity,  besides  giving  to  Prussia  the  more 
substantial  endowment  of  Spanish  Guelderland. 

The  treaties  of  Utrecht  and  Nystadt,  like  those  of  Carlovitz 
and  Passarovitz,  mark  the  end  of  one  epoch  and  the  beginning 
of  another.     The  history  of  northern  Europe   in 

,        1  •  /-     ,  /-r  Northern 

the  seventeenth  century  is  the  history  of  the  effort  Europe  at  the 
of  Sweden  to  obtain  mastery  over  the  Baltic  and   ^"'^  °f  ^^^ 

.  .  century. 

a  footing  in  Germany  ;  of  the  successful  assertion 

by  Brandenburg  of  leadership  in  north  Germany ;  of  the  birth 

of  Russia  as  a  serious  political  power.     Those  questions,  fought 


3IO  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

over  so  strenuously  during  the  seventeenth  century,  re- 
ceived their  final  answer  in  the  great  treaties  which  usher 
in  the  next  epoch.  Sweden,  stricken  from  her  place  of 
vantage,  deprived  of  nearly  all  her  German  possessions,  rele- 
gated to  her  own  side  of  the  Baltic,  is  dismissed  into  the 
obscurity  of  a  third-rate  power,  from  which  she  had  been 
originally  raised  only  by  the  quarrels  of  her  antagonists,  and 
the  unprecedented  personal  ability  of  her  sovereigns.  Prussia, 
acknowledged  as  an  equal  by  the  monarchies  of  Europe, 
stands  forth  without  rival  as  the  unquestioned  leader  of  the 
northern  Germany,  and  is  biding  her  time  until  the  hour  shall 
strike,  which  will  permit  her  to  wrest  from  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg  the  leadership  of  the  German  people,  and  inherit  from  it 
the  duty  of  defending  the  German  Fatherland.  In  the  far 
north  Russia,  under  its  savage  but  capable  ruler,  has  made  her 
voice  heard  among  the  councils  of  Europe.  Seated  firmly  on 
the  eastern  shores  of  the  Baltic,  she  is  bent  on  making  herself 
into  a  commercial  and  maritime  power,  while  in  the  far  south- 
east corner  of  her  empire,  policy  has  already  pointed  the  way 
along  which  her  destiny  must  move.  After  the  conquest  of 
Azof  in  1696,  after  the  campaign  on  the  Pruth  in  171 1,  Turkey 
and  Russia  stand  face  to  face  in  south-eastern  Europe,  and  the 
Eastern  Question  has  begun. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

THE    PARTITION    TREATIES    AND    THE    GRAND    ALLIANCE 

The  question  of  the  Spanish  Succession  —  The  claims  of  the  candidates  — 
Legal  and  political  difficulties  of  the  problem  —  Importance  of  the  interests 
involved  —  The  Partition  Treaty  of  1668 — Adoption  by  Louis  of  a  policy 
of  partition  in  1698  —  Suspicions  of  William  and  Heinsius  —  Objects  of 
Louis,  William,  and  Heinsius  —  The  first  Partition  Treaty — Death  of  the 
Electoral  Prince  —  The  negotiations  continued —The  second  Partition 
Treaty  —  Advantages  of  the  treaty  to  France  and  the  maritime  powers  — 
Acceptance  of  the  treaty  in  Europe  —  Attitude  of  the  Emperor  and  Savoy 
— The  struggle  round  the  death-bed  of  Charles  II.  —  The  will  in  favour  of 
France  —  Acceptance  of  the  will  by  Louis  —  Political  reasons  for  his  con- 
duct—  His  deliberate  breach  of  faith  —  His  policy  purely  opportunist —  Its 
momentary  success  —  Aggressive  conduct  of  Louis  —  The  formation  of  the 
Grand  Alliance. 

Ever  since  the  death  of  Philip  iv.  of  Spain  in  1666,  Europe 
had  Hved  under  the  shadow  of  an  impending  catastrophe. 
Charles  11.  was  the  last  male  representative  of  the  Habsburgs 
of  Spain.  Weak  in  body,  and  imbecile  in  mind,  he  could 
neither  bear  the  burden  of  a  great  empire  himself  _ 

o  r  Question  of 

nor  hand  it  on  to  a  child  to  bear  it  after  him.  the  Spanish 
Married  first  to  Louise  of  Orleans,  and  on  her  Succession, 
death  to  a  German  princess,  Marie  of  Neuburg,  the  blessing 
of  an  heir  was  denied  to  him ;  and  all  Europe  knew  well 
that  when  he  died  the  great  powers  would  wrangle  over  his 
dominions  like  a  pack  of  wolves  round  the  carcase  of  an  ox. 
The  question  of  the  succession  to  the  crown  of  Spain  was 
one  which  required  the  highest  powers  of  statesmanship  for 
its  solution.  It  was  comphcated  by  the  nicest  points  of 
European  policy,  of  international  law,  and  of  public  and  private 

3" 


312  European  History,    15 98-1715 

honour.  Practically  there  were  three  claimants  whose  rights 
were  undeniably  superior  to  those  of  any  one  else,  the  House 
of  Bourbon,  the  House  of  Habsburg,  and  the  Bavarian  House  of 
Wittelsbach.  In  def.iult  of  heirs  to  the  reigning  king,  Charles 
II.,  the  inheritance,  according  to  the  usual  rules  of  legitimate 
succession,  would  go  to  his  sisters,  the  only  other  children  of 
Philip  iv.^  Of  them,  the  elder,  Maria  Theresa,  had  married 
Claim  of  the  Louis  XIV.  of  France,  and  their  eldest  son,  the 
Dauphin.  Dauphin,  was  accordingly  the  rightful  heir  of  the 
crown  of  Spain  by  descent.  But  by  a  special  provision  of 
the  treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  Maria  Theresa,  in  consideration  of  a 
dower  of  500,000  crowns,  covenanted  to  be  paid  her  by  her 
father  Philip  rv.,  had  expressly  renounced  all  claims  for  her- 
self or  her  descendants  upon  the  throne  of  Spain.  So,  if  this 
renunciation  was  valid,  the  Dauphin,  though  heir  by  descent, 
would  be  excluded  from  the  inheritance  by  international  law. 
But  on  behalf  of  the  Dauphin  it  was  argued  with  some  force, 
that  as  the  dower  of  500,000  crowns  had  never  been  paid 
by  Philip  iv.,  the  renunciation,  which  was  expressed  to  have 
been  made  in  consideration  of  it,  fell  to  the  ground  and  was 
of  no  effect. 

The  younger  daughter  of  Philip  iv.,  Margaret  Theresa,  had 
married  the  Emperor  Leopold  i. ;  but  the  only  issue  of  that 
Claim  of  the  i^^i'^i^ge  was  a  daughter,  Maria  Antonia,  who  mar- 
Eiectorai  ried  Max  Emanuel,  the  elector  of  Bavaria.  They 
"""^'^"  had  a  son,  Joseph  Ferdinand,  generally  known  as 

the  Electoral  Prince,  who  became  accordingly  the  representa- 
tive of  the  rights  of  Margaret  Theresa  by  descent.  But  in  his 
way,  as  in  that  of  the  Dauphin,  there  was  a  difficulty  of  inter- 
national law.  Maria  Antonia  had  on  her  marriage  with  the 
elector  of  Bavaria  expressly  renounced  her  claims  on  the  Span- 
ish inheritance,  and  thus  shut  out  her  son  legally  from  the 
succession. 

If  Charles  11.  had  no  child,  and  his  two  sisters  had  renounced 
their  claims,  it  was  clear  that  there  was  no  descendant  of  Philip 

^  See  Appendix  IV.,  p.  379. 


The  Partition  Treaties  a  fid  the  Grand  Alliance   313 

IV.  who  could  make  out  a  valid  title  by  descent  and  law.  Re- 
course must  be  had  to  the  descendants  of  Philip  in.  Here 
again  the  question  lay  between  two  sisters,  for  claim  of  the 
Philip  IV.  was  the  only  son.  The  elder  daughter  Emperor, 
of  Philip  III.  was  Anne  of  Austria,  the  wife  of  Louis  xiii.  and 
the  mother  of  Louis  xiv.  of  France,  but  she,  like  her  niece 
Maria  Theresa,  had  expressly  renounced  her  claims  to  the 
crown  of  Spain  upon  her  marriage.  The  younger  daughter, 
Maria,  had  married  the  Emperor  Ferdinand  iii.,  and  was  there- 
fore the  mother  of  the  Emperor  Leopold  i.,  who  was  the  living 
representative  of  her  rights.  She  had  made  no  renunciation 
whatever,  and  the  Emperor  Leopold  accordingly  maintained 
that  by  the  combined  effect  of  descent  and  law  he  and  he 
alone  was  the  rightful  inheritor  of  the  Spanish  monarchy.  But 
Leopold  was  much  too  sensible  to  dream  for  a  moment  that 
Europe  would  permit  the  resuscitation  of  the  empire  of  Charles 
v.,  just  as  Louis  xiv.  was  too  sensible  to  dream  of  uniting  the 
crowns  of  France  and  Spain  upon  the  same  head,  and  he  passed 
on  his  rights  to  his  second  son  the  archduke  Charles,  just  as 
Louis  and  the  Dauphin  passed  on  theirs  to  the  second  son  of 
the  Dauphin,  Philip  duke  of  Anjou. 

A  more  difficult  problem  has  rarely  presented  itself  to  states- 
men. The  simplest  solution  no  doubt  was  to  be  found  in  the 
purely  legal  view  of  the  matter  taken  by  the  Em-  Legal  diffi- 
peror  Leopold.  The  renunciations  had  been  legally  cuities  of  the 
made,  and  they  must  be  considered  legally  valid,  i"^^*'°"- 
otherwise  there  was  no  sure  basis  of  procedure  at  all.  But 
whatever  force  might  be  attributed  to  an  argument  of  this  sort 
with  reference  to  the  renunciations  of  Anne  of  Austria  and 
Maria  Theresa,  it  was  very  difficult  to  admit  its  validity  in  the 
case  of  Maria  Antonia,  and  permit  a  father  to  profit  by  a  renun- 
ciation, which  he  himself  had  imposed  upon  his  own  daughter 
in  her  extreme  youth  and  in  contemplation  of  marriage.  Yet 
how  could  any  one  maintain  the  invalidity  of  the  renunciation 
of  Maria  Antonia  on  account  of  parental  influence,  and  the 
validity  of  that  of  Maria  Theresa,  when  it  was  an  admitted  fact 


314  European  History,   1 598-1715 

that  the  consideration  for  the  latter,  i.e.,  the  dowry,  had  never 
been  paid?  But  then,  if  the  renunciations  were  to  be  con- 
sidered invalid,  there  was  no  question  as  to  the  right  of  the 
Dauphin  to  the  whole  succession,  and  Europe  would  find  itself 
face  to  face  with  a  danger  far  greater  than  the  resuscitation  of 
the  empire  of  Charles  v. 

Below  the  purely  legal  aspect  of  the  matter  there  was  felt  to 
be  a  momentous  European  question.  Spain  had  been  permit- 
ted to  retain  her  vast  and  splendid  dominions,  because  she  was 
daily  becoming  weaker  and  more  effete.  The  long-drawn  agony 
of  the  Spanish  monarchy  exactly  suited  the  plans  of  European 
Political  statesmen,  as  long  as  Europe  was  in  a  state  of  tran- 

difficuities.  sition.  When  the  chief  powers  were  fighting  among 
themselves  for  the  Low  Countries  and  the  Rhine,  for  the  lower 
Danube  and  the  Baltic,  it  was  highly  convenient  that  problems 
so  grave  should  not  be  further  complicated  by  questions  of 
South  American  trade,  and  access  to  the  Mediterranean.  All 
Europe  was  content  to  leave  the  monopolies  of  Spain  alone, 
because  Spain  was  unable  to  utilise  them.  But  towards  the 
end  of  the  century  this  feeling  was  passing  away,  and  the  prizes 
which  Spain  continued  to  hold,  but  did  not  know  how  to  use, 
were  being  eagerly  and  avariciously  eyed  from  two  quite  differ- 
ent quarters.  The  *  maritime  nations,'  as  they  were  called  in 
the  language  of  diplomacy,  England  and  Holland,  since  the 
revolution  of  1688  had  succeeded  in  establishing  on  the  firm 
basis  of  a  close  mutual  alliance  the  superiority  of  their  commerce 
to  that  of  France.  Already  they  shared  between  them  the 
trade  of  the  Baltic,  of  North  America,  and  of  the  East.  But 
from  two  quarters  of  the  world  they  were  shut  out.  The  policy 
of  Spain  excluded  them  from  a  share  in  the  trade  with  the 
Spanish  Indies,  and  especially  from  the  lucrative  commerce  in 
negroes,  which  was  becoming  of  greater  importance  every  day 
in  those  islands  and  districts  of  central  America  where  white 
labour  was  an  impossibility.  The  want  of  an  harbour  and 
naval  station  in  the  Mediterranean  placed  their  commerce  with 
the  Levant  at  the  mercy  of  pirates,  and  dependent  on  the  good 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   3 1 5 

will  of  the  southern  powers.  At  the  same  time  the  policy  of 
the  House  of  Habsburg,  since  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  had 
been  tending  more  and  more  in  the  direction  of  trying  to  secure 
a  hold  upon  north  Italy.  While  national  interest  and  the  course 
of  events  had  been  pushing  the  Austrian  power  further  and 
further  down  the  Danube  at  the  expense  of  the  Turks,  the 
dynastic  and  personal  policy  of  the  Emperors  had  been  rather 
directed  to  the  gain  of  compensation  upon  the  Po  for  what 
they  had  lost  upon  the  Rhine. 

It  was  clear  then  that  the  question  of  the  succession  to  the 
crown  of  Spain  could  not  be  decided  merely  according  to  the 
legal  claims  of  the  various  candidates.  The  vast 
empire  of  Spain  could  not  be  disposed  of  merely  ofTh J  eu"- 
on  principles  which  decide  the  devolution  of  a  P^^n  mter- 
private  inheritance.  Behind  all  personal  claims, 
behind  all  legal  rights,  behind  even  all  national  policy,  loomed 
the  greater  principles  of  the  balance  of  power  and  the  freedom 
of  commerce.  If  the  interests  and  the  rights  of  France  could 
not  permit  the  union  of  the  Spanish  inheritance  with  the  power 
of  Austria,  if  the  interests  and  the  rights  of  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg could  no  less  permit  the  annexation  of  the  empire  of  Spain 
by  the  power  of  France,  neither  Germany  nor  England  nor  the 
United  Provinces  could  in  the  interests  of  Europe  permit  either 
the  one  or  the  other.  But  if  Europe  was  going  to  claim  her 
right  to  be  heard,  if  claims  of  descent  and  of  legal  rights  were 
to  be  subordinated  to  the  general  good  of  the  European  family 
of  civilised  nations,  the  maritime  nations  would  assuredly 
demand  their  share  in  the  commerce  of  the  Spanish  Indies  as 
the  United  Provinces  would  insist  upon  their  barrier  against 
the  aggression  of  France,  and  Austria  the  security  of  its  hold 
upon  Italy. 

With  his  usual  diplomatic  foresight  Louis  xrv.  had  grasped 
the  situation  as  long  ago  as  the  period  of  the  war  of  Devolution. 
At  that  time  Charles  11.  was  young  and  as  yet  unmarried.  It 
was  quite  possible  that  in  spite  of  the  weakness  of  his  health  he 
might  have  children  born  to  him  before  he  died.     Nevertheless 


3i6  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

his  death  might  occur  at  any  moment,  and  Louis  with  his  keen 
eye  to  the  future  determined  to  be  ready  for  all  emergencies. 
Th  Partition  ^^  ^^  once  recognised  the  improbability  of  being 
Treaty  of  able  to  annex  for  himself  or  his  house  the  whole  of 
'^*'  the  Spanish  dominions,  and  accordingly  decided  to 

try  and  obtain  by  negotiation  with  the  only  other  serious  candi- 
date then  in  the  field  —  the  Emperor  Leopold  —  that  part  of 
the  inheritance  which  was  of  most  value  to  France.  His  policy 
was  completely  successful,  and  on  the  19th  of  January  1668  he 
concluded  with  the  Emperor  a  secret  treaty  for  the  partition  of 
the  Spanish  dominions,  after  the  death  of  Charles  11.  without 
heirs,  by  which  the  Emperor  was  to  have  Spain  and  the  Indies 
and  the  Milanese,  and  France  the  Netherlands,  Franche  Comt^, 
Navarre,  Naples,  Sicily,  and  Catalonia.  In  the  thirty  years 
which  elapsed  between  the  partition  treaty  of  1668  and  the 
peace  of  Ryswick  much  had  happened.  Louis  had  already 
_,  annexed  Franche  Comte,  and  become   master    of 

Changes  in  ' 

Europe  since  SO  much  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  as  to  give 
'^^^'  France  a  safe  and  defensible  frontier.     The  Nether- 

lands were  no  longer  of  the  same  value  to  France  as  they  were 
in  1668,  while  their  acquisition  was  much  more  difficult.  Since 
1668  the  United  Provinces,  through  their  successful  resistance 
to  Louis  in  the  Dutch  war  of  1672  and  in  the  war  of  the  League 
of  Augsburg,  and  through  their  close  alliance  with  England 
since  1688,  were  far  more  formidable  antagonists.  Louis 
knew  well  that  they  would  fight  to  the  death  rather  than  permit 
him  to  break  down  the  barrier  of  the  Spanish  power  in  the 
Netherlands,  which  alone  kept  the  Scheldt  closed  and  Amster- 
dam safe.  At  the  same  time  the  maritime  powers,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  ambitions  of  their  own  in  the  direction  of  the  Spanish 
and  Mediterranean  trade,  which  would  prevent  them  from 
acquiescing  without  a  struggle  in  the  rule  of  France  at  Naples, 
or  her  ascendency  in  Spanish  waters. 

The  problem  therefore  had  increased  in  difficulty  since 
1668.  New  interests  had  to  be  consulted  if  diplomacy  was  to 
try  her   hand  at  a  settlement.     A   long  and   sanguinary  war, 


The  Partition  Treaties  atid  tJie  Grayid  Alliance    317 

which  could  not  fail  to  embrace  all  Europe  in  its  terrible  folds, 
was  absolutely  certain  if  things  were  left  to  take  their  chance. 
Who    could    tell   what    the    results   of  such   a  war 
might  be?     Both  Louis  and  William  had  reached    Louis 'ora^ 
an  age  when  statesmen  do  not  willingly  set  fire  to   p°iicy  of 
the  house  on  the  chance  of  carrying  off  some  valu- 
ables in  the  confusion.     It  was  madness  to  think  that  France 
could   gain   more    even   by   a    successful   war   than    she    had 
gained  by  diplomacy   in   the   treaty  of   1668.     So   when   the 
treaty  of  Ryswick  was  signed  and  Europe  was  once  more  at 
peace,  Louis  sent  his  friend  the  Comte  de  Tallard  to  London, 
on  a  special  mission,  to  submit  to  William  111.  a  project  for  the 
partition  of  the  Spanish  monarchy  when  the  moribund    king 
had  breathed  his  last. 

Tallard  found  William  in.  discouraging,  and  his  friend  and 
confidant  the  duke  of  Portland  almost  hostile.  They  were  natu- 
rally suspicious  of  gifts  which  came  from  so  pronounced  an 
enemy  as  Louis  xiv.  They  were  astonished  at  the 
boldness,  not  to  say  the  rashness,  of  the  proposal  wiiiiam  iii. 
to  parcel  out  the  dominions  of  Charles  11.  in  his  life-  ^"'^  Hein- 
time.  But  the  more  William  thought  over  the  idea 
the  more  feasible  it  seemed.  Heinsius,  the  grand  pensionary  of 
Holland,  was  by  no  means  opposed  to  it  on  principle,  though 
he  doubted  whether  the  interested  parties  could  ever  come  to 
an  agreement  on  the  details.  William  found  the  people  of 
England  so  distrustful  of  him,  so  suspicious  of  his  designs,  so 
hostile  to  his  advisers,  so  determined  to  deprive  him  of  his 
army,  and  fetter  him  by  poverty,  that  he  did  not  dare  to 
reckon  on  their  support  should  he  call  upon  them  again  to 
follow  him  in  a  crusade  against  France.  In  March  1698 
he  authorised  Portland,  who  was  at  Versailles,  to  invite  Louis 
tojay^his  proposals  for  a  treaty  before  him.  In  so  doing  he 
not  only  expressed  his  willingness  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  a  view  to  the  partition  of  the  Spanish  dominions,  but  also 
his  determination  not  to  consider  himself  bound  any  longer  by 
the  clause  in  the  League  of  Augsburg  negotiated  in  1688,  by 


3i8  Etiropean  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

which  he  had  pledged  himself  to  recognise  and  enforce  the 
claims  of  the  Emperor  upon  the  whole  inheritance. 

In  April  1698  the  negotiations  for  a  partition  treaty  between 
France,  England,  and  the  United  Provinces  were  fairly  launched. 
When  once  begun  they  proceeded  briskly  enough, 
the  negotia-  Did  they  seem  to  be  flagging,  the  news  of  a  relapse 
tions.  jj^  ^j^g  health  of  Charles  11.  would  set  them  again 

feverishly  at  work.  Yet  the  business  owing  to  its  delicate 
character  and  many  ramifications  took  a  long  time  to  finish. 
It  was  not  till  the  September  of  that  year,  after  five  months  of 
incessant  negotiations,  that  Louis  could  feel  sure  that  his  efforts 
would  be  crowned  with  success.  During  that  time  the  de- 
spatches show  Louis  to  have  constantly  been  the  active  agent 
in  the  discussions.  William  and  Heinsius  played  mainly  a 
passive  part.  It  was  theirs  to  criticise,  to  accept  or  to  reject 
what  Louis  proposed.  But  as  the  negotiations  continued  it  is 
pleasant  to  see  how  the  desire  for  peace  and  agreement  grew 
stronger  and  stronger,  how  confidence  succeeded  to  suspicion, 
and  frankness  of  mind  to  mistrust.  Never  did  Louis  show  his 
great  mastery  over  the  foreign  politics  of  Europe  in  clearer 
light  than  in  these  negotiations.  Throughout,  his  is  the  master 
mind.  Tallard  but  played  the  part  of  his  eyes  and  ears  and 
mouth  in  England.  William,  though  quick  and  clever  at  see- 
ing the  drift  of  a  suggestion,  fixed  his  eyes  too  closely  upon 
the  national  interests  of  the  maritime  nations  to  take  so  broad 
a  view  of  the  whole  as  that  which  illuminated  the  mind  of 
Louis. 

At  first  Louis  overrated  this  tendency  of  William's  diplo- 
macy. He  thought  that  if  he  was  ready  to  give  ample  security 
for  the  safety  of  the  United  Provinces  behind  their  barrier  of 
the  Netherlands,  and  for  the  security  of  English  trade  in  the 
ob'ectsof  Mediterranean,  he  could  procure  Spain  and  the 
Louis's  di-  Indies  for  his  grandson.  But  he  quickly  found  out 
piomacy.         j^-^  j^^j^t^i^g^  ^i^^j  j^g  fgH  back  upon  two  principles 

of  action  which  determined  his  policy  in  the  whole  question 
from  first   to  last  as   long  as  the  negotiations   lasted.     The 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   319 

first  was  to  guard  against  the  revival  of  the  power  of  the 
Austro-Spanish  House  through  the  succession  question.  The 
second  was  to  neutralise  the  increase  of  the  influence  of  the 
Habsburgs,  by  making  the  frontiers  of  France  strong,  not 
merely  for  defence  but  for  offence.  In  pursuit  of  the  first 
principle  he  opposed  himself  vigorously  to  the  recognition  of 
the  archduke  Charles  as  king  of  Spain,  and  when  through  the 
force  of  circumstances  he  was  obliged  to  give  way  on  that 
point,  he  did  so  only  on  condition  that  the  connection  between 
Spain  and  Austria  through  north  Italy  was  cut  by  the  granting 
of  the  Milanese  to  an  independent  prince,  and  rendered  liable 
to  annihilation  by  France  through  her  acquisition  of  the  Tus- 
can ports  and  Finale.  Louis  was  not  going  to  see  the  chain  of 
the  Austro-Spanish  power,  which  it  had  cost  Henry  iv.  and 
Richelieu  so  much  to  break,  once  more  woven  round  her  by 
the  arts  of  diplomacy,  and  the  accidents  of  life.  In  pursuit  of 
the  second  principle  he  took  care,  that  if  his  grandson  could 
not  rule  at  Madrid,  his  own  armies  might  have  a  way  easily 
open  to  their  advance  thither  by  his  acquisition  of  Guipuscoa ; 
while  he  made  his  eastern  frontier  secure  by  the  annexation 
of  Lorraine,  and  strove  hard  to  make  it  dangerous  by  his  claim 
upon  Luxemburg. 

These  two  principles  regulated  the  diplomacy  of  France 
throughout  the  negotiations  for  both  the  partition  treaties. 
Neither  of  them  were  necessarily  antagonistic  to  obects  of 
the  chief  interests  of  England  and  the  United  wiiiiam  and 
Provinces.  To  England  the  all-important  matter  ^<=insius. 
was  to  detach  Louis  from  the  support  of  the  House  of  Stuart, 
and  so  to  secure  the  maintenance  of  the  principles  of  the 
Revolution.  To  the  United  Provinces  the  possession  of  a 
secure  barrier  against  French  aggression  and  the  opening  of 
the  Scheldt  was  an  essential  condition  of  national  existence. 
To  both  the  maritime  powers  the  duty  of  preventing  France 
from  obtaining  the  monopoly  of  trade  in  Spanish  American 
waters  seemed  of  paramount  importance,  while  the  opportunity 
of  obtaining  a  share  in  the  trade  for  themselves  was  one  which 


320  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

it  was  worth  running  some  risk  to  secure.  Both  sides  were 
therefore  in  their  heart  of  hearts  more  anxious  to  guard  against 
dangers  than  to  obtain  positive  increase  of  power.  They  were 
more  eager  to  prevent  their  enemies  from  gaining  a  prepon- 
derance than  to  secure  preponderance  for  themselves.  Here 
lay  the  secret  both  of  the  success  and  of  the  dilatoriness  of  the 
negotiations.  William  and  Heinsius  were  easily  convinced  of 
the  desirability  of  a  treaty  for  settling  the  succession  of  Spain 
before  Charles  11.  died.  They  were  attracted  by  the  evident 
good  faith  and  conciliatory  attitude  of  Louis.  They  soon 
found  that  they  had  no  cause  to  fear  for  the  security  of  the 
barrier  of  the  United  Provinces  or  of  the  succession  in  Eng- 
land. The  real  difficulty  lay  in  providing  for  the  Dauphin 
such  an  inheritance  as  would  secure  France  against  the  revival 
of  the  power  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House,  and  yet  would  not 
threaten  the  'rade  interests  of  the  maritime  powers  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Spanish  American  waters.  But  that 
was  after  all  a  matter  of  detail  which  was  certain  to  be  settled, 
although  it  might  take  a  long  time  to  settle  it.  The  great 
object  of  Louis  was  to  prevent  an  Austrian  succession.  The 
great  object  of  William  and  Heinsius  was  to  prevent  a  French 
succession.  Directly  both  sides  were  convinced  of  their 
mutual  interest  and  each  others'  good  faith  the  success  of  the 
treaty  was  assured. 

Fortunately  in  the  Electoral  Prince  of  Bavaria  there  was 
a  candidate  whose  advancement  to  the  throne  of  Spain  would 
satisfy  all  the  conditions  required.  Neither  French  nor 
The  first  Par-  Austrian  by  birth  and  only  five  years  of  age,  he 
tition  Treaty,  could  be  dangerous  to  neither  party  either  through 
'  ^  ■  his  territorial  influence  or  personal  abilities,  while 

he  was  likely  to  be  more  popular  than  either  of  the  other 
candidates  in  Spain  itself,  because  owing  to  his  tender  years 
he  could  be  educated  as  a  Spaniard.  In  July  1698  it_was 
agreed  that  Spain,  the  Indies,  and  the  Netherlands  should  go 
to  the  Electoral  Prince.  More  than  two  months  were  spent 
in  the  discussion  of  the  inheritance  of  the  Dauphin.     Eventu- 


The  Partition  Treaties  ami  the  Grand  Alliance    321 

ally,  on  the  loth  of  October  1698,  the  first  partition  treaty 
was  signed.  It  provided  that  the  Electoral  Prince  of  Bavaria 
was  to  receive  Spain,  the  Indies,  and  the  Netherlands.  The 
archduke  Charles  was  to  have  the  Milanese  and  Luxemburgj^ 
and  the  Dauphin  Naples,  Sicily,^  the  Tuscan  ports.  Finale, 
Guipuscoa,  S.  Sebastian,  ind  Fuentarabia.  On  the  news  of 
the  treaty  oozing  out  at  Madrid,  Charles  11.,  though  very 
angry,  determined  to  make  the  best  of  the  position,  executed 
a  will  in  favour  of  the  Electoral  Prince,  giving  him  the  whole 
inheritance,  and  sent  for  him  to  Spain  in  order  that  he  might 
be  educated  there  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the 
Spanish  court. 

All  seemed  now  settled.  It  was  true  that  the  Emperor  was 
not  likely  tamely  to  acquiesce  in  the  rebuff  which  had  been 
dealt  to  his  claims,  and  that  the  pride  of  the  Spaniards  would 
urge  them  to  fight  to  the  last  rather  than  submit  to  the 
enforced  partition  of  their  splendid  empire.  It  Likelihood  of 
was  probable  that  the  inhabitants  of  Naples  and  >*s  success. 
Sicily  would  not  readily  see  their  long  connection  with  the 
crown  of  Spain  rudely  severed  at  the  dictates  of  the  northern 
powers.  France  would  have  to  conquer  her  inheritance  with 
the  sword.  But  there  was  little  reason  to  fear  that  Spain, 
under  the  government  of  a  regency,  with  a  foreign  boy  king 
at  her  head,  in  her  exhausted  and  bankrupt  condition,  could 
seriously  resist  the  armies  of  France  and  the  navies  of  the 
maritime  powers.  And  what  substantial  assistance  could  the 
Emperor  render  with  the  Bavarians  opposed  to  him  on  the 
Danube  and  the  French  masters  of  the  sea?  Louis  knew 
the  sluggish,  calculating  mind  of  Leopold  too  well  not  to  be 
persuaded  that  he  would  soon  accept  the  inevitable,  and  set 
himself  diligently  to  profit  by  the  opportunities  which  the 
possession  of  the  Milanese  gave  him  in  Italy.  Venice  lay 
open  to  him  an  easy  prey.  Ascendency  in  north  Italy  and 
the   harbour   of  Venice    was  more   practically   useful   to    the 

1  The  Tuscan  Ports  comprised  Santo  St^phano,  Porto  Ercole,  Orbitello, 
Porto  Longone,  Talamone,  and  Piombino. 

PERIOD   V.  X 


322  European  History,  1 598-1715 

land-locked  and  poverty-stricken  House  of  Austria  than  a 
shadowy  and  precarious  empire  beyond  the  seas.  The  con- 
tracting powers  might  have  to  enforce  the  treaty  by  war, 
but  the  struggle  would  not  be  general  and  could  not  be 
prolonged. 

Suddenly  this  fair  prospect  was  marred  by  an  unexpected 
and  tragic  blow.  On  the  6th  of  February  1699  the  Electoral 
T-,    .u   *  *i.      Prince  died  of  small-pox,  and  the  labours  of  five 

Death  of  the  .      . 

Electoral  wcary  months  were  dissipated  like  a  bubble  in 
Prince,  1699.  ^^  ^-j.^  Without  a  moment's  hesitation,  without 
wasting  a  minute  in  unavailing  regrets,  the  indefatigable 
Louis  took  up  again  the  web  of  diplomacy  which  had  for 
the  moment  dropped  from  his  hands,  and  instructed  Tallard 
to  negotiate  for  a  new  treaty.  The  matter  was  much  more 
complicated  than  heretofore,  the  details  much  more  difficult 
to  arrange.  There  was  no  third  candidate  now  equally  suit- 
able to  both  parties.  The  duke  of  Savoy,  who  was  sug- 
gested by  Tallard,  was  as  objectionable  to  William  and  Hein- 
sius  as  the  elector  of  Bavaria,  who  was  suggested  by  William, 
_..  was  to  Louis.     It  soon  became  clear  that  the  arch- 

Tne  nego- 
tiations duke  Charles  was  the  only  candidate  for  the. crown 
renewed.  ^^  Spain  and  the  Indies  whom  England  and  the 
United  Provinces  would  accept.  They  even  refused  to  listen 
to  the  suggestion  that  the  Dauphin  ought  to  have  part  of  the 
share  of  the  deceased  prince.  Why  should  the  Dauphin  profit, 
said  William,  by  the  death  of  the  Electoral  Prince  ?  Louis  saw 
that  he  must  yield  if  the  treaty  was  to  be  made.  He  fell  back 
upon  the  principles  of  national  consolidation  and  frontier 
development,  and  bent  all  his  energies  to  obtain  for  France 
such  a  position  as  would  enable  her  to  neutralise  the  increased 
power  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House. 

He  urged  strongly  that  if  the  Netherlands  must  go  to  the 
archduke,  France  at  least  ought  to  receive  compensation  in 
Luxemburg,  and  that  if  the  Austrian  House  was  to  be  per- 
mitted to  add  Spain  to  its  dominions  he  at  least  might  recover 
the  kingdom  of  Navarre.     It  was  all  to  no  purpose.     William 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   323 

and  Heinsius  refused  absolutely  to  allow  Louis  to  turn  the 
barrier  of  the  Netherlands  by  the  annexation  of  Luxemburg, 
or  to  give  his  armies  a  shorter  road  to   Madrid   ^^ 

°  The  second 

than  had  been  already  opened  to  them  by  the  Partition 
first  treaty.  Again  Louis  saw  that  he  must  "^'■^^^y-  '^99 
yield,  and  in  May  1699  the  second  Partition  Treaty  was 
agreed  to  between  Louis,  William,  and  Heinsius.  By  this 
treaty  Spain,  the  Indies,  and  the  Netherlands  fell  to  the 
archduke  Charles,  the  Dauphin  received  the  Milanese,  in 
addition  to  the  share  allotted  to  him  by  the  first  treaty,  but 
on  condition  that  he  should  exchange  it  for  Lorraine  with  the 
duke  of  that  country,  and  annex  Lorraine  finally  to  the  crown 
of  France.  It  was  further  provided  by  secret  articles  that  the 
archduke  Charles  should  not  be  permitted  to  visit  Spain  until 
the  Emperor  had  accepted  the  Partition  Treaty,  and  that  if  the 
Emperor  did  not  accept  the  treaty  before  a  given  date,  and  the 
king  of  Spain  before  his  death,  the  archduke  should  forfeit  his 
rights  under  the  treaty,  and  his  share  should  be  given  to  such 
prince  as  the  contracting  parties  might  choose. 

This  treaty  was  on  the  face  of  it  more  unfavourable  to 
France  than  the  preceding  one,  and  it  may  well  be  a  matter 
of  surprise  at  first  sight  that  Louis  was  prepared  to  make 
such   great   sacrifices    in   order  to  obtain  it.     To   ,,  ,       ,  ^^ 

°  Value  of  the 

seat  the  archduke  Charles  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  treaty  to 
while  his  brother  Joseph  ruled  at  Vienna,  was  ^'■^'^"• 
a  strange  termination  to  the  policy  of  one  whose  life  had 
been  spent  in  determined  antagonism  to  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg.  Yet  on  consideration  it  will  be  seen  that  the  objec- 
tions to  the  treaty  from  the  French  point  of  view  were  more 
apparent  than  real.  Spain  was  in  such  a  disorganised  con- 
dition that  it  was  impossible  for  her  to  count  among  the 
powers  of  the  world.  Her  resources  were  great,  but  they 
neither  were  nor  could  be  developed  without  capital.  Of  capi- 
tal available  for  such  a  purpose  neither  Austria  nor  Spain  had 
the  worth  of  a  dollar.  The  revenues  barely  paid  for  the  ex- 
penses of  the  court  in  either  country.     Even  ambassadors  had 


V 


324  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

not  enough  for  the  expenses  of  their  household.  Important  as 
Spain  would  soon  become  if  annexed  to  energetic  and  prosper- 
ous France,  she  could  not  but  remain  a  nonentity  when  joined 
to  sluggish  and  bankrupt  Austria.  But  that  was  not  all.  France 
was  relieved  of  all  serious  rivalry  on  the  side  of  Spain  for  many 
years  by  the  disorganisation  of  the  Spanish  and  imperial  finances. 
She  was  placed  in  a  position  of  absolute  superiority  to  Spain 
by  her  acquisitions  in  Italy.  The  possession^f^Slaples  and 
Sicily  made  her  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean.  No  com- 
munications could  pass,  no  troops  could  be  sent  from  Austria  to 
Spain,  without  running  the  blockade  of  the  French  fleet  in  the 
Gulf  of  Lyons.  No  army  could  ever  reach  a  port  of  embarka- 
tion without  the  consent  of  the  duke  of  Lorraine  or  the  republic 
of  Venice.  The  gift  of  the  Milanese  to  the  duke  of  Lorraine 
completed  the  policy  of  RicheUeu  in  1625.  It  closed  the  Val- 
telline  to  the  armies  of  the  Austro-Spanish  power.  Were  the 
duke  to  forget  his  associations  with  France,  or  remember  them 
only  too  well,  and  side  with  her  enemy,  French  troops  from 
the  ports  of  Tuscany  and  Finale  could  reach  Milan  before 
a  German  lance  flashed  in  the  Valtelline,  and  French  ships 
could  blockade  the  harbours  of  Genoa  and  Savoy  at  the  first 
note  of  danger.  Even  during  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion, when  English  ships  rode  triumphantly  in  the  Gulf  of 
Lyons,  when  the  imperial  armies  held  Milan,  and  Genoa  was 
friendly,  it  was  found  by  no  means  easy  to  victual  or  reinforce 
the  archduke's  troops  from  Germany.  It  would  have  been  an 
absolute  impossibility  had  France  been  undisputed  mistress  of 
the  sea. 

The  enormous  advantage  gained  by  Louis  xiv.  by  a  simple 
alliance  with  the  maritime  powers,  even  if  it  only  neutralised 
Advantages  their  Opposition  instead  of  securing  their  support, 
of  an  alii-       ^^g   hardlv  been    sufficiently  appreciated   by  his- 

ance  with  the  .  L^  r,  •   i 

maritime  torians.  1  he  Austro-Spanish  power  was  left  by  the 
powers.  Partition  Treaties  huge  in  bulk  but  impotent  through 

division.  It  consisted  of  four  great  masses,  all  dependent 
upon  one  another,  but  unable  to  communicate  with  each  other. 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance    325 

except  with  the  permission  of  foreign  powers.  The  gold  of 
the  Indies  was  necessary  for  the  payment  of  the  very  officials  of 
the  Madrid  court  and  government,  yet  how  could  Spain  pre- 
tend to  guard  her  treasure  ships  from  the  united  fleets  of 
England  and  France?  The  Netherlands  depended  for  their 
governors  and  their  armies  upon  Spain.  What  chance  of  es- 
caping capture  would  a  Spanish  fleet  of  reinforcements  have  as 
it  beat  up  the  narrow  channel  in  sight  of  the  coasts  of  Kent 
and  Picardy?  Austria  and  Spain  could  not  assist  one  another 
without  first  obtaining  the  mastery  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
the  Netherlands  could  only  communicate  with  Vienna  by  per- 
mission of  the  princes  of  Germany.  Had  the  Partition  Treaty 
been  carried  out  France  would  have  become  at  a  stroke,  with- 
out bloodshed,  incontestably  the  dominant  power  in  Europe, 
liable  only  to  be  deposed  from  her  pride  of  place  by  the  rup- 
ture of  the  alliance  with  the  maritime  powers,  and  for  that  very 
reason  the  maritime  powers  would  have  held  the  fate  of  the 
world  in  their  hands. 

Louis  XIV.  thoroughly  grasped  the  situation.  He  fully  under- 
stood the  immense  importance  of  securing  the  friendship  of  the 
maritime  powers,  the  absolute  necessity  of  avoiding  their  hostil- 
ity. It  was  for  this  reason  that  he  laboured  so  long  and 
patiently  for  the  success  of  the  policy  of  partition,  that  he 
repressed  so  strenuously  the  eager  desire  of  Har- 

,.  ,  .  -KIT     -i   ■  ■>  ••  <-i         Reception  of 

court,  his  ambassador  at  Madrid,  to  intrigue  for  the  the  treaty  by 
whole  inheritance,  that  he  made  concession  after  **^^  contract- 

•      •  >"&  powers. 

concession  rather  than  break  off  the  negotiations 
for  a  treaty,  William  and  Heinsius  were  less  far-sighted  and 
more  suspicious,  yet  they  too  were  not  unaware  of  the  great- 
ness of  the  position  in  Europe  which  an  alliance  with  France 
would  give  them.  But  the  people  of  England  and  the  republi- 
can party  in  the  United  Provinces  were  too  narrow  in  mind  and 
bigoted  in  spirit  to  recognise  anything  of  the  sort.  Absurdly 
fearful  for  their  trade  interests,  and  venomously  hostile  to  the 
person  of  William  iii.,  they  opposed  the  Partition  Treaty 
blindly  because  he  had  made  it,  and  because  France  had  allied 


326  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

with  him  to  make  it.  There  was  hardly  a  man  in  England 
outside  the  little  foreign  cabal  of  the  court  who  was  in  favour 
of  it.  Even  Somers,  the  staunchest  of  Whigs  and  a  devoted 
adherent  of  William,  when  after  much  doubt  he  consented  to 
permit  it  to  be  sealed  with  the  great  seal,  only  ventured  to  say 
that  it  would  doubtless  become  popular  in  England  if  it  brought 
with  it  a  large  share  of  the  Spanish-American  trade.  Fortu- 
nately for  William  England  was  powerless  to  stop  it,  for  all  for- 
eign negotiations  were  then  wholly  under  the  control  of  the 
king,  but  the  Amsterdam  traders  fought  hard  and  long  to  pre- 
vent its  acceptance  by  the  States-General.  They  insulted  Louis 
by  demanding  that  it  should  be  registered  by  the  Parlement  de 
Paris,  and  he  was  actually  forced  to  consent  that  it  should  be 
placed  among  the  archives  of  that  body.  It  was  not  till  April 
1 700  that  the  treaty  was  at  last  signed  by  the  three  contracting 
parties  and  the  ratifications  exchanged. 

The  agreement  of  the  maritime  powers  and  France  with 
reference  to  the  disposition  of  the  Spanish  dominions  after 
the  death  of  Charles  11.  was  a  great  step  towards  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  peace  of  Europe,  but  it  did  not  guarantee  it.  It 
was  necessary  to  procure  the  assent  of  the  chief  powers  of 
Europe  to  the  treaty  before  it  was  certain  that  it  could  be 

Its  reception    enforced   without   bloodshed.      Here    Loui^ and 

by  Europe.  WiUiani  found  much  less  opposition  than  they 
had  any  reason  to  expect.  The  duke  of  Lorraine  raised  no 
difificulties  as  to  the  exchange  of  his  duchy  for  the  Milanese, 
the  Pope  and  the  republic  of  Venice  agreed  to  the  treaty  in 
June.  Their  adhesion  was  most  important,  for  Venice  held 
the  gates  of  the  passes  through  the  Alps  to  Austria,  and  the 
Pope  could  block  the  way  to  the  march  of  armies  to  and  from 
Naples.  Besides,  the  opinion  of  the  head  of  the  Catholic 
world  might  not  unreasonably  do  much  to  induce  the  Spanish 
court  to  accept  the  treaty.  Less  difficulty  still  was  experienced 
in  Germany.  Prussia,  now  just  become  a  kingdom,  signed 
the  treaty  in  order  to  gain  recognition  of  her  new   dignity. 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  A  Ilia  nee    327 

the  rest  of  the   German  princes  signed   as  a  protest  against 
the  recent  creation  of  the  electorate  of  Hanover. 

By  the  autumn  the  adhesion  of  the  king  of  Portugal  left 
the  king  of  Spain,  the  Emperor,  and  the  duke  of  Savoy  the 
only  important  powers  of  Europe  which  had  not  opposition 
accepted  the  treaty.  Victor  Amadeus  of  Savoy  °*  savoy. 
was  playing  the  part  traditional  in  his  house.  He  knew  that 
among  the  projects  present  to  the  mind  of  Louis  was  that  of 
exchanging  the  kingdoms  of  Naples  and  Sicily  for  Savoy  and 
Piedmont.  Should  war  eventually  break  out  between  France 
and  Austria  his  alliance  would  be  of  the  utmost  value  to  Louis, 
in  enabling  him  to  support  the  operations  of  his  fleet  by  the 
occupation  of  Milan.  Should  the  Emperor  wish  to  convey 
his  son  secretly  to  Spain  he  would  find  the  numerous  ports  of 
Savoy  the  most  available  for  his  purpose.  Convinced  of  his 
importance  he  determined  to  bide  his  time  and  sell  himself  to 
the  highest  bidder.  Before  long  he  found  that  he  had  miscal- 
culated his  chances  and  lost  his  market.     The  Em-    _, 

Opposition 

peror  could  not  bring  himself  to  renounce  one  jot  of  the  Em- 
or  tittle  of  the  inheritance  which  he  claimed  as  his  p"""^- 
due.  Though  he  received  under  the  treaty  far  more  than  he 
was  likely  to  win  by  war,  though  the  treaty  might  easily  be 
described  as  a  diplomatic  victory  over  his  rival  France,  though 
he  had  willingly  concluded  a  partition  treaty  thirty-two  years 
before,  which  was  less  favourable  than  the  present,  though 
he  knew  not  where  to  turn  for  a  florin  or  look  for  an  ally, 
nevertheless  with  the  patient  stubbornness  characteristic  of 
his  race,  he  set  himself  to  obstruct  the  treaty  by  delay  and 
defeat  it  by  intrigue.  Though  he  never  gave  a  definite  re- 
fusal he  never  really  for  one  moment  intended  to  give  an 
acceptance.  His  hopes  were  bent  upon  obtaining  a  will  in 
favour  of  the  archduke  from  Charles  11.  by  means  of  the 
influence  of  the  queen,  Marie  of  Neuburg,  the  sister  of  the 
Empress. 

For  the  moment  the  interest  of  the  struggle  veered  to  the 
bedside  of  the  dying  king.      As   the  autumn   sped  on   there 


328  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that  the  end  of  that  troublea 
life  was  at  hand.  All  remedies  had  been  tried  but  had 
Events  at  proved  unavailing.  The  angel  of  death  would  not 
Madrid.  surrender  his  victim  to  the  revolting  mixtures  of 

quack  doctors,  or  the  superstitious  delusions  of  monkish  exor- 
cists. One  duty  remained  to  be  performed  by  Charles  ere  he 
quitted  the  world  in  which  he  had  lived  so  wearily.  He  had  to 
choose,  as  far  as  the  power  of  choice  was  left  to  him,  the  suc- 
cessor to  his  throne.  If  he  chose  wrongly  he  might  plunge  all 
Europe  into  a  desolating  war  and  bring  his  country  to  absolute 
ruin.  The  choice  was  by  no  means  an  easy  one  nor  did  his 
advisers  make  it  easier  for  him.  The  Spanish  people  and 
Charles  himself  were  united  on  the  great  principle  of  doing  all 
that  they  could  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  empire,  but 
they  differed  as  to  the  means  to  be  adopted  to  achieve  this 
end.  Angry  as  Charles  was  at  the  news  of  the  first  Partition 
Treaty,  he  accepted  it  so  far  as  to  make  a  will  in  favour  of  the 
Electoral  Prince,  and  he  sent  for  the  young  prince  in  order  to 
educate  him  in  Spain  as  his  heir.  The  act  was  popular,  for 
both  he  and  his  people  believed,  no  doubt  rightly,  that  the 
Electoral  Prince  had  a  better  chance  than  any  other  candidate 
of  uniting  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  dominions  under  himself. 
But  on  the  death  of  the  prince  it  became  very  difficult  to  de- 
cide between  the  representatives  of  the  Dauphin  and  o-f  the 
Emperor.  If  the  Emperor  was  the  weaker,  he  was  the  nearer 
by  the  traditional  ties  of  poUcy  and  of  race.  But  was  not 
France  the  only  power  in  Europe  strong  enough  to  seize  and 
keep  the  whole  inheritance  from  the  hand  of  the  spoiler?  It 
was  a  hard  choice  for  a  moribund  king  to  have  to  make  in  his 
last  days  of  extreme  physical  and  mental  weakness. 

Gradually  it  became  clearer  to  those  who  watched  by  the 
bedside  that  personal  influence  could  alone  decide  his  waver- 
Paiace  "^S  '^'^'     Within  the  palace  the  queen  was  para- 

intrigues  and  mount,  and  she,  after  some  little  vacillation,  had 
ion.      decided    to    support    the    archduke    strenuously. 
Outside  the  palace  the  feeling  was  all  in  favour  of  France. 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance    329 

It  grew  in  intensity  as  the  conviction  spread  that  the  Em- 
peror by  himself  could  never  defeat  a  partition  treaty.  It 
was  fanned  by  the  news  that  the  Pope  had  pronounced  that 
a  decision  in  favour  of  France  would  not  be  contrary  to  the 
interests  of  the  Church.  Even  the  report  of  the  signature  of 
the  Partition  Treaty  did  not  stem  the  advancing  tide,  for  with 
a  willing  self-deception  the  Spaniards  ascribed  it  entirely  to 
the  hated  Dutchman.  The  national  party  determined  on  a 
palace  revolution.  The  cardinal  Porto  Carrero,  archbishop 
of  Toledo,  accompanied  by  a  few  religious  established  him- 
self in  the  sick  room,  and  refused  to  allow  the  queen  or  any 
of  the  adherents  of  the  archduke  to  enter.  He  represented 
to  Charles  that   a  will   in  favour  of  France   was 

,  ,  .  ,       .    .,  1  Signature  of 

the  only  way  to  avoid  civil  war  and  a  partition  awiiiin 
of  the  monarchy.  The  king  freed  from  the  favour  of 
ascendency  of  his  wife  gave  a  tardy  assent.  On 
the  7th  of  October  1 700,  he  signed  the  will.  '  It  is  God  alone,' 
he  said  as  the  pen  dropped  from  his  nerveless  hands,  '  who 
gives  kingdoms,  for  to  Him  alone  they  belong.'  The  next 
day  a  speedy  messenger  hurried  from  Bl^court,  Harcourt's 
successor,  to  Paris  to  acquaint  Louis  with  what  had  hap- 
pened. Three  weeks  afterwards,  on  the  ist  of  November, 
the  poor  king's  troubles  were  over,  and  the  last  of  the  line  of 
Arragon  was  gathered  to  his  fathers.  When  the  will  was 
opened  it  was  found  that  the  whole  inheritance  of  the 
crown  of  Spain  was  given  to  Philip  duke  of  Anjou,  the  second 
son  of  the  Dauphin,  and  in  the  event  of  his  death  to  his 
younger  brother  the  due  de  Berri.  If  Philip  refused  to  accept 
the  inheritance  the  right  to  it  was  to  pass  wholly  to  the 
archduke    Charles. 

For  fifteen  days  all  Europe  hung  breathless  in  suspense. 
What  would  Louis  do  ?  The  unexpected,  if  not  the  unhoped- 
for, had  happened.  Harcourt,  the  able  and  showy  xhe  problem 
ambassador  of  France  at  Madrid,  had  always  before  Louis, 
maintained  that  in  the  end  a  will  in  favour  of  France  could 
certainly   be   obtained,   and    Louis,   without    ever   forbidding 


330  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

them,  had  always  quietly  put  his  suggestions  aside,  and 
pushed  on  with  all  his  skill  the  policy  of  a  partition.  And 
now  Harcourt  had  proved  to  be  right  and  Louis  wrong. 
The  whole  of  the  prize  was  open  to  his  grasp  did  he  choose 
to  stretch  forth  his  hand  and  take  it.  Louis  was  sorely 
perplexed.  For  perhaps  the  first  time  in  his  life  he  did  not 
see  his  way  clear.  His  advisers  were  divided,  some  of  them 
greatly  in  doubt.  Tallard  urged  him  strongly  to  keep 
faith  with  Europe  and  maintain  the  Partition  Treaty.  Torcy 
was  of  the  same  opinion  at  first.  Beauvilliers  was  more 
emphatic  even  than  Tallard.  For  the  moment  their  advice 
prevailed,  and  it  was  decided  to  send  an  envoy  to  Heinsius 
to  assure  him  of  the  good  faith  of  France.  But  the  message 
was  never  sent.  The  wishes  of  Madame  de  Maintenon,  the 
earnest  remonstrances  of  the  Dauphin,  who  refused  to  see  his 
son  disinherited  without  a  struggle,  reasserted  themselves. 
The  feeling  of  the  French  court  was  strongly  in  favour  of  a 
bold  policy.  Torcy  altered  his  mind  as  he  reflected  more 
carefully  upon  the  state  of  Europe.  The  Dauphin  insisted 
with  renewed  energy  on  the  rights  of  his  son.  At  last  the 
decision  could  be  put  off  no  longer.  The  Spanish  ambassador 
reached  Paris  with  the  text  of  the  will  and  required  an 
answer.  If  it  was  unfavourable  he  was  to  go  straight  to 
Acceptance  Vienna.  On  the  1 6th  of  November  a  council  was 
of  the  will,  called  at  Versailles  to  pronounce  a  final  decision. 
The  courtiers  assembled  in  the  great  gallery  of  the  palace 
in  unprecedented  numbers,  for  even  the  most  frivolous  among 
them  could  not  but  feel  the  unique  gravity  of  the  crisis. 
The  minutes  and  the  hours  sped  on,  the  excitement  grew 
more  vivid,  the  strain  more  intense.  At  last  the  great  fold- 
ing doors  were  thrown  open,  and  as  every  one  bowed  low 
to  the  ground  Louis  was  seen  leaning  aff"ectionately  on  the 
shoulder  of  his  grandson.  Advancing  to  the  edge  of  the 
dais  with  that  kingly  dignity  which  was  to  him  a  second 
nature,  he  said  in  clear  and  deliberate  accents,  which  pene- 
trated to  the  furthest  corners  of  the  vast  hall.  Messieurs, 
void  le   roi  (tEspagne  / 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grajid  Allianct    331 

The  die  was  cast.  What  is  to  be  said  of  the  gamester  who 
staked  —  and  lost  —  his  all  on  the  throw?  If  moral  considera- 
tions may  for  the  moment  be  put  on  one  side,  honesty  and  good 
faith  laid  on  the  shelf,  no  one  can  doubt  that  Louis   „ 

Political  rea- 

was  right.  The  mterests  of  his  country  and  the  sons  for  its 
interests  of  his  family  demanded  at  that  particu-  a<="ptance. 
lar  juncture  of  affairs  the  acceptance  of  the  will.  The  diffi- 
culties attending  the  enforcement  of  the  Partition  Treaty, 
in  spite  of  the  favour  with  which  the  powers  of  Europe  had 
received  it  were  enormous.  To  impose  the  archduke  Charles 
upon  Spain  by  French  bayonets,  while  all  Spain  and  half  France 
was  loudly  demanding  the  duke  of  Anjou  was  an  impossibility. 
To  permit  the  archduke  to  establish  himself  in  Spain  by  means 
of  Austrian  troops,  before  he  and  his  father  had  accepted  the 
treaty,  was  too  dangerous  to  be  thought  of.  To  act  upon  the 
secret  article,  declare  the  rights  of  the  archduke  forfeited,  and 
give  Spain  and  the  Indies  to  some  third  person,  was  to  commit 
a  greater  outrage  than  ever  upon  the  pride  of  Spain  and  the 
claims  of  the  Emperor,  and  to  ensure  the  outbreak  of  war. 
The  determination  of  the  Emperor  to  resist  a  treaty  which 
gave  him  the  lion's  share  of  the  spoil  made  it  impossible  to 
enforce  it  in  its  entirety  when  Charles  11.  was  dead.  The  con- 
tracting powers  might,  it  is  true,  have  executed  it  as  far  as  was 
possible.  They  might  have  effected  the  conquest  of  Naples 
and  Sicily  for  the  Dauphin,  and  handed  over  the  Milanese  to 
the  duke  of  Lorraine.  They  might  have  administered  Spain 
and  the  Netherlands  until  a  decision  was  eventually  arrived  at. 
But  to  do  these  things  they  would  have  incurred  as  large  an 
expenditure  of  both  men  and  money  as  would  have  been 
entailed  by  open  war,  and  they  would  not  have  avoided  open 
war  with  the  Emperor.  To  execute  the  treaty  in  its  entirety 
was  impossible,  to  execute  it  partially  was  costly  and  dan- 
gerous. 

To  accept  the  will  on  the  contrary  presented  difficulties  com- 
paratively slight.  Such  a  course  guaranteed  the  loyal  support 
of  Spain.     It  did  not  necessarily  involve  the  active  hostility  of 


332  European  History,    1 598-1715 

the  Emperor.  There  was  no  reason  to  think  that  Prussia  or 
the  princes  of  Germany  would  attach  sufificient  importance 
Remoteness  ^^  ^^  principle  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
of  the  dan-  as  to  incur  on  its  behalf  the  risks  and  responsi- 
gers  of  war.  i^jjij-jgs  of  war.  Danger  only  threatened  from  the 
maritime  powers,  but  however  deeply  William  and  Heinsius 
might  feel,  however  bitterly  they  might  resent  his  conduct, 
Louis  well  knew  that  they  were  powerless  to  act.  In  both 
countries  the  Partition  Treaty  was  more  unpopular  than  the 
will  in  favour  of  France.  The  English  people  fully  realised 
that,  as  long  as  they  kept  out  of  continental  complications, 
their  liberties  were  safe,  their  control  over  their  king  secure. 
If  once  they  allowed  him  to  involve  their  interests  with  those 
of  the  Dutch,  they  thereby  put  into  his  hands  military  and 
naval  power  which  he  could  use  to  make  himself  independent 
of  Parliament.  All  the  Tories  and  many  of  the  Whigs  were 
resolute  against  allowing  a  standing  army  on  principle,  or  con- 
niving at  it  in  fact.  They  cared  far  more  about  keeping  their 
own  king  weak,  than  they  did  about  preventing  Louis  from 
becoming  strong.  As  Wilham  bitterly  admitted  in  his  letters 
to  Heinsius  :  '  I  am  troubled  to  the  very  bottom  of  my  soul  to 
find  now  that  the  business  has  become  public,  that  nearly 
everybody  congratulates  himself  that  France  has  preferred  the 
will  to  the  treaty,  insisting  that  it  is  much  better  for  England 
and  for  the  whole  of  Europe.  .  .  .  People  here  are  perfectly 
unconcerned,  and  turn  their  thoughts  but  little  to  the  great 
change  which  is  happening  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  It 
seems  as  if  it  was  a  punishment  of  heaven  that  this  nation 
should  be  so  little  alive  to  that  which  passes  outside  of  its  own 
island,  although  it  ought  to  have  the  same  interests  and  the 
same  anxieties  as  the  continental  nations.' 

William  did  not  conceal  from  himself  the  fact  that  to  induce 
,   ..„  England   to    declare  war  against    Louis   xrv.,  be- 

Indifference  o  .   . 

of  England  cause  of  his  repudiation  of  the  Partition  Treaty 
and  Holland.  ^^^  j^j^  acceptance  of  the  will  of  Charles  n.,  was 
wholly  out  of  the  question.     He  had  to  content  himself  with 


I 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   333 

urging  the  Emperor  not  to  recognise  the  duke  of  Anjou,  and 
with  endeavouring  to  gain  time.  Heinsius  was  in  a  similar 
plight.  The  republican  party  were  overjoyed  at  the  failure 
of  the  Partition  Treaty.  The  citizens  of  Amsterdam,  in  their 
delight  at  the  defeat  of  the  House  of  Orange,  would  not  hear 
of  any  possible  dangers  to  their  trade  or  their  barrier.  It  was 
doubtful  if  the  States-General  could  be  induced  to  declare  war 
in  alliance  with  England,  it  was  certain  they  would  not  do  so 
by  themselves.  As  far  as  purely  political  dangers  were  con- 
cerned Louis  might  accept  the  will  in  perfect  security.  Not 
a  protest  was  made,  not  a  murmur  was  openly  heard.  Louis 
thought  he  might  go  a  step  further.  In  February  1701  he 
occupied  the  frontier  towns  of  the  Netherlands,  took  captive 
the  Dutch  garrisons  which  they  contained,  and  restored  the 
towns  to  the  government  of  the  elector  of  Bavaria,   „.   . 

°  '     Their  recog- 

Max  Emanuel,  who  had  been  appointed  by  the  nition  of 
Spanish  government  to  that  charge.  To  regain  ^*"''p  ^■ 
their  troops  the  Dutch  recognised  the  duke  of  Anjou  as  king 
of  Spain.  William  held  out  longer,  but  at  last  he  was  obliged 
to  submit  to  the  pressure  of  his  ministers.  In  April  1701 
England  too  recognised  Philip  v.,  and  Louis  had  for  the 
moment  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  that  he  had  calculated  the 
chances  rightly,  and  had  placed  his  grandson  on  the  throne  of 
Spain  without  striking  a  blow,  or  involving  France  in  war. 
Philip  himself  was  received  at  Madrid  with  the  liveliest  expres- 
sions of  joy  and  enthusiasm.  The  grandiloquent  boast  had 
come  true,  II  tCy  a  plus  de  Pyrenees. 

But  at  what  cost  had  this  result  been  achieved?  Never 
since  Richelieu  had  first  launched  France  on  her  career  of 
territorial  aggrandisement,  never  since  sovereigns  had  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  adopted   the    principles 

-  -.         ,  .         „..,.,,.  .  ,  ,  Louis  guilty 

of  Macchiavelli  m  their  dealings  with  one  another,   of  a  deiiber- 
had  any  act   so   deliberately  dishonourable    been   **=  breach  of 
done  as  the   repudiation  of  the   Partition  Treaty 
by  Louis  xiv.      Honesty,   public   faith,  private    honour,   were 
words  of  no  meaning  in  international  relations,  if  kings  might 


334  European  History,    1 598-1 715 

make  treaties  one  day  and  break  them  the  next,  because  it 
happened  to  be  to  their  advantage  to  do  so.  Push  the  princi- 
ple but  a  little  further,  and  European  nations  would  be  once 
more  in  a  state  of  pure  savagery,  for  civilisation  and  progress 
depend  upon  contract,  and  what  contract  is  possible  among 
nations  when  public  faith  is  dead?  If  might  is  right,  treaties 
and  bargains  are  not  merely  useless  but  hypocritical.  If  ever 
there  was  a  case  in  which  a  sovereign  ought  to  have  stuck  to  the 
bargain  which  he  had  made,  it  was  that  of  Louis  xiv.  in  relation 
to  the  Partition  Treaty.  The  treaty  was  essentially  his  own 
handiwork.  It  was  he  who  had  first  suggested  it.  For  two 
years  he  had  urged  it,  worked  for  it,  made  sacrifices  for  it. 
At  his  instance  it  had  been  published  to  the  world  and  accepted 
by  Europe.  He  was  identified  with  it  far  more  than  were 
William  and  Heinsius.  For  him  to  repudiate  his  own  offspring, 
because  his  calculations  proved  wrong,  was  to  deal  a  blow  at 
the  public  morality  of  Europe  from  which  it  took  years  to 
recover.  His  conduct  was  as  plainly  unjustifiable  in  morals 
as  it  was  advantageous  in  politics.  And  no  one  knew  this 
better  than  Louis  himself  The  arguments  which  he  instructed 
Tallard  to  advance  to  William  on  his  behalf,  and  all  the  argu- 
ments which  his  apologists  have  addressed  to  the  world  since 
in  his  justification,  are  arguments  against  the  making  of  a  par- 
tition treaty,  not  in  favour  of  its  repudiation.  They  may  prove 
that  Louis  was  foolish  to  make  a  treaty,  they  do  not  prove  that 
he  was  right  to  tear  it  up  directly  it  was  made.  They  are 
arguments  which  Louis  had  himself  discounted  when  he  began 
the  negotiations,  and  had  himself  answered,  as  far  as  they 
admitted  of  an  answer,  in  his  earlier  instructions  to  Tallard. 
It  is  true  that  he  could  not  actually  have  been  certain  that  the 
Emperor  would  refuse  to  accept  the  treaty,  and  undoubtedly 
the  fact  of  his  refusal  very  seriously  diminished  the  chances  of 
the  ultimate  success  of  the  policy  of  partition,  but  it  was  a  con- 
tingency highly  to  be  expected,  and  had  as  a  matter  of  fact 
been  most  carefully  provided  for  in  the  treaty  itself. 

But  among  English  historians  there  has  been  a  tendency  to 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   335 

make  Louis  out  more  culpable  than  he  really  was.  The  whole 
negotiations  for  a  Partition  Treaty  have  been  depicted  as 
an  elaborate  deception  intended  to  hoodwink  the 

r     1  •   •  .,,...        Not  guilty  of 

eyes  of  the  maritime  powers  until  the  mtrigue  in  a  deeply  laid 
Spain  should  be  successful  and  the  will  in  favour  pianofdecep- 
of  the  duke  of  Anjou  procured.  Harcourt  at 
Madrid  is  described  as  carrying  out  the  real  policy  of  Louis, 
while  Tallard  at  London  is  purposely  his  dupe,  in  order  that 
he  may  with  the  greater  honesty  make  William  and  Heinsius  his 
dupes  too.  The  drama  is  one  in  which  unexampled  villainy 
is  everywhere  triumphant,  dull  virtue  oppressed  and  deceived, 
and  retribution  lamely  limps  along  full  thirteen  years  behind. 
Such  a  theory  is  opposed  both  to  the  facts  of  history  and  the 
limitations  of  human  nature.  To  keep  up  a  deception  planned 
on  such  a  gigantic  scale  for  two  years  and  a  half,  without 
accomplice,  or  confidant,  in  the  face  and  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  ablest  intellects  of  Europe,  most  of  whom  were  pene- 
trated by  suspicion  and  eager  for  revenge,  is  beyond  the 
powers  of  human  villainy  and  opposed  to  all  that  we  know  of 
Louis's  character.  Louis  had  often  played  the  hypocrite  and 
broken  faith  before,  but  he  had  done  it  pompously  in  the  face 
of  Europe  with  a  show  of  bravado.  He  had  claimed  the 
Netherlands  by  the  law  of  devolution,  and  parts  of  Alsace  by 
virtue  of  the  decisions  of  the  Chambres  des  Reunions,  by  sheer 
audacity  not  by  cunning.  He  had  often  been  a  bully,  there 
is  nothing  in  his  long  reign,  except  perhaps  his  conduct  to 
Fouquet,  which  could  justify  the  faintest  suspicion  that  he  was 
an  accomplished  dissembler  before  whom  even  Louis  xi.  must 
bow  the  knee.  For  what  does  the  theory  involve  ?  It  involves 
the  belief  that  for  two  years  and  a  half  he  was  deceiving  not 
merely  Wilham  and  Heinsius,  the  Emperor,  and  the  king  of 
Spain,  but  his  own  most  trusted  emissaries  and  friends.  He 
was  deceiving  Torcy  his  foreign  minister,  Tallard  his  ambassa- 
dor in  London,  and  Harcourt  his  ambassador  at  Madrid.  He 
was  to  the  last  assuring  the  very  man,  tnrough  whose  efforts 
alone  he  could  obtain  the  whole  succession,  that  he  had  deter- 


336  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

mined  on  a  different  policy ;  and  he  was  doing  this,  not  in 
pubhc  letters  which  might  see  the  light,  but  in  his  own  secret 
correspondence,  which  was  often  sent  by  special  messenger 
and  never  went  through  the  foreign  office  at  all.  Further  he 
must  have  carried  out  this  wholesale  deception  with  an  elab- 
oration at  which  the  mind  sinks  back  appalled.  He  wrote 
hundreds  of  letters  in  great  detail,  held  a  large  number  of  con- 
ferences with  his  council  as  a  whole,  and  with  individuals  by 
themselves,  made  numerous  speeches  to  ambassadors,  held 
many  and  long  interviews  with  Lord  Jersey  and  other  envoys, 
and  yet  never  once  in  the  whole  period  said  or  did  anything  to 
suggest  the  slightest  suspicion  of  his  good  faith  !  And  more 
than  that.  He  overacted  his  part  terribly.  If  his  real  object 
was  to  amuse  the  maritime  powers,  while  his  intrigue  in  Spain 
was  maturing,  his  obvious  course  was  so  to  manage  the  nego- 
tiations for  the  Partition  Treaty,  as  to  give  as  little  trouble  as 
possible  to  himself  without  exciting  the  suspicions  of  WiUiam. 
But  on  the  contrary  his  private  correspondence  with  Tallard 
shows  that  he  continually  gave  himself  infinite  and  unnecessary 
trouble.  His  mind  was  fixed  upon  the  possibilities  of  the 
negotiations.  He  sets  out  his  views  at  great  length  on  every 
turn  of  the  diplomatic  game.  It  is  he  who  is  continually  urg- 
ing haste,  especially  when  the  news  of  the  king  of  Spain's 
health  gets  more  unsatisfactory,  the  very  time  when,  if  he  was 
not  in  earnest,  he  might  have  rested  upon  his  oars  without 
danger.  He  continued  the  policy  of  partition,  after  he  knew 
that  in  consequence  of  it  Charles  11.  had  made  a  will  in  favour 
of  the  Electoral  Prince,  and  that  France  had  become  very 
unpopular  in  Spain.  He  even  permitted  Harcourt  to  leave 
Madrid  months  before  Porto  Carrero  effected  his  palace  revo- 
lution, and  when  all  probabilities  pointed  to  a  will  in  favour  of 
the  archduke  made  at  the  dictation  of  the  queen.  Such  con- 
duct would  have  been  sheer  folly  had  Louis  not  been  actuated 
by  honest  motives. 

In  the  face  of  these  facts  can  any  one  doubt  that  the  nego- 
tiations for  the  Partition  Treaties  were  conducted  by  Louis  in 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   337 

good  faith  ?  The  principles  on  which  he  acted,  if  not  strictly 
honourable,  were  far  less  dishonourable  than  it  has  been  the 
fashion  to  assert.     This  policy  stands  out  clear  in   „      .  ,    ^ 

^  ■'  Consistent 

his  private  letters  to  Harcourt  and  to  Tallard.  It  policy  of 
is  consistent  throughout  and  intelligible.  He  never  ^°"'^- 
swerved  from  the  opinion  that  Europe  would  not  permit 
him  to  acquire  the  whole  inheritance  for  his  family.  He 
never  thought  it  probable  that  Charles  11.  could  be  induced 
to  make  a  will  in  favour  of  France.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, his  obvious  policy  was  to  prevent  Austria  from  gain- 
ing the  whole  inheritance,  or  so  much  of  it  as  would  threaten 
the  ascendency  of  France  in  Europe.  The  best,  if  not  the 
only  way  of  securing  this  without  involving  Europe  in  war,  was 
by  means  of  the  old  device  of  a  partition  treaty.  But  it 
was  always  possible,  if  not  probable,  that  the  negotiations  for 
a  partition  would  fail,  and  Louis  accordingly  left  Harcourt  free 
to  act  as  he  thought  best  in  his  interests  until  the  Partition 
Treaty  was  an  accomplished  fact.  Directly  the  treaty  had 
been  concluded,  Harcourt  was  recalled,  and  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  army  on  the  frontier.  He  was  no  longer  wanted  to 
push  the  interests  of  France  at  the  court  of  Charles  11.  The 
time  for  diplomacy  was  over,  that  for  action  had  come,  and 
his  services  were  required  to  prevent  the  archduke  from 
coming  into  Spain  in  contravention  of  the  treaty.  But  the 
unexpected  happened.  Louis  found  himself  the  possessor  of 
the  whole  inheritance,  at  a  moment  when  his  knowledge  of 
Europe  told  him  that  it  was  more  than  probable  that  he  could 
successfully  seize  the  prize  without  bloodshed.  The  tempta- 
tion was  too  great,  and  after  a  sincere  hesitation  of  some  weeks, 
he  turned  his  back  on  the  policy  of  the  last  three  years  and 
deUberately  broke  faith  with  his  allies. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  motives,  the  policy  of  Louis 
XIV.  seemed  crowned  with  success  by  the  spring  of  1701.  His 
grandson  sat  secure  upon  the  throne  of  Spain,  amid  the  enthu- 
siasm of  his  people,  without  a  single  declared  enemy,  though 
it  was  known  that  the  Emperor  was  arming.     The  expulsion  of 

PERIOD   Y.  Y 


338  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

the  Dutch  from  the  frontier  fortresses  placed  the  Netherlands 
at  the  disposal  of  France.  The  recognition  of  Philip  v.  by  the 
maritime  powers  seemed  to  guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe  in 
Dffi  If  sin  spite  of  the  preparations  of  the  Emperor.  None 
the  way  of  knew  better  than  Louis  that  the  storm  was  not 
L«"*>^-  averted,  because  for  the  moment  there  reigned  an 

ominous  calm.  It  required  the  most  careful  and  wary  tread  to 
avoid  the  pitfalls  open  on  all  sides  of  him.  With  or  without 
alhes  the  Emperor  would  probably  declare  war.  William  and 
Heinsius  were  working  hard  to  urge  the  English  and  the  Dutch 
to  action.  '  The  only  game  to  play  with  this  nation,'  wrote  the 
king  to  his  confidant,  '  is  to  engage  them  in  war  without  their 
knowing  it.'  The  princes  of  Germany  were  certain  to  join  an 
alliance  against  France,  were  it  once  set  on  foot,  provided  that 
they  received  plenty  of  money  and  incurred  but  little  risk. 
Prussia  was  too  nearly  interested  in  the  lower  Rhineland  to  stand 
aloof  Never  was  it  more  necessary  for  Louis  to  display  that 
spirit  of  conciliation  of  which  he  at  times  was  apt  to  boast.  All 
his  address,  all  his  self-restraint  was  needed  successfully  to 
smooth  difficulties,  to  allay  suspicion,  to  calm  prejudice.  If 
one  strong  power  besides  the  Emperor  determined  to  draw  the 
sword,  the  fiery  cross  would  run  riot  over  Europe  in  a  moment. 
Already  there  had  been  indications  that  Tory  England  and 
republican  Holland  had  fixed  limits  to  their  indifference.  In- 
structions were  given  to  William  by  the  Parliament  of  1701  to 
take  such  measures  as  might  be  needful  for  the  protection  of 
the  Dutch.  A  point  might  be  reached  at  which  distrust  of 
Louis  xrv.  would  get  the  better  of  distrust  of  William  in.  If 
the  king  of  France  wanted  to  keep  the  advantages  which  he 
had  gained,  without  running  the  risks  of  war,  it  was  essential 
that  he  should  not  excite  the  suspicions  of  the  Enghsh  and 
Dutch  people. 

With  a  strange  infatuation  Louis  adopted  exactly  the  op- 
posite policy.  He  formally  declared  that  the  rights  of  the 
duke  of  Anjou  to  the  French  crown  were  in  no  way  impaired 
by  the  fact  of  his  succession  to  the  throne  of  Spain,  and  early 


The  Partition  Treaties  and  the  Grand  Alliance   339 

in  1 701  he  expelled  the  Dutch  troops  from  the  fortresses  gar- 
risoned by  them  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  replaceil 
them  by  French  soldiers.  He  refused  to  entertain  His  aggres- 
any  proposals  whatever  for  granting  compensation  ^'^^  conduct, 
to  the  Emperor  out  of  the  dominions  of  Spain,  or  security  to 
the  Dutch  by  giving  them  a  fortress  barrier.  He  issued  com- 
mercial decrees  which  pointed  plainly  to  the  exclusion  of 
English  and  Dutch  ships  from  the  Spanish-American  trade, 
and  completed  the  tale  of  arrogance  and  blindness  by  a  delib- 
erate and  unpardonable  violation  of  the  treaty  of  Ryswick. 
On  the  death  of  the  exiled  James  11.  of  England  in  September 
1 701,  Louis  recognised  his  son  James,  the  ChevaUer  de  S. 
George,  as  the  rightful  king  of  England.  The  blunder  soon 
brought  its  own  punishment.  Louis  had  succeeded  in  doing 
what  William  with  all  his  craft  could  never  have  done.  He 
had  inspired  all  Englishmen,  both  Whigs  and  Tories,  with  an 
enthusiastic  determination  to  fight.  Flouted  in  her  national 
pride,  threatened  in  her  commercial  interests,  directly  attacked 
in  her  liberties  and  independence,  England  joined 

.  Formation  of 

wilhngly  with  the  Dutch  and  the  Emperor  to  bnng  the  Grand 
the  haughty  tyrant  of  Europe  to  his  knees.     In  AUiance, 
the  winter  of  1 701-2  the  Grand  AUiance  was  con- 
cluded between  England,  the  Emperor,  the   Dutch,  the  king 
of  Prussia,  and  the  grand  duke  of  Hesse,  with  the  object  of 
destroying  the   tyranny  of    Louis   xiv.  and    breaking   up    the 
Franco-Spanish  monarchy  by  giving  Italy  to  the  Emperor,  and 
the  Indies  to  the  maritime  powers. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Grand  Alliance  was  the  last  act  per- 
mitted to  William  in  the  life-long  struggle  which  he  had  carried 
on  with  the  French  king.  In  March  1 702  he  died,  -q^^^-^  ^j 
but  his  spirit  still  continued  to  animate  the  nation.  Wiiiiam  iii., 
His  successor  Anne,  Tory  though  she  was  by  con-  '''°'* 
viction,  threw  herself  heartily  into  his  policy  under  the  influence 
of  her  friend  and  favourite  the  duchess  of  Marlborough.  In 
May  1702  war  was  declared  and  Louis  found  himself  once 
more  face  to  face  with  indignant  Europe. 


CHAPTER   XV 

THE   WAR   OF  THE   SPANISH    SUCCESSION  AND 
THE   DEATH   OF   LOUIS   XIV. 

The  campaign  of  Prince  Eugene  in  Italy  —  Appointment  of  Mariborough  to  the 
command  in  the  Netherlands  —  His  character  and  abihties —  He  establishes 
himself  upon  the  Rhine — Advance  of  the  French  upon  Vienna  —  Savoy 
joins  the  Grand  Alliance  —  Critical  position  of  the  Emperor  —  The  cam- 
paign and  battle  of  Blenheim  —  The  English  gain  the  command  of  the 
Mediterranean  —  Death  of  the  Emperor  Leopold  —  The  campaign  and 
battle  of  Ramillies — Expedition  of  the  Archduke  Charles  to  Spain  —  The 
battle  of  Almanza  —  The  campaign  and  battle  of  Oudenarde  —  Siege  and 
capture  of  Lille  —  Negotiations  for  peace  —  Appeal  of  Louis  to  his  people 
—  The  campaign  and  battle  of  Malplaquet  —  Dismissal  of  Marlborough  — 
Victories  of  the  Spaniards  over  the  Allies  —  The  negotiations  at  Geitruy- 
denburg — ^The  peace  of  Utrecht  —  Its  policy  and  justification  — The  end  of 
the  seventeenth  century  —  The  death  of  Louis  Xiv. 

The  war  broke  out  in  Italy.  By  a  treaty  concluded  with  the 
duke  of  Savoy  in  the  spring  of  1701  the  road  to  north  Italy 
was  open  to  the  soldiers  of  France,  and  Catinat  at  the  head 
Cam  ai  n  of  °^  40,ooo  men  occupied  the  Milanese.  Pushing 
prince  Eugene  forward  his  advanced  guard  to  the  frontiers  of  the 
in  Italy,  1701.  territories  of  Venice  at  the  Largo  di  Garda,  he  pre- 
pared to  fall  upon  the  Austrian  army  as  it  debouched  into  the 
plain  from  the  passes  of  the  mountains.  To  an  invader  who 
comes  from  Austria  or  the  east,  the  plain  of  north  Italy  pre- 
sents serious  miUtary  difficulties.  His  path  to  the  south  is 
blocked  by  the  strong  and  deep  stream  of  the  Po,  which,  with 
its  surrounding  marshes,  treacherous  banks,  and  swift  currents, 
forms  an  almost  impassable  obstacle  in  the  face  of  an  active 
enemy ;  especially  as  the  most  important  points  of  its  course 

340 


The  War  of  the  Spanish   Succession 


341 


are  defended  by  the  fortresses  of  Alessandria,  Piacenza,  and 
Mantua.  From  the  Alps  on  the  north  descend  into  the  Po  a 
series  of  rivers,  similar  in  character  though  less  in  volume, 
each  of  which  forms,  both  from  the  nature  of  its  stream,  and 
the  cities  which  command  it,  a  strategical  position  very  easy  to 


defend  and  exceedingly  difficult  to  attack  directly.  From  the 
Lago  Maggiore  runs  the  stream  of  the  Ticino  joining  the  Po 
a  Mttle  below  Pavia.  From  the  Valtelline  through  the  Lago 
di  Como  the  Adda  pours  its  waters  into  the  Po  at  Cremona, 
passing  a  little  to  the  east  of  Milan.  To  the  east  of  the  Adda, 
from  the  mountains  of  Bergamo,  flows  the  stream  of  the  Oglio, 
receiving  on  its  way  to  its  home  in  the  Po  the  waters  of  a 
tributary  which  protects  the  important  city  of  Brescia.  Further 
to  the  east,  from  the  southern  end  of  the  Lago  di  Garda,  close 
to  the  fortress  of  Peschiera,  the  Mincio  makes  its  way  directly 
into  the  Po  below  Mantua.     A  few  miles  further,  from  the  wide 


342  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

valley  leading  to  the  Brenner  pass,  descends  the  great  stream 
of  the  Adige,  which,  running  through  the  dominions  of  Venice, 
passing  the  fortresses  of  Verona,  Legnago,  and  Carpi,  makes  its 
own  way  into  the  sea  north  of  the  Po  amid  impassable  marshes. 
Invaders  of  the  Milanese  from  Germany  and  Austria  must 
therefore  either  force  the  positions  of  these  rivers  one  by  one 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  or  turn  them  by  thrusting  their  way 
through  the  mountains  on  the  north.  Catinat  had  made  up  his 
mind  that  the  Austrians  would  attempt  the  latter  feat,  and  was 
carefully  watching  the  mountain  valleys  north  of  the  Lago  di 
Garda,  when  prince  Eugene  suddenly  appeared  behind  him  at 
Brescia.  Quickly  descending  the  valley  of  the  Adige  he  had  not 
scrupled  to  violate  Venetian  territory.  Marching  behind  Verona 
he  crossed  the  Adige  at  Carpi,  then  turning  north-west  crossed 
the  Mincio  above  Mantua  without  opposition,  and  appeared 
between  Peschiera  and  Brescia,  in  the  rear  of  the  French, 
before  Catinat  knew  that  he  had  left  the  obscurity  of  the  moun- 
tains. The  French  had  only  just  time  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat  to 
the  Oglio  and  cover  Milan. 

Louis  was  highly  indignant  at  this  ominous  beginning  to  the 
war,  and  sent  his  friend  and  courtier  Villeroy  to  supersede 
Catinat.  The  change  was  not  to  his  advantage.  Villeroy  was 
a  good  dancer  but  an  indifferent  general.  Having  an  army  far 
outnumbering  that  of  prince  Eugene,  he  crossed  the  Oglio 
and  attacked  him  on  the  ist  of  September  1701  at  Chiari,  but 
was  repulsed.     Acquiescing  in  his  failure  he  took  up  a  position 

on  the  Oglio  defending  Milan,  and  placed  his  head- 
Defeat  and  t>  '  r 
capture  of  quarters  at  Cremona  for  the  winter,  where  he  amused 
Villeroy,  himsclf  in  all  security.  Prince  Eugene  saw  his  op- 
portunity. From  Mantua,  which  he  was  besieging, 
he  advanced  in  February  1702,  surprised  Cremona  under  cover 
of  night,  captured  the  French  general  and  his  staff,  and  obliged 
his  army  to  retire  behind  the  Adda.  The  results  of  this  bold 
stroke  were  quickly  seen.  The  dukes  of  Modena  and  Guas- 
talla  joined  the  imperialists,  the  duke  of  Savoy  began  to  trim, 
and  to  look  out  for  an  opportunity  of  changing   sides.     But 


The  War  of  the  Spanish   Succession  343 

reinforcements  soon  came  to  the  French.  The  duke  of 
Vendome  and  PhiUp  v.  left  Naples  and  appeared  on  the  flank 
of  prince  Eugene  in  Lombardy  in  August  1702.  Greatly  out- 
numbered, the  Austrians  had  to  fall  back  to  a  defensive  posi- 
tion behind  the  Adige,  where  the  French  did  not  dare  to 
attack  them. 

Meanwhile  the  war  had  become  general.  In  May  1702 
Marlborough,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  chief  Marlborough 
command  of  the  English  forces  by  Anne,  and  had  appointed  to 
been  elected  captain  general  of  the  Dutch  forces  in  the  Neth- 
by  the  States-General,  took  command  of  the  allied  erianda. 
army  in  the  Netherlands.  He  had  under  him  about  10,000 
English  troops,  about  20,000  Dutch  troops,  and  about  as  many 
mercenaries,  chiefly  Germans,  in  the  pay  of  England  and  the 
United  Provinces.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  how  small  the 
body  of  purely  British  soldiers  was  who  fought  in  the  armies 
of  Marlborough.  They  were  never  as  numerous  as  the  mer- 
cenaries, though  they  increased  in  numbers  regularly  as  the 
war  went  on.  At  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  owing  no 
doubt  to  the  great  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  evinced  by  all 
Englishmen,  and  to  the  national  distrust  of  William  iii.,  there 
were  very  few  English  soldiers  fit  to  take  the  field  against  the 
veterans  of  France. 

What  England  lost  through  want  of  training  among  her 
soldiers  was  more  than  made  up  to  her  by  the  eminent  capacity 
of  her  general.  Marlborough  had  learned  his  first  lessons  of 
war  in  the  school  of  Turenne,  he  had  shown  his  talents  for 
command  in  his  successful  management  of  an  expedition  to 
the  south  of  Ireland  in  1689,  but  no  one  could  have  antici- 
pated from  his  past,  when  he  was  appointed  to  the  supreme 
command  in  1702,  the  singular  combination  of  His  military 
qualities  which  made  him  incomparably  the  first  qualities, 
man  in  Europe.  Full  of  resource,  gifted  with  a  notable  mas- 
tery over  men,  and  thoroughly  trained  in  the  science  of  war, 
he  is  one  of  the  few  generals  who  have  had  the  power  of  con- 
ceiving and  executing  combined  movements  on  a  large  scale. 


344  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

His  provident  eye  could  take  in  the  whole  of  Europe  as  a 
theatre  of  operations,  and  direct  the  movements  of  four  or  five 
armies  to  a  common  end.  As  a  strategist,  he  was  too  seldom 
permitted  freedom  of  action  for  his  originality  and  resource- 
fulness fully  to  display  themselves.  In  this  he  must  be  com- 
pared, not  with  Frederick  the  Great  or  Napoleon  or  Moltke, 
but  with  WelUngton  or  Turenne,  and  he  need  not  fear  the 
result.  Even  when  driven  by  the  timidity  and  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  Dutch,  or  by  political  danger  at  home  into  the 
commonplace,  his  campaigns  show  a  grasp  of  the  proportion 
of  things,  which  is  only  found  in  the  highest  order  of  intellects. 
He  fixes  with  lightning  rapidity  upon  the  important  thing  to 
be  done,  and  sees  at  once  how  best  to  do  it  with  the  resources 
at  his  command.  He  never  fritters  away  his  strength,  he 
never  wastes  life,^  or  runs  risks  unnecessarily,  or  for  mere 
effect.  He  strikes  directly  at  the  key  of  the  position,  his  com- 
binations are  all  aimed  at  the  central  point  of  the  enemies' 
power.  In  this  capacity  to  appreciate  exactly  the  ratio  of  his 
strength  and  resources  to  those  of  the  enemy,  he  strongly 
resembles  his  great  successor  Wellington.  Like  him  he  never 
lost  a  battle,  unlike  him  he  never  failed  in  a  campaign.  The 
same  characteristics  are  observable  in  the  battle-field.  He 
had  an  extraordinarily  quick  eye  for  the  weak  point  in  an 
enemy's  position,  and  saw  at  once  how  best  to  utilise  the 
opportunities  which  the  ground  afforded  for  attaining  his 
object.  At  Blenheim  and  at  Ramillies,  it  was  his  skilful  use 
of  difficult  ground,  that  mainly  contributed  to  the  victory. 
And  when  his  real  attack  was  developed,  he  showed  some- 
thing of  Napoleon's  power  of  combining  the  whole  strength 
of  his  army  upon  the  end  to  be  achieved.     At  Blenheim  he 

1  It  is  sometimes  said  that  he  fought  Malplaquet,  and  wasted  life  unneces- 
sarily there,  in  order  to  restore  his  waning  popularity  in  England,  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  in  1709,  Mons  was  the  last  of  the  first-class  fortresses 
belonging  to  the  French,  and  the  army  of  Villars  and  Boufflers  the  only  real 
obstacle  between  Marlborough  and  Paris.  Can  any  one  doubt  that  had  Marl- 
borough been  well  supported  in  England,  the  allies  would  have  been  in  Paris 
in  17 10? 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  345 

forced  his  way  through  the  centre  of  his  adversaries'  position, 
and  reduced  the  enemy  from  a  disciphned  army  into  disorgan- 
ised masses  at  a  stroke,  much  as  Napoleon  did  afterwards 
by  Soult's  famous  attack  at  Austerhtz.  But  apart  from  his 
mihtary  genius,  he  was  no  less  conspicuous  for  his  powers  of 
diplomacy,  and  his  singular  management  of  men.  Of  unwearied 
patience,  imperturbable  temper,  and  immovable  His  char- 
resolution  he  rarely  failed  to  gain  his  end  in  the  long  acter. 
run.  The  Grand  Alliance  of  1701-2,  and  the  negotiations  with 
Charles  xii.  of  Sweden  at  Altranstadt  in  1708,  are  undeniable 
proofs  of  his  diplomatic  ability.  His  close  friendship  with 
prince  Eugene  and  Godolphin,  and  his  tender  love  for  his 
imperious  and  fretful  wife,  attest  the  warmth  of  his  affections, 
and  the  amiability  of  his  disposition.  The  wonderful  self- 
command  with  which  he  saw  his  best  plans  ruined,  his  reputa- 
tion endangered,  his  motives  suspected,  his  very  successes 
decried,  by  the  stupidity  of  the  half  envious  and  half  timid 
Dutch,  and  the  malignancy  of  English  party  spirit,  is  no  mean 
tribute  to  the  steadfastness  of  his  patriotism.  If  France  had 
not  the  resources  of  the  allies  upon  which  to  draw,  neither 
had  she  their  divisions  and  quarrels  with  which  to  contend. 

When  Marlborough  took  command  of  the  allied  armies  in 
the  Netherlands  in  1702,  it  was  clear  to  him,  that  the  danger 
to  the  cause  of  the  allies  generally  lay  in  the  isola-  Dangerous 
tion  of  Austria.  Cut  off  from  the  sea,  she  could  isolation  of 
not  be  directly  assisted  by  the  English  and  Dutch  A"^'"^-  '702. 
fleets.  Accessible  from  Italy  through  the  passes  of  Tirol,  she 
might  easily  be  taken  in  flank  should  she  receive  a  repulse  in 
that  quarter.  On  the  side  of  the  Rhine  the  danger  was  not 
only  threatening,  but  imminent.  Bavaria  was  about  to  make 
common  cause  with  Louis,  and  a  united  French  and  Bavarian 
force  might  be  at  the  gates  of  Vienna,  long  before  tardy  succours 
could  force  their  way  there  from  north  Germany  or  the  Nether- 
lands. It  was  therefore  all  important  to  Marlborough  to  gain 
command  of  the  lower  Rhine  valley,  so  as  to  be  able  to  open  up 
communications  with  the  imperial  troops  on  the  upper  Rhine 


346  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

or  upper  Danube  if  necessary.  But  in  the  way  of  this  poUcy 
there  were  considerable  difificulties.  The  Netherlands  formed 
one  vast  intrenched  camp  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  Behind 
the  curtain  of  their  fortresses  they  could  make  their  prepara- 
tions in  secret  for  a  sudden  advance  upon  Amsterdam,  or 
recruit  their  armies  after  a  repulse.  Boufflers  at  the  head  of  the 
French  forces  occupied  a  line  which  stretched  from  Antwerp 
on  the  Scheldt,  through  Venlo  on  the  Meuse,  to  Kaiserwerth 
on  the  Rhine,  thus  blocking  the  three  river  valleys.  If  driven 
from  that  by  a  front  attack,  he  had  but  to  retire  on  the  Hne  of 
the  Demer,  between  Antwerp,  and  Liege,  or  a  little  further  back 
to  the  line  of  the  Mehaigne  from  Antwerp  through  Louvain  and 
Tirlemont  to  Namur,  or  further  back  still  to  the  hne  of  the  frontier, 
and  take  refuge  under  the  great  fortresses  of  Lille,  Tournai,  Mons, 
Charleroi,  and  Namur.  To  force  these  positions  one  after  another, 
and  capture  the  fortresses  which  defended  them,  in  the  face  of 
a  watchful  and  valiant  enemy,  was  a  task  of  much  difficulty,  and 
must  take  many  years.  To  try  and  turn  the  fortresses  by  ad- 
vancing on  France  by  the  valleys  of  the  Rhine  and 

Marlborough      ,        ,  r        ,,  i       ,  •         i  i    i         i 

gains  a  foot-  the  Mosellc  was  sure  to  be  bitterly  opposed  by  the 
ingonthe  Dutch,  whose  timidity  already  pictured  the  French 
at  the  gates  of  Amsterdam.  Marlborough  had  there- 
fore to  act  very  cautiously.  He  took  advantage  of  Boufflers's 
too  extended  position,  and  directed  an  attack  as  if  to  turn  his 
left  in  Brabant.  Boufflers  fell  into  the  trap,  moved  his  troops 
in  all  haste  to  defend  his  left,  and  so  gave  his  right  flank  over 
into  the  enemies'  hands.  Marlborough  easily  turned  his  right 
flank  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine,  drove  him  back  on 
the  line  of  the  Mehaigne,  and  established  himself  strongly  on 
the  valleys  of  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine,  capturing  Venlo,  Rure- 
monde,  and  Li^ge. 

The  next  year  he  prepared  to  push  his  success  further.  In- 
Hisindeci-  structing  the  Dutch  to  advance  on  the  right  wing 
sivecam-  into  Flanders,  capture  Antwerp,  and  seize  the  line 
paignof  1703.  Qf  ^i^g  Scheldt,  he  with  the  left  wing  pushed  down 
the  Rhine,  overran  the  electorate  of  Koln,  and  in  May  1 703 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession 


347 


Typo.ttchute  Co.SCt 


348  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

made  himself  master  of  Bonn.  He  was  now  secure  of  his  com- 
munications with  north  Germany,  and  was  preparing  to  organise 
a  German  army  to  operate  upon  the  Moselle,  and  keep  up  com- 
munications between  himself  and  the  Emperor,  when  he  was 
recalled  to  the  Netherlands  in  hot  haste  to  assist  the  Dutch. 
Tired  of  waiting  for  the  siege  train  and  transport  necessary  to 
form  the  siege  of  Antwerp,  the  Dutch  had  begun  to  send  out 
detachments  into  Flanders  for  pure  plundering  purposes.  One 
of  these  under  Opdam  was  suddenly  attacked  by  Boufflers,  and 
completely  destroyed  in  June  1703.  Whereupon  the  Dutch, 
in  the  extremity  of  terror,  absolutely  refused  to  undertake  the 
siege  of  Antwerp  at  all.  On  Marlborough's  arrival  Boufflers 
withdrew  behind  the  lines  of  the  Mehaigne,  which  he  had  care- 
fully fortified  by  ramparts  and  towers.  Marlborough,  sure  of 
his  ability  to  force  the  lines,  made  preparations  for  the  attack, 
but  the  Dutch  declined  to  co-operate,  and  the  English  general, 
baffled  and  dispirited,  was  obliged  to  content  himself  with  the 
capture  of  a  few  inferior  fortresses. 

Meanwhile  on  the  upper  Rhine  things  were  going  badly  for 
the  allies.     Louis  had  always  intended  to  make  his 

Advance  of  .  ....  ^-..         ,         •      ,     ,     , 

the  French      mam  attack  m  this  quarter.     His  plan  included  a 

upon  Vienna,  simultaneous  advance  upon  Vienna  by  the  Danube 
1703. 

and  by  Italy,  with  the    help  of  the  duke  of  Savoy 

and  the  elector  of  Bavaria,  while  Boufflers  in  the  Netherlands 

merely  kept  the  English  and   the  Dutch  army  occupied  and 

entangled  amid  fortresses  and    fortifications.     The  success  of 

prince    Eugene   in    Italy,  and   his    own   want   of  preparation 

delayed  for  some  time  the  commencement  of  this  movement, 

but  by  the  beginning  of  the  year  1 703  all  was  ready.    Vendome 

was  facing  prince  Eugene  upon  the  Adige  ready  to  attack.    The 

elector  of  Bavaria  had  definitely  declared  himself  on  the  French 

side  and  captured  Ulm.     Accordingly  in  February  1703  Villars 

crossed  the  Rhine  at  Strasburg,  took  Kehl  by  storm,  forced 

the  passes  of  the  Black  Forest,  and  joined  the  elector  on  the 

Danube  ;  while  Tallard  at  the  head  of  another  army  on  the 

Rhine  supported  his  movements,  and  protected  his  communi- 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  349 

cations  with  France.  Prince  Louis  of  Baden,  and  count  Stirum, 
who  commanded  the  aUied  forces,  unable  to  make  head  against 
the  enemy,  withdrew  into  the  Hnes  of  Stolhofen,  a  Httle  below 
Kehl,  which  they  had  carefully  fortified  in  order  to  form  a  base 
of  operations  for  the  imperial  armies  on  the  upper  Rhine,  and 
there  kept  Tallard  at  bay.  The  Emperor  was  in  terrible  straits. 
The  Hungarians  had  risen  under  Ragotsky,  and  were  preparing 
to  attack  Vienna  from  the  east.  Vendome  was  pushing  prince 
Eugene  slowly  before  him  over  the  Brenner  pass  to  Innsbruck. 
The  only  other  Austrian  force  was  cooped  up  behind  Stolhofen. 
There  was  not  a  man  between  the  elector  and  Vienna,  and 
Villars  strongly  urged  Max  Emanuel  to  march  at  once  with  all 
his  forces  on  Vienna,  and  end  the  war  at  a  blow,  while  he 
posted  himself  on  the  Danube  at  Donauworth,  and  defended 
Bavaria  from  a  flank  attack. 

Unfortunately  for  himself  and  his  ally  the  elector  had  not 
the  required  energy.  The  opportunity  passed  never  to  return. 
Max  Emanuel  determined  to  crush  prince  Eugene  first.  In  June 
he  was  at  Kufstein  on  his  way  to  Innsbruck,  while  Vendome 
had  penetrated  up  the  pass  as  far  as  Trent.  The 
army  of  Eugene  was  entangled  in  the  mountains  the  Grand 
between  them.  He  owed  his  preservation  to  for-  Auiance, 
tune,  not  to  skill.  Just  at  this  moment  Victor 
Amadeus  of  Savoy,  after  hesitating  some  months,  made  up  his 
mind  that  the  winning  side  would  be  that  of  the  allies.  He 
joined  the  Grand  Alhance,  and  Vendome  had  to  hasten  back  to 
Piedmont  to  preserve  his  communications.  The  elector  hear- 
ing of  the  retreat  of  Vendome,  dared  not  face  Eugene  by  him- 
self in  such  a  country,  and  began  to  retire.  The  Tirolese  at 
once  rose  on  behalf  of  their  much- loved  master,  and  Max 
Emanuel  had  to  fight  his  way  back  to  Bavaria  as  best  he  could. 
He  found  Villars  defending  himself  with  difficulty  against  prince 
Louis  of  Baden  and  Stirum.  On  the  arrival  of  the  elector  before 
Augsburg,  prince  Louis  left  Stirum  and  marched  to  Augsburg, 
hoping  to  raise  the  siege,  but  Villars  was  too  quick  for  him. 
Falling  upon  Stirum  he  defeated  him  completely  at  Hochstadt 


350  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

on  the  20th  of  September,  and  drove  him  back  on  Nuremberg. 
Prince  Louis  had  at  once  to  retire  to  the  Hnes  of  Stolhofen,  and 
Augsburg  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  elector. 

For  the  moment  the  Emperor  was  safe.     The  year  was  too 

far  advanced  to  permit  of  a  combined  movement  upon  Vienna. 

But  it  was  clear  to  all  parties  that  the  attempt 

Dangerous  .11  t       •        i  •  t  1 

position  of  would  be  made  m  the  next  campaign.  It  seemed 
the  Emperor,  equally  certain  that  if  made  it  must  succeed,  unless 
Marlborough  and  the  army  of  the  Netherlands 
could  come  to  the  rescue.  Louis  made  great  preparations 
for  the  effort.  Villars,  whose  arrogance  was  displeasing  to 
the  elector,  was  recalled  and  sent  to  the  Cevennes,  where 
the  remnants  of  the  Huguenots  had  risen  under  the  name  of 
the  Camisards.  His  place  was  taken  by  Marsin,  and  his  army 
strongly  reinforced.  The  plan  of  campaign  was  simple.  Mar- 
sin  and  the  elector  were  to  march  straight  upon  Vienna  down 
the  Danube,  while  Ragotsky  attacked  the  city  from  the  side 
of  Hungary.  Tallard,  at  the  head  of  35,000  men,  was  posted 
in  Alsace  to  support  the  movement,  preserve  the  communica- 
tions, and  defend  the  army  from  any  flank  attack.  Villeroy, 
with  30,000  men,  was  sent  to  the  Netherlands  to  keep  Marl- 
borough at  bay  and  prevent  him  from  coming  to  the  rescue. 
Against  this  overwhelming  force  Austria  could  only  oppose  the 
armies  of  prince  Louis  of  Baden,  and  prince  Eugene.  If  the 
Emperor  was  to  be  saved,  it  must  be  by  Marlborough,  and 
how  could  Marlborough  leave  the  Netherlands  without  throw- 
ing open  the  United  Provinces  to  invasion  ?  Was  it  likely  that 
the  Dutch  would  endanger  -their  own  safety  for  the  sake  of 
the  Emperor?  Even  if  they  did,  was  it  possible  to  escape  the 
combined  attack  of  the  armies  of  Tallard  and  Marsin  and  the 
elector  when  the  Danube  was  reached  ? 

These  were  the  questions  to  which  Marlborough  was  pre- 
paring to  give  an  answer  in  the  summer  of  1704.  He  had 
Plan  of  conceived  the  brilliant  plan  of  moving  the  whole  of 

Marlborough,  ^jg  army,  except  the  Dutch,  from  the  field  of  opera- 
tions in  the  Netherlands  to  a  totally  new  base  upon  the  upper 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  351 

Danube,  and  of  crushing  Marsin  and  the  elector  before 
Tallard  could  come  to  their  help  from  the  Rhine,  or  Villeroy 
overtake  him  from  the  Meuse.  It  was  a  scheme  which  was 
certain  to  fail  except  in  the  hands  of  a  consummate  general, 
for  it  involved  not  merely  a  victory  over  equal  and  possibly 
superior  forces,  but  a  long  and  extremely  hazardous  flank  march 
over  difficult  country,  and  a  race  against  time.  And  that  was 
not  all,  for  before  he  could  even  undertake  it,  he  had  to  deceive 
the  Dutch  and  lull  Villeroy  into  a  false  security.  If  the  Dutch 
once  suspected  that  he  was  going  to  move  his  army  away  from 
the  protection  of  their  frontier,  they  would  impose  an  energetic 
and  decided  veto.  If  Villeroy  once  divined  that  Marlborough 
was  engaged  in  making  a  long  march  up  the  Rhine,  he  could 
ruin  the  whole  plan  in  a  moment  by  a  well  directed  flank  attack. 
To  surmount  these  difficulties,  Marlborough,  keeping  his  real 
plan  an  absolute  secret,  let  it  be  generally  known  that  he  in- 
tended to  try  and  turn  the  lines  and  fortresses  of  the  Nether- 
lands, by  advancing  into  France  by  way  of  the  Moselle,  and  he 
publicly  asked  for,  and  obtained,  the  permission  of  the  Dutch 
to  that  scheme.  This  enabled  him  to  summon  the  Branden- 
burg contingent  to  the  Rhine  at  Mainz,  and  to  move  his  own 
headquarters  to  Coblentz  without  incurring  suspicion,  and  to 
leave  Overkirk  with  the  Dutch  army  and  the  Dutch  deputies  at 
Maestricht  on  his  extreme  right,  to  guard  the  line  of  the  Meuse 
should  Villeroy  advance  on  Amsterdam  during  his  absence.  The 
plan  succeeded  admirably.  Villeroy,  completely  deceived,  took 
up  a  strong  position  on  the  upper  Moselle  near  Trier  to  resist  the 
advance  of  the  allies,  and  waited  in  vain  for  the  first  signs  of 
the    invading  army.      The    Dutch   left   behind   at   „.   „    , 

°  -'  His  flank 

Maestricht  could  not  interfere  with  Marlborough's  march  to  the 
plans.  All  was  ready.^  In  June  1 704  he  threw  off  °^""'''=- 
the  mask,  advanced  up  the  Rhine  by  forced  marches  to  Mainz, 
then,  picking  up  the  Brandenburg  contingent  as  he  went,  he 
left  the  Rhine  and  directed  his  army  straight  upon  the  upper 
Danube  at  Donauworth.  At  Heilbronn  he  was  joined  by  a 
1  See  Map,  p.  241. 


352  European  History,    15 98-171 5 

German  force,  and  near  Ulm  by  prince  Eugene  and  prince 
Louis  of  Baden.  It  was  agreed  that  Eugene  should  return 
to  Stolhofen  to  prevent  Tallard,  and  possibly  Villeroy  if  he 
appeared  upon  the  scene,  from  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the 
elector  and  Marsin  before  the  allies  could  attack  them.  Marl- 
borough himself  and  prince  Louis  of  Baden  marched  straight 
against  the  elector,  who  had  entrenched  himself  on  the  Schell- 
enberg  near  Donauworth,  carried  the  lines  by  assault  on  the  2d 
of  July  and  drove  the  elector  back  on  Augsburg,  thus  thrusting 
themselves  in  between  the  French  and  Vienna  and  completely 
protecting  the  latter  city. 

So  far  the  campaign  had  been  brilliantly  successful,  but  the 
most  difficult  part  was  yet  to  come.  Villeroy  on  discovering 
Difficulties  of  the  trick  played  upon  him  by  Marlborough  marched 
Marlborough,  across  Alsace  and  joined  Tallard  before  Stolhofen 
with  30,000  men.  This  enabled  Tallard  to  leave  prince  Eugene 
to  the  care  of  Villeroy,  and  to  march  to  the  assistance  of  Marsin 
and  the  elector,  whom  he  joined  at  Augsburg  early  in  August. 
Counting  the  army  of  Villeroy  the  French  and  Bavarians  far 
outnumbered  the  allies.  Marlborough  himself  was  a  long  dis- 
tance from  his  true  base  of  operations.  He  had  no  fortress  or 
entrenched  camps  where  he  could  collect  stores,  establish  his 
hospitals,  or  recruit  his  army.  It  was  essential  to  his  safety  to 
be  able  to  strike  hard  and  quick.  Fortunately  for  him  the 
French  played  into  his  hands.  Marsin  and  Tallard  were  anxious 
to  have  the  sole  credit  of  crushing  this  impudent  Englishman. 
They  would  not  wait  for  Villeroy.  They  would  not  hear  of 
Fabian  tactics.  They  determined  to  destroy  him  at  a  blow,  and 
marched  down  the  Danube  to  meet  him.  Prince  Eugene,  who 
had  abandoned  Stolhofen  in  pursuit  of  Tallard,  effected  his  junc- 
tion with  Marlborough  near  Donauworth  on  the  nth  of  August, 
and  on  the  13th  the  two  armies  found  themselves  facing  each 
other  on  the  field  of  Blenheim. 

The  French  generals  had  taken  up  a  defensive  position  at 
right  angles  to  the  Danube,  just  behind  the  little  stream  of  the 
Nebel,     Tallard  at  the  head  of  the  right  wing  occupied  in 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  353 

force  the  village  of  Blenheim,  the  left  wing  under  Marsin  and 
the  elector  the  village  of  Lutzingen.  The  centre  was  con- 
sidered sufficiently  protected  from  serious  attack  by  The  battle  of 
the  stream  of  the  Nebel  and  its  adjacent  marshes,  Blenheim, 
and  was  weakly  held,  chiefly  by  cavalry.  The  plan  of  battle 
which  they  had  adopted,  clearly  was  to  permit  the  allies  to 
dash  themselves  in  vain  against  the  strong  positions  of  Blenheim 
and  Lutzingen,  and  when  they  were  exhausted  finally  to  over- 
whelm them  by  an  advance  from  the  two  wings.  Marlborough 
on  reconnoitring  the  ground  saw  at  once  that  the  weakness  of 
their  position  lay  in  the  centre,  and  that  the  marshes  were  not 
so  impassable  as  they  seemed.  Accordingly  he  directed  prince 
Eugene  to  direct  a  strong  attack  upon  Marsin  and  the  elector 
at  Lutzingen,  and  Cutts  to  do  the  same  upon  Tallard  at  Blen- 
heim. Under  cover  of  these  assaults  he  made  his  real  attack 
on  the  centre.  With  some  difficulty  he  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  marshes,  then,  thrusting  himself  in  between  the  two  wings 
of  the  enemy  he  completely  drove  the  Maison  du  Roi  off  the 
ground  and  cut  the  French  line  in  two.  Then  turning  to  the 
left  he  hemmed  Tallard  in  at  Blenheim  between  his  army  and 
the  Danube,  and  forced  him  to  surrender  with  all  his  infantry. 
Marsin  and  the  elector  finding  their  centre  and  right  wing  an- 
nihilated fled  as  best  they  could  through  the  Black  Forest  to 
Villeroy  on  the  Rhine  pursued  by  the  fiery  Eugene.  Never 
was  defeat  more  complete.  As  the  sun  set  on  the  field  of  Blen- 
heim the  glory  of  Louis  xiv.  departed. 

No  one  can  wonder  at  the  outburst  of  joy  which  thrilled 
through  England  and  Europe  at  the  news  of  the  batde  of  Blen- 
heim. It  was  felt  to  be  decisive  of  the  main  issues  of  the  war. 
France  had  other  armies  in  the   field   and  could 

.Its  results. 

raise  new  troops,  but  she  could  never  replace  the 
loss  of  her  veterans.  She  could  not  again  tyrannise  over  Eu- 
rope. She  might  win  victories,  she  might  defend  her  frontiers, 
she  might  emerge  honourably  from  the  contest,  but  she  could 
no  nore  hope  to  dictate  terms  to  Europe  after  Blenheim,  than 
she  could  a  century  later  after  the  retreat  from  Moscow.     But 

PERIOD    V,  Z 


354  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

Blenheim  had  not  only  put  a  bridle  in  the  mouth  of  Louis  xiv., 
it  had  not  only  destroyed  his  veteran  army,  it  had  not  only 
saved  the  Emperor  from  absolute  ruin,  it  had  unexpectedly 
brought  to  light  a  new  and  most  important  factor  among  the 
decisive  forces  of  Europe.  The  English  sailor  had  been  recog- 
nised as  a  formidable  power  since  the  days  of  the  Armada,  but 
the  English  soldier  had  not  had  an  opportunity  of  proving  his 
real  worth  since  the  fight  of  Agincourt.  Blenheim  was  as  im- 
portant an  event  in  the  history  of  civilised  warfare  as  Rocroy,  not 
because  it  gave  the  death  blow  to  an  antiquated  system  of 
tactics,  but  because  it  was  the  birthplace  of  a  new  military 
power  of  the  first  class.  From  Blenheim  to  Waterloo  the  Eng- 
lish soldier  stands  out  as  the  best  fighting  material  in  Europe, 
and  England  takes  her  place  among  the  first  military  nations 
of  the  world. 

While  France  was  losing  her  mihtary  prestige  and  superiority 
„.    „    ...     at  Blenheim  she  received  a  humiliating  reminder 

The  English  o 

gain  the  of  her   inferiority  at   sea.      In  1702  a  combined 

mastery  in       ^^^^  ^^f  English  and  Dutch  ships  was  sent  under 

the  Mediter-  °  '■ 

ranean,  1702-  the  Command  of  Sir  George  Rooke  to  the  coast  of 
*'"'^"  Spain,  which  by  a  stroke  of  good  luck  fell  in  with 

the  Spanish  plate  fleet  and  the  French  ships  which  were  pro- 
tecting it  in  the  harbour  of  Vigo,  and  after  a  spirited  action 
completely  destroyed  them  both.  Two  years  afterwards,  in 
the  summer  of  1704,  Rooke  captured  the  impregnable  rock 
of  Gibraltar,  and  defeated  the  French  fleet  which  attempted 
its  recovery.  This  gave  England  an  important  position  in  the 
Mediterranean,  the  value  of  which  made  itself  gradually  recog- 
nised as  the  century  wore  on,  and  estabhshed  the  superiority 
of  the  allies  at  sea,  the  effect  of  which  soon  resulted  in  the  loss 
of  Italy  to  the  French  power.  Directly  north  Italy  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  imperialists,  as  it  did  after  the  brilliant  cam- 
paign of  prince  Eugene  in  Italy  in  1 706,  there  was  no  means 
of  keeping  up  communications  between  Naples  and  France. 
Consequently  after  the  victory  of  prince  Eugene  at  Turin  in 
1706  had  finally  driven  the  French  back  behind  their  own 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  355 

frontier,  a  revolution  broke  out  at  Naples  which  ended  in  the 
total  loss  of  Italy  to  the  French  cause. 

After  the  battle  of  Blenheim  the  French  armies  were  obliged 
to  act  upon  the  defensive,  and  the  interest  of  the  war  turned 
once  more  to  the  Netherlands.  In  1705  Marlborough  took 
up  in  earnest  the  plan  with  which  he  had  deceived  Villeroy 
and   the   Dutch    the    year   before.     He  arranged    ,^    .^   ,   ^ 

■>  °  Death  of  the 

with  prince  Louis  of  Baden  (for  Eugene  had  Emperor 
returned  to  his  command  in  Italy),  a  combined  Leopold,  1705. 
attack  upon  France  by  the  Moselle  and  the  Saar,  in  order  to 
turn  the  defensive  fortresses  of  the  Netherlands.  But  time 
sHpped  away,  and  the  aUies  had  not  completed  their  prepara- 
tions, when  in  May  1705  the  Emperor  Leopold  died,  and  the 
imperial  troops  were  summoned  home.  All  hope  of  a  com- 
bined movement  had  to  be  abandoned.  At  the  same  time 
Villeroy,  who  commanded  upon  the  Meuse,  moved  forward 
and  threatened  Liege.  Marlborough  at  once  left  the  Moselle 
and  marched  to  relieve  Liege,  and  Villeroy  retired  into  the 
fortified  lines  of  the  Mehaigne  between  Antwerp  Marlborough 
and  Namur,  just  as  Boufflers  had  done  in  1703.  forces  the 
But  by  this  time  the  Dutch  had  learned  to  have  Mehaigne, 
somewhat  more  confidence  in  Marlborough's  '705- 
skill,  and  he  was  permitted  to  attack.  Making  a  feint  at 
the  two  extremities  of  the  lines  he  easily  forced  them  in  the 
centre  at  Tirlemont,  and  drove  Villeroy  back  on  Louvain  and 
Brussels,  thus  cutting  him  off  from  Namur  and  his  direct  com- 
munications with  France.  The  marshal  took  up  a  position 
behind  the  Dyle,  which  the  Dutch  thought  too  strong  to  be 
safely  attacked  in  front,  and  Marlborough  moved  to  the  west 
to  turn  it  and  threaten  Brussels.  To  save  Brussels  the  French 
retired  on  the  city,  and  stood  at  bay  near  the  forest  of  Soignies, 
on  ground  which  in  a  little  more  than  a  hundred  years  was  to 
become  celebrated  for  all  time  as  the  English  position  at 
Waterloo.  Marlborough  in  pursuit  took  up  the  ground  after- 
wards occupied  by  Napoleon  and  prepared  to  attack.  But 
Dutch   timidity  stepped   in   to  prevent   this  most   interesting 


356  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

rehearsal  of  the  last  tragedy  of  the  Napoleonic  war  with  the 
parts  reversed.  Marlborough  was  forced  to  retire  when  the 
prey  was  in  his  grasp.  Deeply  chagrined  he  contemplated 
leaving  the  struggle  in  the  Netherlands  to  the  Dutch,  and  com- 
bining his  forces  with  those  of  the  gallant  Eugene  in  Italy,  but 
this  was  not  permitted.  He  could  not  be  spared  as  long  as 
Villeroy  was  unhurt  on  the  Dyle,  and  Villars  held  his  own 
upon  the  Rhine.  So  in  the  spring  of  1 706  he  again  took  com- 
Campaign  mand  of  the  army  of  Flanders  and  prepared  to 
of  1706.  bring  Villeroy  to  book.     That  incapable  and  boast- 

ful general  was  equally  anxious  to  cross  swords  with  the  hero 
of  Blenheim.  Refusing  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  a  reinforce- 
ment of  15,000  men  under  Marsin,  who  were  on  their  way,  he 
left  the  line  of  the  Dyle  in  the  spring,  and  marched  towards 
Namur.  On  his  way  Marlborough  met  him  at  Ramillies  on 
23d  of  May. 

Villeroy  had  chosen  his  ground  with  some  skill.  His  right 
occupied  the  village  of  Tavidres,  which  stood  on  a  slight 
Battle  of  eminence  above  the  Mehaigne,  and  was  protected 
Ramillies.  j^y  ^^<^  Stream.  His  centre  rested  upon  the 
village  of  Ramillies,  which,  with  the  mound  called  the  tumulus 
of  Ottomond  behind  it,  formed  the  key  of  the  position.  His 
left  was  defended  by  the  marshes  in  which  the  stream  of  the 
little  Gheet  rises.  The  bulk  of  his  troops  were  massed  at 
Tavi^res  and  Ramillies,  and  his  left  being  so  well  defended  by 
the  nature  of  the  ground  was  very  weakly  held.  The  quick 
eye  of  Marlborough  soon  detected  this  defect.  He  saw  too 
that  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground  within  his  own  position 
he  could  move  troops  from  his  own  right  to  his  centre  without 
being  observed  by  the  enemy.  On  these  two  facts  he  based 
his  plan  of  battle.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  23d  of  May 
he  directed  a  strong  and  imposing  attack  against  the  French 
left.  Villeroy  thinking  that  he  was  going  to  force  his  way  over 
the  marshes  of  the  little  Gheet,  as  he  had  forced  his  way  over 
the  marshes  of  the  Nebel,  began  to  hurry  up  troops  from  his 
centre  in  hot   haste  to  defend   his  threatened   left.     Directly 


The  War  of  tJic  Spanish  Succession  357 

Marlborough  saw  this  movement,  he  marched  the  bulk  of  his 
troops  from  his  right  to  his  centre  under  cover  of  the  ground, 
so  that  the  operation  could  not  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  merely 
leaving  enough  men  before  the  French  left  to  keep  Villeroy 
persuaded  that  the  main  attack  was  still  being  made  in  that 
quarter.  When  all  was  prepared  he  suddenly  launched  the 
bulk  of  his  army  upon  the  weakened  French  centre  between 
Tavi^res  and  Ramilhes.  Tavi^res  was  carried  by  the  impetu- 
ous rush  but  the  battle  was  not  yet  won.  The  Maison  du  Roi, 
mindful  of  their  old  fame,  and  burning  to  avenge  the  disgrace 
of  Blenheim,  checked  the  advance  of  the  alhes  upon  Ramillies 
by  repeated  and  heroic  charges.  The  French  infantry  hurried 
back  to  their  old  posts  from  the  left,  and  round  the  village 
of  Ramillies  the  battle  swayed  backwards  and  forwards  for 
some  time.  At  last  the  French  fell  slowly  back,  the  village 
was  won,  and  the  centre  of  the  French  position  forced.  Ville- 
roy gave  the  signal  for  a  retreat  which  quickly  changed  into 
a  rout.  His  army  was  destroyed  as  a  fighting  force.  In  rapid 
succession  the  chief  towns  of  the  Netherlands  opened  their 
gates  to  the  victorious  allies,  and  the  French  were  driven  back 
to  the  line  of  the  frontier  fortresses. 

The  battle  of  Turin  and  the  battle  of  Ramillies  had  reduced 
France  to  the  line  of  her  frontiers,  but  in  the  next  year  a 
gleam  of  success  visited  the  arms  of  her  indefatigable  master. 
Marlborough  was  too  much  occupied  with  the  negotiations 
at  Altranstadt  and  hampered  by  the  badness  of  the 

,  .  -   .  ,  .,        Expedition 

weather  to  attempt  anything  of  importance,  while  of  the  Arch- 
on  the  Rhine  Villars  succeeded  in  capturing  the  ^^^^  Charies 
lines  of  Stolhofen  and  preventing  the  imperialists 
from  moving.  But  the  best  news  came  from  Spain.  In  the 
year  1703  through  the  exertions  of  Methuen,  the  English 
ambassador  at  Lisbon,  a  treaty  had  been  negotiated  between 
England  and  Portugal,  which  had  the  effect  of  making  Portugal 
the  devoted  political  adherent  of  England  for  more  than  a 
century,  and  of  introducing  English  statesmen  to  the  too 
seductive  influences  of  port  wine.     By  the  accession  of  Portu- 


358  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

gal  to  the  Grand  Alliance  an  opening  was  made  for  the  arch- 
duke Charles  to  make  good  his  claims  to  his  kingdom.  In 
1 704  he  landed  at  Lisbon  with  a  force  of  1 2,000  English  and 
Dutch  troops  under  Schomberg  with  the  object  of  invading 
Spain.  The  expedition  met  with  little  success  and  Galway 
replaced  Schomberg  in  1705.  In  the  same  year  the  English 
ministry  sent  the  earl  of  Peterborough  at  the  head  of  5000 
men  to  the  assistance  of  the  duke  of  Savoy,  but  gave  him  per- 
mission to  employ  himself  in  Spain  if  he  found  an  opportunity. 
Peterborough,  who  was  a  man  of  brilliant  imagination  and 
boastful  temperament,  induced  the  archduke  to  trust  himself 
to  his  guidance.  Sailing  round  the  coast  of  Spain  he  landed 
in  Catalonia,  captured  Barcelona,  chiefly  through  the  efforts  of 
prince  George  of  Darmstadt  in  October  1705,  and  quickly 
made  himself  master  of  Arragon. 

In  the   following   year   Galway  determined    to  support  the 

success  achieved  in  Arragon  by  marching  upon  Madrid  from 

Portugal.     The    French   armies  were   engaged   in 

His  power  °  . 

limited  to  a  fruitless  siege  of  Barcelona,  and  Galway  occupied 
Catalonia.  Madrid  and  proclaimed  the  archduke  Charles  as 
king  almost  without  opposition.  But  now  the  political  wisdom 
of  the  determination  of  Louis  not  to  force  a  foreign  king  upon 
the  Spaniards  against  their  will  showed  itself.  A  national 
opposition  to  Charles  quickly  grew  up  in  1 706,  just  as  it  did 
a  century  later  to  Joseph  Buonaparte.  Wherever  the  English 
soldiers  were  quartered,  all  was  submission.  Directly  their 
backs  were  turned  all  was  opposition.  To  make  things  worse 
disease  broke  out  among  the  troops,  and  Galway  found  it 
necessary  to  retire  from  Madrid  and  join  Charles  and  Peter- 
borough in  Arragon.  In  the  next  year  he  determined  to 
repeat  the  attempt,  and  leaving  Charles  at  Barcelona  sailed 
down  to  Valencia,  and  marched  from  there  on  Madrid.  At 
Almanza  he  was  met  by  Berwick,  who  had  lately  been  strongly 
reinforced  from  the  army  of  Italy,  and  was  completely  crushed. 
Valencia  and  Arragon  were  lost,  and  the  power  of  Charles 
limited   to  the  turbulent   province  of  Catalonia.     From   that 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  359 

time  the  allies  ceased  for  some  years  to  make  any  serious 
efforts  to  oust  Philip  v.  by  force  from  the  throne  of  Spain. 
Galway  was  recalled  and  Stanhope  appointed  in  his  place,  but 
with  the  exception  of  the  capture  of  Port  Mahon  in  Minorca 
in  1708  he  was  unable  to  achieve  anything  of  importance. 
Having  failed  in  open  warfare  the  allies  found  diplomacy  a 
better  weapon  with  which  to  effect  the  retirement  of  Philip  v. 

The  security  of  Spain  and  the  defeat  of  the  imperialists  on 
the  Rhine  in  1707  nerved  Louis  to  make  a  great  effort  in  1708 
to  recover  the  ground  which   he   had   lost.     He   „     .  „    . 

°  Great  efforts 

fitted  out  a  fleet  to  land  the  Chevaher  in  Scotland  of  Louis  in 
and  take  advantage  of  the  hostility  felt  to  the  Act  '^°^" 
of  Union  with  England,  which  had  been  lately  passed.  He 
placed  one  army  under  Berwick  on  the  Moselle  to  watch 
Eugene  and  the  imperialists,  while  the  main  force  under 
Vendome  advanced  and  occupied  almost  without  opposition 
the  great  towns  of  Ghent  and  Bruges  in  Flanders,  and  estab- 
lished itself  behind  the  Scheldt,  prepared  to  move  forward  when 
Berwick  was  ready  to  co-operate.  In  July,  finding  Marlborough 
still  inactive,  Vendome  advanced  his  right  wing  as  far  as  Mons, 
and  laid  siege  to  Oudenarde  in  the  centre,  thus  spreading  him- 
self out  in  an  extended  line  over  the  whole  country  between 
Mons  and  Bruges.  Marlborough  saw  his  opportunity.  Sending 
in  haste  to  Eugene  to  join  him  with  his  cavalry  he  struck 
sharply  at  the  centre  of  the  French  position.  Vendome  at 
once  perceived  his  mistake  and  concentrated  his  army  on  Ouden- 
arde by  a  hurried  retreat.  Marlborough  and  Eugene  followed 
him  with  all  speed,  pushed  his  rear  guard  over  the  Scheldt, 
and  finally  forced  it  to  turn  and  give  battle  a  few  miles  from 
Oudenarde  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  The  battle  did  not 
begin  till  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  It  was  a  soldiers'  fight. 
Each  regiment  as  it  came  up  took  ground  as  best  ^^^  battle  of 
it  could  and  engaged.  But  the  allies  had  the  ad-  Oudenarde, 
vantage  of  a  single  command.  The  French  gen-  ''"^' 
erals  Vendome  and  the  duke  of  Burgundy  in  the  excitement  and 
hurry  of  a  disorganised  mel^e  gave  contradictory  orders,  and 


360  European  History,    1 598-171 5 

made  confusion  worse  confounded.  Eventually  Marlborough 
succeeded  in  outnumbering  the  French  right,  turning  it  and 
driving  it  off  the  field.  That  operation  put  an  end  to  the 
battle.  The  French  retired  on  Ghent.  Marlborough  had  suc- 
ceeded in  interposing  his  army  between  the  French  and  the 
frontier.  Nothing  stood  between  him  and  Paris  except  the 
great  fortresses  of  the  frontier  of  which  Lille  was  the  greatest. 
It  is  said  that  he  wished  to  neglect  the  fortress  altogether  and 
march  straight  upon  Paris,  but  that  the  scheme  was  too  bold 
even  for  Eugene,  considering  that  Bouiiflers  held  the  place  with 
15,000  men  and  Berwick  was  at  Mons  with  30,000.  In  August 
the  siege  was  begun.  Eugene  took  charge  of  the  trenches, 
while  Marlborough,  posted  between  the  Lys  and  the  Scheldt, 
protected  the  convoys  coming  from  Ostend,  and  prevented 
Berwick  or  Vendome  from  marching  to  the  assistance  of  the 
doomed  city.  Neither  dared  to  attempt  a  rescue.  They  con- 
tented themselves  with  trying  to  cut  off  convoys.  After  an 
Capture  of  attempt  of  this  sort  had  been  entirely  defeated  at 
Lille.  Wynendaal  on  September  27th,  more  by  the  valour 

of  General  Webb  than  by  the  skill  of  Marlborough,  Lille  could 
hold  out  no  longer.  On  the  22nd  of  October  the  city  surren- 
dered. Vendome  made  his  way  safely  to  Mons,  which  with 
Namur  now  remained  the  only  great  fortress  in  the  hands  of 
France.     Paris  lay  open  to  the  advance  of  the  allies. 

But  just  in  proportion  as  the  opportunities  for  a  brilliant  and 

decisive  campaign  were  opening  out  to  the  allies  their  ability 

,    .,     to  take  advantage  of  them  was  diminishing.     In 

Unpopularity  °  ° 

of  the  war  in  England  the  Strain  of  the  long  war  was  making 
England.  itself  felt  in  spite  of  the  accessions  to  her  colonies 
and  trade  which  her  supremacy  over  the  sea  was  daily  making. 
Tory  feeling  reasserted  itself  directly  the  danger  to  European 
liberty  and  English  commerce  passed  away  after  the  battle  of 
Blenheim.  No  one  in  England  cared  one  straw  whether  Bour- 
bon or  Habsburg  sat  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  as  long  as  the 
free  and  peaceful  development  of  Europe  and  England  went 
quietly  on.     Within  the  precincts  of  the  court  itself  a  revolution 


TJie  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  361 

was  in  progress,  and  every  courtier  knew  that  the  ascendency 
of  the  duchess  of  Marlborough  over  the  mind  of  Anne  was  a 
thing  of  the  past.     In  this  state  of  affairs  Marlborough  did  not 
dare  to  run  the  risk  of  a  doubtful  campaign.     In  the  field  he 
restricted  himself  to  the  common-place.      In  the  cabinet  he 
professed  himself  willing    to  listen    to    suggestions  of  peace. 
Louis  was  overjoyed  at  the  news.     France  was  in  a   Exhaustion 
state  of  extreme  exhaustion.     Her  veteran  armies   °^  France, 
were  destroyed,  her  magazines  empty,  her  generals  discredited. 
The  taxes  had  reached  a  point  beyond  which  taxation  could 
no  further  go.     Offices  were  created  by  the  hundred  to  be  sold 
for  what  they  would  fetch.     Loans  could  be  raised  no  longer. 
The  capitation  tax  was  made  permanent,  and  even  births,  mar- 
riages, and  deaths  were  obliged  to  contribute  to  the  revenue. 
To  make  the  misery  still  more  intolerable  the  terribly  severe 
winter  of  1 708-9  destroyed  the  fruit  trees  and  the  vines,  and 
brought  the  horrors  of  famine  into  the  fairest  districts  of  France. 
Early  in  1709  negotiations  were  begun  at  the  Hague,  but  it 
soon  appeared  that  the  allies  were  determined  not  merely  to 
humiliate  Louis  but  to  disgrace  him.     They  demanded  as  a 
condition    precedent   to    entering   on  negotiations  for  a  final 
treaty  of  peace,  that  Louis  was  to  surrender  Mons  and  Namur, 
evacuate  Alsace  including  Strasburg,  and  force  his  y^ppggi  ^^ 
grandson  Phihp  v.  to  retire  from  Spain.     The  obli-   Louis  to 
gation  to  make  war  upon  his  own  grandson  in  the   a'^a^nstthe 
interests  of  the  enemy  was  more  than  Louis,  dis-   demands  of 
pirited  as  he  was,  could  with  honour  accept.     He   ^^^  a"»es- 
determined  to  appeal  to  French  patriotism  against  terms  so 
cruelly  unjust.      France  responded   nobly  to  his  call.      Men 
volunteered  everywhere  to  protect  the  sacred  soil  of  France 
from  the  invader.     Nobles  sent  their  plate,  ladies  their  jewels, 
and  the  peasants  their  hoarded   sous  to  organise  a  national 
army.      Never  was  Louis  more  truly  king  and  leader  of  his 
people  than  when  in  the  days  of  his  humiliation  he  sent  the 
last  army  of  France  to  the  front  in  1 709. 

Villars  was  selected  as  the  general  to  be  entrusted  with  the 


362  Eiiropean  History,   1 598-171 5 

last  hopes  of  France.  He  proved  himself  equal  to  the  respon- 
sibility. Carefully  entrenching  himself  in  strong  positions, 
Battle  of  vvhile  he  trained  his  recruits  and  collected  suppHes, 
Maipiaquet,  he  trusted  to  the  great  ally  Time  whom  he  knew 
^^"^^  could  not  fail  him.     At  last  as  the  summer  grew 

on  Marlborough  and  Eugene,  not  daring  to  attack  him  in  his 
camp  near  Lens,  marched  upon  Mons,  and  Villars  was  forced 
to  advance  in  order  to  relieve  it.  He  took  up  an  almost  im- 
pregnable position  at  Maipiaquet,  resting  his  two  flanks  on 
wooded  heights,  and  holding  the  gap  in  the  middle,  which  he 
had  strongly  entrenched,  with  his  main  force.  There  he 
awaited  the  onslaught  of  the  allies.  There  was  nothing  for  it 
but  a  front  attack.  The  position,  if  taken  at  all,  must  be  taken 
by  a  direct  assault.  On  the  nth  of  September  Marlborough 
and  Eugene  hurled  their  troops  up  the  gap.  It  was  not  a 
battle,  it  was  a  carnage.  Fighting  desperately  hand-to-hand, 
the  victors  of  Blenheim  and  Ramillies  at  last  forced  the  posi- 
tion. Villars  himself  was  wounded,  but  Boufflers  who  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command  effected  his  retreat  in  good  order. 
Mons  remained  the  prize  of  the  conquerors. 

The  battle  of  Maipiaquet  was  more  honourable  to  the  van- 
quished than  to  the  victors.  It  did  not  even  re-establish 
Marlborough's  influence  in  England.  In  the  year  in  which  it 
was  fought  the  duchess  was  dismissed  from  her  court  appoint- 
ssaiof  '^^^ts.  In  the  following  year  a  definitely  Tory 
Marlborough,  and  peace  ministry  was  formed  under  Harley.  It 
*^*'"  was  obvious  that  the  dismissal  of  Marlborough  was 

only  a  question  of  time.  Determined  to  run  no  risk,  he  con- 
tented himself  with  forcing  Villars  slowly  back  into  France. 
At  the  beginning  of  1711  he  learned  that  the  ministry  had 
secretly  opened  negotiations  for  peace,  and  he  proceeded 
methodically  to  drive  Villars  back  from  one  position  to  another 
while  awaiting  the  final  blow.  Political  necessities  had  entirely 
superseded  military  opportunities.  At  last  the  blow  fell.  On 
December  31st,  1711,  he  was  dismissed  from  a  command 
which  had  long  ceased  to  be  a  reality. 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  363 

Meanwhile  in  Spain  the  necessities  of  Louis  actually  strength- 
ened the  position  of  Philip  v.  In  1 709  all  the  French  troops 
were   withdrawn   to   defend    their   own    frontiers.   „  , 

Defeat  of 

Stanhope  and  Stahremberg,  who  commanded  the  the  allies  in 
imperialists,  accordingly  advanced  against  Philip  in  ^p"'"-  '7«o- 
1 710,  drove  him  first  out  of  Arragon,  then  almost  out  of  Castile 
to  Valladolid,  and  occupied  Madrid.  The  result  was  a  national 
movement  of  the  Spaniards  in  favour  of  their  king.  Louis  al- 
lowed Vendome  to  take  command  of  the  Spanish  army.  The 
aUies  found  it  impossible  to  maintain  themselves  at  Madrid,  and 
retreated  in  two  divisions  upon  Arragon.  Vendome  manoeu- 
vring with  great  skill  forced  himself  between  them,  surrounded 
Stanhope  at  Brihuega  and  obliged  him  to  capitulate,  then  throw- 
ing himself  on  Stahremberg,  routed  him  at  Villa  Viciosa,  and 
drove  him  back  to  Barcelona.  Again  the  Spaniards  had  em- 
phatically pronounced  their  determination  that  Philip,  and  none 
but  Philip,  should  reign  over  them. 

In  spite  of  this  the  allies  were  still  endeavouring  to  compel 
Louis  to  make  war  upon  his  grandson.  In  the  winter  of  1 709-10 
negotiations  were  resumed  at  Gertruydenberg.  Louis  consented 
to  surrender  Alsace,  and  offered  not  only  to  recognise  the  arch- 
duke Charles  as  king,  but  to  forbid  his  subjects  to   „      ^.  ,. 

°'  •"  Negotiations 

serve  in  Spain,  and  even  to  provide  supphes  for  the   of  Gertruy- 
allied  armies  in  Spain.     But  the  aUies  were  deter-   ^^^^^^s- 
mined  to  put  Louis  openly  to  shame  before  the  face  of  Europe, 
and  insisted  that  he  should  force  his  grandson  to  resign  the 
crown.     Again  the  negotiations  fell  through.     They  were  not 
renewed.     Directly  a   Tory   ministry   came    into    power   they 
opened  private  communications  with  Louis  without  taking  their 
allies  into  their  confidence.     By  September  171 1    The  treaty 
an  agreement  was  arrived  at  between  France  and   of  Utrecht, 
England  alone,  and  preliminaries  of  peace  settled.   '^'^' 
These  were  then  communicated  to  the  Dutch  and  the  other 
allies,  and  were  accepted  with  some  protests  by  all  except  the 
Emperor.     In  accordance  with  the  preliminaries  a  congress  was 
held  at  Utrecht  in  171 2,  and  the  final  peace  drawn  up  there 
and  signed  in  17:3. 


364  European  History,    1 598-1 71 5 

The  Emperor  still  stubbornly  refused  to  yield.  In  1711,  that 
terrible  year  of  mortality  among  princely  houses,  Joseph  i.  had 
^^  died,  and  the  archduke  Charles  was  now  Emperor. 

The  war  con-  '  ^ 

tinued  by  the  His  pride  would  not  suffer  him  to  surrender  the 
Emperor.  crown  of  Spain  to  his  rival,  and  Eugene  was  in- 
structed to  push  on  military  operations  in  spite  of  the  defection 
of  the  English.  Without  the  aid  of  Marlborough  even  Eugene 
was  powerless  against  the  patriotism  of  France.  Beaten  at  the 
bridge  of  Denain  by  Villars  in  171 2,  he  was  driven  back  to  the 
frontier  of  the  Netherlands,  and  had  in  consequence  of  the  con- 
clusion of  the  peace  to  transfer  his  army  to  the  upper  Rhine. 
But  misfortune  pursued  him  there.  In  1713  Villars  burst  into 
^     ,.       .      Alsace,   crossed   the    Rhine   at    Strasburg,    forced 

Treaties  of  '  °' 

Rastadt  and  Eugenc  from  his  entrenched  camp  at  Freiburg,  and 
Baden.  obliged  the  Emperor  at  last  to  consent  to  make 

peace.  The  definitive  treaties  were  eventually  signed  at  Rastadt 
and  Baden  in  17 14. 

By  the  treaties  of  Utrecht,  Rastadt,  and  Baden,  generally 
Terms  of  the  grouped  together  under  the  name  of  the  Peace  of 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  the  following  arrangements  were  effected. 

Utrecht. 

(i)  Philip  V.  was  recognised  as  King  of  Spain  and  the  Indies,  on 
the  condition  that  the  crowns  of  France  and  Spain  should 
never  be  united  on  the  same  head. 

(2)  Naples,  the  Milanese,  Sardinia,  and  the  Netherlands  were  given 

to  the  Emperor,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  Dutch  to  the  mili- 
tary government  of  Furnes,  Ypres,  Menin,  Ghent,  Tournai, 
Mons,  Charleroi,  and  Namur  as  their  barrier  against  France. 

(3)  France  was  permitted  to  retain  Alsace  including  Strasburg,  as 

she  had  been  by  the  peace  of  Ryswick,  but  she  had  to  sur- 
render the  fortresses  of  Kehl  Breisach  and  Freiburg,  which 
she  had  seized  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

(4)  The  electors  of  Koln  and  Bavaria  were  restored,  the  succession 

of  the  House  of  Hanover  in  England  acknowledged,  and  the 
Chevalier  banished  from  France. 

(5)  England  received   Gibraltar,  Minorca,  Newfoundland  (subject 

to  certain  rights  of  fishing  on  the  banks),  Hudson's  Bay, 
Acadia,  and  S.  Kitts,  and  acquired  by  an  assiento,  or  agree- 


TJie  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  365 

ment,  with  Spain  the  right  to  trade  under  strict  limitations 
with  certain  town  in  Spanish  waters  set  apart  for  the  purpose. 

(6)  The  kingdom  of  Prussia  was  recognised  and    received    upper 

Guelderland. 

(7)  Sicily  and  part  of  the  Milanese  were  given  to  the  duke  of  Savoy, 

and  the  fortifications  of  Dunkirk  were  agreed  to  be  demol- 
ished. 

The  peace  of  Utrecht  has  been  denounced  perhaps  with 
greater  fervour  than  any  of  the  great  settlements  of  European 
affairs,  except  the  treaty  of  Vienna  in  181  c.     But   _. 

,      ,  -^  The  peace 

in  these  denunciations  attention  has  usually  been  justly  liable 
directed  more  to  the  particular  interests  of  nations  *°  '=="^"''^- 
and  parties  than  to  the  general  welfare  of  Europe.  From  this 
circumscribed  point  of  view  much  may  be  said  against  the  treaty 
itself,  and  still  more  against  the  means  which  were  taken  to 
bring  it  about.  To  institute  secret  negotiations  for  a  private 
peace,  behind  the  back  of  her  own  allies,  was  a  proceeding 
most  unworthy  of  England.  To  leave  the  Catalans  and  the 
Cevennois  entirely  without  protection  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
Philip  and  Louis,  after  they  had  been  induced  to  rise  against 
their  rulers  by  the  promises  and  assistance  of  the  allies,  was 
both  a  crime  and  a  blunder.  Who  could  trust  to  English  faith 
again?  To  permit  PhiUp  to  retain  the  crown  of  Spain,  and 
France  to  keep  Alsace,  to  the  detriment  of  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg,  was  unfair  to  the  one  power  which  had  consistently  op- 
posed the  supremacy  of  France,  and  unfaithful  to  the  pledges 
of  the  Grand  Alliance.  All  this  is  to  a  certain  extent  true. 
After  the  concessions  made  by  Louis  at  the  Hague  and  Gert- 
ruydenberg,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  would  eventually  have 
signed  a  treaty  much  more  favourable  to  the  Emperor  and  his 
supporters  than  the  peace  actually  made,  rather  y^^  ^  recog- 
than  run  the  risk  of  continuing  the  war.  It  may  nition  of  ex- 
be  admitted  that  the  Tory  ministry  made  peace  as  '^*'"^ 
quickly  as  they  could,  without  much  consideration  for  anybody 
except  themselves,  in  order  to  be  free  from  foreign  complica- 
tions when  the  crisis  of  the  succession  should  occur  at  home. 


366  European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 

Yet  from  the  larger  point  of  view  of  the  welfare  of  Europe,  the 
peace  of  Utrecht,  like  its  predecessor  the  peace  of  Westphalia, 
mainly  registered  and  sanctioned  accomplished  facts.  Sub- 
stantially it  ordered  Europe  for  the  future  on  the  basis  of  devel- 
opment at  which  it  had  then  arrived. 

Since  the  last  great  settlement  of  the  affairs  of  Europe  three 
great  changes  had  occurred  in  European  politics. 

(i)  France  had  acquired  beyond  all  question  the  position  of 
the  leading  nation  of  Europe,  and  that,  not  merely 
nisedthedue  through  the  cxtcnsiou  of  her  frontiers,  the  splen- 
position  of  (jour  of  her  court,  or  the  ambition  of  her  king  ;  but 
through  the  energy  and  ability  of  her  people,  the 
richness  of  her  soil,  and  the  advantages  of  her  geographical 
position.  A  settlement  of  Europe,  which  ignored  this  fact, 
could  not  stand  for  ten  years,  and  the  aUies  showed  their 
wisdom  in  permitting  France  to  retain  the  position  which 
she  had  legitimately  won,  and  guarding  against  her  abuse 
of  it  by  forming  states  on  her  frontiers,  powerful  enough  to 
keep  her  in  check.  Events  proved  that  they  were  right.  Aus- 
tria and  the  Dutch  in  combination  on  the  dangerous  northern 
frontier,  Prussia  and  the  Empire  to  the  east,  Savoy  to  the  south- 
east, with  Austria  in  reserve  in  Italy,  were  as  a  matter  of  fact 
found  strong  enough  to  deal  with  France  in  the  eighteenth 
century ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  balance  of  power  and  the 
European  states  system  were  alike  swept  away  by  the  militant 
democracy  of  the  Revolution,  that  France  became  once  more 
a  menace  to  the  liberties  of  Europe. 

(2)  England  had  launched  herself  on  that  career  of  colonial 

and   commercial   ascendency  which  has  made  her  the  most 

a.  The  com-     prosperous  country  in  the  world.     She  was  learning 

merciai  and  ^q  found  her  colonial  empire  more  upon  the  con- 
maritime  SU-  ...  ,  .    ,     ^  ,  - 

premacy  of  quests  of  colouics,  which  France  could  not  support, 
England.  than  upon  the  efforts  of  her  own  children.  Her 
acknowledged  superiority  at  sea,  dating  from  the  battle  of  La 
Hogue,  emphasised  by  the  battle  of  Vigo,  and  the  capture  of 
Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  might  from  time  to  time  be  questioned 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  367 

by  France  and  Spain,  it  could  never  be  overthrown,  and  it 
brought  naturally  with  it  the  acquisition  of  French  colonies  and 
Spanish  trade  privileges.  The  assiento  was  the  thin  end  of  the 
wedge  by  which  England  soon  obtained  the  lion's  share  of  the 
lucrative  and  nefarious  slave  trade.  The  cessions  in  north 
America  were  the  beginning  of  her  hold  over  the  vast  stretches 
of  land  to  the  north  of  her  plantations,  which  were  to  be 
reduced  wholly  under  her  rule  during  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  are  now  known  as  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  and  the  colony 
of  British  Columbia.  •  In  securing  to  England  power  and  privi- 
leges, which  she  alone,  owing  to  her  maritime  supremacy, 
could  properly  use,  the  peace  not  only  helped  her  forward  on 
her  true  line  of  national  development,  but  contributed  in  no 
slight  degree  to  add  to  the  resources  and  prosperity  of  the 
world  at  large. 

(3)  The  dismembermcDt  of  the  Empire,  which  had  been 
recognised  and  made  permanent  by  the  peace  of  Westphalia, 
had  finally  removed  the  last  vestiges  of  national  feel-  j^  estab- 
ing  and  national  policy  in  Germany.  The  smaller  ushed  Euro- 
German  states  grouped  themselves  for  purposes  ''ua"/^^^'' 
of  offence  or  defence  naturally  around  the  larger  against 
powers  of  the  north  and  south, — Prussia  and  Austria.  ^''^"'=*=- 
The  barrier  to  French  aggression  on  the  Rhine  had  therefore 
to  be  sought,  not  in  bolstering  up  an  effete  institution  like  the 
Empire,  out  of  which  vitality  had  long  ago  departed,  but  in 
strengthening  and  utilising  the  national  forces  of  the  two  leading 
powers.  The  peace  of  Utrecht  adopted  this  policy  as  far  as 
was  at  that  time  possible.  It  planted  Prussia  as  a  sentinel  over 
against  France  on  the  lower  Rhine,  and  added  to  her  posses- 
sions in  that  quarter  as  well  as  to  her  general  dignity,  in  order 
to  make  her  discharge  her  duties  with  the  greater  zeal.  The 
subsequent  history  of  Europe  is  one  long  commentary  on  the 
wisdom  of  this  policy.  Austria  required  no  incentive  to  fulfil 
a  similar  task  in  the  upper  Rhine  and  in  Italy,  but  she  was 
sadly  deficient  in  the  necessary  resources.  In  the  last  war  the 
gold  of  England  and  the  armies  of  England  alone  had  saved 


368  European  History,   1 598-171 5 

her  from  irretrievable  ruin.  By  giving  over  to  her  the  richest 
part  of  Italy,  and  defending  her  from  French  attack  by  the 
buffer  state  of  Savoy,  the  peace  did  all  that  was  possible  to 
strengthen  the  defences  of  Europe  against  a  renewal  of  French 
tyranny,  while  ministering  to  the  dynastic  ambition  of  the 
House  of  Habsburg. 

If  Europe  had  no  just  reason  to  find  fault  with  the  peace  of 

Utrecht  from  the  point  of  view  of  her  larger  interests,  neither 

could  the  nations  themselves  complain  that  their 

Advantages  '■ 

gained  by  individual  aspiratious  had  been  unduly  neglected, 
the  peace.  ^w  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  in  spite  of  the  gro- 
tesque device  of  the  barrier  fortresses,  the  United  Provinces 
gained  a  protection  against  the  aggression  of  France  and  the 
rivalry  of  Antwerp,  not  less  efficient  than  the  Spanish  Nether- 
lands had  proved  to  be.  By  the  partial  opening  of  the  Spanish 
trade,  and  the  establishment  of  a  colonial  empire  by  England, 
the  maritime  nations  obtained  the  extension  of  their  commerce, 
which  was  one  of  the  principal  objects  which  they  hoped  to 
gain  by  taking  up  arms.  Portugal  retained  its  independence 
and  opened  up  through  the  Methuen  treaty  an  important  and 
lucrative  trade  with  England.  Savoy  retained  its  political 
importance  as  a  buffer  state,  and  was  encouraged  to  make  itself 
more  definitely  an  Italian  power.  Prussia  was  received  into  the 
brotherhood  of  independent  monarchies.  Even  Spain,  though 
she  lost  the  integrity  of  her  empire,  was  able  to  retain  the  king 
of  her  own  choice.  It  is  here  that  the  provisions  of  the  peace 
have  been  most  violently  assailed,  but  with  little  justice.  The 
war  of  the  Spanish  Succession  was  fought,  say  the  critics  of 
the  peace,  to  prevent  the  House  of  Bourbon  from  ascending 
the  throne  of  Spain,  and  after  eleven  years  of  terrible  blood- 
shed the  peace  of  Utrecht  sanctioned  the  very  connection 
between  the  two  crowns  of  France  and  Spain,  which  the  Grand 
Alliance  was  formed  to  render  impossible.  The  family  com- 
pacts of  the  eighteenth  century  are  adduced  to  show  the  evil 
effects  of  such  a  policy.  It  may  be  frankly  admitted  that  the 
relations  between  the  houses  of  Habsburg  and  Bourbon  were 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  369 

the  least  satisfactory  parts  of  the  settlements  effected  at  Utrecht, 
and  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  were  the  most  difficult  sat- 
isfactorily to  settle.  It  might  have  been  possible  to  impose  the 
archduke  Charles  upon  the  Spanish  people  under  the  Partition 
Treaty  or  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It  had  become  impos- 
sible in  1 71 2,  when  the  Spaniards  themselves  had  driven  him 
out  without  French  assistance.  It  was  wholly  out  of  the  ques- 
tion when  after  the  death  of  his  brother  Joseph  he  had  become 
Emperor.  Phihp  v.  was  left  on  the  throne  of  Spain  because 
there  was  no  one  else  who  could  be  put  there.  Events  soon 
proved  that  Austria  could  not  even  hold  Naples  and  Sicily 
against  Spain,  much  less  could  she  conquer  her.  The  weak 
point  in  the  peace  of  Utrecht,  the  danger  to  Europe  from  the 
family  compacts,  much  exaggerated  as  it  has  been,  came  from 
a  cause  over  which  the  negotiations  of  the  peace  could  have 
no  control  whatever  —  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  House  of 
Habsburg.  The  danger  to  Europe  from  the  family  compacts 
lay  not  in  the  fact  that  France  and  Spain  were  intrinsically 
so  much  more  powerful  than  Austria,  the  Milanese,  and  Naples, 
but  in  the  far  greater  ability  to  use  their  opportunities  which 
distinguished  the  House  of  Bourbon  and  their  political  advisers. 
The  seventeenth  century  ends  properly  speaking  with  the 
peace  of  Utrecht.  The  earnestness  and  the  ambitions  to 
which  it  had  given  birth  found  in  that  peace  either 
their  accomplishment  or  their  burial  place.  The  of  the  seven- 
attempt  of  France  to  estabhsh  a  dictatorship  over  teenth  cen- 
Europe,  which  has  formed  the  dramatic  interest 
of  the  century,  has  failed.  France  remains  but  one,  and  not 
always  the  chief,  of  the  nations  of  Europe.  The  determination 
of  England  on  the  contrary  to  attain  the  commercial  leadership 
of  the  world,  the  effort  made  by  Prussia  to  obtain  leadership  in 
Germany,  of  Austria  to  obtain  command  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube,  and  a  footing  in  Italy,  have  been  crowned  with  success. 
By  the  treaties  of  Passarovitch  and  Nystadt,  which  were  to  follow 
the  peace  of  Utrecht,  as  the  treaties  of  Oliva  and  the  Pyrenees 
followed  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  Sweden  and  Poland  have  to 

PERIOD  V.  2  A 


370  European  History y   1 598-171 5 

give  way  to  Russia  and  Prussia  in  the  north,  while  Turkey 
stands  face  to  face  with  Russia  on  the  Pruth  and  the  Black 
Sea.  In  the  peace  of  Westphalia  the  rehgious  rivalries  of  the 
century  found  their  appropriate  solution.  In  the  treaties  of 
Utrecht  and  Nystadt  the  political  questions  of  the  century 
received  their  appropriate  answer.  The  rivalry  between  the 
House  of  Bourbon  and  the  House  of  Habsburg  for  the  Rhine 
was  over.  The  aggrandisement  of  Prussia,  the  rise  of  Russia, 
the  development  of  England,  the  failure  of  Sweden,  the  decline 
of  the  Ottoman  Turks,  were  accomplished  facts,  recognised 
and  dealt  with  by  the  treaties.  In  the  future  the  great  political 
questions  of  Europe  take  a  somewhat  different  form.  As  the 
power  of  the  Austro-Spanish  House  is  finally  broken  at  Utrecht, 
the  Franco-German  question  begins  to  take  the  place  of  the 
Franco-Imperial  question.  As  Russia  advances  to  the  Pruth, 
and  the  Turks  retire  behind  the  Danube  the  Eastern  Question 
takes  its  rise.  As  English  traders  press  into  every  part  of  the 
world  the  old  rivalry  between  France  and  England  breaks  out 
again  and  again  in  another  '  hundred  years'  war.'  But  these 
are  the  problems  of  the  years  which  are  to  come,  and  as  they 
appear  upon  the  scene  the  questions  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury which  have  given  birth  to  them  pass  into  history. 

Two  years  were  still  to  drag  their  weary  length  along  before 
the  greatest  figure  of  the  seventeenth  century  passed  away 
The  last  from  the  struggles  and  the  disappointments  of  life, 

years  of  They  wcre  years  of  domestic  misfortune  and  public 

Louis  XIV.  gloom.  In  the  fatal  year  1711  the  Dauphin  and 
his  eldest  son,  the  duke  of  Burgundy,  the  much  loved  pupil  of 
Fen^lon,  were  carried  off  by  the  small-pox.  The  heir  of  France 
was  the  baby  duke  of  Anjou,  and  the  only  legitimate  member 
of  the  royal  family  capable  of  acting  as  regent  was  the  libertine 
and  atheist  Philip  of  Orleans.  As  Louis  xiv.  looked  into  the 
future  he  could  see  nothing  but  what  he  most  dreaded  for 
France.  As  he  turned  his  eyes  to  the  present  the  picture  was 
one  of  sombre  misery  unrelieved.  In  his  despair  of  being  able 
to  make  public  affairs  better,  Louis  turned  in  the  closing  years 


The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  371 

of  his  life  with  ahnost  feverish  excitement  to  the  task  of  atoning 
for  his  sins.  Urged  on  by  Madame  de  Maintenon  he  deter- 
mined to  root  out  heresy  from  his  dominions  while  still  it  was 
possible.  He  attacked  the  Jansenists,  procured  their  condem- 
nation by  Pope  Clement  xi.,  and  destroyed  Port  Royal,  the 
home  of  the  keenest  intellects  and  perhaps  the  His  death, 
noblest  lives  in  France.  In  the  middle  of  this  strife  '715- 
of  mistaken  duty  his  own  call  came,  and  on  the  15  th  of 
September  1715  the  great  king  breathed  his  last,  leaving  a 
weakly  child  of  five  the  inheritor  of  his  power.  It  was  a  sad 
and  pathetic  ending  to  a  career  often  mistaken,  but  never 
ignoble.  The  sun  set  indeed  amid  dark  and  murky  clouds. 
Yet  on  the  page  of  history  he  shines  out  in  clear  predominance 
over  all  contemporary  sovereigns,  and  of  him  it  may  be  said, 
with  more  truth  than  of  most  kings  or  statesmen,  that  during  a 
reign  extending  over  more  than  half  a  century  the  motive  and 
inspiration  of  his  every  thought  and  plan  was  the  glory  and 
welfare  of  his  country. 


APPENDICES 


APPEN- 


1598. 

1603. 
1604. 
1605. 

1608. 
1610. 
1611. 

1613. 

1617. 
1618. 
1619. 
1621. 
1622. 

1623. 
1624. 
1625. 
1632. 
1637. 
1640. 
1643. 

1644. 
1645. 
1648. 
1649. 
1654. 
1655. 
1658. 
1660. 
1665. 
1667. 
1670. 
1676. 
1682. 
1685. 
1687. 


1691. 
1695. 
1697. 

1699. 

1700. 

1702. 
1703- 

1705. 
1711. 

1713. 

1714. 


England. 


Elizabeth. 
James  I. 


Charles  I. 


France. 


Henry  iv. 


Louis  XIII. 


Louis  XIV. 
d.  1715. 


The  Commonwealth. 


Charles  Ii. 


James  11. 
William  in. 


George  i. 
d.  1727. 


The  Empire. 


Rudolf  II. 


Matthias. 


Ferdinand  11. 


Spain. 


Philip  in. 


Ferdinand  ill. 


Leopold  I. 


Joseph  I. 

Charles  vi. 

d.  1742. 


Philip  IV. 


Charles  11. 


Philip  V. 
d.  1746. 


The  Papacy. 


Clement  vni. 


Paul  V. 


Gregory  xv. 


Urban  viii. 


Innocent  x. 


Alexander  vii. 


Clement  ix. 
Clement  x. 
Innocent  xi. 


Alexander  viii. 
Innocent  xii. 


Clement  xi. 
d.  1724. 


374 


DIX     I. 


Brandenburg. 


Joachim  Frederick. 


John  Sigismond. 


George  William. 


Frederick  William. 


Frederick  iii. 


Frederick  William, 
d.  1740. 


Sweden. 


Sigismond 
of  Poland. 

Charles  ix. 


Gustavus 
Adolphus. 


Christina. 


Charles  x. 
Charles  xi. 


Charles  XII. 
d.  1720. 


Russia. 


Boris  Godu- 
noff. 


The  Troublous 
Times. 


Michael    Ro- 
manoff. 


Alexis. 


Theodore. 
Peterand  Ivan 


Peter  the  Great 
d.  1724. 


Turkey. 

Mohammed  III. 
Achmet. 


Mustapha  i. 
Osman  11. 


Mustapha  i. 
(restored). 
Murad  iv. 


Ibrahim. 


Mohammed  iv. 


Suleiman  11. 


Achmet  11. 
Mustapha  11. 


Achmet  m. 
deposed  1727. 


Denmark. 


Christian  iv. 


Frederick  in. 


Christian  v. 


Frederick  iv. 
d.  1730. 


1598. 

1603. 
1604. 
1605. 

1608. 
1610. 
1611. 

1612. 

1617. 
1618. 
1619. 
162 1. 
1632. 

1623. 
1624. 
1625. 
1632. 
1637. 
1O40. 
1643. 

1644. 
1645. 
1648. 
1649. 
1654. 
1655. 
1658. 
1660. 
1665. 
1667. 
1670. 
1676. 
1682. 
1685. 
1687. 


1691. 
1695. 
1697. 

1699. 


1702. 
1703. 


1705. 
1711. 


1713. 
1714. 


375 


376 


European  History,    1 598-1715 


APPEN- 
The    House 


r' 


Antony,  =  Jeanne  d'Albert, 
1562.       I    Q.  of  Navarre. 


Charles  of  Bourbon  = 
d.  of  Vendome, 
1537- 


Henry  iv.,  =  Marie  de  Medicis. 

1610.         I 


Louis  XIII.,  =  Anne  of 
1843.  Austria. 


Elizabeth  =  Philip  iv.  Christina  =  Victor  Amadeus 

of  Spain.  of  Savoy. 


Louis  xiv.,  =  Maria  Theresa, 


1715. 


d.  of  Philip  iv. 
of  Spain. 


Louis  the  =  Maria  of 

Dauphin,      Bavaria. 

1711. 


Philip  of  =  Henrietta,  d. 
Orleans,     of  Charles  i. 
1701. 


Louis,  d.  of  =  Marie  of 
Burgundy,   1     Savoy. 


Philip  v.  of  Spain, 
d.  of  Anjou 


Louis  xv. 
of  France. 


Appendix  II. 


377 


DIX    II. 

OF    Bourbon. 

Francoise  of  Alen^on. 


Margaret  =  Francois,  d.  of 
I     Nevers,  1562. 


Henrietta  =  Louis  Gonzaga 
of  Mantua. 


Louis,  Prince 

of  Condi, 

1569. 


Henry  i.  of 
Condi, 


Gaston,  d.  of 
Orleans, 
1660. 


Marie  of 
Montpensier. 


Henrietta  = 
Maria. 


:  Charles : 
of  England. 


Francois, 
Prince  of 
Conti,  ob. 
i.p.  1614. 


Henrv  II. 

of  Condi, 

1646. 


Anne  of  Montpensier 
(La  Grande  Demoiselle), 
1693. 


Louis  II. 

the  Great, 

1686. 


Henry, 
1709. 


Louis  III. 


Armand,  Anne,  d.  of 

Prince  of         Longueville, 
Conti,  1666.  1679. 


Louis  Armand, 
1685. 


Francois  Louis, 
1709. 


378 


European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 


<«  ■ 


'^^^ 


X 

Q 

W 

Ph 
Ph 

< 


w 

CJ 

i-i 
)-I 

>-;-» 

en 

W 
> 
W 
i-t 

u 

o 

H 
O 


W 
U 

u 

D 
CO 


•r  be 


-^. 


«  «  « 
II 

s" 

.2 

-is 


"as 


il 


O  o 


Appendix  IV. 


379 


o  ta 
°  2 

n  3 


^ 

o 

> 

00 

h— ( 

(« 

W 

u 

X 

(— I 

CO 

Q 

ffi 

IZi 

CA) 

PL, 

in 

< 

w 

w 

E- 

S'o 


'=^; 


c3  rt 
WcQ 


>.2> 


^•3S,^- 


INDEX 


Accord,  the,  64. 

Adrian,  patriarch  of-  Moscow,  303. 

Aides,  the,  in  France,  21. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  treaty  of,  212. 

Alais,  peace  of,  145. 

Aldringer,  loi. 

Alexander  VII.  humiliated  by  Louis 

XIV.,  207. 
Alexis,  Czar  of  Russia,  280,  298. 

son  of  Peter  the  Great,  302. 

Ali  Cumurgi,  recaptures  the  Morea, 

287. 
Alliance,  the  Grand,  339 
Almanza,  battle  of,  358. 
Alte  Veste,  attack  on  the,  97. 
Altranstadt,    peace   of,    305 ;    negotia- 
tions at,  357. 
Amboyna,  massacre  of,  219. 
Amsterdam,  importance  of,  218  ;  saved 

from  William  11.,  223;  saved  from 

the  French,  237. 
Ancre,  marshal  of,  32,  36. 
Andrusoff,  treaty  of,  280. 
AngoulSme,  treaty  of,  36. 
Anne   of  Austria,  regent    of  France, 

117,  153 ;    appoints  Mazarin  prime 

minister,   154;    clever   management 

of  the  Fronde  by,  i6r  ;   claim  on  the 

Spanish  crown  of,  313. 
Antwerp,  truce  of,  65. 
Apafy,  prince  of  Transylvania,  283. 
Assiento,  the,  364. 
Augsburg,    the    religious     peace    of, 

questions  left  unsettled  by,  46;  the 

league  of,  259. 
Augustus  the  Strong,  of  Saxony  and 

Poland,  305. 
Axulic  Council,  the,  8. 
Austria,    the     estates    of,    assist    the 

Bohemians,  57. 
Austro-Spanish  house,  rivalry  of  with 

France,  10,  25,  26. 
Azof,  capture  of,  by  Peter  the  Great, 

287,  301 ;   given  back  to  the  Turks, 

308. 


Baden,  treaty  of,  364. 

Baden-Durlach,  margrave  of,  49,  65. 

Raner,  115. 

Barbesieux,  263. 

Barrier,  the  Dutch,  question  of,  209, 
267. 

Barwalde,  treaty  of,  88,  112. 

Bavaria,  elector  of.  See  Maximilian, 
Max  Emanuel. 

■ electoral  prince  of.     See  Joseph 

Ferdinand. 

Beachy  Head,  battle  off,  262. 

Beaufort,  duke  of,  160. 

Belgrade,  capture  of,  286. 

Berg,  duchy  of,  28,  176;  ceded  to  the 
count  of  Neuberg,  51. 

Berwick,  Marquis  of,  359. 

Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar,  takes  the 
command  at  Liitzen,  98 ;  demands 
a  duchy,  loc ;  appointed  general 
of  the  league  of  Heilbronn,  100; 
defeated  at  Nordlingen,  102;  takes 
service  under  France,  113;  captures 
Breisach,  115;   death  of,  115. 

Bethlen  Gabor  assists  the  Bohemians, 
58;  makes  terms  with  Ferdinand  II., 
61 ;  assists  Christian  IV.  of  Den- 
mark, 71 ;  makes  the  treaty  of  Press- 
burg,  7?. 

Biron,  marshal,  24. 

Blake,  admiral,  227. 

Blecourt,  329. 

Blenau,  battle  of,  162. 

Blenheim,  battle  of,  353. 

Boguslav,  duke  of  Pomerania,  88. 

Bohemia,  Ferdinand  recognised  king 
of,  52 ;  revolt  of  the  Protestants  of, 
52 ;  supported  by  Savoy,  55 ;  by 
the  Silesians  and  estates  of  Austria, 
56,  57 ;  Frederick  V.  elected  king 
of,  59;  the  revolt  of,  crushed  at  the 
White  Mountain,  63;  Protestantism 
suppressed  in,  64. 

Bohemian  royal  charter,  the,  50. 

Bordeaux,  capture  of,  161. 


381 


382 


European  History,   1 598-1 71 5 


Bossuet,  bishop  of  Meaux,  249,  254. 

Boufflers,  marshal,  negotiates  the 
treaty  of  Ryswick,  263  ;  strong  posi- 
tion of  in  the  Netherlands,  346 ;  out- 
witted by  Marlborough,  348  ;  defeats 
the  Dutch,  348;  defends  Lille,  360; 
retreats  from  Malplaquet,  362. 

Bouillon,  duke  of,  24,  37;  plots  of 
against  Richelieu,  151,  160. 

Boyne,  battle  of  the,  262. 

Brandenburg,  John  Sigismond,  elector 
of,  28  ;  acquires  Cleves,  Mark,  and 
Ravensbeig,  51. 

•  George  William,  elector  of,  re- 
fuses to  join  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
88 ;  joins  Saxony  and  the  Swedes, 
gi ;  rivalry  of  with  Sweden,  174. 

Frederick    William,    the    Great 

Elector,  makes  a  treaty  with  the 
Swedes,  122;  gains  of  at  the  peace 
of  Westphalia,  124;  character  and 
policy  of,  173 ;  state  of  the  domin- 
ions of  on  his  accession,  175  ;  estab- 
lishes his  authority,  178 ;  annexes 
east  Pomerania,  179 ;  gives  Charles 
X.  a  passage  through  Pomerania, 
180;  intrigues  against  him,  180  ; 
forced  to  acknowledge  Swedish 
suzerainty,  180 ;  makes  war  with 
Sweden  against  Poland,  181 ;  ob- 
tains independence  from  Sweden 
at  Labiau,  181;  makes  war  upon 
Sweden  with  Poland,  182;  obtains 
independence  from  Poland  at 
Wehlau,  181;  joins  the  coalition 
against  France,  238,  296 ;  is  recog- 
nised in  east  Prussia,  292;  estab- 
lishes persona!  rule  in  Prussia,  293  ; 
his  policy  of  centralisation,  294; 
wins  the  battle  of  Fehrbellin,  295 ; 
accepts  the  treaty  of  S.  Germain-en- 
Laye,  296. 

Frederick    III.,  elector  of,  reign 

of,  308  ;  recognised  as  king  of 
Prussia,  309;  accepts  the  partition 
treaty,  327;  joins  the  Grand  Alli- 
ance, 339. 

Brandenburg,  mark  of,  175. 

Breda  treaty  of,  230. 

Breisach,  capture  of,  115. 

Breitenfeld,  battle  of,  91. 

Bresse,  duchy  of,  ceded  to  France,  27. 

Brihuega,  battle  of,  363. 

Bromsebrn,  ti-eaty  of,  168. 

Broussel,  arrest  of,  157. 

Buckingham,  duke  of,  tries  to  relieve 
La  Rochelle,  144. 

Bucquoi,  53,  56,  57. 


Buczacz,  treaty  of,  281. 

Budweis,  siege  of,  56. 

Bugey,  duchy  of,  ceded  to  France,  27. 

Burgundy,  Louis,  duke  of,  359,  370. 


Calvinism,  character  of  in  France, 
3,  6 ;  political  aspects  of  in  Ger- 
many, 10,  40. 

Calvinists,  the  difficulties  of  in  Ger- 
many, 46,  47. 

Camisards,  rising  of  the,  350. 

Canada,  colonisation  of,  17. 

Candia,  siege  of,  208,  266,  274,  276. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  colonisation  of, 
220. 

Carelia  ceded  to  Sweden,  85. 

Carlowitz,  peace  of,  287. 

Catalonia,  revolt  of,  116. 

Catalans,  desertion  of  the,  in  the  peace 
of  Utrecht,  365. 

Catinat,  148,  340. 

Cevennes,  risings  in  the,  255. 

Chalais,  conspiracy  of,  142. 

Chambre  des  Comptes,  the,  19. 

Chambre  de  S.  Louis,  156. 

Charleroi,  212,  235. 

Charles  I.  of  England  interferes  in  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  68  ;  marriage  of, 
109;  makes  war  with  France,  143. 

II.  of  England,  enters  into  the 

triple  alliance,  210  ;  makes  the 
treaty  of  Dover,  214;  makes  war 
upon  the  Dutch,  227;  accepts  the 
treaty  of  Breda,  230 ;  declares  war 
against  the  Dutch  in  1672,  235; 
withdraws  from  it,  239. 

II.  of  Spain,  311;  makes  a  will 

in  favour  of  the  electoral  prince, 
321 ;  intrigues  round  the  deathbed 
of,  328 ;  makes  a  will  in  favour  of 
France,  329  ;  death  of,  329. 

IX.  of  Sweden,  reign  of,  83. 

X.  of  Sweden,  accession  of,  170; 

defeats  John  Casimir  of  Poland, 
180 ;  forces  Brandenburg  to  ac- 
knowledge his  suzerainty,  180  ; 
conquers  Poland,  181;  makes  the 
treaty  of  Labiau,  181;  conquers 
Denmark,  182;  death  of,  182. 

XI.  of  Sweden,  regency  during 

minority  of,  291 ;  defeated  at  Fehr- 
bellin, 295 ;  makes  the  treaty  of 
S.  Germain-en-Laye,  296 ;  efifects  a 
monarchical  revolution,  296 ;  death 
of,  304. 

XII.  of  Sweden,  coalition  against, 

304;    defeats  Denmark,  304;   wins 


Index 


383 


the  battle  of  Narva,  305 ;  occupies 
Poland,  305;  makes  Stanislas  king 
of  Poland,  305 ;  overruns  Saxony, 
305 ;  his  position  at  Altranstadt, 
305 ;  invades  Russia,  306 ;  is  de- 
feated at  Pultava,  307 ;  death  of, 
308. 
Charles,  archduke  of  Austria,  claims 
of  to  the  throne  of  Spain,  313  ;  share 
of  under  the  first  partition  treaty, 
321 ;  share  of  under  the  second 
treaty,  323;  lands  in  Portugal,  367; 
becomes  master  of  Arragon,  368; 
proclaimed  king  at  Madrid,  368 ; 
driven  out  of  Spain,  368;  refuses 
the  terms  of  Utrecht,  364;  makes 
the  treaties  of  Rastadt  and  Baden, 

364- 

Emanuel  of  Savoy.     See  Savoy. 

— —  Lewis,  Elector  Palatine,  123. 

Charnace,  in. 

Cherasco,  peace  of,  90,  in. 

Chevalier  de  S.  George,  the,  recog- 
nised by  Louis  xiv.,  339. 

Chevreuse,  duchess  of,  142. 

Chiari,  battle  of,  342. 

Choczim,  battle  of,  282. 

Christian  of  Anhalt,  48;  advises 
Frederick  to  accept  the  crown  of 
Bohemia,  60. 

of  Brunswick,  65 ;  dismissed  by 

Frederick  v.,  66;  employed  by  the 
Dutch,  66;  defeated  at  Stadtlohn, 
67. 

IV.   of  Denmark,    interferes    in 

the  Thirty  Years'  War,  68 ;  treaty 
of  with  England,  68 ;  defeated  at 
Lutter,  73 ;  makes  the  peace  of 
Liibeck,  75;  attacks  Sweden,  85; 
makes  a  treaty  with  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  87 ;  raises  the  dues  of 
the  Sound,  168;  makes  the  treaty 
of  Bromsebio,  168. 

Christina  of  Sweden,  promotes  the 
peace  of  Westphalia,  122;  character 
of,  170 ;  political  ability  of,  172 ; 
abdication  and  subsequent  life  of, 
172. 

Church,  the,  religious  revival  in,  41. 

Cinq-Mars,  conspiracy  of,  151. 

Civita,  battle  of,  262. 

Clement  VIII.,  6. 

XI.,  371. 

of  Bavaria,  archbishop  of  Koln, 

264. 

Clement,  Jacques,  3. 

Cleves-Jiilich,  question  of,  28;  parti- 
tion of,  51. 


Cleves,  duchy  of,  176. 

Clissow,  battle  of,  305. 

Colbert,  training  ot  under  Mazarin, 
193  ;  appointed  controller  of  financr, 
195;  administrative  reforms  of,  196; 
prmciples  of  the  policy  of,  196; 
objects  of  the  protective  system  of, 
197 ;  advantages  ol  it  to  !•  ranee, 
200 ;  its  defects,  200 ;  character  of, 
202. 

Coligny,  208. 

Conde,  Henry  II.,  Prince  of,  33. 

Louis  11.,  Prince  of,  wins  Rocroy, 

118;  conquers  the  Rhineland,  119; 
wins  the  battle  of  I^ens,  156;  joins 
the  Fronde  against  Mazarin,  157; 
comes  over  to  tlie  court,  160; 
arrested  by  Mazarin,  160;  rebtis 
against  the  king,  162;  joins  the 
Spaniards,  129,  162;  overruns 
Franche  Comt6,  212;  invades  the 
United  Provinces,  235 ;  defends 
Alsace,  238 ;  wins  the  battle  of 
Seneft",  238 ;  checks  Montecuculli 
in  Alsace,  238 ;  retirement  of,  242. 

Conti,  prince  of,  160. 

Copenhagen,  treaty  of,  182. 

Corpus  Evangelicorum,  the,  95. 

Cossacks,  the,  of  the  Ukraine,  280. 

Counter-Reformation,  progress  of  the, 

".  43.  45- 
Crequi,  duke  of,  207. 
Cromwell,    makes    peace     with     the 

Dutch,  227. 


Dantzig,  86. 

Denmark.  See  Christian  IV.,  Frede- 
rick III.,  Frederick  IV. 

Design,  the  Great,  of  Henry  IV.,  28. 

Dessau,  the  bridge  of,  71. 

Devereux,  102. 

Devolution,  the  law  of,  208. 

Diet,  the  German,  8. 

Donauworth,  the  troubles  of,  48. 

Dorislaus,  Dr.,  murder  of,  226. 

Douanes,  the,  m  France,  21. 

Dover,  treaty  of,  214,  235. 

Downs,  the,  battle  of,  116. 

Dragonades,  the,  255. 

Dunes,  the,  the  battle  of,  130. 

Dunkirk,  purchase  of  by  France,  207. 

Dupes,  the  Day  of,  149. 

Duplessis,  marshal,  161. 

Duquesnc,  258. 

Dutch,  the,  employ  Mansfield  and 
Christian  of  Brunswick,  66;  oppose 
Louis  XIV.,  209;  character  of  the 


384 


European  History^   1 598-1 71 5 


war  of  independence  of,  215;  con-- 
stitution  of,  216 ;  supremacy  of  the 
town  councils  among,  217  ;  position 
of  Holland  among,  217;  position  of 
the  House  of  Orange  among,  218 ; 
prosperity  of,  219 ;  internal  dissen- 
sions of,  220;  quarrel  of,  with  the 
English  Commonwealth,  226;  ri- 
valry of  with  England,  227 ;  war 
of  with  Charles  II.,  228;  attack  of 
Louis  XIV.  upon,  229 ;  defence  of 
under  William  III.,  238 ;  position 
of  at  the  treaty  of  Nimwegen, 
243 ;  adhesion  of  to  the  League  of 
Augsburg,  259 ;  position  of  at  the 
treaty  of  Ryswick,  263;  opposition 
of  to  the  partition  treaty,  325,  332 ; 
recognition  of  Philip  V.  by,  333; 
adhesion  of  to  the  Grand  Alliance, 
339 ;  election  of  Marlborough  as 
captain  general  by,  343 ;  defeat  of 
by  Boufflers,  348 ;  resistance  of  to 
Marlborough's  plans,  348,  351,  355; 
position  of  at  the  treaty  of  Utrecht, 
364,  368. 


ECCLESIASTICAL   RESERVATION,  the, 

47- 

Electorate  of  the  Palatinate,  transfer- 
ence of  66. 

Elector  Palatine.  See  Frederick  v., 
Charles  Lewis. 

Emanuel,  duke  of  Savoy.    See  Savoy. 

Emperor,  the,  position  of  in  1598,  7. 

the,  position  of  in  1715,  367. 

England,  condition  of  in  1598,  12. 

condition  of  in  1715,  366. 

Epernon,  duke  of  24,  31,  36. 

Esthonia  annexed  by  Sweden,  84. 

Estrades,  count  of,  206,  211. 

Eternal  peace,  treaty  of,  299. 

Eugene,  prince,  victory  of  at  Zenta, 
286;  victory  of  at  Peterwardein, 
287;  campaign  of  in  Italy,  1701, 
340;  capture  of  Villeroy  by,  342; 
retreat  of  behind  the  Adige,  343 ; 
critical  position  of  at  Innsbruck, 
349;  junction  of  with  Marlborough, 
352 ;  victory  of  at  Blenheim,  353 ; 
conquest  of  north  Italy  by,  354; 
junction  with  Marlborough  before 
Oudenarde,  359;  capture  of  Lille 
by,  360;  storm  of  Malplaquet  by, 
362;  defeat  of  by  Villars  at  Denain 
and  Freiburg,  364. 

Exclusion,  act  of,  227,  228. 


Fabert,  138,  148. 

Fabricius,  52. 

Faubourg  S.  Antoine,  battle  of,  162. 

Fehrbellin,  battle  of,  242,  295. 

Ferdinand  i.,  emperor,  10. 

II.,  emperor,  religious  policy  of, 

45  ;  election  of  as  king  of  Hungary, 
51 ;  recognised  as  king  of  Bohemia, 
52;  critical  condition  of  at  Vienna, 
57 ;  election  of  as  Emperor,  59 ; 
deposition  of  by  the  Bohemian 
estates,  59;  conquest  of  Bohemia 
by,  63  ;  suppression  of  Protestantism 
in  Bohemia  by,  64 ;  effect  of  mili- 
tary success  upon,  76 ;  issue  of  the 
Edict  of  Restitution  by,  77;  dismis- 
sal of  Wallenstein  by,  80;  Saxony 
driven  to  alliance  with  Sweden  by, 
91;  appeal  of  to  Wallenstein,  95; 
appointment  of  Wallenstein  as 
dictator  by,  96;  Wallenstein  de- 
clared traitor  by,  loi ;  refusal  of 
to  give  the  Swedes  German  terri- 
tory, 114;  death  of,  120. 

III.,  emperor,  102,  120. 

the  cardinal  infant,  102. 

Form  of  Government,  the,  166. 

Fouquet,  Nicholas,  194. 

France,  condition  of  in  1598,3;  the 
indefensible  frontier  of,  25,  107 ;  the 
colonial  empire  of,  203 ;  condition 
of  in  1715,  366. 

Franche  Comte,  acquisition  of,  by 
France,  212,  243. 

Frauenstadt,  battle  of  365. 

Frederick,  Henry  of  Nassau,  219,  223. 

Frederick  III.  of.  Denmark,  war  of 
with  Sweden,  181 ;  defeat  of  by 
Charles  x.,  182 ;  monarchical  revo- 
lution effected  by,  290. 

IV.   of   Denmark,   war  of  with 

Sweden,  304;  defeat  of  by  Charles 
XII.,  305. 

v.,    Elector    Palatine,    head    of 

the  Protestant  Union,  49;  char- 
acter of,  55  ;  support  to  the  Bohe- 
mians sent  by,  55  ;  conduct  of  at  the 
imperial  election,  58 ;  election  of 
as  king  of  Bohemia,  59;  accept- 
ance of  the  crown  of  Bohemia  by, 
60;  alienation  of  England  and  the 
Lutherans  by,  61 ;  driven  from 
Bohemia  and  the  Palatinate,  63; 
death  of  120. 

Frederick  William   of  Brandenburg. 

See  Brandenburg. 
Freiburg,  battle  of,  119. 


Index 


385 


Fronde,  the,  weakness  of  France 
owing  to,  129 ;  outbreak  of,  155 ; 
constitutional  reforms  of,  156,  157 ; 
opposition  of  to  a  prime  minister, 
157  ;  weakness  of  the  constitutional 
element  in,  159;  lead  of  taken  by 
the  nobles,  159;  risings  of  in  the 
provinces,  161 ;  factious  character 
of,  162 ;  end  of,  163. 

Fuentes,  count  of,  118. 


Gabelle,  the,  20. 

Gallas,  loi. 

Gallican  Church,  liberties  of  the, 
248. 

Galway,  expedition  of  to  Portugal, 
358 ;  occupation  of  Madrid  by, 
358 ;.  defeat  of  at  Almanza,  358 ; 
recall  of,  359. 

Gaston,  duke  of  Orleans,  plots  of 
against  Richelieu,  142,  148,  149; 
reconciliation  of  with  Richelieu, 
151 ;  conduct  of  in  the  Fronde, 
i6t. 

George  William  of  Brandenburg.  See 
Brandenburg. 

Germain-en-Laye,  S.,  treaty  of,  296. 

Germany,  condition  of  in  1598,7-9; 
condition  of  in  1715,  367. 

Gertruydenberg,  negotiations  at,  365. 

Gibraltar,  capture  of,  354. 

Golitsin,  Prmce  Basil,  299. 

Gondi,  archbishop  of  Paris,  157. 

Gordon,  general,  301. 

Gothard,  S.,  battle  of,  208,  276. 

Guiton,  mayor  of  La  Rochelle,  145. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  of  Sweden,  inter- 
ference of  in  Germany,  80 ;  objects 
of,  81 ;  Swedish  policy  of,  84  ;  wars 
of  with  Denmark,  Russia,  and 
Poland,  85 ;  negotiations  of  with 
England,  86;  landing  of  in  Ger- 
many, 87 ;  alliance  of  with  France, 
88 ;  reception  of  in  Germany,  88 ; 
failure  of  to  relieve  Magdeburg,  90  ; 
retreat  of  to  Werben,  90;  alliance 
of  with  Saxony  and  Brandenburg, 
91 ;  victory  of  at  Breitenfeld,  91 ; 
conquest  of  central  Germany  by, 
94 ;  proposal  of  for  a  Protestant 
alliance  under  Sweden,  94;  victory 
of  at  the  Lech,  95;  failure  of  be- 
fore Nuremberg,  97;  march  of 
into  Saxony,  97;  victory  and  death 
of  at  Liitzen,  98 ;  results  of  the 
death  of,  99. 

Gustavus  Vasa  of  Sweden,  82. 

PERIOD  V. 


Hague,  the,  negotiations  at  in  1708, 
361. 

Harcourt,  count  of  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  325.  329,  335. 

Harley,  Tory  ministry  of  in  1710, 
362;  private  negotiations  of  with 
Louis  XIV.,  363;  the  treaty  of 
Utrecht  made  by,  363. 

Heilhronn,  league  of,  100,  113. 

Heinsius,  grand  pensionary  of  Hol- 
land, negotiations  for  a  partition 
treaty  by,  317,  319;  the  first  par- 
tition treaty  concluded  by,  320; 
negotiations  of  for  a  second  treaty, 
322;  the  second  partition  treaty 
concluded  by,  323 ;  unpopularity 
of  the  policy  of,  332;  the  Grand 
Alliance  joined  by,  339. 

Henrietta  Maria,  queen  of  England, 
marriage  of,  109 ;  treaty  between 
Louis  XIV.  and  Charles  11.  negoti- 
ated by,  229. 

Henry  ill.  of  France,  3. 

IV.    of    France,    absolution    of, 

6,  14 ;  difficulties  of  14 ;  character 
of,  15 ;  economical  policy  of,  17 ; 
policy  of  towards  the  nobles,  23 ; 
foreign  policy  of,  24-30;  death  of, 

30- 

Hochstadt,  battle  of  349. 

Hochst,  battle  of,  65. 

Hogue,  La,  battle  off,  262. 

Holland,  the  province  of,  importance 
of,  217,  222. 

Holy  League,  the,  285. 

Horn,  general,  88,  102. 

Hospitallers,  the  Knights,  266,  274. 

Huguenots,  the,  rising  of  in  1620,  36; 
position  of  in  1622,  139;  organisa- 
tion of,  140;  risings  of,  141,  144; 
suppression  of  as  a  political  organi- 
sation, 145 ;  existence  of  contrary 
to  Louis  XIV. 's  love  of  uniformity, 
252;  persecution  of,  254;  emigra- 
tion of,  256. 


Ibrahim  1.,  Ottoman  Sultan,  274. 
Imperial  courts,  the,  of  Germany,  8. 
Ingria,  ceded  to  Sweden,  85. 
Innocent   XI.,  quarrel  of  with  Louis 

XIV.,  248. 
Innocent   xil.,  reconciliation  of  with 

Louis  XIV.,  251. 
Intendants,  appointment  of  in  France, 

19.  152. 
Italy,  condition  of  in  1598,  13. 
Ivan  the  Terrible,  Czar  of  Russia,  297. 


386 


European  History,    1598-1715 


Ivan  II.,  Czar  of  Russia,  299,  301. 
Ivry,  battle  of,  3. 


JAGELLON,  Catherine,  44,  82. 

James  I.  of  England,  policy  of  to- 
wards Spain,  55 ;  attitude  of  to- 
wards the  Bohemian  question,  60; 
disavowal  of  Frederick  by,  61 ;  en- 
hstment  of  troops  authorised  by, 
67 ;  war  declared  against  Spain  by, 
68. 

•  II.  of  England,  quarrel  of  with 

Louis  XIV.,  260  ;  expulsion  of  from 
England,  261 ;  death  of,  339. 

Janizaries,  the,  269. 

jansenists,  condemnation  of  the,  371. 

Jeannin,  35. 

Jesus,  the  Society  of,  11,  42. 

John  Casiniir  of  Poland,  recognition 
of  the  Great  Elector  by,  178 ;  war 
of  with  Sweden,  180;  defeat  of 
at  Warsaw,  181;  the  treaty  of 
Wehlau  made  by,  181;  participa- 
tion of  in  the  treaty  of  Oliva,  182; 
war  of  with  Russia  and  the  Cos- 
sacks, 280 ;  abdication  of,  280. 

John  George,  elector  of  Saxony,  re- 
fusal of  to  help  the  Bohemians,  53; 
policy  of  with  regard  to  the  im- 
perial election,  58;  invasion  of 
Silesia  by,  64  ;  refusal  of  to  join  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  88 ;  refusal  of  to 
disband  his  troops,  91  ;  alliance  of 
with  Gustavus  Adolphus,  91 ;  occu- 
pation of  Bohemia  by,  95 ;  expul- 
sion of  by  Wallenstein,  97;  the 
peace  of  Prague  made  by,  103 ; 
political  views  of,  104;  defeat  of  at 
Wittstock,  115;  treaty  with  the 
Swedes  made  by,  122. 

John  Sigismond,  elector  of  Branden- 
burg.    See  Brandenburg. 

Joseph,  Fatlier,  79,  iii,  115. 

I.,  emperor,  366. 

Ferdinand,     electoral     prince, 

claim  of  to  the  throne  of  Spain, 
312;  share  of  in  the  partition 
treaty,  320 ;  death  of,  322. 

Jiilich,  duchy  of,  question  of  the 
succession  to,  28,  51. 


Kalkstein,  count,  292,  293. 

Kara  Mustafa,  grand  vizier,  282 
war  of  against  the  empire,  283 
defeat  of  before  Vienna,  285 
death  of,  285. 


Kardis,  treaty  of,  182. 

Kingship,  theory  of  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  186,  187. 

Kiuprili,  Mohammed,  grand  vizier, 
275  ;  quarrel  of  with  France,  276. 

Achmet,  grand  vizier,  attack  of 

upon  the  empire,  276;  defeat  of 
at  S.  Gothard,  276;  capture  of 
Candia  by,  277 ;  war  of  with 
Poland,  281 ;  death  of,  282. 

■ ■  Mustafa,  grand  vizier,  286. 

Knarod,  peace  of,  85. 

Konigsberg,  treaty  of,  180. 


Labiau,  treaty  of,  181. 

La  Feuillade,  208. 

La  Force,  37. 

La  Rochelle,  6,  38 ;  siege  of,  144. 

La  Vieuville,  38. 

League,  the  Catholic,  in  Germany, 
49;  Ferdinand  assisted  by  in 
Bohemia,  62;  the  dismissal  of 
Wallenstein  procured  by,  80. 

Lefort,  301. 

Leopol,  battle  of,  282. 

Leopold  I.,  emperor,  the  partition 
treaty  of  1667  made  by,  210; 
"'"alition  against  Louis  joined  by, 
238 ;  war  of  with  the  Turks,  276 ; 
the  Hungarians  persecuted  by,  282; 
the  kingdom  t)f  Prussia  recognised 
by,  309;  claim  of  to  the  throne  of 
Spain,  313;  designs  of  upon  Italy, 
315 ;  refusal  of  to  accept  the  par- 
tition treaty,  327 ;  the  Grand  Alli- 
ance joined  by,  339  ;  death  of,  355. 

Lepanto,  battle  of,  266,  272. 

Lesdigui^res,  29,  37,  109. 

Leslie,  Alexander,  87. 

Le  Tellier,  161. 

Levenhaupt,  307. 

Lille,  acquisition  of  by  France,  212; 
capture  of  by  prince  Eugene,  360. 

Lionne,  161,  214. 

Lit  de  justice,  a,  5. 

Livonia,  acquired  by  Sweden,  84,  86. 

Longueville,  duke  of,  160,  161. 

Lorraine,  duchy  of,  occupied  by  the 
Fiench,  149. 

duke  of,  284,  285,  326. 

Loudun,  treaty  of,  33. 

Louis  of  Baden,  prince,  349,  352. 

XIII.,    of    F"rance,    declared    of 

^gs.  35 ;  Luynes  supported  by, 
36;  promise  of  to  let  Mansfeld 
cross  France,  68 ;  withdrawal  of 
the  promise,  68 ;    invasion  of  Italy 


Index 


I'^l 


by,  no;  character  of,  138;  sup- 
pression of  the  Huguenots  by,  145  ; 
serious  illness  of,  148 ;  support  of 
Richelieu  by  in  the  Day  of  Dupes, 
149;  death  of,  117,  153. 
Louis  XIV.,  of  France,  declared  of 
age,  161 ;  suppression  of  the 
Fronde  by,  163 ;  character  and 
qualities  of,  187 ;  theory  of  king- 
ship of,  189;  attention  of  to 
detail,  191 ;  organisation  of  France 
under,  192;  choice  of  policy  be- 
fore in  1671,  203;  determination 
of  to  be  dictator  of  Europe,  205 ; 
humiliation  of  Spain  and  the  Pope 
by,  206,  207  ;  assistance  of  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Venetians  by,  208 ; 
claim  of  to  the  Netherlands  by 
the  law  of  devolution,  208;  de- 
feated by  the  Triple  Alliance,  211; 
greatness  of  the  position  of  in  1672, 
234 ;  attack  of  upon  the  Dutch, 
235 ;  formation  of  a  coalition 
against,  238 ;  the  treaty  of  Nim- 
wegen  made  by,  243;  quarrel  of 
with  the  Pope,  247 ;  the  four  re- 
solutions promulgated  by,  249,  250 ; 
reconciliation  of  with  Innocent 
XII.,  251 ;  alteration  in  the  charac- 
ter of,  253 ;  attempt  of  to  convert 
the  Huguenots,  254;  persecution 
of  the  Huguenots  by,  254;  revoca- 
tion of  the  edict  of  Nantes  by,  255 ; 
aggressions  of  after  Nimwegen, 
256;  alienation  of  Europe  by,  259; 
invasion  of  England  permitted  by, 
260 ;  war  of  against  Europe,  261 ; 
treaty  of  Ryswick  made  by,  263 ; 
support  of  the  Turks  against  the 
emperor  by,  283 ;  foresight  of 
with  regard  to  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion question,  315;  adoption  of  a 
policy  of  partition  by,  316;  objects 
of  during  the  negotiations,  318; 
conclusion  of  the  partition  treaties 
by,  321,  323;  policy  of  in  con- 
cluding the  treaties,  323 ;  will  of 
Charles  II.  accepted  by,  330; 
policy  of  in  accepting  it,  331-338; 
difficuiies  of,  338;  aggressive 
policy  of,  339;  war  of  against 
Europe,  339;  plan  of  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  348,  350;  results 
of  the  battle  of  Blenheim  upon, 
355  ;  loss  of  Italy  by,  355  ;  negotia- 
tions of  for  peace,  361 ;  appeal  of 
to  France,  361 ;  renewal  of  negotia- 


tions, 362;  conclusion  of  the  peace 

of  Utrecht  by,  364;  death  of,  371. 
Louis,  the    Dauphin,  claim  of  to  the 

throne  of  Spain,  312;   share  of  in 

the     partition     treaties,    321,    323; 

advocacy    of    his    son's    rights    by, 

330  ;  death  of,  370. 
Louvois,  minister  of  war,  214;  advice 

of  to  refuse  the  Dutch  terms,  1672, 

238 ;  organisation  of  the  army  by, 

258  ;  death  of,  263. 
Loyola,  Ignatius,  42. 
Liibeck,  peace  of,  75. 
Lutheranism,  political   aspects   of   in 

Germany,  10,  11,  40. 
Lutter,  battle  of,  73. 
Liitzen,  battle  of,  98. 
Luxemburg,  duke  of,  243. 
Luynes,  count  of,  36,  37. 


Macchiavelli,  influence  of  in  poli- 
tics, 107. 
Magdeburg,  sack  of,  89. 
Mahon,  Port,  capture  of,  359. 
Maintenon,    Madame    de,    251,    253, 

330,  373- 

Malplaquet,  battle  of,  362. 

Mancini,  Marie,  171. 

Mansfeld,  employment  of  in  Bohe- 
mia, 55-57 ;  abandonment  of  the 
upper  Palatinate  by,  65;  dismissal 
of  by  Frederick  v.,  66;  employ- 
ment of  by  the  Dutch  and  English, 
66 ;  campaign  of  against  Wallen- 
stein,  71 ;  death  of,  72. 

Mantua,  question  of  the  succession 
to,  no. 

Margaret  Theresa,  claim  of  to  the 
throne  of  Spain,  312. 

Maria,  daughter  of  Philip  III.,  claim 
of  to  the  throne  of  Spain,  313. 

Maria  Antonia,  claim  of  to  the  throne 
of  Spain,  312. 

Marie  Theresa,  claim  of  to  the  throne 
of  Spain,  312. 

Marie  de  M6dicis,  marriage  of,  27 ; 
regency  of,  31 ;  disastrous  govern- 
ment of,  32-36;  attack  of  on  Rich- 
elieu, 149. 

Marie   of  Neuburg,  queen  of  Spain, 

327- 
Marienbad,  treaty  of,  180. 
Maritime  nations,  the  policy  of  with 

regard  to  Spain,  314. 
Marlborough,    duke    of,   visit    of    to 

Charles  xil.,  305  ;  appointment  of  to 


388 


European  History,   1 598-171 5 


the  command  in  the  Netherlands, 
343 ;  the  military  qualities  of,  343 ; 
personal  character  of,  345  ;  occupa- 
tion of  the  lower  Rhineland  by,  345, 
356;  the  Blenheim  campaign  of, 
350-353 ;  the  Ramillies  campaign 
of,  356 ;  the  Oudenarde  campaign 
of,  359;  critical  political  situation  of, 
360 ;  victory  of  at  Malplaquet,  362  ; 
dismissal  of,  362. 

Marsin,  350,  352. 

Martinitz,  52. 

Masaniello,  128. 

Matthias,  emperor,  rising  of  against 
Rudolf  II.  in  Austria,  50;  recogni- 
tion of  as  king  of  Bohemia,  50; 
election  of  as  emperor,  50 ;  death 
of,  56. 

Maurice  of  Nassau,  31,  65,  218,  219, 
222. 

Maximilian  of  Bavaria,  30;  religious 
policy  of,  45 ;  suppression  of  Pro- 
testantism by  at  Donauworth,  48; 
appointed  head  of  the  Catholic 
league,  49 ;  assistance  of  to  Ferdi- 
nand, 62 ;  character  of,  62 ;  recog- 
nition of  as  elector,  66;  defeat  of  by 
Turenne,  120  ;  gains  of  at  the  peace 
of  Westphalia,  123. 

Max  Emanuel,  elector  of  Bavaria, 
312,333;  adhesion  of  to  Louis  Xiv., 
349;  campaign  of  against  Eugene, 
349 ;    defeat    of   by    Marlborough, 

351.  353- 

Mazarin,  cardinal,  employment  of  in 
the  peace  of  Cherasco,  11 1;  Rich- 
elieu's foreign  policy  continued 
by,  117;  success  of  at  the  peace  of 
Westphalia,  128 ;  alliance  of  with 
Cromwell,  129;  success  of  at  the 
peace  of  the  Pyrenees,  130;  char- 
acter of,  154;  policy  of  towards 
the  Parlement  de  Paris,  157 ;  un- 
popularity of,  157 ;  arrest  of  the 
princes  by,  160 ;  flight  of,  161 ;  re- 
turn of  to  power,  163. 

Mazeppa,  306. 

Mehaigne,  the  lines  of  the,  348. 

Mello,  117. 

Menschikoff,  303. 

Messenius,  172. 

Methuen,  357. 

Michael,  king  of  Poland,  281. 

Michael  Romanoff,  Czar  of  Russia, 
298. 

Milanese,  the,  25. 

Mocenigo,  274,  276. 

Modena,  duke  of,  342. 


Mohacz,  battle  of,  286. 
Mohammed  II.,  267,  270. 

III.,  274. 

IV.,  286. 

Mole,  160. 

Monaleschi,  murder  of,  171. 

Monk,  general,  228,  230. 

Mons,  261,  362. 

Montauban,  6,  37. 

Montecuculli,  victory  of  at  S.  Gothard, 

208,    276;    campaigns    of    on    the 

Rhine,  239-242. 
Montmorency-Bouteville,      execution 

of,  143. 
Montmorency,  rising  of,  150. 
Montpellier,  treaty  of,  37,  141. 
Montpensier,  Anne  of.  Mademoiselle, 

161. 
Monzon,  treaty  of,  no,  141. 
Morea,  the  capture  and  recapture  of, 

286,  287. 
Moriscoes,  the  expulsion  of,  30. 
Morosini,  277,  285-287. 
Miilhausen,  agreement  of,  62. 
Miinster,  congress  of,  121. 

treaty  of,  223. 

bishop  of,  214,  229,  239. 

Murad  IV.,  274. 
Mustafa  il.,  286. 


Nantes,  the  edict  of,  6,  14,  255. 

Namur,  capture  of,  262. 

Narva,  battle  of,  304. 

Naryshkins,  the,  299. 

Navigation,  act  of,  226.        , 

Neerwinden,  battle  of,  262. 

Nevers,  duke  of,  no. 

Neuburg,  count  palatine  of,  28. 

Nimwegen,  peace  of,  243. 

Ninon  de  I'Enclos,  171. 

Nordlingcn,    battle    of,    102;    second 

battle  of,  119. 
Nystadt,  peace  of,  308. 


Olden-Barneveldt,  execution  of, 

222. 
Oliva,  peace  of,  182,  280,  289. 
Opdam,  admiral,  227,  228. 

general,  348. 

Orange,  House  of,  importance  of  the, 

218  ;  rivalry  of  with  the  republican 

party,  220. 
Ornano,  142. 

Osnabrlick,  congress  of,  121. 
Oudenarde,  battle  of,  359. 
Oxenstjerna,     leadership      of     after 


Index 


389 


Liitzen,  100;  conduct  of  in  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  100,  loi,  114; 
character  and  policy  of,  165 ; 
oligarchy  established  in  Sweden 
by,  167 ;  war  of  with  Denmark, 
168 ;  acquisition  of  Halland  by, 
169. 


Papacy,  the,  quarrel  of  with  Louis 
XIV.,  247. 

Pappenheim,  general,  89,  92,  98,  99. 

Parkan,  battle  of,  285. 

Parlement  de  Paris,  character  and 
powers  of,  5  ;  recognition  of  Marie 
de  Medicis  as  regent  by,  31 ;  the 
will  of  Louis  XIII.  set  aside  by, 
153  ;  refusal  of  to  register  the  octroi 
edict,  156 ;  programme  of  reform 
of,  156 ;  surrender  of  to  the  nobles 
and  populace,  159. 

Parthenon,  the  destruction  of,  286. 

Partition  Treaties,  the,  of  1667,  210; 
negotiations  for  that  of  1699,  316- 
320 ;  conclusion  of  the  first  of,  321 ; 
chances  of  the  success  of,  321 ;  con- 
clusion of  the  second  of,  323 ; 
unpopularity  of  among  the  English 
and  Dutch,  325;  general  accept- 
ance of  in  Europe,  326;  opposition 
to  by  the  Emperor  and  Savoy,  327  ; 
difficulties   in   the  carrying  out  of, 

331- 

Passarovitz,  treaty  of,  288. 

Patkul,  304,  305. 

Paulette,  the,  18,  24. 

Paul  v.,  45. 

Pays  d'election,  and  pays  d'6tat,  19. 

Pelisson,  254. 

Perpetual  Edict,  the,  232. 

Peter  the  Great,  Czar  of  Russia,  cap- 
ture of  Azof  by,  287,  301 ;  defeat  oi 
on  the  Pruth,  287,  307 ;  education 
of,  300;  character  of,  301 ;  domestic 
policy  of,  301 ;  foreign  policy  of, 
303;  defeat  of,  at  Narva,  305; 
victory  of  at  Pultava,  307. 

Peterborough,  earl  of,  358. 

Petersburg,  S.,  foundation  of,  303, 
306. 

Peterwardein,  battle  of,  287. 

Philip  III.,  of  Spain,  63. 

IV.,  of  Spain,  208. 

v.,    of    Spain,    claim    of,   312; 

acknowledged  as  king  by  the 
Spaniards,  333,  363  ;  recognised  by 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  364. 

Piccolomini,  general,  98,  loi,  120. 


Pinerolo,  27. 

Poland,  the  Counter-Reformation  in, 
44;  condition  and  institutions  of, 
277 ;  weakness  of,  279.  .SV^  Sigis- 
mond,  John  Casimir,  John  Sobieski, 
Augustus  the  Strong. 

Pomerania,  question  of  the  succession 
to,  174. 

east,  acquired  by  Brandenburg, 

179. 

Pontchartrain,  263. 

Portland,  duke  of,  263,  317. 

Porto-Carrero,  cardinal,  329. 

Portugal,  independence  of,  116. 

Prague,  treaty  of,  103. 

Pressburg,  treaty  of,  72. 

Project  of  Harmony,  the,  232. 

Protective  system,  the,  of  the  seven- 
teenth  century  reasons  for,  16,  197. 

Protestantism,  inherent  weakness  of, 
40 ;  critical  state  of  in  Germany  in 
1630,  76. 

Prussia,  East,  duchy  of,  175. 

West  or  Polish,  177. 

kingdom  of,  308. 

Pultava,  battle  of,  307. 

Pyrenees,  the,  peace  of,  130. 


Quadruple  Alliance,  the,  229, 
Quebec,  foundation  of,  17. 


Ragotsky,  350. 

Ramillies,  battle  of,  356. 

Rastadt,  treaty  of,  366. 

Ravaillac,  30. 

Ravensberg,  duchy  of,  51,  176. 

Reformation,  the,  in  Germany,  9. 

Regale,  the,  right  of,  249. 

Regensburg,  diets  at,  66,  79;  truce  of, 

259- 

Restitution,  Edict  of,  77,  96. 

Rethel,  battle  of,  161. 

Reunions,  Chambres  des,  257. 

Rhode,  292. 

Richelieu,  cardinal,  adviser  of  Marie 
de  M6dicis,  36;  entry  of  into  the 
ministry,  37 ;  alliance  of  with  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  88,  112;  foreign 
policy  of,  105 ;  the  Valtelline  re- 
covered by,  109 ;  interference  of  in 
the  Mantuan  question,  no;  in- 
trigues of  in  Germany,  in  ;  declarw- 
tion  of  war  against  Spain  by,  113; 
want  of  success  of  at  first,  114; 
ultimate  success  of,  116;  position 
of  France  at  the    death    of,   117; 


390 


European  History,   1 598-171 5 


character  of,  132 ;  principle's  of  the 
government  of,  133 ;  wrfit  of  sym- 
pathy of  with  the  j-eople,  136; 
suppression  of  the  Fyagiienot  rising 
of  1625  by,  141;  vdr  of  with  Eng- 
land, 143;  the  jjolitical  power  of 
the  Kuguenots  suppressed  by,  145; 
administrative  changes  of,  147 ; 
success  of  in  the  Day  of  Dupes, 
149;  the  power  of  the  nobles 
crushed  by,  150,  151 ;  centraUsing 
poHcy  of,  151. 

Rie,  battle  of  37. 

Rocroy,  battle  of,  118. 

Rohan,  risings  of,  36,  144. 

Romanoff  dynasty,  the,  accession  of, 
298. 

Rooke,  Sir  George,  354. 

Royal,  Port,  371. 

Rudolf  II.,  emperor,  10,  11,  29,  45, 
50. 

Ruel,  peace  of,  160. 

Ruppa,  54. 

Russia,  early  history  of,  297 ;  rivalry 
of  with  Sweden,  84;  supremacy  of 
after  Nystadt,  308. 

See    Alexis,   Sophia,    Peter    the 

Great. 

Ruvigny,  256. 

Ruyter,  228,  237. 

Ryswick,  peace  of,  263. 


Saluzzo,  27. 

Savoy,  importance  of  the  duchy  of, 

26. 
Emanuel,  duke  of,  27. 

Charles     Emanuel,     duke     of, 

assistance  given  to  the  Bohemians 

by,  55- 

Victor  Amadeus,  duke  of,  de- 
feat of  at  Staffards,  262;  refusal  of 
to  accept  the  partition  treaty,  327 ; 
alliance  of  with  France,  340;  the 
Grand  Alliance  joined  by,  349. 

Schellenberg,  the,  storming  of,  352. 

Schomberg,  207,  256. 

Schwartzenburg,  178. 

Secularised  lands  in  Germany,  ques- 
tion of,  46. 

Sedan,  surrender  of  to  France,  151. 

Seignelay,  258,  263. 

Selim,  the  Sot,  272. 

Seneff,  battle  of,  239. 

Servien,  161. 

Seventeenth  century,  importance  of, 
I ;  alteration  in  the  political  ideas 
of,  184 ;  end  of  the,  369. 


Sigismond  Augustus,  of  Poland,  278. 
of  Poland,   religious   policy  of, 

44;  expulsion  of  from  Sweden,  83; 

war  of  with  Gustavus  Adolphus,  85. 
Silesia,  occupation  of  by  Wallenstein, 

73- 

Silesians,  assistance  given  by  to  the 
Bohemians,  56;  reduction  of  by 
John  George  of  Saxony,  64. 

Sinzheim,  battle  of,  240. 

Sitvatorok,  treaty  of,  272. 

Slavata,  52. 

Sobieski,  John,  of  Poland,  alienation 
of  by  Louis  XIV.,  259;  defeat  of 
Russia  and  the  Cossacks  by,  280 ; 
defeat  of  the  Cossacks  and  Turks 
by,  280;  election  of  as  king  of 
Poland,  282 ;  the  peace  of  Zurawno 
made  by,  282;  alliance  of  with  the 
emperor,  283 ;  relief  of  Vienna  by, 
284;  the  Turks  driven  out  of  Hun- 
gary by,  285. 

Soissons,  count  of,  142. 

Somers,  326. 

Sophia,  princess,  regency  of,  299. 

Soubise,  risings  of,  37,  141. 

Spain,  state  of,  in  1598,  12 ;  weakness 
of,  128,  321. 

Spanish  Succession,  the,  question  of, 

3"- 

Spinola,  66,  no. 

S.  Germain,  assembly  of,  249. 

S.  Germain-en-Laye,  treaty  of,  297. 

S.  Gothard,  battle'of,  208. 

S.  Menehould,  treaty  of,  33. 

St.  John,  226. 

Stadtholderate,  the  Dutch,  put  into 
commission,  224. 

Stadtlohn,  battle  of,  67. 

Staffarda,  battle  of,  262. 

Stahremberg,  defence  of  Vienna  by, 
284. 

defeat  of,  at  Villa  Viciosa,  363. 

Stanhope,  capture  of  Port  Mahon  by, 
359;  capitulation  of,  363. 

Stanislas  Leczinski  made  king  of 
Poland,  305. 

States-General,  the,  of  France,  char- 
acter of,  3  ;   meeting  of  in  1614,  33. 

Steinkirk,  battle  of,  262. 

Stolbova,  peace  of,  85. 

Stolhofen,  lines  of,  349. 

Stralsund,  siege  of,  74. 

Strasburg,  seizure  of  by  Louis  xiv., 

257- 
Streltsi,   the,   298  ;    revolts    of,    299  ; 

abolition  of,  302. 
Stuhmsdorf,  treaty  of,  86,  87. 


Index 


391 


Suleiman,  the  Magnificent,  267,  270. 

Sully,  character  of,  15;  economical 
policy  of,  16 ;  financial  reforms  of, 
17,  21 ;  retirement  of,  31. 

Sweden,  condition  of  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  century,  81,83;  acquisi- 
tion of  Halland  by,  169 ;  adhesion 
of  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  211  ; 
alliance  of  with  France,  214 ;  loss 
of  supremacy  in  the  north  by,  308. 

See  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Oxenst- 

jerna,  Charles  X.,  Charles  XI., 
Charles  XII. 

Swieten,  Cornelius  Bicker  von,  223. 

Szcelankemen,  battle  of,  286. 


Taille,  the,  in  France,  18,  19. 

Tallard,  count,  the  partition  treaties 
negotiated  by,  317,  322;  advice  to 
Louis  XIV.  to  keep  faith,  330 ;  cam- 
paigns of  on  the  Rhine,  349, 352, 353. 

Taxation  in  France,  18-21. 

Temple,  Sir  William,  210. 

Theodore,  Czar  of  Russia,  299. 

Throwing  from  the  window,  the,  52. 

Thurn,  count,  52,  57. 

Tilly,  count,  general  of  the  League, 
30,  49 ;  victory  of  at  the  White 
Mountain,  63  ;  victories  of  at 
Hochst,  Wimpfen,  and  Lutter,  65, 
72  ;  invasion  of  Saxony  by,  91; 
defeat  of,  at  Breitenfeld,  91 ;  defeat 
of  at  the  Lech,  and  death  of,  95. 

Tokoli,  283,  286. 

Tolhuys,  the  crossing  of  the  Rhine 
at,  237. 

Torcy,  330. 

Torstenson,  general,  92,  119,  168. 

Tourville,  de,  admiral,  258,  262. 

Travendal,  treaty  of,  304. 

Triple  Alliance,  the,  211,  214. 

Tromp,  admiral,  227,  228. 

Troublous  Times,  the,  297. 

Turenne,  count  of,  advice  of  at  Frei- 
burg, 119  ;  determination  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  by,  119;  cam- 
paign of  against  Cond6  in  Cham- 
pagne, 129  ;  victory  of  at  the  Dunes, 
130;  adhesion  of  to  the  Fronde, 
160 ;  defeat  of  at  Rethel,  161 ;  return 
of  to  the  king's  side  and  defeat  of 
Conde  by,  162;  campaign  of  in  the 
Netherlands,  209;  invasion  of  the 
United  Provinces  by,  236;  cam- 
paigns of  on  the  Rhine,  238,  239, 
240 ;  winter  campaign  of,  240 ;  death 
of,  242. 


Turin,  battle  of,  354,  357. 

Turks,  the  Ottoman,  establishment  of 
in  Europe,  265 ;  defects  of  the  rule 
of,  267 ;  causes  of  the  success  of, 
269;  summit  of  tlie  power  of,  270; 
alliance  of  with  France,  271 ;  antag- 
onism of  to  Austria,  273;  revival  of 
under  the  Kiuprili,  275;  defeat  of 
at  Vienna,  284 ;  loss  of  the  Danube 
valley  by,  287. 


Urban  viii.,  ho. 

Union,  the    Protestant,  in   Germany, 

49.  65. 
United     Provinces,    the.      See    The 

Dutch. 
Utrecht,  peace  of,  provisions  of  the, 

364 ;    merits   and   demerits   of  the, 

364-369. 


Valtelline,  the  valley  of  the,  13, 
108. 

Vasvar,  treaty  of,  276. 

Vauban,  257,  261. 

Venddme,  duke  of,  36,  142,  154. 

duke    of,   campaign   of    against 

Eugene  in  Italy,  343;  advance  of 
to  Trent,  349 ;  retreat  of  to  Pied- 
mont, 349 ;  campaign  of  in  the 
Netherlands,  359 ;  campaign  of  in 
Spain,  363. 

Vere,  65. 

Vervins,  peace  of,  6,  11,  14,  27. 

Victor  Amadeus.     See  Savoy. 

Vigo,  battle  at,  354. 

Villa  Viciosa,  victory  of  the  Portu- 
guese at,  208 ;  victory  of  the  Span- 
iards at,  363. 

Villars,  marshal,  campaign  of  on  the 
Danube  1703,  349;  capture  of  Stol- 
hofen  by,  357 ;  entrusted  with  the 
last  army  of  France,  361 ;  campaigns 
of  on  tlifc  frontiers,  362,  363  ;  victo- 
ries of  on  the  Rhine,  364. 

Villeroy,  marshal,  campaign  of  in 
Italy,  342  ;  campaigns  of  in  the 
Netherlands,  353,  355,  356. 


Wallenstein,  count,  conduct  of  at 
Zablat,  58  ;  character  and  views  of, 
69 ;  offer  of  to  raise  an  army,  70 ; 
campaign  against  Mansfeld,  71,  72; 
occupation  of  Silesia  and  Pomer- 
ania  by,  73;  resistance  of  Stra- 
laund  to,  73  ;  political  results  of  the 


i92 


European  History,   1 598-171 5 


success  of,  75 ;  difference  of  with 
Ferdinand  and  the  League,  78 ; 
dismissal  of  by  Ferdinand,  80  ; 
appealed  to  by  Ferdinand,  95 ; 
appointed  dictator,  96 ;  campaigns 
of  against  Gustavus  Adolphus,  96, 
97  ;  ambitious  schemes  of,  100; 
declared  traitor  and  murdered,  loi. 

Warsaw,  battle  of,  181. 

Webb,  general,  360. 

Wehlau,  treaty  of,  181,  280. 

Werth,  John,  119. 

Westphalia,  peace  of,  the  provisions 
of  the,  122,  123;  importance  of  the, 
124-128. 

White  Mountain,  battle  of,  63. 

William  the  Silent,  of  Orange,  216, 
218. 

II.  of  Orange,  attempt  of  to  be- 
come king,  223 ;  death  of,  224. 

III.  of  Orange,  education  of  by 

the  State,  229 ;  elected  captain  gen- 
eral, 232;  accessory  to  the  murder 
of  de  Witt,  233  ;  defence  of  Holland 
by  in  1672,  236  ;  elected  stadtholder, 
238  ;  defeat  of  at  Seneff,  239  ;  attacks 
Luxemburg  near  Mons  to  prevent 
peace,  243  ;  character  of,  245  ;  made 
king  of  England,  261 ;  campaigns 
of  in  the  Netherlands,  262 ;  nego- 
tiations for  a  partition  treaty,  317- 


323 ;  policy  of  in  the  negotiations, 
318 ;  unpopularity  of  in  England, 
325 ;  recognition  of  Philip  v.  by, 
333 ;  formation  of  the  Grand  AUi- 
ance  by,  339 ;  death  of,  339. 

Willstedt,  truce  of,  32. 

Wimpfen,  battle  of,  65. 

Wittstock,  battle  of,  115. 

Witt,  John  de,  negotiation  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  by,  210,  211 ;  ap- 
pointment of  as  grand  pensionary 
of  Holland,  224  ;  character  and 
policy  of,  225 ;  policy  of  towards 
England,  227,  230;  policy  of  towards 
France,  231 ;  enmity  of  to  the  House 
of  Orange,  225,  232 ;  murder  of,  233. 

Wrangel,  120. 

Wynendaal,  battle  of,  360. 


Xanten,  treaty  of,  51,  176. 

York,  New,  capture  of  by  England, 
228,  230. 


Zablat,  battle  of,  58. 
Zenta,  battle  of,  287. 
Zurawno,  peace  of,  282. 
Zusmarshausen,  battle  of,  120. 


RNIA  LIBRARY 
'•^ed  below. 


Wm.TTfnni 


3  1158  01338  5983 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    001  119  090   7 


D 
I39ha 


